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
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THE CRISIS
OF
THE CONFEDERACY

EIGHTH THOUSAND.
**STONEWALL JACKSON AND THE
AMERICAN CIVIL WAR.**


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"BATTLE FLAGS OF THE CONFEDERACY"

THE CRISIS
OF
THE CONFEDERACY

*A HISTORY OF GETTYSBURG AND
THE WILDERNESS*

BY
CECIL BATTINE
CAPTAIN 15TH THE KING'S HUSSARS

WITH FRONTISPIECE
AND 6 MAPS

LONGMANS, GREEN, AND CO.
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1905

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TO THE SURVIVING SOLDIERS
OF THE
AMERICAN CIVIL WAR
THIS BOOK
IS RESPECTFULLY DEDICATED
BY THE AUTHOR

PREFACE

THE great war which has clouded the dawn of the twentieth century serves to remind the nations of the world that international life, like all life, is a struggle to which there is no truce, and that it may at any moment take the form of an appeal to arms. The study of history not only gives the best education to the men whose business it will be to strike for their country, but it also helps every elector in a democratic state to understand the serious nature of war, the conditions essential to waging it successfully, and the best means of avoiding it.

It is with the hope of increasing, if ever so little, the interest in military history which recent great events have awakened, and of adding a concise account of the most critical phase of the great Civil War to the literature which already exists, that the author has ventured to offer his book to the public. Though far from professing to be a complete history of the downfall of the military power of the Southern States, it aims at placing before the reader in manageable form an account of the principal events which brought it about.

The history of the American Civil War still remains the most important theme for the student and the statesman because it was waged between adversaries of the highest intelligence and courage, who fought by land and sea over an enormous area with every device within the reach of human

ingenuity, and who had to create every organisation needed for the purpose after the struggle had begun. The admiration which the valour of the Confederate soldiers fighting against superior numbers and resources excited in Europe, the dazzling genius of some of the Confederate generals, and in some measure jealousy at the power of the United States, have ranged the sympathies of the world during the war and ever since in a large degree on the side of the vanquished. Justice has hardly been done to the armies which arose time and again from sanguinary repulses, and from disasters more demoralising than any repulse in the field, because they were caused by political and military incapacity in high places, to redeem which the soldiers freely shed their blood as it seemed in vain. If the heroic endurance of the Southern people and the fiery valour of the Southern armies thrill us to-day with wonder and admiration, the stubborn tenacity and courage which succeeded in preserving intact the heritage of the American nation, and which triumphed over foes so formidable, are not less worthy of praise and imitation. The Americans still hold the world's record for hard fighting.

To criticise the work of the great masters of military art, of Lee and Grant, Sherman and Jackson, with the best maps on the table in the quiet of a library and with information available which in many instances was wanting to the commanders in the field, is not to assert that one could have done better oneself. Every commander, however brilliant, made mistakes either from lack of correct information, from want of knowledge which subsequent experiments on the battlefield have placed within the reach of every subaltern, and very often from bodily pain and exhaustion which the prolonged strain of commanding an army in war not seldom inflicts. No sort of education in troop-leading is more valuable than a close consideration of the mistakes and failures of great generals, together with an attempt to form the

mental picture which presented itself to them and on which they acted at the time. More often than not it will be found that the course of action which turned out unfortunately had every reasonable appearance of being the best, perhaps of being the only, course which promised good results. The chief whose intuition is most seldom at fault under these circumstances is the one who has the right to be called a genius.

Important as the close study of military history is to a correct judgment of military affairs both for the soldier and civilian, the study of the map and the grasp of the principal natural and artificial features of the scene of a campaign is just as essential; since to read the history of a war without the map is waste of time, the author respectfully requests all who do him the honour to read his book to follow the events narrated with the map before them.

To the industry of many previous writers and to the kind assistance of some who took a distinguished part in the great war the author desires to express his gratitude and obligation. In particular he availed himself of the Comte de Paris' impartial history, of the Memoirs of Lee by Colonel Long, the Campaigns of Stuart's Cavalry by McClellan, and General A. A. Humphreys' Campaign in Virginia 1864, and sought inspiration from the pages of Henderson's Life of Stonewall Jackson. It has been his endeavour to carry on the thread of the story which closed with the death of the great Virginian through the doubtful struggle on Northern soil and the desperate contest in the Wilderness which inaugurated the final campaigns in defence of Richmond; but in order to expose the true situation of the contending forces, it has been found necessary to give a very short sketch of the war and in particular a brief summary of the difficult campaign which placed the keys of the Mississippi Valley in Northern power and which brought to the front

the dominating personality of Grant. The narrative of the Chancellorsville campaign, the Confederate attack on Hooker's army, Jackson's famous flank march and fatal wound, painted by Henderson with a more subtle hand, could not be omitted without dislocating the coherence of the story; but no one is more aware than the author how unskilful his work will appear in comparison, and how much he stands in need of the reader's indulgent good-will.

LONDON : *January* 1905.

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Errata

P. 80, line 27, for II corps read Second corps
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THE CRISIS OF THE CONFEDERACY

CHAPTER I

THE ROAD TO RICHMOND

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THE causes of great wars and the motives of the men who declared them are not always the same as popular history records. Personal feelings and the dangerous gusts of passion or jealousy which sometimes electrify a whole nation have been accountable for some of the most sanguinary contests, and especially for the great civil wars which have decimated and divided the English race.

The savage enmity which sustained the Wars of the Roses for so many years was due to the envy and hatred of new men under the haughty rule of an ancient and undisciplined aristocracy rather than to any other political issue.

The war between King Charles and the Parliament, though fanned by religious bigotry, was essentially a struggle between the noble families who owned the land and their adherents against a rising class of rich men, who, having recently acquired wealth, were determined to have political power and to exact vengeance for years of petty oppression and insults more rankling than greater wrongs.

The secession of the American colonies, at that time the fairest heritage of the British Crown, can be traced to the misunderstandings created by stupidity rather than wickedness, by pompous adherence to the letter of the law in defiance of common sense, and by an official attitude of supercilious intolerance more galling and contemptible than strong tyranny.

It is no part of our task to investigate the causes of the war between the Northern and Southern States, except so far as to remind the reader that a quarrel so bitter, fought to a finish so stern and long delayed, was provoked by feelings deeper and more exciting than the enmity of political strife or even the rivalry for material wealth. The people of the North and South had got to hate one another before the trial of strength was removed from the ballot-box to the battlefield. When once the latent combativeness of a manly people flows in the channel of hatred against another, war is likely to be the consequence; a fact which should be remembered by those who, for personal and political reasons, in the press and on the platform, with criminal ignorance of the nature of war, do their best to bring it about.

Whatever blame should be attached to the American statesmen and politicians who were responsible for the rupture between the North and South, it does not affect the officers and soldiers who heroically followed the flags of their native states, and whose blood, poured out like water, has more firmly cemented the union of the nation than any other sacrifice could have done. In reading of their exploits and devotion we have no other feeling than admiration for the brave, and in the pursuit of military science the desire to profit by a truthful analysis of the vicissitudes in the mighty contest.

At the birth of the year 1861 the danger of civil war loomed large before the people of America. It broke out in the spring, and in the course of twelve months had assumed dimensions and excited passions which prevented its ending otherwise than in the complete overthrow of one party or the other. The real turning point of the war was reached on May 7, 1863, when the Army of Northern Virginia was triumphantly re-entering its cantonments, after overthrowing in the Wilderness the great army of invasion for the fifth time directed against it. Had the Confederates then promptly concentrated their whole resources and instantly followed up the victories on the Rappahannock by an invasion of the Northern States before their moral effect had subsided, it is more than likely that the Southern cause would have triumphed. Southern fortresses still barred the Mississippi, sufficient resources of men and material were still available for the prosecution of the war on approximately even terms with the giant adversary, and the spirit of the Southern people was elated by victory. But the opportunity, like all great chances, was likely to be of very short duration. In the valley of the Mississippi the Federals had accumulated superior forces to the Confederates; Tennessee had been overrun and New Orleans snatched from the Southern Republic. Right along the coast the Federal navy had established its superiority, and by its strict blockade had most seriously reduced the fighting power of the Southern armies and the military resources of the nation. On the northern frontier of Virginia alone had the Confederates gained repeated and decisive victories, and it was just at this point of the theatre of war that fatal blows could most easily and effectively be dealt at the Northern Power.

In order to comprehend the strategic situation which had arisen when the Army of the Potomac regained the lines of Falmouth after Hooker's defeat, a short sketch of the principal events of the war up to that date may be found useful.

In the summer of 1861 fighting more or less desultory took place all along the frontier line of the contending

states; in Virginia alone the struggle took the form of a campaign between organised armies. President Lincoln had originally called for the services of only seventy-five thousand volunteers to defend the Union, but a much greater number had been enrolled, and when McDowell advanced with a well-equipped but undisciplined army of about forty thousand men to capture Richmond in the middle of July, there were about seventy thousand Federals in arms on the Potomac, in the Shenandoah Valley and at Fortress Monroe, besides a strong corps under McClellan in the mountains of Western Virginia. They were opposed by about sixty thousand Confederates, of whom nearly half had been raised by General Lee in Virginia. These forces were distributed as follows: twenty thousand under Beauregard were quartered around Manassas Junction, barring the railways which connected Washington with Virginia; fifteen thousand, under General J. E. Johnston, defended the Shenandoah Valley, and five thousand tried to make head against McClellan in Western Virginia. The remainder were posted on the York and James rivers to defend the coast.

At the beginning of the war both sides were anxious to avoid the reproach of aggression, yet the North had no choice but to attack, and the most fatal error of the Southern leaders was not to follow suit when they got the opportunity. It was feared that an attack on Northern territory would arouse to fever-heat the patriotism of the United States and close the ranks of all parties; for a large section of people north of the Potomac sympathised with slavery and hated coercing the South. Determination to preserve the Union kept the Northern Democrats loyal to the Federal Government, in spite of a minority to whom the events of the war at times gave a following, and who were in favour of permitting the secession. In the South it was erroneously believed that this minority was a factor to reckon with, and it was thought that the volunteers who thronged to Washington had come chiefly to defend the national capital; having repudiated the Union themselves, the Southern rulers and people failed to realise until it was too late the intense

devotion with which the integrity of the great American commonwealth was regarded in the North.

When McDowell's army marched from the camp at Washington, where it had been collected and organised, on the way to Richmond the troops believed that they had an easy task in front of them to 'whip the rebels,' to inflict a little salutary discipline on the rebellious sisters, and then to return in triumph to enjoy the fame of victory. The weather was hot and the short march to the banks of the Bull Run severely tried the powers of the young Federal army. McDowell's plan of campaign had been for a simultaneous offensive by all the Federal forces in Virginia, nor did he then realise the difficulty of co-ordinating the efforts of raw levies so far apart. On the contrary, General J. Johnston, who commanded the Confederates in the Shenandoah Valley, gave his opponent the slip and united the bulk of his forces with Beauregard's on the Bull Run in time to meet McDowell's attack. The Confederate troops, having taken the call to arms more seriously, were at this period superior to the Federals, and so Johnston's corps was able to respond to his skilful direction and perform the rapid march through the mountains. The battle which followed, however, was by no means an easy victory for the South. The untrained Federal volunteers threw themselves with great bravery against the defenders' line, pierced it, and nearly succeeded in rolling it up, but the personal influence of the Southern generals and the steady conduct of Jackson's brigade, which stood like a 'stone wall' in the confused mêlée, turned the scale. The Northern troops, spent and disorganised by their efforts, fell back in great confusion; retreat soon degenerated into rout, and the whole army fled incontinently into Washington, throwing away their arms and equipment by the way. After the battle the avenues of the city were full of soldiers who were making no effort to find their regiments, but who were ready to describe in every drinking saloon to all who cared to listen, the adventures they had met with in the brief and luckless expedition. Panic reigned in the public offices and in the money market; in truth, for several days nothing

could have prevented the capture of the city by the enemy if he had chosen to attempt it. The Confederate forces, however, were also much shaken by the fight, and they had no chief far-sighted enough to perceive how great would be the advantage of capturing Washington, or strong enough to rally the dislocated brigades for a great offensive stroke. The occasion soon passed away. The Federal divisions were reconstructed and reinforced, and a chain of forts was thrown up to cover the approaches of the capital.

In Western Virginia a short campaign took place in August between Lee and McClellan, in which the former was worsted. The victory was the sole consolation of the North at this period, and it greatly raised the credit of the successful general, to whom was entrusted at once the task of reorganising the Army of the Potomac. For a brief period he was given supreme command of the forces of the United States, then Lincoln thought better of it, and reduced his authority to the command of the army at Washington; in the meanwhile Joseph Johnston with thirty thousand troops remained entrenched at Centreville, close to the field of Bull Run.

While the first battle had been in progress the wildest excitement had reigned in both capitals. From Washington senators and other magnates had driven out towards Manassas with a carriage and pair as if to the races, in order to enjoy the spectacle. Crowds besieged the telegraph offices, and as conflicting messages arrived announcing alternately success and disaster, the masses of excited men and weeping women went from one paroxysm of emotion to the opposite pole. Sharp are the lessons of adversity, and well it is for those who know how to profit by them. The autumn and winter of 1861 were employed by the North in energetic preparation for the struggle, whose magnitude was now dimly discerned, but in the South a strange apathy followed the too easy victory. No serious effort was made to take advantage of it, nor yet to concentrate forces in Virginia commensurate with the menacing activity of the enemy. On March 13, 1862, Lee became 'military adviser' to the Southern President, and about the same date more serious

measures were taken to concentrate an adequate force in the forthcoming contest.

George McClellan, the man on whom Mr. Lincoln's choice fell as commanding general, had been the managing director of a railway company, where his great talents for organisation had been developed. He had served in the Engineer corps of the old army and had reached the rank of captain when he resigned. Of all the great men of America McClellan has been the object of most hatred and obloquy, yet it is the almost universally accepted opinion of foreigners who are acquainted with his history that he was unjustly dealt with. The complete ignorance of the meaning of war on the part of the Government, press and people rendered his task a very heavy one. He was impulsive and given to writing ill-considered despatches at critical times; he had no diplomatic skill and utterly failed to manage Lincoln and his Cabinet, even if he tried to, which is not certain; his eyes magnified difficulties rather than saw through them, and he ever leaned to the fault of excessive caution. Such were his faults, and at the beginning of the war he had little or no technical skill in leading troops, which was not to be wondered at, considering his previous career; but he showed great aptitude for learning, and was well aware of his own limitations and of the weak points of his own army and its command arrangements. McClellan soon gained and ever kept the affectionate confidence of his soldiers. He excelled as a strategist in the Cabinet, and as an organiser of victory he stands very high in the list of great military statesmen. He was but thirty-seven years of age when appointed to the most responsible post in the Federal army, and, in spite of his failings, it is probably true that he shares equally with Lincoln and Grant the glory of having done more by his individual work to preserve the Union than any other of his contemporaries.

Right through the autumn, winter and spring he laboured incessantly to bring the army up to a level which would enable it to renew the invasion with a fair prospect of success. He steadily resisted the pressure brought to bear by politicians and journalists to begin before he was ready, so that

by the end of March 1862 the camps round Washington held over one hundred thousand well-drilled and perfectly equipped infantry, with a powerful artillery. Cavalry and trained staff were still wanting, nor did McClellan at that time appreciate the importance of the mounted arm. He was soon to learn it by costly experience.

The general plan of operations which McClellan recommended was an enfolding attack by land and sea upon the enemy's territories. Its very magnitude pleased the vanity of the American public, who likened it to the crushing coils of a serpent round its prey and christened it the 'Anaconda Scheme.' But the most important part of the plan, which McClellan kept to himself as long as possible, was the concentration of an overwhelmingly strong army in the peninsula between the York and James rivers where it could be supplied by sea, in order to attack the capital of the Confederacy. It was a later development of this plan to transport the army by water to the south bank of the James in order to cut Richmond's railway communication with the South. The plan of landing in the peninsula was not particularly brilliant, but it had the merit of utilising the Federal navy; if it had been supported by all the forces originally destined for the purpose, it would probably have resulted in the capture of Richmond. Whether the Federals would have been able to hold the city or follow up their advantage is far more doubtful.

Lincoln and his ministers soon began to distrust and dislike their new general. There is no question but that the President, at any rate, meant to give loyal support, his military education, however, had not at that time reached the stage which enabled him to comprehend the intricate problem presented by the war. He was utterly unable to grasp the fact that strength in defence, but still more in offence, depends on concentration of force, not on dispersion; and that, in order to concentrate, some risks must be run, some minor considerations must be temporarily neglected. We have not space to record here the bickerings and misunderstandings which ensued. As is usual in such cases, blame attached to both parties and the public service suffered.

Some idea may be formed, however, of Lincoln's strategy from the order which he issued at the beginning of February for all commanders of the forces of the United States, military and naval, without regard to climate, locality or other circumstances, to attack the enemy on Washington's birthday, February 22.

The month of May found the Army of the Potomac investing Richmond on the east and north-east. The Federal outposts were established only six miles from the city, whose spires and domes could be seen with tantalising clearness, and whose church bells could be heard in the Federal bivouacs. The progress of the army from York Town, where the surrender of the British forces under Cornwallis had taken place in 1781, to the neighbourhood of the capital had been slow and painful. McClellan's want of cavalry had made it almost impossible for him to obtain information of any value in the enemy's country. Every spy and negro exaggerated the strength of the Confederate forces, the swampy nature of the country induced much sickness, and the damp heat of the climate enervated the Northern soldiers. The Chickahominy, swollen by rain unprecedentedly heavy at that time of year, divided the wings of the army, which was entrenched across the branch railway from Richmond to White House on the Pamunkey, McClellan's great supply depot. The necessity for stretching a hand to McDowell's corps, whose advance from Fredericksburg to unite with the army before Richmond was daily expected, greatly weakened the Federals by unduly extending their positions. In the meanwhile a powerful Confederate army had at length been collected round Richmond under the command of Joseph Johnston, who determined to concentrate against the wing of McClellan's army on the right bank of the Chickahominy, while half the Federal forces were vainly waiting to join hands with McDowell on the left bank.

On May 31 this attack took place. The Confederate troops marched through Richmond cheered by the inhabitants, of whom the vast majority were women and children, and accompanied as far as the battlefield itself by members of the Government and of Congress. Every carriage and

omnibus that could be horsed followed the army to bring back the wounded; the rain fell in torrents, but that did not prevent a crowd of spectators thrusting itself right on to the field, where newsboys were hawking their journals.

Battle of
Seven
Pines.

Directly they assumed the offensive rôle the Confederates found the difficulties of handling large masses of raw troops with untrained leaders. The corps of Longstreet, Smith and Huger, advancing by different roads, were to attack simultaneously; but one column waited on another, and eventually they became engaged one at a time after several hours' delay. The waters of the Chickahominy swept over the banks in a tawny flood, carried away one trestle bridge, and threatened to cut off all communication between the Federal wings. If the Confederate divisions had succeeded in making their attack in concert, it must have gone hard with the Federal left. McClellan from his headquarters could follow by the lines of smoke the progress of the struggle, but he did not take the energetic measures which the situation demanded. In the course of the afternoon General Johnston was severely wounded, and the command of the Confederates devolved on Smith, who was ill. The fighting was sanguinary but indecisive; the Federal divisions on the left bank were tardily despatched to help their troops on the other side of the stream. A single bridge connected the two wings and over it the flooded river almost flowed. When at last the passage was accomplished, it was found impossible to get the artillery through the deep mire to which the tracks through the woods were all reduced. The Federal generals hesitated to engage the enemy without guns, and so threw away the best chance they had of inflicting a disastrous repulse. Artillery has unquestionably played a great rôle in the wars of the nineteenth century, but the circumstances required to develop its full force are more rarely obtained than for the use of cavalry, which is generally neglected except by first-rate commanders. Artillery always exercises a powerful moral effect: it can also be used to inflict severe material loss if the ground favours its action and if it is handled by officers who are skilful tacticians with thorough knowledge of how

to assist the other arms. The last condition is the hardest to find; and it is certain that many a fight has been lost by depending too much on the effect of artillery fire, which has in many cases done nothing except batter the hostile guns. On June 1 the Southern troops fell back to Richmond, leaving the Federals in possession of the field; their enterprise had failed from want of concerted action, but it had shown how precarious was the position of the Federal army.

The promise of uniting McDowell's corps with the rest of the army under McClellan's command had compelled the latter to extend his right flank so as to effect a junction north of Richmond with the expected reinforcements; but, since McDowell's march had been countermanded, the sacrifice was made in

vain. In order to understand the motives which actuated the Government in withholding the repeatedly promised reinforcements we must turn to another part of the theatre of war. When Johnston brought his army back from Manassas Junction to defend Richmond, he detached about fifteen thousand men under the command of Stonewall Jackson into the Shenandoah Valley, with instructions to defend it as far as possible, and to keep the Federal forces on the Potomac from reinforcing McClellan by stirring up trouble for them elsewhere. Since General Smith was too ill to serve, Lee succeeded Johnston in the command of the army on the morrow of Seven Pines. Jackson had by this time acquitted himself so well of his task that Lee formed the daring plan of bringing his army corps to Richmond for a decisive attack on McClellan. For another three weeks, however, Jackson was busy in the Valley fighting the three Federal divisions with which Lincoln attempted to surround him, and which were directed by telegraph from the White House at Washington. The forces employed were greatly superior to Jackson's corps, but, operating from distant points with no supreme commander present in the field, they suffered defeat one after the other at the hands of their slippery antagonist, who marched and countermarched his command from Staunton to Winchester, striking first at one

Jackson in
the Shen-
andoah
Valley.

and then at another of the separate Federal columns, so that each was led to believe itself to be the prime objective.

The Valley of Virginia which played such an important part in the strategy of the war is a fertile province averaging thirty miles in width, bounded by the Potomac on the north and by a rampart of mountains on the other three sides. The Blue Ridge divides it for a length of one hundred and seventy miles from the plain of Virginia. The scene of Jackson's memorable campaign was the northern half of this province, whose rich pastures, deep ravines and forest-clad slopes provided a most admirable arena for skilful manœuvres, while the ample resources of the country enabled the Confederates to dispense with supply trains in a great measure, thus increasing their mobility; the friendly disposition of the inhabitants kept them well informed of the movements of the enemy. A small but active force of cavalry formed part of the Valley army under command of Colonel Ashby, whose skilful tactics greatly contributed to its victories, though the want of discipline of his men sometimes lost fair opportunities. Unfortunately for the South, Ashby was killed before Jackson left the Shenandoah.

The situation in the Valley was an ideal chance for a young commander to show his skill, and in Jackson the Confederate Government had found one of the greatest artists who ever had the chance of displaying genius by commanding troops in war. He was at this time thirty-seven years old, and had served in the regular artillery before he joined the Virginian forces at the outbreak of the war. For several years he had been a professor of tactics and military history at the Cadet College of Lexington. At first he was very unpopular in the army; his stern enforcement of discipline among the young Republican levies was impatiently borne, but his thorough devotion to the cause of his country and sincere love of his profession gained the respect of the troops, which rapidly developed into enthusiastic affection as they shared his glorious exploits.

Throughout the month of June, Lee and his troops successfully deceived the Federal forces and their cautious leader as to the real strength of the defending army.

Constant skirmishes gave the impression that the Southerners were able to dispute every yard of ground; wherever the Federal outposts were known to be most vigilant and where field-glasses most often searched their lines, the Confederate soldiers made a great show of entrenching and raising breast-works. The month of June was an anxious time for the South. The unchecked advance of the Federal troops in the West, the enormous host threatening the capital on the soil of Virginia, and the reaction and disappointment after the unsuccessful battle of Seven Pines, had spread dismay among the people and shaken the faith of the army. Lee did not then possess the trust which had been accorded to Joseph Johnston; he was best known as the commander who had failed against McClellan in Western Virginia, and his appointment to the chief command of the Army of Northern Virginia, which he was destined to lead through so glorious a career both of victory and disaster, was considered at the time to be due entirely to the friendship of Jefferson Davis. Never did a ruler exercise a wiser choice. It was characteristic of Lee's bold strategy that as soon as he had taken over command he resisted the pressure brought to bear on him to withdraw his lines nearer to Richmond because any contraction of the Confederate posts would have greatly facilitated McClellan's task by reducing the wide extent of front over which his army was stretched. Lee was already maturing the audacious stroke by which in concert with Jackson he defeated the Army of the Potomac and raised the siege of Richmond.

By one of those lucky coincidences which, however, only befall good managers, Jackson chased Banks' division before him into Winchester on May 24, the very same day that Lincoln visited McDowell at Fredericksburg, where final arrangements were made to march thence on Richmond with forty thousand men and one hundred guns. If this measure had been carried out, and followed up by a general advance of the united forces under McClellan, it is not improbable that Richmond would have fallen; but on his return to Washington the President was met by the news that Stonewall Jackson had swept the

Lincoln's
hunt of
Stonewall
Jackson.

Valley and was about to cross the Potomac with his victorious army. The Government instantly cancelled McDowell's instructions, and directed the best part of his troops to assist in a campaign against Jackson. This decision was fatal to the original plan of capturing Richmond. If, however, it had succeeded in capturing Jackson, the result would have been almost as solid an advantage for the North ; but, owing in great measure to the method of its execution, to want of cavalry, and to the absence of any supreme commander of the widely separated corps designated to join in the hunt, Lincoln's campaign on the Shenandoah failed as signally as McClellan's on the Chickahominy. The Federal troops were used up by forced marches and sharp rearguard actions, but failed to close on the small Confederate army, which slipped away from them in the middle of June, leaving its bewildered and exhausted pursuers to expect a repetition of its enterprises in the same region.

Lee in the meanwhile had conquered the hearts of his soldiers, who had worked with a will in fortifying their lines.

He had sent Stuart with a brigade of cavalry to make an extended reconnoissance round the enemy's right, which was only guarded by a few squadrons of the weak Federal cavalry division. These squadrons belonged to Stuart's old regiment the 2nd United States Cavalry ; they were quickly driven away, and the reconnoissance was carried out with complete success. Stuart swept right round the Federal army, using bridle roads through the woods with which his men were well acquainted. He destroyed much material, gathered important information, and, after crossing the Chickahominy below the Federal positions, reappeared in Richmond from the south. This raid made the reputation of the adventurous cavalry leader and proved to demonstration how pitiable is the situation of a huge mass of infantry without cavalry protection. Lee profited by the information thus obtained and by the consternation created both at Washington and at McClellan's headquarters to complete his arrangements for taking the offensive.

Stuart's
first great
Raid.

No artifice was neglected to deceive the Federal authorities ; newspapers, prisoners and spies all conspired to acquaint the enemy that Jackson's army was being heavily reinforced for a grand stroke at Washington. A division of infantry was actually sent by train to reinforce him, and great was the indignant surprise in the Richmond press because the careless mismanagement of the railway authorities had allowed the trains conveying this division to be blocked in broad daylight within sight of a camp of Federal prisoners about to be exchanged who would spread the news in the North. The men had hardly got out of the cars than they were re-embarked by night, and the whole of Jackson's army, less a small detachment, was brought across Virginia, a distance of one hundred miles, to attack the Army of the Potomac. This was the second time the Confederates had executed the same stroke of strategy, Johnston having slipped through Manassas Gap in time to join Beauregard at Bull Run, eleven months earlier.

On May 25, as the first rosy flush of dawn spread across the eastern sky and slowly lit up the seven hills of the Jackson and Lee combine. beleaguered city, a single travel-stained rider came in between the forts and dismounted at the door of Lee's house. The commander-in-chief was immediately roused to confer with the new-comer, who an hour later was making his way back through the streets, where it is said he was recognised as the already famous victor of the Shenandoah campaign. The same night the Valley troops halted at Ashland Station, twenty miles north of Richmond ; the following day they were marching south-west so as to strike at the right flank and rear of the single Federal corps with which McClellan still clung to the left bank of the Chickahominy. At the same time Lee personally took command of a powerful column which bore down against the front of the enemy. At night the vault of the sky was again ruddy with the glare of hostile watch-fires, but the agony of Richmond was over for the present ; the next few days were to witness her signal deliverance.

The right wing of the Unionist army was commanded by FitzJohn Porter, then accounted one of the best of the

Federal generals. The first Confederate attack fell upon McCall's division of 'Pennsylvania Reserves,' strongly entrenched on a small creek flowing into the Chickahominy called Beaver's Dam. The assault was made without proper reconnaissance against a very strong position held with cool courage by its sturdy defenders, who flung back one storming column after another with destructive loss until darkness put an end to the fight. On the following day the Confederate army resumed its advance in three columns, Longstreet, on the right, marched down the river bank, A. P. Hill in the centre and Jackson on the left, covered by Stuart's cavalry division. The Federals had withdrawn from Beaver's Dam and were concentrated on the Gaines' Mill plateau covering the bridges of the Chickahominy. McClellan, being now aware of Lee's intentions, had reinforced his right wing to forty thousand men, who were attacked by fifty-five thousand Confederates. The advance of the latter was delayed owing to Jackson's troops taking a wrong road and crossing the front of the centre column under A. P. Hill. To rectify the mistake took several hours, and thus the right wing of Lee's army was engaged to the hilt before the left had deployed for action. Jackson's attack though tardy was decisive, and Porter's army corps was swept in confusion from its position. Darkness and the sturdy resistance of a rearguard of regular infantry saved the Federals from annihilation, but the victory was complete, and McClellan's communication with his supply depot at White House was cut. He had already resolved to move his army to the left bank of the James and had made every preparation for his 'strategic movement,' as he called it. Lee was at a loss for several hours, nor did he divine the intentions of his adversary until the latter had gained a start in the race to the James which was decisive.

On June 29 Lee began the pursuit. He ordered Jackson to press on the rear of the retreating army, while Longstreet attacked it in flank and Magruder endeavoured to head it off. These dispositions did not succeed. Jackson was held up first on the Chickahominy and then at the passage of the White Oak Swamp, a morass

through which trickles a sluggish stream parallel with the Chickahominy. Longstreet's flank attack was repulsed at Frayzer's Farm, and McClellan's army, having successfully executed its most difficult manœuvre of retreating in the teeth of a victorious enemy, reached the plateau called Malvern Hill, which overlooked the dark forest on the north and east, and which was protected by the waters of the James glittering in the midsummer sun on the west and south, and by little creeks on both flanks. Across this plateau the Federal army formed for battle on July 1, with an open space of about half a mile between its position and the sombre curtain of woods which hid the approach of the enemy. The infantry had time to partially entrench themselves, and the guns placed in a wide semicircle swept the narrow valley and formed a second tier of deadly fire over the heads of the riflemen.

The distance which the Federal host had traversed in the three days was not great, fifteen miles having been the average length of the whole march ; but the ninety thousand soldiers had formed the escort of a huge convoy which moved by a single narrow road through the woods and stretched from the point of departure to the bank of the James. The nine regiments which composed the Confederate cavalry force under Stuart had been lured into pursuing the Federal cavalry down the Chickahominy, which was at first believed to be McClellan's line of retreat, consequently they were unable to take part in the pursuit of the main army. Not only was cavalry needed to harass the enemy's retreating column, and to seize the heights on the river bank in order to cut off its escape, but nine regiments of cavalry, say three thousand riders, would not have been too many to patrol the Confederate front, to explore the many tracks through the plantations and woods, and to link the marching columns so that they might deliver their assault together.

From the Chickahominy to the James the line of march had been strewn with débris of all sorts. The wounded of two hard fights and many thousand stragglers filled the woods ; every yard of the road the pursuers found arms, ammunition and warlike stores abandoned, a state of things

which spread the delusion that the Federal army had lost all power of resistance. It was unavoidable that the Confederate infantry columns fell into considerable confusion, and reached the edge of the woods before Malvern Hill at different times in the afternoon of the 1st, while the Federal troops had been resting themselves and preparing the position since ten o'clock. McClellan had so little fear of its being captured that he went on board a Federal gunboat to superintend the supplying of his forces and their next move to Harrison's Landing, leaving FitzJohn Porter once again in command. His enemies in the North have not failed to remark on his absence from the battlefield on the critical days of Seven Pines, Gaines' Mill and Malvern Hill, and not without some show of reason.

At 3 P.M., before the position had been carefully reconnoitred, the battle began by a series of fierce but badly directed assaults from the Confederate right wing under Magruder. Without artillery preparation he attempted to rush his infantry in successive detachments across the seven hundred yards of open ground which lay in front of the Federal line. The Southern soldiers fought heroically; their killed and wounded covered the hill-side, but they were unable to make any serious impression on the well-posted enemy. D. Hill commanded the Confederate division which next came up into line on Magruder's left; he did his best to assist the right wing, but with like result. The disjointed attacks, again and again repeated, were met by a smashing storm of gun and rifle fire. The Federal left was protected by the gunboats on the river which threw big shells into the woods where the Confederates attempted to mass their brigades preparatory to the attack. Of Jackson's corps only the advanced guard was engaged, and Longstreet was still behind him when the sun set on a field blurred with smoke and blood.

The Confederate army lost seventeen thousand men killed and wounded from June 25 to the night of July 1, of whom more than four thousand fell in the vain assault on Malvern Hill. Some five thousand men had straggled in the woods who afterwards rejoined the colours. The severe work

in the hottest period of the Virginian summer, long hours on the march and costly fights each day had greatly exhausted both armies. During the night of July 1 the sultry sky became overclouded and tropical rain descended which penetrated the thick foliage of the trees and soaked the men who slept exhausted beneath them, while the wounded on the hillside were exposed to the full fury of the storm. Under cover of the pitch-dark night and heavy rain McClellan withdrew his troops from the position they had defended so well, in order to rejoin their trains at Harrison's Landing. The exhaustion of the night's march on the top of all their previous exertions and following the long battle on Malvern Hill completely wrecked the army for several hours. The different regiments staggered into their new bivouacs without strength to defend themselves if they had been attacked. Fortunately for them the bulk of the enemy's forces were hardly less used up; the bloody repulse on the 1st and the strength of the position at Harrison's Landing saved the Federal army from being attacked again; for Lee, satisfied with having raised the siege of Richmond, had determined to ask no further sacrifice of his army for the present, though it is said that Jackson was most reluctant to give up the chase.

The situation of the two armies on the night of July 1 is worth remembering. Both had suffered very severely, physically and morally, but the Confederate commander had the whole of his left wing under Jackson and Longstreet comparatively fresh, since they had not been engaged on the 1st. The destruction of McClellan's army was of paramount importance, and so fair a chance of decisive victory was not likely to recur at frequent intervals. It can now be said that Lee missed a grand opportunity in the midst of the hurricane which hid the retreat of his enemy. Having failed to storm their position by a frontal attack with his right wing, he should have closed on the enemy with a chain of outposts while the divisions of the Confederate left should have slept on their arms for a few hours ready to attack with the first streak of daylight. These dispositions would probably have given warning of the retreat in time to fall upon the enemy in the very act. They could hardly

have failed to enable such a leader as Jackson to make an effective swoop on the rearguard and to capture a rich prize. It should never be forgotten that when your own forces are apparently at their last gasp your enemy is very likely in a yet more stricken condition.

From Malvern Hill the victorious army of the South returned triumphant to the capital which it had saved, to receive the praises of the beautiful women of Virginia. Some ten thousand brave men had been killed or permanently disabled, the city was a vast hospital crammed to overflowing with the wounded of both armies, but the people were becoming inured to such horrors, and their joy was boundless at being able to sleep of a night without hearing through their slumber the menacing snarl of McClellan's guns. The month of July passed while both armies rested and refitted, but in the interval the Washington Government had initiated a new campaign which was destined to be even more disastrous to it than the last. Lincoln had learned from Jackson the folly of trying to direct the movement of distant armies from his office in Washington; dazzled by the Federal successes on the Mississippi, and unable to appreciate the greater difficulty of McClellan's task, he had sent for two generals from the West to carry on the war against Virginia. Halleck was named commander-in-chief of the Federal armies; to Pope was given the command of the field army concentrated in the northern counties of the State, which was made up of the corps formerly led independently by Fremont, Banks and McDowell. In the first week in August this army numbered fifty thousand fighting men.

Pope will ever be notorious for the odious and boastful proclamations with which he inaugurated his inglorious campaign. The plan which he communicated to the 'Committee of Congress on the Conduct of the War,' a sort of political inquisition sitting at Washington with power to report on the generals in the field, was to 'lie off the flank of the rebels,' to press upon their rearward communications if they neglected him, and to draw them away into the Shenandoah Valley if they pressed him. Without being

brilliant, the scheme thus quaintly expressed was not unsound; the essential condition for success, however, was perfect harmony of action between McClellan's army on the James and Pope's detachment on the Rappahannock, and this harmony was entirely wanting from the beginning.

As soon as Lee became convinced that the dissensions known to exist between McClellan and his Government would prevent a vigorous offensive against Richmond from that quarter, he granted Jackson's urgent request to turn upon Pope, and placed three divisions at his disposal, shortly followed by a fourth. With these troops Jackson hastily occupied Gordonsville and Orange Court House so as to block the further advance of the enemy along the Orange and Alexandria Railway, the trunk line of Virginia which was connected with the line from Richmond to Fredericksburg by a branch from Gordonsville to Hanover Court House, called the Virginia Central. Pope was on unusually bad terms with the people of the country, nor was his local supply service good enough to collect its meagre resources, so that he depended almost entirely on the railway for the food and ammunition necessary to keep his army in the field. His principal supply depot was at Manassas Junction, then considered to be so safe from hostile raids that no proper measures were taken to guard this precious line of railway by which alone the army drew the means of life.

On August 7 Jackson, who had until then remained on the defensive, marched northwards to gain touch with the enemy. On the 8th he crossed the Rapidan, and on the 9th at Cedar Mountain fought a severe and indecisive action with Banks' corps, which was on its mettle to answer the sneers of the general from the West. Both sides suffered about fifteen hundred casualties, and Jackson fell back across the Rapidan, leaving to Banks the credit of having successfully withstood him. But the terror of his name induced the Washington Cabinet to interpret his movements as the prelude of an advance in force upon the Potomac. Instead of seeking to prevent this plan by a vigorous offensive with McClellan's large army in front of Richmond, which must quickly have put a term

The
Battle of
Cedar
Mountain.

to Confederate adventures, Halleck persuaded the President to recall the Army of the Potomac and to add it to the army of Pope. So little did he understand the magnitude of this operation that he seems to have believed seven days would suffice to place McClellan's regiments in line of battle by the side of Pope's, and to this day Pope's friends assert that the scheme failed through the disloyal conduct of McClellan in purposely delaying the move. In point of fact, it was executed with surprising smoothness and rapidity, but long ere it was possible for the two Federal armies to unite, Lee had concentrated his main strength against Pope.

On August 13 Lee learnt from Mosby, who arrived that day in Richmond among a batch of prisoners exchanged with the Federals, that Burnside's troops had sailed from Hampton Roads for Acquia Creek on the Potomac, and immediately the northward march of the Confederate army was resolved upon. We shall here endeavour to give in main outline a short account of the events which followed, considered from the standpoint of their strategic importance. The famous campaign has inspired many an interesting theme and will furnish the material for many more. Whoever wishes to study the tactical details of the hardly disputed battles by the Potomac will find in Henderson's eloquent pages a thrilling and picturesque narrative of this period of the war.

To continue our story; on August 20 the Confederates crossed the Rapidan, but Pope hastily retreated behind the Rappahannock. Want of sufficient cavalry had caused Lee's plan of surprising Pope on the Rapidan to fail. It had been necessary to post Stuart's division on the Lower Rappahannock, while the infantry division there under D. H. Hill concentrated, and before Stuart's command could rejoin the army a captured letter had warned Pope of Lee's gathering forces. On the 21st the Confederate army under Lee, sixty-five thousand strong and divided into two army corps of which Jackson's formed the left and Longstreet's the right wing, faced the Federals along the Rappahannock; both armies held on to the railway. Lee had three alterna-

McClellan
recalled
from the
James:
Lee quits
Rich-
mond.

tives: to force the passage of the river and attack Pope in front, to turn his right or left flank. He finally resolved on turning the enemy's right, trusting to the wooded spurs of the Bull Run Mountains to conceal the movements of the outflanking column, which had to do its work quickly before the Army of the Potomac could reinforce Pope. On the 22nd Jackson began his flank march with three divisions of infantry, while Stuart's cavalry covered his exposed flank and Longstreet did his best by extending his troops to mask Jackson's departure. The movement, however, soon became known to Pope, who had been on the look out for it. He telegraphed to Halleck that he should relinquish the line of the river and conform to the movements of the detached Confederate wing in order to crush it. During the 22nd, however, he changed his mind and issued orders that night to his corps commanders to concentrate for an attack upon Longstreet. The same evening torrents of rain filled the river and made the fords impassable. Early's division of Jackson's corps which had crossed was cut off, and Pope renouncing his plan of assailing Longstreet, sent out fresh orders to turn upon Jackson, as he had originally intended.

Rather than run any risks a great preponderance of strength was directed to surround Early's division, with the result that the whole of August 23 was spent in concentrating the Federal army, while the Confederate soldiers constructed a trestle bridge over which Early's troops recrossed. Consequently the four Federal corps marched all day only to find their prey had escaped. In the midst of the storm on the night of the 22nd Stuart had reached the railway in rear of Pope's army with a regiment of horse and captured Pope's private baggage and official papers, the contents of which greatly assisted Lee in his next move. August 24 was passed by the opposing forces on the Rappahannock with the amusement of a distant and desultory cannonade, while Jackson pursued his march round Pope's right flank; the corps of Porter and Heintzelman of McClellan's army having reached Acquia Creek and Alexandria respectively were hurrying to Pope's assistance. Stuart's raid had upset the Federal railway communication and a

quarrel between Pope and the railway director named Hangst brought the confusion to a climax. The Federal cavalry and infantry continued to march, but food and forage had become very scarce in their bivouacs, the horses and men were knocked up and the fighting strength of the army was greatly reduced by straggling. The varying destinations given by Pope to the reinforcements marching towards him as he changed his plans had had the effect of scattering the Federal forces in hopeless confusion across Northern Virginia. Halleck lost count of the position of the different corps and was obliged to confess to McClellan that he knew neither where to find Pope nor the enemy.

While this chaos of command reigned in the Federal army Jackson early on the 25th disappeared among the woods which clothe the spurs of the Blue Ridge, and leaving every cart behind which he could dispense with pressed rapidly forward. About midnight he reached Salem, at the western end of the pass called Thoroughfare Gap; after a few hours' rest the column resumed its march through the hills still covered by Stuart's horsemen, who crossed the ridge single file by a mountain path. Soon after noon on August 26 the Confederates were in possession of the railway at Bristow Station, and had cut the telegraph wires while the Federal troops with Pope were preparing once again to attack Lee on the Rappahannock. The same evening a small detachment under Stuart seized the great Federal depot at Manassas Junction, whither Jackson repaired with his whole corps next day. Having rested and fed his weary and hungry 'Foot Cavalry,' as his wonderful infantry were called from their feats of marching, he set fire to the immense mass of stores collected for the use of the Federal army; it was the sinister glare of this conflagration which announced to the enemy that their communications were effectually cut. Pope had no choice but to reopen them by force, and with that purpose he once again set his troops on the march with the intention of surrounding Jackson's audacious corps.

On August 26 Lee had moved the Confederate army to its left leaving a line of outposts on the river; and on the 27th he marched rapidly towards Thoroughfare Gap by the

same road Jackson had followed two days before. If Pope was to profit by the separation of the enemy's wings he had very little time to spare, and at any cost he must delay the column marching to Jackson's assistance. The fact that this column must pass through the defiles of the Bull Run Mountains greatly simplified the task of checking it with a detachment while the main body fell upon Jackson, who retired northward on the 28th, striking sharply at a Federal division he encountered on the Warrenton road. With incredible lack of judgment Pope decided to abandon the pass and to call up McDowell's corps which guarded it to join in the attack on Jackson. A skirmish, however, took place at Thoroughfare Gap on the 28th between Lee's advanced guard and a division of McDowell's corps, and the firing was heard by Jackson's troops, who thus became aware that their comrades had come within hail. The distance from Manassas Junction to Rappahannock Station on the river is twenty-six miles, but the route followed by the Confederate army entailed a march of fifty miles. The object of the *détour* for Jackson's corps was to demoralise the enemy by seizing his magazines, and Lee's object in following the same route was to fight with his whole army united, by which alone decisive results could be hoped for. Both plans succeeded to perfection. On August 29 Pope having at length concentrated about half his scattered army attacked Jackson's corps. It was strongly posted on the right bank of the Bull Run, which protected the left, while an old railway cutting ran along the front and gave excellent cover to riflemen. At the same time Pope, realising all too late the fatal error he had made in letting Longstreet's corps pass the Gap, took tardy steps to keep the Confederate wings apart. The Federal generals, however, confused by contradictory orders do not seem to have supported his plan with proper energy, for no serious resistance was offered to Longstreet, who came into line with Jackson by noon on the 29th, just as the Federal corps employed in the attack all the morning withdrew from Jackson's front shattered and demoralised. The village of Groveton gave its name to the battle of the 29th to distinguish

it from the more important struggle on the 30th called the second Manassas.

Dawn of August 30 saw both armies united and drawn up in presence of one another. The woods concealed the troops of Longstreet's corps, so that Pope was induced to believe he had still time to crush Jackson's command, which had lost severely in the battle of the 29th. Accordingly he concentrated his reinforcements against the Confederate left and renewed the attacks, which were uniformly repulsed with severe loss. Fresh troops were brought into action, and it seemed as if mere weight of numbers must break the thin line of Grey, which still clung with desperate tenacity to the position, when just as a great dark column of infantry strode forward to deliver a stunning blow at the Confederate centre, Longstreet slipped the leash and his infantry threw themselves with savage yells of triumph upon the Federal left. A general advance of the Southern army then took place. Longstreet swept the opposing troops before him, and the survivors of Jackson's ragged regiments joined in the chase. It was just such a manoeuvre as Wellington and Blucher successfully executed on the field of Waterloo. There were only wanting the ten thousand cavalry who flooded the Belgian plain, spread confusion right through the Grand Army, and prevented it from rallying. Had such a force been under Lee's hand the annihilation of the Federal army must have followed. As it was, a rear-guard of Pennsylvanian and regular infantry gallantly stemmed the torrent and enabled the defeated troops to cross the Bull Run on their way to Centreville.

Heavy rain fell after the battle, which doubtless checked the ardour of the pursuit, but it also added to the misery and demoralisation of the retreating Federals. Lee once again divided his forces. Jackson on the 31st reached Chantilly on the turnpike road from Alexandria to Aldie, thus threatening to cut off from the Potomac Pope's army, which had gained the Centreville entrenchments, while Longstreet's outposts were extended across the Warrenton road. On September 1 there was another sharp fight on the Aldie turnpike close to Chantilly, in which Jackson's

men were again victorious ; but Pope's game was up, and September 2 saw the masses of the Federal army thrown back upon Washington, where McClellan once again took command, and by his personal influence restored order and confidence in a very short time.

On the field of Manassas and in the marches which had preceded the collision Pope's incapacity had placed his army at a hopeless disadvantage in spite of its numerical superiority, but the troops on both sides had displayed a power of marching and manœuvring, and a contempt of death in the fight, which proved how far they had travelled on the way of becoming perfect machines of war. Nearly ten thousand men had been lost in action by Lee and about fifteen thousand by Pope ; the country was sown broadcast with stragglers, the great majority of whom rejoined their colours. Great was the triumph at Richmond when it was announced that the mighty host so lately thundering at her gates had been chased ignominiously into Washington, which now stood in like predicament. Great was the consternation throughout the North, for it was rightly conjectured that the Southern generals were not men to let such victories go without profiting by them. If the Southern Government had possessed the same insight as Lee and Jackson, Manassas would not improbably have been followed by an invasion of the North with the concentrated forces of the Confederacy, drawn from every part of the Southern States for the purpose ; but no such wise counsel prevailed and the chance was lost.

Loss in battle, but much more the straggling of men who could not follow their regiments on the forced marches which had carried their standards from the James to the Potomac, had reduced Lee's army to less than fifty thousand men in spite of reinforcements. A great number of his infantry had worn out their boots, and even the spoils captured on the field of Manassas had not sufficed to renew their equipment ; guns and rifles indeed there were, but boots, clothes and blankets were terribly deficient. Another fifty thousand men from Richmond and from the Southern and Central States were required for an advance into

The cam-
paign in
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—Septem-
ber 1862.

Northern territory, which was certain to draw all the Federal forces once more into the field. Almost any sacrifice of territory for the time being would have been a small price to pay in order to strengthen Lee's hand with adequate numbers. Nothing was done, however, to help him, and he resolved to cross the Potomac with what troops he had in anticipation of the consent of his Government reluctantly wrung from it.

The military situation on the Potomac was singular enough. The two Federal armies which had lately mustered 170,000 troops, and which still included 100,000 fit for duty, organised in eight army corps, lay within the forts of Washington. At Harper's Ferry twelve thousand men garrisoned another entrenched camp which, besides guarding the passage of the Potomac at this point fifty miles above Washington, contained a vast amount of warlike stores. There were no other organised Federal forces in this part of the theatre of war, but the militia were available in unlimited number for garrisons and local defence, while volunteers were enrolling in every State of the Union to repel the invasion. Between Harper's Ferry and the capital Lee's little army crossed the Potomac and occupied Frederic City in Maryland, while Stuart's cavalry ranged the country. It was hoped that the appearance of the Confederate army in the border State would rally its inhabitants to the cause of Secession, but this hope proved vain. In western Maryland the sympathy of the people was Unionist or indifferent, and although from Frederic the Confederate army could easily reach Baltimore, which was disaffected to the Union, yet such a move would have been fatal unless Lee was capable of defeating McClellan's numerous host, which now cautiously issued from the shelter of the forts.

The Confederate commander resolved to attempt the capture of Harper's Ferry; he therefore fell back west of the Harper's South Mountain, which he resolved on holding Ferry. against McClellan's troops while Jackson reduced the fortress. An order was sent in duplicate to General D. H. Hill at Frederic informing him of the scheme and directing him to hold the pass at Turner's Gap by which the

road from Frederic is carried westward through the hills. One copy of this order was left about and picked up by a Federal soldier after the Confederates had retreated from Frederic. The result of this careless accident was very unfortunate to the South, for McClellan immediately realised the danger to Harper's Ferry and saw through his enemy's whole scheme. The slow movements of the Army of the Potomac in its advance from Washington to Frederic gave place to more energetic measures for the relief of Harper's Ferry, and for forcing Lee to give battle before he could concentrate his army.

In the meanwhile Jackson and McLaws had converged on the doomed fortress from opposite directions. Jackson had crossed the Potomac above the place, while McLaws had seized the Maryland heights which command it on the right bank of the river. On the 14th the investment was completed by the punctual arrival of the Confederate divisions at their rendezvous. On September 15 it surrendered with all its material, and McLaws had time to turn and inflict a smart check upon Franklin's corps sent to relieve the place before he followed Jackson across the stream at Harper's Ferry, and thence up the right bank to gain Sharpsburg on the left bank, where the Southern army was concentrating. The capture of this fortress was a fine stroke of audacious strategy, but it must be admitted that after the loss of the despatch fortune singularly favoured the bold adventure, which could hardly have been accomplished had the Federals displayed more intelligence and activity.

Not less than ninety thousand men were advancing on September 13 to crush Lee's small army, which, including the detachments assailing Harper's Ferry, hardly mustered forty-five thousand soldiers. On September 14 the Federals forced the passes of the South Mountain after a sanguinary fight. On the 15th Lee took his stand at Sharpsburg, on the hills overlooking the Antietam, a small tributary of the Potomac. McClellan's army had been somewhat dislocated by the rough fighting of the previous day, and was not easy to handle in the face of the enemy, for the same familiar

The
Federals
storm the
passes of
the South
Mountain,
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14.

causes, i.e. want of cavalry and scarcity of trained staff officers. Lee might therefore have fallen back into Virginia, where McClellan must have followed him, to give battle under circumstances which were more likely to be favourable to the South; but he seems to have counted on the high spirit of his soldiers elated by their recent splendid victories, and he was loth to abandon his enterprise without a battle. There is little doubt too that he underrated at this time the fighting power of his enemies.

While Lee was taking post along the Antietam, and Jackson's corps was hurrying to join him, the great Federal army continued its cautious advance. On the 16th the two armies were in contact and some sharp skirmishes took place between them. During the day Jackson's division arrived, followed by McLaws. A. P. Hill's division had been left to dispose of the valuable booty and prisoners captured at Harper's Ferry; it could not therefore reach Sharpsburg until the next day. The day was spent by the Federal columns in closing up and forming for action. In the afternoon a river mist deepened into a fog which might have facilitated the plans of the assailant had his masses been more mobile; as it was the obscurity hindered their movements, and nothing very important was attempted until the rising sun of the 17th pierced the mists and inaugurated the splendour of a bright September day.

The battle which followed was the sternest and most bloody which had yet been fought. McClellan intended to use his great numerical superiority to crush both Confederate wings at the same time, but he failed to co-ordinate his attacks. They took place one after another on his right, while his left wing, led by Burnside delayed its advance for reasons never satisfactorily explained, until the afternoon had brought A. P. Hill's division to fill the gap in Longstreet's corps left by troops which had been drawn off to assist Jackson. Jackson's defence was a repetition of his magnificent performance at Groveton and Manassas. Nothing but death itself could make his matchless infantry yield their ground, and just when his corps was worn to a shadow by the enemy's

Battle of
Sharps-
burg on
the Anti-
etam, Sep-
tember 17.

repeated attacks, he chose the occasion to deliver the fierce counter-stroke which flung the Federals back in confusion. A cool autumn evening followed the heat of the sunny day, and as the night approached the firing stopped between the hostile armies, but not before the Blue legions had ceased to attack in earnest, so heavy had been their losses and so complete the exhaustion of moral and material force. September 18 passed without more fighting; when evening shrouded the Valley of the Potomac, the Confederate army, having sent on its wounded and baggage, recrossed the river and fell back slowly towards Winchester. An attempt to pursue was sharply checked by Jackson in command of the rearguard.

The Comte de Paris gives the loss of the Federal army as 2,010 killed on the field; 9,416 wounded and 1,043 taken prisoners. He estimates the Confederate losses at the passes of the South Mountain and on the Antietam at fourteen thousand, of whom three thousand five hundred were captured. In the four days' struggle including Harper's Ferry the Federal army was diminished by not less than twenty-five thousand soldiers, but they could bear the loss far easier than their enemy. The lack of troops to follow up the great victory at Manassas should have warned the Confederate leader how precious the lives of his men were; nothing but decisive success was worth his while to fight for. It is said of Jackson that when Lee sent him a straggler who had been pillaging for trial and execution the day before the battle, he grimly replied that he would leave that task to the enemy; the culprit was put in the front line, where he fought hard all the next day, and unlike most of his comrades emerged from the combat unwounded.

With this stubborn battle ended the expedition into Maryland. It had collected a certain amount of spoil besides the capture of Harper's Ferry; it had caused in the North great alarm, but had reaped no other solid result. The Confederate soldier returned with even more complete confidence in himself and his leaders, dearly purchased at the loss of so many precious lives. For some weeks active hostilities ceased and both armies used the respite thus accorded in preparing for another trial of strength.

Even if it be conceded that McClellan displayed excess of caution in not forcing his shattered army to renew the battle on the Antietam on September 18, there can be no doubt that he was wise to pause before he tried to follow Lee's army into Virginia. Against an enemy so mobile and so resourceful, horses for the cavalry and transport service were as essential instruments of war as men and rifles, but of horses fit for duty the Army of the Potomac had scarcely any left. There was no particular advantage to be gained by renewing the struggle at once, and the heavy losses, particularly in superior officers, which had been sustained at Manassas and Sharpsburg made a certain delay for the recuperation of the army advisable. The Government at Washington, backed by the press and public of the Northern cities, was just as unreasonably impatient as it had been before, and McClellan, disgusted with this ungrateful treatment, was at no particular pains to conciliate. He had, however, determined on an advance along the Orange and Alexandria Railway, and when his preparations were complete he crossed the Potomac at Harper's Ferry; on November 5 he had reoccupied Warrenton and Warrenton Junction, while his patrols watched the passes of the Bull Run hills and the course of the Upper Rappahannock. He had in fact resumed with concentrated forces the menacing position held by Pope in the middle of August from which the swift campaign of Manassas had dislodged the Federal army.

A month's rest had likewise been a great blessing to the Confederate soldiers. The failure of the Maryland expedition following on such brilliant successes had stirred the Southern Government and people to greater efforts for the equipment of the army. Boots and clothes had been in a measure provided and the muster-rolls of the regiments were filled with convalescents, exchanged prisoners and absentees returning to the colours. At the head of more than sixty-thousand veterans Lee was ready once more to give battle. He watched the course of the Rappahannock with Longstreet's corps, while Jackson's lay in wait west of

McClellan
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Federal
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the Blue Ridge for a chance of repeating its previous exploits. Suddenly, and without any particular pretext, McClellan was dismissed from the command of the army, which was turned over to Burnside, a brave officer, but one who had demonstrated on the Antietam how little capacity he had for the most difficult task of controlling a great army in the field. Burnside at once gave up McClellan's line of invasion and endeavoured to anticipate the Confederates south of the Rappahannock by crossing below the fords at Fredericksburg. Delay in the arrival of the necessary pontoon equipment frustrated this scheme, so that Lee had ample time to concentrate his army opposite the enemy on the right bank of the river. Every likely point of crossing was carefully watched, and the troops lay at convenient distances ready to repel any attempt to force a passage.

Nearly a month passed; the two armies prepared what accommodation they could for the winter, and Burnside's engineers sought in vain to simplify the task of transferring the Northern army across the stream. Finally the general resolved on taking the bull by the horns and tried to open the way to Richmond by brute force.

The position held by the Confederate army was exceedingly strong. A line of hills encircle the town of Fredericksburg and the meadows south of it which fringe the river bank. These hills were well clothed with woods whose black stems and withered brown leaves still effectually concealed the defending troops. Artificial batteries and rifle-pits crowned the heights, a stone wall ran along their base, and a canal formed a wet ditch to the left of the position. A sunken road gave good shelter to the infantry in the centre, and afforded a second tier of fire. The right occupied by Jackson's corps was the least strong part of the line. On December 11 the Federals bridged the river and sent over two army corps. On the 12th, after being repulsed by Barksdale's brigade of Mississippi riflemen in an attempt to clear the town, the Northern batteries which crowned the Stafford heights bombarded the place, destroyed much private property and killed a few civilians. The Southern

The
Battle of
Fredericks-
burg,
December
13, 1862.

troops then evacuated the town, through which two more army corps pushed their way.

December 13 broke in a thick fog off the river which as at Sharpsburg delayed the Federal preparations. When at length the fog rose the defenders of the position beheld an imposing spectacle. Eighty thousand Federal soldiers with three hundred guns were drawn up in the valley below them ready to attack; fire was promptly opened by the Confederate batteries and returned from below. Covered by the smoke, the Federal infantry marched against Jackson's corps, pierced his first line and engaged his second line in the woods. Prompt help might have established the Blue infantry in possession, but Meade's division was not sufficiently supported. Jackson's reserves swarmed to the rescue, and hurled the intruding column with the loss of half its strength back into the valley.

The attempt of the Federal right wing under Sumner to storm Marye's Hill, which stood out like a buttress from the centre of the position, overlooking the town at a distance of less than half a mile, was defeated with murderous loss. The right of Longstreet's corps rested on this hill; his riflemen and gunners from secure cover plied the broad target presented by the Federal lines with shot which mowed them down like corn before the reaper. The Northern infantry behaved with splendid valour and returned again and again to the impossible task. The light of the short winter's day was beginning to wane when Burnside relinquished the attempt, and commanded his generals to rally their troops in the valley, leaving twelve thousand of their comrades stiff in death or writhing in agony on the fatal slopes. On the Confederate side five thousand men were reported to have been killed or injured, a loss that was considered trifling in those days and which was certainly small in comparison with the havoc wrought in the ranks of the enemy. Then Lee let slip the best opportunity he had yet been given of dealing a death-blow to the Army of the Potomac.

At a given moment in a great battle it is difficult if not impossible for the general-in-chief of the victorious side to

know how comparatively small are his own losses nor how great are his enemy's. His own men lie mangled on the ground at his feet; the enemy's wounded even with the short-range weapons of 1862 lay thickest several hundred yards from the position and further still from the post of the commanding general. Every report through the long anxious hours tells of doubtful struggles, of attacks driven home and repelled with difficulty; the tendency of each subordinate commander is to exaggerate his own danger and the enemy's strength. Add to these, which are the ordinary conditions of all defensive fighting, the fact that Lee had been obliged to extend his fifty-two thousand infantry on a front of nearly six miles in order to secure his left flank and hold the chain of heights dominating the valley, then the immense risk and difficulty of forming a reserve force to strike back at the enemy will be appreciated. The darkness was fast closing on the field, but so long as it was light the powerful artillery of the Federals on the Stafford heights across the river threatened to repeat the lesson of Malvern Hill if the Grey troops quitted the shelter of their position. Yet it must be conceded that Lee's genius fell short of its happiest inspirations when he suffered his enemy still reeling from the crushing repulse to escape out of reach of the Southern bayonets. An attack in force with every battalion that could be thrown forward in the twilight would in all reasonable probability have swept the Northern army across the river with annihilating loss.

December 14 found the Confederates in position expecting and hoping for a repetition of the enemy's attack. Burnside had every intention of obliging them, but partly persuaded by the accumulating proofs of disaster and partly constrained by the insubordinate refusal of Franklin and Hooker to renew the engagement, he finally ordered a retreat. During the night in the midst of the storm which seemed to be the necessary accompaniment of all the great battles of the war, the Federals once more recrossed the Rappahannock and abandoned their fourth attempt to open the way to Richmond.

A month later an offensive movement was initiated above

Fredericksburg, but the weather was so wet and stormy, and marching was found to be so difficult, that it was almost as soon abandoned; after this the Army of Northern Virginia enjoyed a respite of four whole months before a fresh attempt at invasion once more recalled it to the field. In the interval Burnside was replaced by Hooker, whose intrepid bearing as a division-commander on many fields had won the confidence of the army.

The close of the year 1862 still saw the flag of the new Republic waving triumphantly over the broad territory of the Seceding States. Four great armies had in vain attempted to capture her capital; though the blood-stained fields of the Peninsula, Manassas, the Antietam and Fredericksburg had wrought havoc and desolation in countless homes through every town and county north and south of the Potomac, yet the issue was as far from being decided as on the day when the Northern volunteers in the first flush of anger had sprung to arms for the preservation of the Union. Since the first encounter on the Bull Run of the two armies whose long duel forms the most thrilling part of the war, the conflict had swayed from the banks of the Potomac to the outskirts of Richmond; then back again to within sound of the bells of Washington and had closed for a short truce on the Rappahannock midway between the two capitals. In severe marching and desperate fighting the period between the landing of McClellan in the Peninsula and the repulse of Burnside at Fredericksburg had surpassed the record of any previous wars of equal length. It had transformed the hosts of impetuous and undisciplined volunteers into veteran troops capable of the cleverest manœuvres and the boldest attacks. Generals had been brought to the front whose methods will always be eagerly studied by those who would understand the art of war, and at whatever cost an unperishable page had been written in the annals of American history.

CHAPTER II

STONEWALL JACKSON IN THE WILDERNESS

The Situation of the South Reviewed—Means of Transport—Want of Horses—Condition of the Northern States: April 1863—The Military Situation in Virginia: April 1863—The Problem before Hooker—Hooker's Plan of Campaign—Summary of Events—Strength of the Opposing Forces: April 27—The Confederate Army—Description of the Country—Position of Confederates—Narrative of Events to the night of April 30—Morning of April 30—Passage of the II Federal Corps at United States Ford—Hooker reaches Chancellorsville—Lee's orders to Jackson: Evening of April 30—The Morning of May 1—Orders of Jackson and Hooker, 9 A.M.—Collision between the Armies at 12 noon—The fight broken off at 3 P.M.—Hooker's Disposition at Nightfall: May 1—Position of the two Armies on the night of May 1—Federal Army: May 2—The last Meeting of Lee and Jackson—Jackson marches round the Federal flank, 7 A.M. to 4 P.M.—The Attack on the Federal Right Wing at 6 P.M.—Hooker's Dispositions to meet the Attack—Charge of Cavalry checks victorious Confederates—The III Federal Corps bars Jackson's Advance—Preparations for renewing the Fight—The Wounding of Stonewall Jackson—Night Attack of Sickles' Corps—Lee's Divisions on the Afternoon of May 2, 6.30 P.M.—End of the Fight of May 2—The Situation reviewed.

THE stormy spring of 1863 in Northern Virginia found the two adversaries still confronting one another on opposite banks of the Rappahannock in the neighbourhood of Fredericksburg. The long series of victories gained by the army under Lee and Jackson had given a short respite to the Confederacy on the northern border, but the presence of Federal troops at Suffolk and on the coast of the Carolinas was a source of anxiety, for it threatened the main lines of rail which kept Richmond and the army supplied. As early as February Longstreet had been detached with Hood's and Pickett's divisions, eleven thousand men, to join the local forces under General D. H. Hill for an offensive campaign against Suffolk, the hostile

The situa-
tion of the
South re-
viewed.

occupation of which place was particularly dangerous owing to its vicinity to Richmond and to the neck of the railway system connecting it with the South.

In March a sharp passage of arms had occurred between the opposing cavalry in the neighbourhood of Brandy Station in which the Federals had displayed a fighting capacity hitherto wanting in their mounted troops. Otherwise Lee's army had been unmolested and thus the detachment of Longstreet's two divisions had been possible. In the western theatre of war, however, the onward march of the Federal armies had continued in spite of the Confederate victory of Murfreesburg in Tennessee and Sherman's repulse before Vicksburg. After two years of the severest warfare exhaustion and discouragement were paralysing the resources of both sides; it only needed decided success in the field for one or the other to determine the downfall of the Confederacy or the end of the Federal supremacy.

At sea the superiority of the Federal navy was complete; the depredations of Confederate privateers, however mischievous and galling, had no more delayed the end of the war than the raids of Forest and Morgan. The sea formed the best means of transporting the forces of the Union to the attack of the Southern States and enabled them to penetrate by the estuaries of the great rivers into the heart of the hostile country. The Mississippi and other great rivers had provided highways for the transportation of troops and stores without which their movements would not have been possible on a great scale. The effect, however, of the blockade on the coast and ports of the South was even more far-reaching. Until the outbreak of the war the vast territories south of the Potomac and Cumberland rivers had been almost exclusively devoted to agriculture. Everything that was required for this industry and for the ordinary business of life was imported from Europe or from the North in exchange for the boundless wealth of raw material yielded by the rich soil. When the Southern statesmen resolved on Secession, and on war to achieve it, they had overlooked the fact that this sea-borne trade, by which alone the new Republic could exist, depended on the freedom of navigation

which it would be the first object of the Federal navy to prevent. So far as the matter had been considered it was believed that neutral Powers would not permit their trade to be interrupted, but in this they were mistaken. The success of the South, therefore, from the first depended on the rapid victory of her armies.

After two years' warfare some factories had under stress of necessity been founded for the repair and manufacture of warlike stores ; but many of the necessities of life, such as salt, as well as the luxuries, were very difficult to obtain, and suffering was inflicted upon every household in consequence. Even the plantations failed to yield as much as formerly in the absence of most of the able-bodied white men in the army, of whom a very small number were left to manage the slaves ; the same want of men greatly increased the difficulty of organising factories, besides the want of the most essential plant. It is remarkable, however, that in the main the slaves remained loyal to their masters in spite of the events of the war and by their labour supplied the armies in the field with the means of continuing the struggle. About this time the scarcity of grain compelled the Government at Richmond to interfere in order to induce the planters to devote their energies to the production of corn along the railways for the victualling of the army, instead of cotton and tobacco ; and to this cause the Comte de Paris attributes the successful march of Sherman's army through Georgia in 1864, which he says would not have been possible in 1863.

To a noteworthy extent the energy of the women made up for the absence of men in carrying on the routine business of life. History records no more heroic conduct than that of the daughters of the South in this gigantic struggle. Not only did they serve in the shops, look after the small farms and carry on a thousand and one of the less burdensome duties of daily life, but they helped in the manufacture of arms and ammunition and supplied the army with clothes, so that the rough brown homespun cloth gradually replaced the official grey in the uniforms of the troops. Each sanguinary battle made a fresh demand on their energies by sending a fresh batch of wounded into the hospitals and the

sick from the front continued to come and go throughout the war.

It has been asserted that the supply system of the Confederacy was badly administered, but considering fairly how Means of Transport. difficult it must have been to create out of nothing the machinery of the central government plunged in an immense war, it may be conceded that, although the administrative services were far from perfect, yet they accomplished a great deal. In no respect was the pressure of the war felt more severely by the South than in the want of transport. The waterways being all blocked by Federal cruisers and gunboats, the Confederacy was reduced to depend on the main lines of rail for intercommunication in her vast territories and for transportation of the army. The distances were very great and the roads were few and indifferent. By the spring of 1863, Northern Virginia had been fearfully desolated by no less than four campaigns fought in a restricted area, so that the means of subsistence for horses and men had to be brought for great distances by rail. Any attempt to make use of the interior position of the South by transferring troops from the western to the northern seat of war, or *vice versa*, depended on the same channel of communication, but the plant available was almost worn out. Locomotives, rails, rolling-stock and machinery of all sorts wanted renewal, the most necessary extension of the lines was impossible and the speed of the trains was generally reduced to twelve miles an hour. In spite of every difficulty the service rendered by the railway lines surpasses belief.

Next only in importance to the means of transport came the supply of horses, Want of Horses. The early victories of the Confederates in Virginia had been due in no small measure to the superiority of the Confederate cavalry under Stuart and his lieutenants. They had kept their own headquarters well informed while bewildering the enemy's generals, Banks, McClellan, Pope, and Burnside, by an impenetrable veil of piquets and patrols which spread false information and hid the movements of the Southern columns. This fact had not escaped the notice of the Federal authorities, who during the winter organised a very powerful cavalry

force under General Stoneman, and spared no expense in equipping and in mounting it. All that the Federal cavalry now required in order to measure swords successfully with its rival was experience in the field, and such education was soon to be had for the asking. Just as the enemy's cavalry was developing its power the Confederates were beginning to experience great difficulty in mounting theirs. Long marches on short rations, indifferent accommodation, wounds and overwork had cost the army great numbers of well-bred horses which it was difficult to replace, even with less serviceable animals. In April 1863, Stuart's command only included four brigades numbering seven thousand riders to oppose to the nine thousand Federal Horse, and of these brigades two were absent from the army. Jones' was detached in the Shenandoah Valley, and Hampton's was collecting recruits and remounts at the base.

The numbers of the Army of Northern Virginia had been nominally maintained by the conscription, but a greater proportion than formerly were absent with or without leave, and there was no reserve of trained men nor untouched section of the population from which to draw recruits. Of ammunition the Confederate army was dangerously short; it was equally ill supplied with reserves of clothing and forage. Want of boots still threatened to hinder the marching power of the infantry, as it had the year before, though the victorious fields of Manassas and Fredericksburg had yielded a goodly crop of rifles and guns which were now turned against their former owners. No sign of foreign intervention, the great hope of Southern politicians, appeared on the horizon, and in spite of Lee's victories a great Federal army still threatened Richmond from the north; the Atlantic coast was bitten at several points by joint military and naval expeditions. In the central field of action Kentucky and Western Virginia had been brought under Federal authority, while Tennessee was all but overrun by Rosecrans' army, which was only just held in check by the Confederates under Bragg. In the Valley of the Mississippi the Federal arms had made most alarming progress, and now General Grant with four strong army corps was ready to strike at

the last strongholds of the South on the river, and to hold at a distance the far less numerous forces despatched to relieve them. Although the spirit of the people throughout the Southern States was as high as ever, signs of the exhaustion which eventually crippled their warlike power were already manifest; but as yet the leading politicians in Richmond professed the utmost confidence in their ability to continue the war on defensive lines, and thus to wear out the patience, patriotism and military power of the Northern States.

Looking across the Potomac it must be confessed that there were reasons, though insufficient ones, for the hopes and theories of the Cabinet at Richmond. The repeated victories of the Confederate army in Virginia had lowered the prestige of the Government and damaged the reputation of individuals. Although the credit of the Northern States held good, and as the war progressed its industries adapted themselves to it, yet the immense sacrifices of life and treasure, the restrictions to commerce and general sufferings of the war were borne with increasing impatience. In some States, notably New York, a party hostile to the Government was raising its head and doing its best to hinder the recruiting of the army. There were many who openly argued that there must be a limit to the power of Lincoln's Government and to the number of armies sent to destruction one after the other. Since the battle of Fredericksburg the troops under General Hooker had recovered their confidence and military worth, but it cannot be said that this confidence was shared to a great degree by the public. In short, while the material resources remained not only unimpaired, but had actually increased, yet the despondency, and even active disloyalty, of a large section of the Northern people threatened to cut short the prosecution of the war. The fate of the Union rested in fact on the three field armies under Grant, Rosecrans and Hooker, the last of which was the largest and most important. It had already been twice overthrown, but the effort had cost its adversary so dear that it had not been followed up, and after each defeat it had

Condition
of the
Northern
States.
April
1863.

reappeared in the field more formidable than ever. The shortest and simplest way of winning Southern independence would then have been to destroy the Army of the Potomac ; for this purpose a great concentration of force should have been made in Lee's command, instead of which at the opening of the campaign his army had been so reduced as to be dangerously weak even for the defensive rôle.

The Army of the Potomac on April 1, 1863, by recruiting and reinforcement had reached the respectable total of a hundred and thirty-five thousand men, of whom a hundred and fifteen thousand were present with the colours. Washington and Harper's Ferry were garrisoned by independent forces, besides the strong garrisons which held Yorktown and Suffolk. Never have troops been better equipped than those of the United States, never has a Government thrown itself more whole-heartedly into the business of war, which indeed should be the paramount business of any Government when once a state of war exists or threatens. It is true that Lincoln and his ministers had not yet broken themselves from the habit of constant interference with their generals at the most inopportune moments, but under the correcting lash of Lee's victories they had learnt many a hard lesson, as had also the troops themselves. Each campaign brought a great increase to the discipline and fighting power of the army.

The capital of the Confederacy was still the immediate objective of the Federal army, which lay in huts and tents round Falmouth on the northern bank of the Rappahannock, opposite Fredericksburg and sixty miles distant from Richmond. The Southern Government was well aware that the invasion was about to be tried again for the fifth time, but could not tell whether a route overland would be taken round the left flank of Lee's army, or whether McClellan's plan of approaching their city by water would be renewed. It seemed very unlikely that a direct advance would be made against the strong positions occupied by the Confederate troops. Constant small raids and skirmishes on the upper Rappahannock kept the cavalry leaders informed of any

The mili-
tary situa-
tion in
Virginia.
April
1863.

movements of troops in that quarter and the triangle of country between the Rapidan and Rappahannock was also well patrolled. The two divisions of the First ¹ corps remaining with the army held Marye's heights and picketed the fords above Fredericksburg as far as Germanna Ford; Jackson's, the Second corps, watched the river bank as far as Port Royal, but the whole army was more intent on recuperating and resting than in taking active measures for defence.

If the way to Secession lay over the ruin of the Army of the Potomac, so did the restoration of the Union demand the destruction of its valiant antagonist, as the event proved. The idea was not grasped entirely by the Northern strategists, who aimed first at the capture of Richmond, which was putting the cart before the horse; but Hooker, who planned better than he executed, resolved to deal with Lee's army as early as possible. Since he had renounced McClellan's plan of basing himself on the coast and of proceeding by water to the point of attack, a practical choice of two main routes lay before him. The first was to transfer his army to the Orange and Alexandria railway, which would become his means of supply, to strike at the enemy's magazines at Gordonsville, and finally to cut off Richmond from the Carolinas by throwing an army across the James above the capital. The advance of the Federals in this direction must have brought Lee to battle, probably in the neighbourhood of Cedar Mountain or Orange Court-house. If the result were a Federal victory, the enemy would have to choose whether he retired on Richmond or on Gordonsville, and a victorious advance southward must have laid the communications of Richmond with the South at the mercy of the Federal general. Tactical victory was, however, an essential condition, and Hooker may well have doubted whether his army was certain to gain it, and whether he had troops enough to keep open the railway with his base at Washington. Two great advantages this line of operation possessed over any other: it directly covered Washington,

¹ The corps of the Confederate Army are denoted numerically by the words: First, Second and Third. The Federal corps are in every case denoted by Roman numerals: I, IV, and so forth.

while cutting off from Richmond the Shenandoah Valley hitherto so useful to the Confederate generals; it traversed a country where the superior numbers of the Federals could be easily deployed and which was crossed by no considerable natural obstacle. It had, however, the disadvantage of giving full scope to the skill of the Confederate leaders, and of enabling them both to strike at the Federal communications from east and west and also to concentrate all their forces then in Virginia, including the detachment under Longstreet. Balancing its advantages and disadvantages the route was probably the best that could have been adopted, for while it involved the greatest hazards, it was the only plan which promised decisive victory.

The route actually chosen by Hooker was the direct advance on Richmond after turning the flank of Lee's army on the Rappahannock. Its principal advantages were that it admitted of an immediate attack on Lee by the numerical superiority of the Federal army while his forces were reduced; it was not only the shortest way to Richmond, thus demanding a smaller number of troops to keep open communications, but it made possible a change of base to the sea at any moment that circumstances rendered advisable. Its drawbacks were, however, great. To begin with a dense forest stretched across the path of the Federals directly they succeeded in the not too easy task of anticipating their enemy on the south bank of the Rappahannock, and the Confederate commanders had proved themselves to be very slippery eels to catch in troubled waters. South of this forest, a number of streams crossed the road, several of which would afford the Confederates a chance of renewing their defence; while a victorious advance, unless it succeeded in also ruining the opposing army, would but lead to the fortifications of Richmond, and to the situation of the preceding spring. This was just what happened in 1864 when Grant successfully fought his way from the Rapidan to the James.

As is usual there were additional complications besetting General Hooker which had nothing to do with military science. Halleck, the Federal commander-in-chief at

Washington, was personally hostile to him. The Northern press was still clamouring for immediate victory; and, more important than either, the term of engagement for twenty thousand of his men was about to expire, so that he felt it incumbent upon him to strike while he commanded their services and while his enemy was still relatively weakened by the detachment of Longstreet's two divisions. Accordingly he formed a plan of campaign which in spite of its inherent defect promised good results if only the execution corresponded with the conception in energy and skill. His first idea was to throw the mass of his cavalry united in one corps of seven thousand men across the Rappahannock, to sweep away the opposing cavalry, and march as if to attack the depots of Gordonsville, then to turn eastward and strike at the Confederate communication by road and rail between Fredericksburg and Richmond. Hooker reckoned erroneously that this eccentric march would of itself compel Lee to fall back on the capital, and that the main Federal army would then be able to cross the Rappahannock unopposed at Hamilton's Crossing. The third week in April, however, brought such storms of rain that the fords became impassable and the advance of the cavalry was countermanded. Hooker then modified his plan. He determined by a rapid flank march to anticipate Lee on the right bank of the Rapidan with the right wing of his army, which should march across the peninsula formed by the confluence of the Rapidan and Rappahannock: the centre should unite with this wing after crossing just below the confluence at United States Ford, while the left held Lee in position before Fredericksburg. Converging attacks of the three Federal columns were then to demolish the Confederate army, while Stoneman's cavalry corps intercepted its retreat on Richmond. This plan aimed at nothing less than a decisive victory in the field which should destroy the enemy's army and throw open the capital and the surrounding country to the Federal arms: it took the fullest advantage of the numerical superiority of the Federals, and ran no great risk of disaster in case of failure. To succeed, however, required very nice co-operation

between the divided fractions of the Federal army, and the utmost possible rapidity of action. The character of the opposing generals was well enough known to make it certain that they would either retire in good time to avoid the trap, or would attempt to fall upon the separated parts of the invading force before they could act in combination.

The first part of these operations was effected with unexpected success. On the night of April 27 the Federals Summary of events. began their flank march; they gained the Germanna Ford at nightfall on the 29th. The passage of the stream was effected during the night by two corps, the XI and XII, while the II closed on the river bank at United States Ford, and Meade's corps, the V, crossed on the 30th at Ely's Ford. During the 30th three corps were united on the clearing at Chancellorsville and at break of day on May 1 Hooker concentrated all four corps forming his right wing. Only four miles of wood lay between the eastern extremity of his huge bivouac and the open country where he should have deployed his troops, but an early start would be necessary to get clear of the woods without interruption from the enemy. From that moment feebleness of execution marred the whole design. Instead of rapidly seizing the edge of the forest so as to deploy the four corps for action in the open country in rear of Lee's position, which might easily have been done in the early hours of May 1, and instead of following the stroke up by a vigorous offensive at this point and at Fredericksburg, both wings hesitated and waited on each other, thus enabling Lee to assemble his forces. When the Confederates at noon on the 1st took the offensive, their bold attitude so imposed on Hooker that he actually withdrew to the Chancellorsville plateau, and suffered himself to be attacked and even invested there by the far smaller forces of the enemy. Neither the cavalry corps under Stoneman nor the detached wing at Fredericksburg effected any useful diversion, and after four separate actions the whole Federal army recrossed the river and retreated to the cantonments it had occupied in the winter, leaving to the Confederates the glory of having once more

defeated a great numerical superiority. But at the cost of the life of Stonewall Jackson.

Before proceeding to describe in greater detail the first campaign in the Wilderness, as the forest of Spottsylvania is

Strength generally called, some further particulars as to the
of the effective strength of the contending armies and the
opposing forces. scene of the struggle may be of use to the reader.

April 27.

Fighting Joe Hooker, as the new commander of the Army of the Potomac was nicknamed by his comrades, had won a reputation for reckless gallantry in battle as well as for skilful leadership. His clean-shaven face, with eager eyes and sharp features, revealed the confident and enthusiastic temperament of the man. Although he entertained boundless confidence in his own opinion, yet when he had the power and opportunity of carrying out his plans, we shall see how he weakly allowed himself to be dominated by the superior skill of his opponent. In several battles, notably at the Antietam, he had gained the confidence of his soldiers, and his vigorous administration restored the moral tone so sadly impaired by Burnside's disastrous command, but his want of loyalty to that incompetent chief had somewhat shaken the estimation in which he was held by several of his principal generals and by Mr. Lincoln. For his failure, however, he had no one to blame but himself, since all ranks of the army did their best to execute his orders. As a general he was incomparably superior to Pope and Burnside, but no match for Lee and Jackson. The other Federal corps were commanded as follows: the I by Reynolds, who soon showed himself to be a leader of the first order; the II by Couch; the III by Sickles, brave but inclined to rashness; the V by Meade, who had fought with great courage and skill at Fredericksburg on December 13; the VI by Sedgwick, who was entrusted with the command of the detached wing before Fredericksburg; the XI by Howard, who had lost an arm in the preceding summer, and the XII by Slocum, who subsequently distinguished himself. All the corps commanders were officers of respectable capacity, and Butterfield, the chief of the staff, was accounted a good organiser. Among the commanders of divisions

were several officers who in this campaign and the next greatly distinguished themselves. The Federal army had been long enough in the field to acquire a solidity and mutual confidence between leaders and troops invaluable in war but particularly in offensive war; the troops, rested and refreshed, were eager to take the field and to reverse the verdict of previous campaigns.

The strength of the Federal corps varied from twenty-three thousand in the VI to thirteen thousand in the XI corps. If we estimate that one hundred and fifteen thousand infantry, artillery, sappers, and administrative troops took the field on April 27 we shall be very near the correct figure. There were, besides, Stoneman's independent cavalry corps numbering seven thousand horsemen and Pleasonton's brigade with the army. The force of cavalry retained for combined operations was altogether too small for the purpose, and the distance to which Stoneman's main body was sent from the critical point precluded him from rendering effective service at the critical time. The army possessed four hundred field guns besides the big guns commanding the Valley of the Rappahannock from Stafford Heights; but the nature of the country prevented the Federal commander from making much use of his superiority in this arm. He did not attempt to take all his guns across the river and was only able to bring a small number of those into action.

In quitting cantonments every precaution was taken not to give the alarm to the enemy; by break of day on April 29, the Federal right wing was already out of sight of Marye's Heights marching north-west. Below the town of Fredericksburg Sedgwick threw two pontoon bridges across the river and made demonstrations of crossing in force on the 29th. The next day Stoneman advanced with two divisions of cavalry in the direction of Culpeper, so that on each extremity of the zone they were defending the Confederates were threatened by demonstrations while the real attack was developing. These feints had the desired effect, and it was not until late in the evening of the 30th that Lee saw into his adversary's plan.

At no period of its glorious history had the Army of Northern Virginia possessed greater military value than at the beginning of the Chancellorsville campaign. The victories of the preceding summer, even the sanguinary struggle on the Antietam, had filled the soldiers with unbounded confidence, and their easy victory over Burnside led them to believe themselves invincible. For Lee and Jackson they had enthusiastic affection, and every 'ragged rebel' gloried in the tactical skill of his chiefs and personally took to himself some of the credit of their joint achievements. Three months' rest had revived their thirst for campaigning, while discipline and administration within the army had been perfected. Lastly they were better armed and equipped than hitherto, though not so well as their antagonists whom they hoped to despoil once more.

Six divisions averaging nine thousand five hundred infantry and artillery soldiers each formed the strength of the Confederate army. To oppose the troops of Hooker we may reckon that Lee disposed of nearly sixty thousand men including cavalry. Four of these divisions formed the Second corps under Stonewall Jackson and were cantoned south and west of the position they had defended on December 13; McLaws' division of the First corps held Marye's Heights and Anderson's piqueted the fords of the Rappahannock north and west of these entrenchments. During the winter there had been a constant intercourse between the army and the people of Richmond; the railway had borne many of the families of the officers and men in bullet-riddled cars to the quarters and cantonments, and Jackson himself had enjoyed the society of his wife and baby daughter until the first warm days of spring gave notice of renewed strife. The huts and rough quarters in which the army was lodged had in this way been cheered and comforted by visitors from the homes which so many soldiers were destined never to see again. It would seem from the absence of Longstreet's detachment and Hampton's cavalry brigade that the Federal march was not expected for another fortnight, but when once certain information

reached Lee he was able without delay to concentrate his six divisions ; the only pause was due to uncertainty as to which flank Hooker was about to assail in earnest.

The peninsula between the two branches of the river and the country south of it was watched by patrols of Stuart's cavalry, which was thus responsible for the protection of the left flank of the army as well as for containing the cavalry forces of the enemy. Lee had with his army one hundred and seventy field guns ; some of the batteries were distributed through the divisions, but a large reserve was kept under the hand of the commanding general.

The forest of Spottsylvania, generally called the ' Wilderness,' which was destined to be the scene of so much hard fighting, extended for twenty miles from east to west and about twelve from north to south along the southern bank of the Rapidan, just above its confluence with the Rappahannock. Its dimensions and the roads which traverse it should be carefully studied on the map by anyone who would understand the military events which took place there. Countless ravines intersect the woods and drain off generally to the north or south. It is also traversed by a number of roads and bridle-paths from north to south ; from east to west ran the unfinished railway-cutting from Orange Court-house to Fredericksburg and the main road known as the old pike. Parallel with the old turnpike ran the plank road into which it cut at different points, so that the two roads in reality formed but one main line of communication. Ten miles from Fredericksburg the roads united at Chancellorsville and traversed the plateau in the very centre of the forest, where a wide clearing three miles long enabled the Federal army to rendezvous. Several good roads connected Chancellorsville with the fords of the Rapidan, and a lane called the Brock road connected it with Spottsylvania Court-house and the main road from Fredericksburg to Richmond. Along the river bank at various places mining had taken place : near the mines most of the tall trees had been cut down for the furnaces, and in their places a dense undergrowth of small trees and shrubs clothed the ground and impeded the movements of troops off the

roads. The sides of the ravines were rocky and steep. The fighting which took place on the first four days of May 1863 had for its object the possession of the Orange Court-house and Fredericksburg road, along which the Confederate troops marched and countermarched to keep the wings of the Federal army apart. The next most important bone of contention was the open ground on the eastern edge of the Wilderness close to the southward loop of the river which can be traversed in dry weather at Banks' Ford. The forest did not indeed come to an end with a clearly defined tract of open country, but the land north and south of the turnpike was sufficiently open to permit of the wide deployment of troops and artillery in a manner which was impossible within the denser thickets. Access to these fields should therefore have been the first objective of Hooker's forces as soon as they had safely got across the two branches of the stream, for not only could the full power of the right and centre of his army be thus brought to bear, but having once uncovered Banks' Ford by the advance along the river bank the corps grouped under Sedgwick could have been called up at will to reinforce the right and centre: the point was therefore of the greatest tactical importance.

Remembering the time available to the Confederates for studying the situation and the topography of the country it was much to Hooker's credit that he succeeded in reaching Chancellorsville without serious opposition, because the swollen state of the rivers and their steep banks would have made a disputed passage a very costly affair. The Rappahannock, which had been bridged at Kelly's and United States Fords, was not at that time fordable, and the Rapidan had as much as four feet of water at Germanna Ford. The obstacle of the stream certainly complicated Hooker's task and he failed to turn it to any account for his own army. The weather had become very warm when the rain ceased, and the roads and ravines consequently began to dry up very quickly.

Opposed to the town of Fredericksburg and overlooking the flat fields on the river bank was the position defended so easily by the Confederate army on December 13: the

entrenchments had now been greatly strengthened and Lee reckoned on holding them against large forces with a single division. He was less confident, however, of checking an outflanking movement from a lower reach of the river against his right. A lane called the Mine road connected the right and left extremities of his cantonments, which were about thirteen miles apart. The Culpeper plank road from Old Wilderness Tavern by Germanna Ford to Culpeper was the way of communication between Lee's headquarters and Stuart, so that when the Federals got possession of it Stuart's couriers informing Lee of the enemy's movements were intercepted. During the 29th, however, Jackson's four divisions concentrated to meet the troops which Sedgwick had thrown across the river. McLaws remained on Marye's Heights. Anderson's detachments were falling back before the Federal columns.

The smoothness and speed with which the Federal infantry marched from Falmouth to the Rapidan marked a great improvement on the record of former campaigns. The very completeness with which the soldiers were equipped stopped the speed of the columns by overloading individuals; besides a very ample equipment each man carried three days' rations in his haversack and a canteen full of water. The distance from Falmouth to Germanna and Ely's Ford by road is more than thirty miles, and it was covered by the mass of troops and vehicles in forty-eight hours. While the never-ending serpent of Blue soldiers wound its way from the Rappahannock to the Rapidan, Pleasonton's troopers on the afternoon of the 29th drove from the river bank the small post which was left on guard there; then, plunging into the stream, seized a position to cover the crossing while patrols pushed into the Wilderness to feel for any force which might disturb the passage. One of Pleasonton's brigades had been taken from his command and added to the mass of cavalry under Stoneman, thus leaving but twelve hundred sabres to do the service of information for the whole army. As the daylight waned dense masses of infantry reached the banks of

Position
of Con-
federates.

Narrative
of events
to the
night of
April 30.

the Rapidan, but since there was no other bridge equipment available than the one at the same moment in use at Kelly's Ford, the troops began to ford the stream.

By the weird light of huge bonfires made on the western bank by Pleasonton's troopers the foot soldiers waded the river, while one party of cavalry stemmed the current with their horses, and another picked up any man who was swept off his feet. The crossing was slowly but uninterruptedly carried out, and ere day had dawned the XII corps had taken up a strong position covering the passage of the rest of the army. In the meanwhile Stuart for once had been thrown off the scent.

When the invading flood of Federal troops had poured into the land enclosed between the two streams the Confederate cavalry had given prompt information to Lee, but the situation was still full of doubt and Stuart had more than he could do to check Stoneman as well as to cover his own army. The presence of three Federal corps below Fredericksburg threatening his vital communications by road and rail with Richmond forced Lee to await the development of his enemy's plan, and thus the chance was given to Hooker of securing Chancellorsville as a place of rendezvous for the Federal columns approaching through Germanna, Ely's and United States Ford. When the Federal advanced guards pushed forward to these points the weak detachments of Confederate cavalry and infantry fell back before them; at the same time Stuart rode towards Brandy Station to meet and give battle to the main body of the Federal Horse. Stoneman, however, did not oblige him by marching to the encounter. He hesitated and hung back, and by noon of the 30th the march of Hooker's army in force into the Wilderness was reported to Stuart. The Confederate commander immediately countermarched one brigade, FitzLee's, leaving W. F. Lee to hang on to Stoneman.

The first alarm was given to the Southern army when two pontoon bridges over the Rappahannock were constructed at Sedgwick's order during the night of the 28th, and by the appearance of Federal troops on the morning of

the 29th moving across them in force. The advance, however, came to a standstill after some skirmishing, and by the evening of the 29th it became evident that a feint against the Confederate right was turning attention away from the real attack against the other flank. At the same time, Lee knew the strength of the troops under Sedgwick and was obliged to take count of their respectable numbers: to hold them in check, Jackson's corps was massed between Massaponax and Prospect Hills.

In the early morning of the 30th, however, a courier from Stuart warned the Confederate headquarters of the seizure by Pleasonton's horsemen of Germanna Ford. He Morn- was soon followed by fresh tidings from the same ing of April 30. locality announcing the march of three Federal army corps on Chancellorsville and the hasty retirement of the Southern outposts. Jackson joined Lee about the same time and the two held a short consultation. It was plain that a formidable attack was developing against their left, but close to their right wing lay the Federal forces which had crossed the river; at first Jackson proposed to fall upon them with his corps while the First corps delayed the Federals in the Wilderness. The difficulty of inflicting severe loss before the Federal advanced divisions could recross the Rappahannock decided Lee to give up this idea, and to move with the main body of his army against Hooker, while Early's division together with Barksdale's Mississippi brigade, which still held the town of Fredericksburg, was left to contain Sedgwick.

Whatever scheme the Southern commander adopted involved great hazards. Each wing of Hooker's army equalled in numbers the whole of Lee's, while a far larger force of cavalry than Stuart's threatened the safety of the railways in rear and the supply depots at Gordonsville and Guiney Station. Lee wisely resolved to keep the Federal wings apart and to pen Hooker's superior numbers up in the woods where the disparity of numbers would be less felt and where the mass of the invading troops might become unwieldy and difficult to handle. During the 30th therefore Anderson was directed to fall back slowly from Chancellorsville

checking the enemy as long as possible. McLaws' division, less Barksdale's brigade, was sent to reinforce him, and Jackson's corps was warned to be ready to support them.

On the extreme left of the Confederates Stuart after separating his two brigades sent W. F. Lee to bar the way of the Northern Horse; the other led by FitzLee and accompanied by Stuart himself hurried back to rejoin the army, but in the meanwhile the Federal infantry filled the Culpeper plank road from the ford to Old Wilderness Tavern. FitzLee did all he could to arrest their progress by hanging on to their flank and rear, harassing the column with dismounted skirmishers. One of his regiments broke through the hostile line of march and rejoined the army, but the remainder were drawn off after the enemy's strength had been ascertained to start on a march round the head of the enemy's column through Todd's Tavern, where a sharp skirmish occurred after dark with the advanced regiment of Pleasonton's brigade. This wide détour to the south brought the cavalry brigade, white and weary from fighting and marching, into touch with Jackson's infantry early on May 1.

While Sedgwick's troops were entrenching themselves on the right bank and the XII, XI and V corps were pressing forward through the deep fords into the dense forest beyond, General Couch had reached the river at United States Ford with the II corps and at two o'clock his sappers had placed two pontoon bridges across the stream. The piquet of Georgian infantry, having been compelled to beat a hasty retreat by the threat of being cut off, left the road clear to Couch, who led his troops and convoys over the bridges; a large force of artillery and baggage had also taken this road as being the shorter and because it avoided the necessity of fording the stream. The heads of the columns having reached Chancellorsville without serious opposition took up their bivouacs for the night with the expectation of continuing the march early next morning. The night was fine; the white rays of the full moon pierced the glades of the great forest where the weary soldiers threw themselves down

Passage
of the II
Federal
Corps at
United
States
Ford.

by the camp fires, and far down the glens to the river bank stretched back the long files of cannon and carts.

In the evening of the 30th Hooker arrived at Chancellorsville. He was greeted with cheers as he passed his troops for the swift successful march had appealed to their quick wit; round the camp fires was circulated and read with approval mixed with chaff the vaunting proclamation issued by the general before retiring to rest. This remarkable document, after congratulating the army on its feat of marching, boldly announced that the 'Army of Northern Virginia was now the lawful prize of the Army of the Potomac: it must either fly ignominiously or come to fight on a chosen field where it will meet certain destruction.' Later this boasting sounded foolish enough; at the time it harmonised with the exultation of the troops after the successful passage of the river. During the morning two very important measures had been taken by Hooker: he sent orders to Sedgwick not to attack unless the Confederates retreated, or until the right wing made itself felt in Lee's rear; also to despatch with all speed the III corps to United States Ford to join the four corps at Chancellorsville. He thus reduced Sedgwick's force to two corps and his rôle to a very secondary one. In compliance with these orders the III corps was immediately sent off to follow the II, and Sedgwick's troops which were on the right bank began to entrench themselves, thus revealing to Lee on the 30th that only a feint was intended there. In the evening Hooker also ordered one pontoon bridge to be brought from Kelly's and United States Ford for use at Banks' Ford, so as to connect with his left wing by a shorter road. This step indicated that he intended to advance with his whole army next day, but his soldiers and generals were asleep and no orders for the morrow had been issued. The Federal Commander having made up his mind that Lee must retreat, was seemingly waiting for his adversary to 'fly ignominiously' as he had planned.

While the Federal army was prematurely rejoicing over the defeat of their enemies the four divisions of Jackson's corps were lying concentrated like a tiger crouching and

Hooker
reaches
Chancel-
lorsville.

about to spring. In the evening of the 30th, Lee's orders reached Jackson's quarters. They simply indicated that he was to march by the shortest route to bar the way to the enemy on the road from Chancellorsville. Such details as the time of departure and the exact road to be taken were left to the general, who could be counted on to lose no time. As soon as it was dark Early's brigades silently extended along the heights from Prospect Hill northward so as to relieve McLaws' division, while the rest of the troops packed their baggage and snatched a short night's rest. The starry night beheld the stir of troops getting ready to march and a crowd of officers surrounding Jackson's tent. In their midst he knelt down and prayed to God with all the fervour of faith and devotion ; then he arose, the light of inspiration in his eyes and gave the signal to march. Before dawn the mighty column set itself in motion to the field of Chancellorsville.

A consideration of the time at which the different fractions of the two armies reached the neighbourhood of Chancellorsville will show the inestimable value of a few hours in concerting decisive movements in the field.

The morning of May 1.

At nightfall on the 30th fifty thousand Federal soldiers had crossed the river and penetrated the forest as far as the clearing. Their advanced posts were within three miles of the open ground to the east of it upon which the army could in six hours' time have deployed a force greatly exceeding Lee's whole army. All that was needed to seize this position was a prompt movement in the early morning of May 1. On the other side it would have been easy to secure possession of the same ground by moving troops there any time of the day during April 30. Ignorance of the enemy's movements and doubts as to the real point of his attack alone delayed the order from Lee's headquarters which was to let loose his troops. The first rays of the sun pierced the leaves of the forest to find the Federal host leisurely getting under arms, and the Confederates marching from their positions west of Fredericksburg by the

plank and Mine roads to reinforce Mahone's Virginian brigade on the old turnpike; a fraction of this brigade had been pushed before the advancing enemy, but had not been brushed aside, and by incredible endurance had kept tight hold of its proper line of retreat without losing touch of the foe. Wright's Georgian brigade had been marched backwards and forwards by contradictory orders; detachments of it had been driven before the advancing Federals and the men were very done up with marching and fighting for two days and could have effected little more had they not been reinforced.

Reinforcements, however, soon began to arrive; first came the division of Lafayette McLaws, whose burly chief with hair and beard like the mane of a lion had already been a notable figure on many battlefields. These troops had given up the entrenchments on Marye's Height to Early's regiments while it was still dark, so that the same force apparently held the Confederate lines before Fredericksburg, though in reality there were but twelve thousand men left to hold a front of nearly ten miles. About six o'clock the head of this division reached the junction of the plank and pike roads near Tabernacle Church and joined Anderson's men in felling timber to prepare a defensive position. At eight o'clock Jackson riding ahead of his troops reached the half-finished barricade. He saw at once the advantage of throwing back the enemy's troops into the depths of the forest and ordered an advance along both roads. The head of his own corps reached Tabernacle Church about 11 A.M. and at the same hour FitzLee's cavalry brigade regained touch of the infantry. Federal troopers dodged among the trees in front of the Confederate riflemen but as yet no serious opposition was met with.

Orders of Jackson and Hooker. 9 A.M. About the time Jackson commanded his troops to enter the forest Hooker at length issued his tardy orders for the general advance of his army. Meade on the left was to lead the V corps along the river bank by the so-called river road, Couch the II corps along the turnpike, and Slocum with the XII had instructions to march along the plank road abreast of the centre

column, but as the road bended southwards he got behind the others ; moreover the crossing of so many paths at Chancellorsville retarded the Federal troops. A division of the II corps was sent out to Todd's Tavern to guard the right flank, but before it had gone far the whole movement was countermanded. Two corps, Howard's and Sickles' the XI and III, were massed in reserve near the Wilderness Church. Hooker roughly designated the edge of the forest as the line of deployment for his army ; a line that is running southward from Smith's Hill, where the position would command Banks' Ford, through Tabernacle Church to the high ground beyond the unfinished railway. Even at the hour he issued his orders this plan might well have been carried out. Its prosecution would have led to a shock of arms with Jackson's advancing troops, but hard fighting should have been just what Hooker wanted.

The Virginian brigade of Anderson's division led the Confederate column and about noon knocked up against the leading Federal brigade which consisted of the regular infantry of the United States. A fight soon kindled north and south of the road and extended itself along the ravines to the river on one side and over the railway on the other. Regiments and companies broke up and the struggle became fierce between groups and individuals contending in the greenwood like the foresters of medieval wars. The long range of rifles counted for little in such a combat and the handling of masses of men was very difficult. It soon became evident how wisely Jackson had acted in plunging into the woods. Hooker meanwhile had shut himself up in his headquarters. He had given no orders in the eventuality of a fight on the Fredericksburg road, which he must have known was highly probable, and it would seem that he had already decided to abandon the offensive and to retire within an entrenched position in the forest. At any rate he caused such a position to be prepared by felling trees and by making abattis and entanglements of their boughs. The Federal commander's motives will ever remain obscure ; at one moment he seems to have taken for granted that his enemy would

Collision
between
the Armies
at 12
noon.

retreat at his mere presence, at another that he would come and dash his forces to pieces against his breast-works, as Burnside had done on December 13. The roar of artillery was plainly audible in his room and every messenger brought him news showing the increasing gravity of the fight. Then he sent out the command which astounded his generals, to fall back on the Chancellorsville clearing whence they had started in the morning.

After spirited but useless remonstrance the Federal corps commanders set to work to draw their troops out of the action and succeeded in doing so without being broken off hardly pressed between 3 P.M. and 5 P.M. The mass of the Federal army regained their position of the night before after a running fight with the advancing Confederates who now covered Banks' Ford and threw a line of outposts half way round the Federal army; at the same time Stuart's squadrons pushed back the Federal patrols and pursued their investigations right round the Federal flank at Wilderness Church. Desultory firing between the skirmishers of the armies continued at intervals in the waning light, then finally the silence of the forest was restored for a few hours of darkness.

The result of the day's work was in the highest degree favourable to the Southern arms. The main force of the enemy had been pushed back into the forest and the distance between his two wings increased instead of diminished. Lee, who reached the field soon after noon, had gained time to group his forces as he wished and had snatched the initiative back from his enemy; the next day would see to what audacious purpose he could use it. That he was still in a hazardous situation could not be denied. Longstreet with his detachment had been telegraphed for but could not arrive for a week. Greatly superior forces lay entrenched before him, and a hostile detachment of forty thousand men menaced his rear. But the great Virginian soldier knew that it was one thing to storm entrenchments across an open field and quite another to stalk an enemy through the friendly shade of the woods; he therefore at once

The Fight
broken off
at 3 P.M.

Hooker's
disposi-
tion at
nightfall.
May 1.

resolved to strike hard at the mass of troops cooped up on the plateau west of Chancellorsville. The same evening Hooker sent orders to Sedgwick for the I corps under Reynolds to join the five corps he already had concentrated around him, and further to engage the attention of the Confederates by a demonstration in force on the Bowling-green road about 1 p.m. but not to commit his force to decisive action. These instructions denoted an entire change of plan, for they contemplated a decisive fight in the neighbourhood of Chancellorsville, and reduced the rôle of Sedgwick's corps to the minor duty of detaining some of the enemy's troops until a result was arrived at on the principal field of action; they go far to exonerate Sedgwick from blame for what followed.

During the hours of darkness the troops snatched some sleep, but parties were at work all night felling trees in front of both armies, thus hemming one another in with opposing lines of abattis and breast-work. The Federal corps were posted in the same order in which they had marched into the forest. Meade's, the V corps, was posted on the left and rested on the river bank; Slocum's, the XII corps, formed the centre; Couch, the II corps, had one division, Hancock's, in the first line between the V and the XII corps and the other, French's division, in reserve; Sickles with the III corps was on Slocum's right and Howard's the XI corps formed the extreme right from Dowdall's Tavern to a farm called Tally's whence his line turned perpendicularly northwards so as to face west as far as Hawkin's, the next farm.

The Confederates' lines were formed from the river road to the plank road by McLaws' division with two of Anderson's brigades; Wright and Posey's brigades had pushed the Southern outposts up to the Federal breast-works along the ravine called Big Meadow Swamp, which ran into the Motts' Run, and A. P. Hill's division of Jackson's corps extended the line westward to Catherine's Furnace on the western bank of the Lewis Creek, a small stream which clove its way southwards through the forest from the Chancellorsville plateau. The other two divisions of the Second corps were massed in reserve on the plank

road, and detachments of Stuart's cavalry were posted at the extremity of each flank.

In the Federal lines profound security reigned when morning broke. The soldiers breakfasted comfortably in keen enjoyment of the picnic in the forest as yet unattended by the hardships and horrors of war; Federal army May 2. eager groups discussed the events of the preceding days and warmly disputed about Hooker's generalship. Bets were freely laid among the rank and file as to the success of the latest move whose object in luring the Confederates to a rash attack was perfectly appreciated by the intelligent American soldiery. Hooker assembled his generals at Chancellorsville and discussed various plans for improving his situation, but finally resolved to stay where he was. He then rode round the positions of his army corps five miles from left to right, being saluted with cheers by the troops as he passed through their lines. He seems to have been mightily impressed with the strength of the ground he had chosen to defend and frequently remarked on it; near the extreme right he made some suggestion to Howard about covering his flank towards Ely's Ford, then he returned to his headquarters.

In the meanwhile the march of a hostile column had been reported by Sickles' troops at Hazel Grove; this column of considerable strength followed by guns and trains was heading southward as if its destination were Spottsylvania Court-house. Hooker immediately jumped to the conclusion that his manœuvre in entrenching his army on Lee's flank had succeeded in compelling his retreat, and he therefore ordered Sickles to 'pursue' with his own corps and Pleasonton's cavalry brigade.

Erroneous as was Hooker's deduction the offensive stroke to which it impelled him would have gained great advantages if he had struck with all his might, but he was still too much enamoured with his scheme of drawing Lee on against the breast-works to abandon the project entirely, and spoil his own conception by the half measure of attacking with only one corps, while he still kept the remainder on the defensive. He, however, sent a carelessly worded order

to Sedgwick, stating that the enemy was in full retreat and that 'Sickles was among his trains.' He also commanded Sedgwick to cross the river, which he had already done four days before, and to fall upon Lee's rear. This order contradicted to some extent the last one, despatched at 1 A.M.

The advance of Sickles' troops led to a sharp skirmish on the bank of the Lewis Creek, one mile south of Hazel Grove, about 2.30 P.M., in which the Federals took some prisoners, but gradually the fight extended eastward, and strong swarms of Confederate skirmishers came into action. Pleasonton's troopers, who were blocked on every bridle path by FitzLee's riders, could find no trace of the flying Confederates nor of their trains; so that Sickles, whose left would be compromised by advancing any further from the rest of the army, broke off the combat, and gradually fell back to his original position at Hazel Grove. Firing went on from time to time along the ravine which separated the Federal line from Lee's infantry, and occasionally the guns posted in the few open spaces where they could be used, exchanged compliments. During all this time the troops of the different Federal corps had busied themselves in strengthening their temporary fortress with barricades of timber and in making their bivouacs comfortable. So the summer afternoon passed on the strip of open glade occupied by the Army of the Potomac.

A mile and a half from Hooker's headquarters General Lee slept that night under a grove of pine by the roadside.

The last meeting of Lee and Jackson. Reports had reached him before he lay down to rest, skilfully despatched by Stuart through the maze of forest paths; they showed that the enemy's right flank was thrust into the forest naked of the cavalry which should in ordinary caution have covered it. Before it was light on May 2 Jackson and Stuart sought the commanding general and by a fire of pine cones, for the nights were chilly, the situation was discussed. The problem was hard enough to tax the wit of these masters of the art of war. The enemy must be attacked without delay while his main force was cooped up in the thicket; but at what point? If his front were assailed he would meet the attack with

troops who were expecting it behind barricades of considerable strength. His left flank not only rested on the river bank, but a successful advance in that direction would plunge the assaulting troops into thick woods where no decisive result was possible. To win a decisive victory the Federal army must be routed, and that was only possible on the open spaces which bordered the road.

Stuart had, indeed, ascertained by the skilful patrolling of his horsemen that the enemy's right flank was weakly posted and insufficiently protected against surprise; but the distance which separated it from the sleeping Confederate soldiers seemed to warrant its security. Then Jackson proposed a plan of attack which exceeded in audacity anything that even he had ever attempted. He proposed to march round the Federal army with three divisions by forest paths and to surprise their right flank by attacking it before nightfall; Lee was to be left with two divisions to hold Hooker in check and to join in the battle when the noise of firing should reach him. Early was still left confronting Sedgwick on Marye's Heights. The Confederate army would thus be converted from two into three groups: Jackson's thirty thousand strong; Lee's thirteen thousand opposite seventy thousand Federals; Early's five brigades or twelve thousand men to oppose Sedgwick with twenty-three thousand not including Reynolds' corps, sixteen thousand, available as a reserve for either Federal wing. Ten miles separated Lee from Early; Jackson would have at least twelve to march, and perhaps more, before he could reach the place whence he meditated striking his blow.

Stretched on a biscuit-box lay a rough map of the Wilderness and on it Jackson briefly indicated the path he wished to pursue; Lee nodded assent as he followed the plan. After a moment's thought Lee concurred in the scheme and Jackson arose, his eyes sparkling with unwonted excitement, to give the necessary orders to his troops, while Stuart and FitzLee sped before them to bar every road by which Federal scouts might come across the marching column. Swiftly and silently the two divisions on the plank road got under arms, and while the eastern sky was

still red with the dawn the head of the long column took the road which after dipping down into the ravine of the Lewis Creek passes Catherine Furnace, turns due south for half a mile and then gradually bends away to the west. Rodes' division led the way, then came Trimble's under Colston, and lastly A. P. Hill's, whose outpost line was stealthily occupied by Posey and Wright's brigades of Anderson's division. The troops marched just as they would go into battle, without other vehicles than guns, ambulances and ammunition wagons; even thus the column extended over nine miles of the forest track. Lee and Jackson posted themselves by the roadside to watch the leading brigades defile past them; then the two chiefs parted never to meet again in life, and Jackson pushed his way to the head of the long procession.

All day Jackson's men tramped through the woods, which became hotter and closer as the sun rose in the heavens

Jackson
marches
round the
Federal
flank, 7 A.M.
to 4 P.M.

while clouds of fine dust enclosed by the trees clung to the ranks. The wheels of the gun carriages and waggons sank deep in the rough road and the soldiers were obliged to help the horses to drag them along. At 2.30 P.M. Jackson wrote a line to Lee stating that the march was progressing satisfactorily. About noon the collision between his rearguard and Sickles' troops took place to which allusion has already been made; fortunately the advance of the Federals occurred after the greater part of the troops and guns had passed the Furnace, where the column might easily have been cut in twain by an energetic attack. The 23rd Georgians had sacrificed themselves to check the first Federal attack and later two brigades of Hill's, the rear division, with a battery had turned on the Federal III corps, but they were able to counter-march to rejoin their leader without having any serious fight.

Before three o'clock Jackson riding in advance of his troops had gained the Orange plank road. The route
3 P.M. he had taken traced an arc round the right wing of the Federal army which ran outside the shortest way, following a lane parallel to the Brock road, past Trigg's farm,

through woods so dense that the men were obliged to keep to the track. At the junction of the Orange and Culpeper roads he was met by FitzLee, who conducted him with one orderly on to a hillock whence the broad clearing at Dowdall's Tavern could be seen through the trees and the host of the enemy reposing on it. Less than a mile away the neatly constructed breastwork could also be seen facing south and barring the Orange road, but north of it the Federal flank was quite unprotected by any works as yet ; behind the barrier were the groups of soldiers preparing their evening meal in fancied security, with many thousand horses, mules and carts for whom there was barely room in the background.

The head of the column had halted while the generals reconnoitred, giving the rear a chance to close up ; then came the order to continue the march by the Culpeper road 4 P.M. until the leading division crossed the old turn-pike a mile and a half further on. There they turned to the right, and formed in line of battle across the road on a front of three thousand yards : Rodes' division in the first line, Colston's two hundred yards behind it, and Hill's toiling in march formation gradually came into line as a reserve. Although everything depended on surprise, and any moment an accident might reveal the near presence of so large a force to the careless enemy, Jackson patiently superintended the formation of his troops, and instructed them carefully how to act when the inevitable confusion of an attack on such ground should take them from his control. Two hours were thus consumed.

Not a sign of alarm, however, appeared in the vast bivouac. The men continued their occupations, and the animals filled themselves with forage while they swished at the forest flies with their long tails. FitzLee had withdrawn his squadrons to meet the approach of Federal Horse reported at Ely's Ford, and at 6 P.M. when all was in perfect order the advance began.

For more than a mile the broad line of infantry marched through the thickets with their left wing extending far into

The attack
on the
Federal
right wing
at 6 P.M.

the forest north of the road. They resembled a huge line of beaters on some gigantic battue and before them fled countless wild animals, rabbits, deer, foxes and flocks of wild turkeys. The beasts were soon followed by men, for the weak Federal piquets thrown out a few hundred yards from the line were quickly swept away. Then the bugles rang out the charge and the cheering ranks levelled their bayonets and rushed straight into the position. In a moment the wildest confusion prevailed. Men and animals stampeded and fell over one another. In swift succession the divisions of the luckless XI corps were borne away by the mob of fugitives, though many regiments gallantly strove to stem the torrent. The attacking troops, with yells of triumph, followed up their success; they pierced the breast-work on the Orange road at many points and took the flying troops in flank and rear, shooting and stabbing the isolated groups who continued to resist and pursuing with their fire the flying mass along the road. A long line of Confederate standards flew triumphant where the Federal guards had stood fifteen minutes ago, large groups of prisoners were being marched to the rear, guns, rifles and trophies of every sort were being collected. The rout of one of the five corps opposed to the Confederate army had been but the work of a few minutes.

The sound of firing had brought Hooker out of his quarters at the Chancellorsville house; his staff were hurriedly collecting on the verandah, when the flood of men and animals came rushing towards them. 'My God, here they come!' exclaimed a voice; the first impression being that the enemy had penetrated to the centre of the army. Hooker's measures were quickly and wisely taken. Sickles with the III corps was to meet the intruders with a flank attack, while the reserve divisions were as soon as possible to be thrown athwart their path.

The cavalry brigade of Pleasonton was the first succour which came to the retreating Federals. Having abandoned the useless pursuit of Jackson's trains, this officer had returned to Hazel Grove and luckily for his army had not

Hooker's
disposi-
tions to
meet the
attack.

off-saddled. At the first alarm he at once sent one of his remaining regiments, the 8th Pennsylvanians, at a gallop to attack the enemy in flank, while with the other, the 17th Pennsylvanians, he hurried along the artillery nearest at hand to bar their direct advance. The 8th rode gallantly through the wood by a Charge of Cavalry checks victorious Confederate rates. bridle path until they came upon Rodes' infantry disordered by their victory; without waiting to form line they dashed in a swarm straight in among the foot soldiers, and after a short and bloody *mêlée* in which they lost one third of their strength, the brave troopers escaped in the jungle. Of all the events of the campaign this isolated charge had the most important result; for, besides inflicting a temporary check on the advancing infantry, it led indirectly to the shooting down by his own men of Stonewall Jackson. Orders were given along the Confederate lines to beware of the enemy's cavalry, whose strength was unknown, and when their general and his staff returned from reconnoitring they were mistaken for hostile cavalry and fired upon.

While the Confederate infantry were charging furiously up the road, waving their own and the captured colours, The III Federal corps bars Jackson's advance. Whipple and Berry's divisions were hurrying to meet them with their artillery; and eventually the Federals succeeded in forming a strong line of battle across the road covering the open ground between Fairview and Chancellorsville. Great confusion reigned in the Southern ranks. The centre brigades of the two leading divisions were merged in one mass of charging soldiers, while the flank brigades had diverged through the wood. The rays of the setting sun were slanting through the trees and little time remained to complete the victory. In the scene of mad excitement Jackson exerted himself to restore order; he pressed forwards towards the open space where crowded together stood the trains of the Federal army. With his head bare, his lips moving in prayer, the reins in his right hand and his left pointing in the direction he wished the attack to take, he rode in the leading ranks of his soldiers, looking like a priest of Odin, the incarnation of

aggressive war. In the thick of the fight his mind worked quickest and clearest and he had already formed the daring project of cutting off the retreat of the enemy from United States Ford, the last now left open to him, and of penning him up in the space between Fairview and Chancellorsville. With this object he strove to restore order in Rodes' and Colston's divisions; then he sent for A. P. Hill to come through them to form the first line for a fresh attack. The impetus of the advance was gone for the present and Whipple and Birney's Federals had made good their stand in the woods which closed in on the road north of Hazel Grove. Gradually the firing diminished and nearly ceased, though here and there a fitful outburst disturbed the silence of the forest and flecked its sombre recesses with tongues of flame.

The ridge or plateau from Talley's Farm, the point where Jackson's attack first smote the Federal army, to Chancellorsville is for three miles the water-parting between the Rappahannock and Matapony rivers. At the point where the road to United States Ford diverges from it, the woods closely approach the main road and divide the plateau into two approximately equal parts. By 8 P.M. the western half of the plateau was in the hands of Jackson's troops, but their farther advance was barred by Sickles' divisions thrown into the wood and athwart the road. Within this wood a stone wall and a rough entrenchment hastily constructed gave some protection to the Federals.

Both sides now prepared to renew the contest by offensive strokes. Jackson had sent for Hill's division, which had been on the march ever since it had been relieved by Anderson on the outpost line, and Lane's its leading brigade pushed through the regiments of Colston's and Rodes' divisions which were rallying round their colours as best they could in the failing light. Having restored some order to his line of battle, and while Hill's division, which was designated for the next attack, was forming up, Jackson rode forward himself to reconnoitre the enemy's position in the wood. He was returning with a large group of staff officers and couriers when the shot of a

Prepara-
tions for
renewing
the fight.

The
wounding
of Stone-
wall Jack-
son.

single skirmisher threw the opposing lines on the alert, for they were close enough to one another to hear distinctly the shouts and words of command. A desultory exchange of shots followed, and as it died away the general, leading his party, pushed his horse through the trees to the spot where he had passed the 18th North Carolina of Lane's brigade. The officer in command of the leading company, whose nerves had been overstrained by fatigue and by the exciting circumstances of the combat in the dark jungle, fearing another cavalry attack, ordered his men to fire a volley at the approaching group of horsemen. The effect was deadly. Jackson was struck by three bullets; two hit the left arm and one his right hand raised to guard his face from the branches. He fell from the saddle. Several of his party were struck down, and Boswell, the engineer officer who knew best the topography of the surrounding woods, was killed. With great difficulty, after coming twice under the enemy's fire the officers with him succeeded in bearing the wounded commander out of the battle and in a field hospital at Dowdall's Tavern his wounds were attended to. His left arm was amputated, after which he seemed to rally and to be recovering; but the shock was too great for his delicate frame and a week later he died in the arms of his wife, who had come from Richmond to nurse him. His last instructions on the field were 'to press the enemy,' and in his message to Lee announcing his wound he employed the same phrase. The last unconscious words he articulated on his death-bed called on A. P. Hill to charge. There never was a leader who better understood the value of offensive warfare or who waged it more skillfully.

The fall of Jackson was fatal to the chance of winning a decisive victory that evening. No one present but Hill knew of his plan or had the authority to attempt its execution; but while his chief was being borne from the field Hill was severely injured by the enemy's artillery, which 9 P.M. tried to sweep the road of Lane's regiments massed in column upon it. Stuart was sent for to take command, but he was several miles away by road at Ely's

Ford ; in the meanwhile Sickles was preparing to renew the battle with an attack of his whole corps, to which Hooker had given his assent, and for which he was bringing up reinforcements.

The advance of three divisions of the III corps was made at the same time north and south of the high road, so as to sweep the wood of the Confederate troops and to converge on the open ground west of it, but the Federals met with a most stubborn resistance. They soon fell into great confusion in the darkness, and lost direction in the undergrowth of the forest. The struggle degenerated into a costly but bootless *mêlée* in which many a man was struck down by his own side and in which the troops on the defensive lying in wait for their opponents had all the advantage. By 11 P.M. orders were given to abandon the attempt until the morning, and about the same time Stuart reached the scene of the fight. At first he thought of attacking in his turn, but soon gave up the idea and prepared his three divisions to resume the battle in the early morning. With this intention he extended his right wing down the Lewis Creek opposite Hazel Grove which he meant to storm, so as to connect with Lee's left opposite Fairview on the eastern side of the streamlet. Stuart's plan was thus the reverse of Jackson's. Instead of widening the gap between the Confederate wings so as to strike at the enemy's line of retreat which was Jackson's intention, Stuart reduced the interval between them and aimed his stroke at the commanding ground on the enemy's front. It is probable that the more daring plan of attacking the Federal rear might have succeeded if Jackson could have carried it out promptly after routing the XI corps, but Stuart's more cautious orders better met the case after the Federal army had in some measure recovered from the surprise and disposed itself to meet the new situation.

At 6.30 P.M. the sound of rifle and artillery fire rolling from west to east announced to Lee's anxious ears that Jackson had not only attacked but was driving his enemy before him. He lost no time in engaging the attention of

troops. It was imperative too for Hooker to recover the lost ground on the western half of the plateau so essential to the freedom of movement of his army and to the possession of the roads through the forest. He still disposed of five corps, besides the XI corps now massed in reserve; he might have thrown seventy thousand men upon the forty thousand Southerners, and by well-concerted action it was still possible to attack their rear with Sedgwick's corps from Fredericksburg.

This last measure, indeed, he tried to take by ordering Sedgwick to advance without delay, at the same time informing him of the weakness of the Confederate detachment holding Marye's Heights. Otherwise he prepared to remain on the defensive, and even to contract his position by withdrawing from the height called Hazel Grove which overlooked the clearing at Chancellorsville. As if in anticipation of more disaster, the Federal commander caused a new defensive position to be prepared by felling trees along the two ravines which ran from the White House down to the river, the Mineral Spring and the Hunting Run, so as to cover the ford and provide a refuge for his army if driven from the high road. These feeble dispositions yielded to his bold adversaries every advantage which should have been his, and enabled Lee and Stuart to carry out their audacious strategy.

The fiery attack made by Jackson's corps after its fine flank march had effected the rout of a Federal corps at little cost, and had obtained possession of one half of the plateau, but it had failed in its principal object owing to mistakes which might easily have been avoided. To begin with, the formation of the attacking troops was faulty in the extreme. Instead of extending whole divisions in each line, each division should have approached the enemy in column as near as possible. Little by little they should have been engaged by deploying successive regiments or brigades as they came in contact with the enemy, and by reinforcing from rear to front. The premature deployment of two whole divisions soon placed it out of the power of the commanding general to follow up his initial success, and it was

by good luck and favour of the night that his troops held on to their captured ground.

Far more disastrous and quite as unnecessary was the reckless exposure of the life of the Confederate leader in between the firing lines of the two hostile forces. Not much was to be learnt in the darkness by exposing himself, and his life was of priceless value to his country. Moreover, even in the local combat, his place was where he could command the whole army corps which was left without any proper direction by the wounding of its chief and his principal staff officers. It may sometimes be essential for a general to risk his life in order to reconnoitre for himself, but it can only be justifiable when a good view is obtainable and when ample provision has been made to hand over the command in case of an accident. Lastly, Jackson made a mistake in parting with all his cavalry. The pursuit of the routed XI corps by a regiment of FitzLee's gallant troopers for a mile along the road would have completed their destruction, while the victorious infantry re-formed and advanced in good order for a fresh enterprise; but opportunities for the combined action of cavalry and infantry in the fight were not sought for as they should have been by any of the American generals. Having regard to the great disparity between the two armies and the absolute necessity of instantly following up the surprise attack by fresh blows before the enemy could rally and prepare to meet them, it may be questioned whether it would not have been wiser to delay the whole attack until dawn of the following day. Thus there would then have been time enough to communicate with Lee in order to arrange a combined assault, and the long hours of daylight would have enabled the Confederates to fight out the battle to a decisive finish in one day, after resting and feeding the infantry which had marched all day on Saturday the 2nd.

Such as it was the flank march and surprise attack, followed by the stubborn defence of the captured position against an assault by night of fresh troops, form one of the most brilliant feats of arms recorded in military history. The fall of the chief who designed and executed the master

stroke in the very hour of victory adds pathos to the story and appropriately closed his too brief career of glory. Great as were the moral and material results of the victory they were bought at all too dear a price, for with the fatal shot which struck down Stonewall Jackson began the series of disastrous events leading to the conquest of the Confederacy.

CHAPTER III

FAIRVIEW HEIGHTS

Jeb Stuart—Hazel Grove abandoned by the Federals, 6 A.M.—The Attack on Fairview, 6 A.M. to 9 A.M.—The Battle from 9 A.M. to 10 A.M.—Storming Fairview, 9.30 A.M.—Decisive Confederate Victory, 10 A.M.—The Attack suspended by news of Sedgwick's Advance, 1 P.M.—Fight on Marye's Heights—The assault on Marye's Hill and Lee's Hill at 11 A.M.—Fight at 5 P.M. on Salem Heights—Remarks on the Operations of the Detached Wing: May 3—Situation of contending Forces at daybreak: May 4—Lee's Dispositions on May 4—Second Fight on Salem Heights on May 4 at about 1 P.M.—May 5 in the Wilderness—Lee's Orders—The Rain falls at noon—Hooker's Escape by night—May 6—Loss of the two Armies—Operations of the Federal Cavalry—Remarks on the Campaign—The career of Stonewall Jackson—General Order No. 61.

JAMES STUART, or Jeb as he was called in the army from his first three initials, proved himself in his short career the greatest warrior among the many great men who have been so called. Whether or no he was really descended from Robert the Bruce, he certainly had inherited the kingly talent for leading men and making war. He won the great battle of May 3 which was decisive in this campaign by skilful and gallant leading. He was but twenty-eight years old when he took Jackson's place at the head of the Second corps, and it would perhaps have been well for the Southern cause if Lee had retained him at his side to share in the supreme command as he had used Jackson, instead of once again transferring him to the command of the cavalry which FitzLee, W. Lee, or Hampton was qualified to hold. Stuart had, like Sedgwick, served under Lee in the cavalry of the United States army, and the knowledge possessed by their former colonel of the two men's characters and capacities stood the Southern general in good stead on this critical field; he could take liberties with the over-

cautious Sedgwick and give the rein to the offensive skill of Stuart. Soon after the outbreak of the war Stuart distinguished himself as a cavalry leader, and his strategical work in blindfolding the enemy and in enlightening his own army has never been surpassed. As a cavalry tactician he is not only the first, but hitherto the only, leader of the arm who understood how to combine the effects of fire and shock, how to render effective service in fighting on foot without losing the power to strike on horseback when opportunity offered, though his Federal opponents imitated his strategy and tactics with some success in the next campaign.

On Sunday May 3, the dawn was obscured by the river mist so frequent on the banks of the Rappahannock. By five o'clock in the morning the Confederate regiments had got under arms and, scarcely waiting to eat the food which Stuart had caused to be distributed, the soldiers of Hill's division now forming the first line, were clamouring to be led into action. While it was yet dark Stuart had brought up the artillery of the Second corps to the Lewis Creek in order to enfilade the hostile position, but before it came into action his infantry threw themselves upon the Federal soldiers still remaining in the wood which had been the scene of last night's engagement, with vengeful cries of 'Remember Jackson!'

Sickles in the meanwhile had begun to execute Hooker's orders for the evacuation of the ground west of the Lewis Creek when the furious charge of the Grey riflemen compelled him to turn and defend himself. The fierce and costly fight which followed left the contested wood and the heights of Hazel Grove in the possession of the assailants. Stuart lost no time in dragging his artillery forward on to the height; he established a battery of thirty guns opposite Fairview hill and cemetery which could fire across the high road at a range of only eleven hundred yards.

Unaware that the retreat of the enemy had been made by order the Confederates pressed impetuously on their tracks and were checked with severe loss in the ravine which splits the plateau from White House southward to Lewis Creek.

Hazel
Grove
aban-
doned
by the
Federals,
6 A.M.

Along the road, however, some Confederate guns followed; the fight was quickly restored and raged with increasing fury around the Fairview Heights on which Sickles' troops rallied to oppose the converging attacks from the west and south. The fire of Stuart's guns at Hazel Grove caused great loss of life and confusion to the closely concentrated Federals, for the shells fell in among the mass of carriages around Chancellorsville and raked the whole glade. As the fight becomes more intense the snarl of rifles through the woods to the east of Hazel Grove is at length audible and gradually swells into the roar of a fierce contest in which artillery takes part. The soldiers of the Second corps realise that their comrades of the First are joining in the battle, and encouraged by the sound fight more furiously than before on both sides of the road and against the defenders of Fairview.

The troops at Lee's disposal were too few to enable him to strike home when Stuart began his advance on both sides of the main road, but he closed his brigades towards their left, leaving skirmishers to keep the enemy's left wing amused, and pushing forward artillery wherever an opening in the trees gave it a range. Thus skilfully disposing his forces he began gradually to press upon the Federal breast-works, threatening them right along their line and so keeping them in doubt as to his real point of attack. The Confederate artillery under the orders of both Stuart and Lee greatly assisted the attack; the fire of the batteries of the First and Second corps crossed, and inflicted death and wounds in the space round the Federal headquarters, crowded as it was with troops, trains and field-hospitals. Of the seven Federal divisions seriously attacked, three defended the Fairview plateau, two faced westward along the Lewis Creek ravine and two held Lee at bay facing east on the plank and old pike roads which once again diverge at Chancellorsville.

When he judged the fire of his guns to have produced some effect Stuart hurled his line across the ravine and a hard fight followed on its eastern bank; at the same time two brigades attacked from the south and repeatedly charged the defenders of the cemetery with the bayonet. Between

The attack
on Fair-
view,
6 A.M. to
9 A.M.

the mêlées a hot fire of musketry occupied the combatants, which inflicted less harm owing to the protection of the ground and trees. Three unsuccessful attempts were made to storm Fairview; the divisions of Stuart's second and third lines, Rodes' and Colston's, which had fought overnight, were brought up in succession, but only to be repulsed by the fierce tenacity with which the Northern soldiers clung to their blood-stained post. Officers of all ranks fought in the hand-to-hand contest and both Berry and Whipple commanding the two Northern divisions with which Sickles held Fairview were mortally wounded. By 9 A.M., though the Federals had fired away almost their last cartridge and the rain of shells behind them had broken up the ammunition column, thus preventing the supply from being replenished, yet they had driven the Confederate brigades exhausted from loss of blood back into the wood which bordered the western side of the ravine. The men's faces were black with smoke and their clothes torn by the thickets; the barrels of the rifles were hot from use and their bayonets in many cases twisted and stained with blood. All around them lay wounded and dying men, while the fire never ceased for an instant, nor the sharp sound of bullets cutting their way through the branches. The famous Stonewall brigade which had made the last fierce attempt to establish itself on Fairview had lost its commander, the brave Paxton; six out of seventeen general officers in the II corps had fallen, regiments and brigades were hopelessly mixed up and a pause in the attack took place.

It may well be asked why the reserve troops of the Federal army, the I and V corps, thirty-two thousand rifles, were not used to decide the contest. No satisfactory answer to this question has ever been forthcoming. The battle increasing in fury had been four hours in progress, but no attempt was made to reinforce the defenders of Fairview. So far as Hooker can be said to have controlled the army, he merely used the half of it engaged as a rearguard while he made preparations for retreating with his whole force within the new entrenched position which he had prepared and whose salient angle was at the

The battle
from 9 A.M.
to 10 A.M.

White House, one mile north of Chancellorsville. In the lull of the fighting Stuart rode through his troops and helped to reform them for another attack, while he caused the artillery to increase its fire against the enemy's position and to sweep the high road. Lee was doing the same thing, and the effect of this bombardment was to inflict still greater loss and confusion in the enemy's ranks. Hooker himself was wounded and stunned by falling masonry at Chancellor's House which was set on fire; many wounded soldiers were burnt alive, and the dry branches in the barricades and entanglements also caught fire. All order had ceased in the clearing north of Fairview; no succour came to the decimated defenders. At this critical moment Lee himself brought Perry's Florida brigade from the wood south of the plank road down the ravine until he joined hands with Archer's brigade, which formed Stuart's extreme right. The five Confederate divisions were thus reunited in a continuous line of battle.

The sight of Lee roused the utmost enthusiasm among Jackson's soldiers, who shouted 'God bless your noble head!' as he passed. The signal was then given for an assault right along the line. While the guns swept the road and the clearing on either side of it, Stuart led his infantry once more across the ravine, singing at the top of his voice and waving his sword. His blond beard, blue eyes and noble figure on horseback recalled the Norman hero who led the van at Hastings singing the songs of Roland. With a fury the Federals were no longer able to resist the converging troops from the west, south, and east thronged across the ravines cheering and waving their tattered colours. The brigades and regiments were mixed up and many hundreds of the men were dabbled with blood from wounds given or received, but undeterred by previous failure the whole line lowered their bayonets and fell upon Sickles' corps, which bravely contested every yard of the ground, repeatedly charging with cold steel, but were finally swept away. Berry had been succeeded in command of his division by General Revere. This officer gave the signal to retire while Sickles was still endeavouring to stem

Storming
Fairview,
9.30 A.M.

the tide of disaster, for which he was put under arrest on the spot and afterwards cashiered by a court-martial. He had, however, but anticipated the inevitable retreat by a few minutes, and each minute's delay now made it more costly. On every side the Confederate soldiers mad with excitement were breaking through the contracted line of the defenders. Anderson and McLaws' divisions had attacked in earnest and driven Slocum's XII corps before them into the smoke of the conflagration round Chancellorsville. Fairview was lost, and it only remained for Sickles to withdraw the wreck of his command to the new line of entrenchments.

By 10 o'clock the whole mass of the three Federal corps was recoiling before the victorious assailants. Sickles' corps, which had sustained the brunt of the conflict, had also suffered most and was in the greatest disorder; the XII corps fell back fighting, and on the Federal left Hancock withdrew his division in masterly style, checking McLaws' advance as he did so. In this manœuvre Colonel Miles, afterwards commander-in-chief of the United States army, first became distinguished. The scene around Chancellorsville when Lee on horseback amid his victorious soldiers reached the cross roads showed how severe had been the struggle and how destructive the fire of the Southern artillery. The ground was littered with injured men and horses, and with the smoking débris of carts and equipment; an immense mass of military stores became the prize of the victors, who crowded round their well-beloved chief with enthusiastic cheers, while the retreating mass and the sound of firing rolled slowly northward. But little time was wasted in self-congratulation. Lee was determined to finish off Hooker without giving him time to recover the stunning blow under which his army was reeling, and orders were issued to re-form the decimated Grey divisions with the intention of resuming the attack.

The victory was indeed a brilliant achievement. Three more Federal army corps had been driven from a strong position in four hours' fighting within an hour's march of the other three, but the loss on both sides had been very

great. By the capture of the open space between Dowdall's Tavern and Chancellorsville Lee deprived his opponents of all offensive power at this point; all they could do now was to defend themselves, and there was good reason to hope that their last refuge might not save the defeated troops from ruin. News, however, reached the Confederate commander soon after one o'clock which compelled him to countermand the fresh attack for which his troops had already been drawn up, and to leave Hooker in his entrenchments over which a mass of black smoke rolled from the burning woods. A message from General Early informed Lee that the Federal VI corps had stormed Marye's Heights and was in possession of the Orange plank road. Lee's countenance showed no change at these evil tidings; he promptly suspended the preparations for the attack, and commanded instead that four divisions should invest Hooker while McLaws marched to meet the Federals menacing the rear of his army. These orders were forthwith executed.

A brief description of the events in front of Fredericksburg is necessary to understand how the VI corps made its tardy appearance in the arena of decisive conflict.

Fight on
Marye's
Heights.

The result of many more or less contradictory orders and bewildering communications from Hooker to Sedgwick had left that general with the three divisions of the VI corps on the right bank of the Rappahannock below Fredericksburg ready to pursue the fugitives from Hooker's battlefield on the roads leading southwards to Richmond. Gibbon's division of the II corps remained at Falmouth linking the two wings of the Federal army and guarding the vast supply depot there. Not content with sending telegrams Hooker had despatched both Butterfield the chief of the Staff and Warren his chief engineer to enlighten Sedgwick and to concert measures with him. The absence of Butterfield from headquarters on the morning of May 3 was particularly unfortunate for the army, because when Hooker was wounded there was no one to take up the command, and the Federals suffered in consequence, as their enemy had suffered the night before when Jackson fell. The presence

of Warren, however, with Sedgwick's detachment infused a vigour into his measures hitherto wanting. The line of heights from Taylor's Hill to Marye's Hill was piqueted by Barksdale's two thousand men on a front of two and a half miles. Early had disposed his four brigades to dispute the Federal advance on the southern roads, and Wilcox's brigade held Banks' Ford. Acting on Warren's suggestion Sedgwick now directed Gibbon to cross the river by a pontoon bridge, and to attack Cemetery Hill, while the VI corps marched up the river bank to roll up the flank of the Confederate outpost line. Hooker knew the weakness of Early's forces early on Saturday the 2nd, but only communicated the important intelligence to Sedgwick late the same evening, with a positive order to strike at them.

In spite of the moonlight the mist which hung over the valley made night operations difficult. The march of Sedgwick's troops was harassed by hostile riflemen, and its progress was very slow. On the Sunday morning, at the hour when the battle of Chancellorsville began, Gibbon's division was crossing the river and Sedgwick's advanced troops had occupied the town. Warren remained at Gibbon's side urging him to action, but the preparations of the four Federal divisions were very slow, and it seemed as if they were oppressed by the recollection of the fatal field of December 13. At length a general movement was made against the defenders of the heights, who had, however, become aware of the menace, and were prepared to meet it, though it cannot be said that Early's dispositions were very skilful. His instructions were above all things to cover the great Confederate supply depot at Guiney's Station, distant only thirteen miles on the Richmond railway. Engrossed by the tremendous events at Chancellorsville, Lee had omitted to inform Early of the new situation which had arisen, and which made the road to Chancellorsville and not the road to Richmond the important one to bar. A single brigade could have sufficiently delayed Sedgwick's advance to the south if he had rashly taken that direction; but he had no such intention, and a closer observation of the Federal dispositions and a swifter manœuvring of the slender forces

at his disposal would have enabled Early, if not to deny the Chancellorsville road entirely to the enemy, yet to hold him in check long enough to prevent interference with Lee's army. Moreover, Lee's headquarters were but ten miles distant by road, and the sound of heavy firing all the morning attested the violence of the struggle in which the main army was engaged, and gave a clue to the situation.

At 11 A.M. the Federal general extended long lines of skirmishers followed by troops in close order and marched forward to attack; his first advance was repulsed with heavy loss, but the second pierced the thinly occupied line of works, and the centre of the position at Lee's Hill fell at the same time. In fifteen minutes the defenders of the famous lines were in full retreat in diverging directions. Early rallied his division on the telegraph road leading to Richmond; Wilcox, who made a rapid march from Banks' Ford which he was guarding to assist in the defence, fell back along the plank road with the intention of guarding Lee's rear as long as possible by checking any Federal troops that might try to march along it. Three hours then elapsed without a sign of troops on the plank road; it seemed as if Early had rightly judged the enemy to be marching south when a mounted officer sent to watch them came galloping along the road. After the capture of the heights, the Federal corps, which had lost nearly one thousand men in the effort, had halted to rest and recover itself; Warren who supplied its impetus had returned to Hooker's headquarters. Gibbon's division had been sent back across the river to guard the magazines at Falmouth leaving a brigade only to hold Fredericksburg and outposts on Marye's Heights. The two divisions which had been engaged piled their arms until Brooks', the third division which had formed Sedgwick's left wing, was brought on to the plank road and deployed across it in front of them. This manœuvre was not unmolested by Wilcox, who managed to delay the Federals another hour before they advanced in two lines covered by skirmishers and followed by the remainder of the VI corps in column.

Four miles from the foot of Marye's Heights stood

Salem Church and schoolhouse on opposite sides of the plank road; thence eastward the road runs on a neck of high ground for a mile to the Tollhouse. The loop of the river where are Banks' and Scott's Fords is but a mile and a half from Salem Church, and south of this neck, known as Salem Heights, runs a ravine into the Hazel Run; this little stream also runs parallel with and south of the road. Between the plank road and the river the country is wooded and intersected with ravines, so that the position was a good one for delaying the advance of superior numbers, and would become a strong one when reinforcements prolonged its flanks. At 5 o'clock the scouts in Blue approached the Tollhouse where Southern soldiers lay hid and very soon a circle of rifle fire crept round the Confederate post, which had to be abandoned. A running fight to Salem Church, then a determined stand followed; before the Federals could bring their strength to bear, however, McLaws' men, tramping from the battlefield of Chancellorsville, had heard the firing and had hastened their march. A solid line of battle was soon formed by McLaws' two leading brigades and a determined advance threw the Federals on the defensive in their turn and recovered a quarter of a mile of the road. Up and down the highway the fighting swayed as each side was reinforced by the troops which kept pressing up into line from the road behind; darkness fell upon the scene without a decisive result, but not before heavy loss had been sustained by both sides. McLaws' and Wilcox's troops bivouacked in position across the road, while Sedgwick withdrew his weary men out of range of the hostile guns.

By his presence of mind and correct tactical insight Wilcox had gained a very important advantage for the Confederate army in checking the VI corps seven miles from the principal scene of action. Early would have done better if he had perceived the real objective of Sedgwick's advance, and if he had massed some of his troops so as to fall on the flank of the advancing Federals on the plank road. Sedgwick's manœuvres were extremely slow just when time

Fight at
5 P.M. on
Salem
Heights.

Remarks
on the
operations
of the
detached
wing.
May 3.

was the essence of the situation. The entire lack of cavalry in these operations tied the hands of both the adversaries and gave a halting and indecisive character to their efforts. It is easy to see how decisive would have been the advantage to either side which possessed even five hundred good horsemen in the struggle for Marye's Heights and subsequently in the fight on the plank road. Had both sides disposed of a cavalry force the initial advantage would have been with whichever could cut up the hostile cavalry in seeking to play its rôle. The staunchness of the Confederate soldiers of the First corps who fearlessly faced overwhelming numbers, and who swiftly strode from one sanguinary battlefield to another, cannot be too highly praised nor too faithfully imitated, for no infantry ever fought better; while the constancy of their Federal opponents in returning again and again to the struggle in spite of reverses of fortune caused by feeble leadership established their claim to the highest consideration, and enhances the fame of both combatants. Rapid and direct communication between the separated wings of both armies should not have been difficult for the Federals and was very easy for the Confederates, but it was neglected by both with fatal results. The want of despatch-riders, of useful and well-instructed staff officers, but above all of co-operating cavalry, impeded the manœuvres and spoilt the best conceptions of the commanding generals.

The call of sentries and the moans of the wounded, familiar sounds on a stricken field, alone broke the silence of the night in the thick forest where the seventy-five thousand troops under Hooker had taken cover. All around them the net had been drawn, and across the steep ravines which bounded the position of the Unionist army countless groups of Grey soldiers were sleeping by their rifles ready at a moment's notice to dispute any advance of the defeated host beyond the barricades. The other group of the Federal army consisted now of the VI corps only; it had been reduced to less than twenty thousand riflemen by the losses of the previous day's fighting and by men straggling in the

Situation
of con-
tending
forces at
daybreak,
May 4.

woods. Between these two forces the Confederates had likewise two distinct groups; their principal force of four divisions, say thirty thousand fighting men, lay on an outer circle investing Hooker. Six miles off McLaws with five brigades, which after much fighting could not have exceeded seven thousand combatants, held Salem Church and a position barring the plank road. But there was yet a third group of Confederates, the five brigades under Early eight thousand men, lying in the fields beside the Richmond road only five miles from the bivouac of the VI corps. During the night Early had established touch with McLaws and realised how matters stood. Somewhat ashamed of the blunder he had made in leaving open the road to Sedgwick, he now determined to retrieve it by attacking the Federals in rear without waiting for orders, and as soon as it was light, his brigades were marching to sweep from the heights of Fredericksburg the feeble posts which occupied them. During the night there had been repeated exchange of despatches between Sedgwick and Hooker. The latter's instructions were as contradictory as before; only one thing was clear from them, the Federal commander-in-chief had no intention of resuming the offensive. It became then quite useless for Sedgwick to continue his advance, which would merely have brought his army corps near enough to Lee's main body to make it certain that the whole might of the Confederate leader would be hurled on his front and flank while Early cut off his retreat. The only rational plan left for the VI corps was to get out of harm's way while there was yet time.

On May 4 the chances of victory for the Federals were far less than twenty-four hours earlier, owing to the defeats they had suffered and the bad situation of the main body under Hooker; but they still retained the means of reinforcing the VI corps from Hooker's wing, and they still possessed a very great numerical superiority, while the capture of the Marye Heights had done something to raise their confidence. A prompt reinforcement of the VI corps by way of United States and Banks Fords with two corps at least, followed by an energetic offensive simultaneously with both wings,

might yet have turned the tables on the Southern army, which had been weakened and wearied by four days' continuous marching and fighting. Directly it became certain that no such plan was contemplated by his superior, Sedgwick wisely resolved to abandon his advance, but prepared to defend the ground occupied by his three divisions covering the road to Banks' Ford from the Tollhouse.

Daylight on Monday found General Lee still revolving daring schemes for the destruction of the now unwieldy host which he had so skilfully driven into a pen, while Lee's Dis- positions the hostile detachment under Sedgwick lay tempt- on May 4. ingly near for a sudden swoop. At first he inclined to an attack on Hooker, and in the early morning prepared to assail the left of the Federal position with Anderson's division; but a reconnoissance along the river road revealed the strength of the defensive line, and made Lee determine to strike at Sedgwick instead, and then to come back with his whole army to finish off Hooker. Accordingly he commanded Anderson to countermarch and to reinforce McLaws, while Stuart still further extended his attenuated line so as to complete the investment in Anderson's place. While these movements were in process of execution Lee betook himself to Salem Church to take command in the battle, while Stuart remained to sit on guard over the mass of the enemy's army. Profiting by the inaction of the Unionists and making good use of the curtain of forest which narrowly bounded its horizon, Stuart ably and successfully carried out Lee's instructions. A reconnoissance in force against his left was driven in with a loss of five hundred men to the Federals, leaving Hooker more than ever convinced that he was surrounded by superior forces.

At about 1 P.M. Lee and Anderson reached Salem Church, having passed their troops on the march. The men heartily cheered their general, and gleefully stepped along Second Fight on Salem Heights on May 4. to join in the sport he was providing for them. Lee's plan was to fall on the VI corps from two direc- tions and thus to roll it up. He sent Anderson by a détour along the railway cutting which ran parallel with the plank road to join hands with Early, two of whose

brigades had in the meanwhile reoccupied Marye's Heights and were pushing northwards against the Federals on Taylor's Hill. This point was two miles from the Tollhouse in a straight line, and upon it rested Sedgwick's extreme left. McLaws was to attack when he heard the firing of Anderson's men and the three divisions were to converge on the high ground commanding the passage of the river. It was five o'clock before these dispositions were completed and then the fight began again in earnest. Anderson and Early's divisions emerging from the Hazel Run stormed across the high ground south of the plank road on a front of two thousand yards. Wright's Georgians captured the strongly built farmhouse called Downman's which commanded the surrounding fields, a North Carolina regiment penetrated across the plank road, and the left attack drove the Federals back on the Tollhouse. Then the advance came to a standstill. McLaws, owing to some mistake, had failed to co-operate, and Anderson suspended his attack, waiting for McLaws. In this manner the chance of a crushing victory over the VI corps was lost and night separated the combatants on another indecisive field; but Lee's combination had rid him of Sedgwick. After some further exchange of despatches with his chief the commander of the VI corps upon whose bivouacs the enemy continued to fire during the night finally resolved to recross the river, and the morning of May 5 showed the Federal positions to be deserted and their pontoon bridges to have been withdrawn across the stream, while on the far bank a long serpent of Blue wearily and dejectedly wound its way northwards and slowly disappeared between the woods.

Heavy clouds and grey mist hung over the surrounding woodlands when Lee's soldiers roused themselves on Tuesday

May 5 in
the Wil-
derness. May 5. Soon there came word that Sedgwick's army corps had disappeared in the night, and this report was followed by a message from Marye's Heights announcing that the enemy had retreated from them, evacuating all the right bank of the Rappahannock and the town of Fredericksburg. The Confederate general had now greatly simplified the task of his army; there only remained

the forces of Hooker cooped up in their entrenchments on the river bank, and at them he resolved to strike at once.

Once again the plank road between Salem Church and Chancellorsville was filled by the long array of McLaws' Lee's and Anderson's divisions countermarching to Orders. another battlefield, while Early drew off his division and Barksdale's brigade to hold the river bank in case Sedgwick should try to come back. Lee had resolved to attack Hooker on both his flanks, striking with the First corps at his left across the Mineral Spring Run, and with the Second corps at his right on the Hunting Run. Before the divisions could be formed for attack Stuart's troops must be relieved by Anderson and McLaws on the investing line from Chancellorsville along the Mineral Spring Run to the river, and this manœuvre unavoidably consumed several hours.

As the morning wore on, and the Confederate columns marching from Salem Heights turned their backs on one another, the clouds thickened and the rain began. The rain falls at noon. First a heavy shower, then a steady downpour which lasted all the afternoon. The 'Times' correspondent has vividly described how he sheltered himself in a cottage by the plank road and beheld the soldiers of the Confederate right wing tramp past, splashing through the mud and rain in roaring spirits, laughing and singing after fighting two battles a day, with a hard march in between them. Such troops might well consider themselves invincible. The rain, however, greatly delayed operations. Carts and guns stuck in the mud and the teams had to be helped by the troops to drag them along. Even the Confederate army began to show signs of exhaustion. Since the night of the 29th every man in it had been marching and fighting without intermission, and want of sleep was beginning to tell. It was late and dark before the preparations for the assault on Hooker's works were complete, and Lee was obliged to put off the formidable task till the morrow, but during the night Hooker escaped.

The heavy rain which delayed the march of the Southern army quickly swelled the waters of the Rappahannock.

The Federal commander had already resolved to retreat and in the morning when it began to rain he summoned a council of war to share the responsibility of the decision. He even left the generals to discuss the question together, and it would seem that the majority favoured retreat. The situation of the army had in truth become a very bad one. Even if it was posted strongly enough to beat back an assault, which could not be certain after the storming of Fairview, there seemed no prospect of its being able to take the offensive with any success. Moreover a number of regiments consisted of men whose engagement had expired on May 1, and of these the majority demanded their discharge and refused to fight any more. Such being the case, in spite of the gallant and devoted conduct of the remainder of the army, it seemed futile to continue the struggle in the Wilderness. The rapid rise of the water hastened Hooker's decision; one of his three bridges had to be broken up to prolong the other two, and it seemed likely that he might at any moment be cut off from his supplies of food and ammunition, both of which were exhausted in the trains he had brought with him. As soon, therefore, as the thick mist which succeeded the rain when evening fell, wrapped itself around the outposts of the two armies the Federal retreat began.

The passage of the stream was successfully accomplished, though it seemed at one time as if the current might carry away the bridges and leave the army cut in twain. Forty guns on the left bank, and Meade's fresh army corps on the right, formed a rearguard to cover the passage. As on a former occasion the regular infantry held the post of honour and were the last to cross the river; then the bridges were withdrawn. The advancing Confederates had found the carefully constructed barricades empty, but they had not then pushed forward as quickly as they might have done, and when between eight and nine o'clock they began to swarm above the ford their foe was already out of range. The whole day was spent by the Federals in gloomily retracing their steps to the winter cantonments; wet, weary and discouraged the troops could see no end to their task,

while the loss of comrades and kinsfolk in what seemed to be an impossible attempt weighed heavily on everyone. Little as they seemed to have gained in the sanguinary campaign, however, an accident had given them an advantage, which perhaps alone made possible the ultimate triumph of the North when, in the confusion of the forest fighting, a chance bullet laid low their most dangerous foe.

In a very different frame of mind the Southern soldiers marched back from the scene of their glorious victory to their old quarters around Fredericksburg, for Lee had found it impossible to follow his enemy over the river, much as he would have liked to strike another blow at him. The regiments needed repose and recruits, for the victories of the past week had cost the lives of near three thousand officers and men and had filled the hospitals with seven thousand more, many of whom would never again be able to fight for the South. Eighteen thousand killed, wounded and prisoners was the loss Chancellorsville inflicted on the Army of the Potomac; over twenty thousand men left the colours at the same time, thus reducing by forty thousand the fine army which had marched forth to conquer Virginia. Immense stores of rifles and military material of every sort had been captured by the victors, who in common with the people of the Southern States believed that they had rendered their independence secure.

While the two armies had been fighting hard in the Wilderness the large force of cavalry which the Federal general needed so sorely to help his infantry had been carrying out the project of a great raid against the hostile lines of communication. On April 29 Stoneman crossed the Rappahannock with Buford's division and Gregg's brigade of Pleasonton's division one day later than Slocum's infantry. Averell's division followed the Orange and Alexandria railway with no other instructions than to cover Stoneman's corps from interference in its raid on the Virginia Central and Fredericksburg lines.

On May 1 Averell attacked W. F. Lee's cavalry brigade detached by Stuart to hold in check the whole mass of

Federal cavalry, and the two forces skirmished most of the day on foot around Rapidan Station without any decisive result. The Confederate brigades numbered about two thousand mounted men, but W. Lee's had been reduced to two regiments or nine hundred men. The Federal divisions mustered about two thousand eight hundred. After it was dark W. Lee shook off his opponent, and in the night's march reached Gordonsville, a distance of fifteen miles; here he rested his squadrons, while scouts and patrols rode forth to investigate what the rest of the Federal cavalry was doing. It soon transpired that Averell had not pursued, having fallen back to rejoin Hooker, but Stoneman's main body demanded attention. At the close of the campaign Averell and Stoneman were both superseded, though it seems probable that Hooker was more to blame than his cavalry officers for the little use he made of that arm. In rejoining the main army after completing the task assigned to him of covering Stoneman's flank, Averell certainly did the best thing possible, and drew upon himself the cavalry brigade of FitzLee, which had enabled Jackson to make his flank march on May 2, and which was certain to have wrought further mischief if it had been left unemployed by the Federal cavalry. Stoneman had left with him more than four thousand riders. He split his troops up into seven detachments with instructions to raid the country round Richmond and to destroy the railways. He would certainly have better carried out Hooker's instructions if he had kept his forces together and moved in as close as possible on Lee's rear, destroying the railway bridges as he went. As it was, the various detachments were too weak to venture to stay long enough in one place to do any permanent harm to the railway, though they destroyed a vast amount of public and private property and learnt some useful lessons in the art of raiding. W. Lee, however, keeping his brigade together, was soon on their tracks, and sweeping across the country from Gordonsville to Hanover Junction, compelled Stoneman to retreat northwards; two Federal detachments escaped across the Pamunkey to find shelter with the garrison of Gloster Court-house, at the mouth of the York.

These two detachments alone of Stoneman's corps touched the Fredericksburg railway; they burnt some small bridges and did other damage which was very soon repaired.

Stoneman recrossed the Rapidan on May 7, one day later than Hooker. His raid had not for a single day interrupted the railway service which supplied the Confederate army, nor did the damage done to the lines prevent the wounded and prisoners from Chancellorsville going to Richmond by rail. It is true that if Averell had continued to keep W. Lee's cavalry brigade busy, and if Stoneman had kept his squadrons concentrated, they might between them have done much more harm, especially if Lee's army had had another week's fighting to do in the Wilderness; but the fact remains that such raids have ever proved a failure in comparison with what cavalry can effect in close combination with the army it belongs to.

In all history there is not recorded a campaign which exemplifies more fully the preponderance of skilful direction over superior numbers than this week's fighting in the forest of Virginia. The Federal army was twice as numerous as the Confederate; the troops on either side were of the same race and almost equal in fighting power. What advantage the Southerners possessed consisted in the confidence engendered by previous victories and skilful leading. The scene of the strife gave, it is true, considerable advantages to a smaller army acting on interior lines; but these advantages had been practically neutralised by Hooker's skilful passage of the rivers and by the close touch he had the power to establish with his left wing on May 1. Directly the Federal army fell back into the forest the most promising features in its situation vanished. Precious space was given to the Southern chiefs in which to manœuvre while the woods correspondingly hindered their enemy and screened the movements of marching troops. Jackson perceived in a flash the opportunity and resolved on a relentless offensive. His fierce attack quickly imposed on the hesitating Hooker, who feared the fate of Pope, and believed from dire experience in the advantages of the tactical defensive. Had Lee been as badly informed as his

Remarks
on the
Campaign.

adversary, he might have played the latter's game by blundering against the entrenchments, but the Confederate cavalry working in close combination with their infantry secured for Lee the intelligence which at the same time it withheld from Hooker.

Outnumbered and to some extent outmanœuvred by the first Federal advance, Stuart's dispositions to repair his error were masterly. Having detached all the force he could spare to check the enemy's cavalry, he hurried without the loss of an hour to take post at the vital point, the outer flank that is of the contending armies. There he swept away the feeble resistance of the enemy's very inferior force of cavalry and sent his patrols swarming round the flank of the hostile army till they found its weak point. The information thus obtained was swiftly and accurately conveyed to headquarters, a task which is often harder than to get it, and far more often mismanaged. At headquarters there was responding energy. Jackson studied the map, and having matured his daring scheme, submitted it to Lee in a few words, by whom it was at once approved. The harmony which prevailed between the great Confederate generals is as rare as it was effective.

While the Confederates prosecuted their plans with all skill and energy, Hooker, deprived by the enemy's cavalry of all insight into the situation, hugged his delusions at Chancellorsville until they were dispelled by the yell of Jackson's charging riflemen. From this surprise he never recovered; his nerve for the offensive stroke by which alone his army could have been extricated was gone.

The advantages of a defensive attitude in war are apparent to all intelligent men who bring their close attention to bear on the subject. The difficulties and perils of the attacking side are not less apparent. It takes expert intelligence of the highest order to say when a military organisation has reached that pitch of excellence over its opponents, either by reason of the quality of its troops or from the superior skill of their commander, to justify the passing from the defensive to the offensive rôle; on the correct choice of that moment all depends both in directing a war on the most important

scale and in the local combats between small bodies of troops.

The history of war is a long record of the destruction of the defending side by its more enterprising and therefore more warlike adversary.

It is most interesting for the military student to mark the hopeless failure to co-operate between the wings of the Federal army, separated only by a single day's march. Administrative failure had much to do with this, mismanagement of the field telegraph and bad staff arrangements for the despatch and collection of orders ; but the same failures on a large and small scale are so constantly repeated that they are worthy of notice. Even the forces of Lee and Early connected by seven miles of good road failed to act as completely in concert as might have been expected from the general excellence of the Confederate command arrangements. The attacks of McLaws and Anderson on the night of May 4 at Salem Heights, which should have been simultaneous, failed similarly from want of proper concerted action. Nothing seems simpler than to prearrange that at a given hour troops shall move in co-operation ; nothing is harder to execute in practice. Every furlong which separates troops in a fight heavily handicaps their united action, and only leaders who have been trained to act in concert with a well-organised and tested system of distributing orders and information can maintain touch between separated bodies of troops, and can hope to strike together from different points of a field of battle.

When the news of the Federal defeat was carried to Jackson, he remarked that Hooker's plan of campaign was a good one, but that he had spoilt it by depriving himself of his cavalry. On the Confederate side a blunder was made by the Government at Richmond which exposed their principal army to crushing disaster, and which deprived their general in the field of the means of reaping the best fruits of the victory which skill had wrenched from superior strength. The concentration of force under Longstreet in North Carolina while the weather was too stormy and wet in Northern Virginia for field operations was timely and

judicious, but renewed aggression from the Army of the Potomac was to have been counted on as safely as the return of spring. Common sense therefore dictated that the lesser operations before Suffolk should be subordinated to the vitally important work before Fredericksburg, and however promising seemed the chance of a local success at the former place, it should never have been allowed to jeopardise the result of the campaign at the latter. Lee had repeatedly warned the President of the danger in which he stood in face of the far stronger army of the Union, while twelve thousand of his best infantry were distant a hundred and thirty-five miles by rail. The presence of these troops on the battlefields of the Wilderness would, as matters turned out, have completed the destruction of the Federal army. The difficulty would have been to withdraw them from before Suffolk in time to reinforce the army fighting Hooker after that general had crossed the Rapidan. If they had been withdrawn before he moved it is possible that he would have received a corresponding accession of strength from the numerous detached forces of the Union.

The problem here suggested would not have been insolvable. To begin with, a sharper look out by means of spies and other sources of information should have been kept on Hooker's preparations. With the armies in such close proximity there was no excuse for the ignorance which prevailed at the Confederate headquarters of the enemy's flank march till April 29. The railway connecting Longstreet's detachment through Richmond with Lee's advanced base at Guiney's Station should have been kept clear as far as possible for the conveyance of troops, while one division at least should have been stealthily withdrawn and marched by road. If Lee had been informed even as late as the morning of April 28 of Hooker's march, and had instantly telegraphed orders to execute the transference of the detachment, for which every preparation had been made by using both the railway and the road, some ten thousand infantry could have reached Chancellorsville on the night of May 4, in time to deliver an attack on the 5th before the retreat of the enemy. It seems that Longstreet's eagerness to obtain a local

success and to keep his independent command played into the hands of the Cabinet, whose members, like most amateurs in the art of strategy, were unable to appreciate the necessity of obtaining success at the decisive point, cost what sacrifices it may at points of subsidiary importance. Throughout the duration of the war the governments of both Republics continued to make the same fatal error; until, taught by adversity, Lincoln entrusted supreme direction of his military forces to one strong man, while Davis continued to interfere with the military dispositions of his commander-in-chief. Then and then only was a decision arrived at.

Chancellorsville has been described by Henderson 'as much the tactical masterpiece of the nineteenth century as Leuthen was of the eighteenth.' It was also a strategical masterpiece; a triumph that is of the general's skill in planning the movements of his army before it comes into collision with the enemy. But it was indecisive owing to the blunder of the Richmond authorities in splitting up their forces. Such as it was, it might have led to decisive victory if it had been followed up without the loss of a day by the invasion of the North, which took place six weeks later. Unfortunately, however, for the Confederacy, its rulers neglected the best opportunity they ever got of finishing the business. Their preparations had all been made on the idea of a defensive war which should wear out the patience and power of the North, and they relinquished this fatal policy only after hesitations and delays which enabled the enemy to recover from the material damage and moral disaster consequent on the failure of Hooker's invasion.

A masterhand has traced the principal lines in the life and military career of Stonewall Jackson, but no work which attempted to describe the downfall of the Southern military power would be complete without a brief sketch showing how the talents of this one great soldier had been the principal instrument in winning its victories, and how his untimely death deprived the chivalrous Lee, as he himself expressed it, of his right arm. 'If I had had the direction of events I should for the good of the

country have chosen to have been disabled in your stead.' With this generous message to his fallen comrade Lee gave expression to the loss which the Southern people had suffered. He could not have expressed it more forcibly. Both Jackson and Lee were indispensable to the success of the Confederate cause. It is probable that Jackson without Lee would have found his task hardly less impossible than did Lee without his great lieutenant.

In his now famous book Henderson has been accused of that sort of hero-worship in which biographers very generally delight, and of having exalted unreasonably Jackson's merits and performances during his two years' career as a general. Closer study of the history of the war will, we think, more than sustain the correctness of Henderson's judgment and the fame of his hero.

As a young officer Jackson had distinguished himself in the Mexican campaign; as an instructor of military history and as an organiser he had shown talent while a professor at the Lexington College for military cadets in Virginia. He made good use of his time in this capacity to study military history, by which alone the rough stone of military genius can be sharpened for practical use and application. His first chance as a leader in the field occurred when the two hosts of brave but undisciplined volunteers met at the fight on the Bull Run in July 1861. By his sure *coup d'œil* and by the ascendancy which his personality had won for him with the rank and file he turned the scale in that confused struggle, and won for himself and his brigade the famous title which will ever be remembered in history.

When the war began in earnest in the spring of 1862 by the invasion of the Southern States on a gigantic scale, Jackson was entrusted with the command of the small detached forces in the Shenandoah Valley with orders to keep away from the critical point round Richmond as large a proportion of the Federal army as possible. The result was the campaign in which he defeated in detail the immensely superior forces under Banks, Frémont and McDowell, and in which he spread panic and dismay to the

very streets of Washington, where his paltry detachment was magnified into a great army of invasion. His opponents were certainly not masters of their art, but his treatment of the situation will ever remain a model of skilful generalship.

Then came the campaign against McClellan, the least brilliant episode in Jackson's record.

Leaving a small fraction of his 'Valley army' on the banks of the Shenandoah to hoodwink the Federal forces in that region, Jackson hurried across Virginia to join in the attack on McClellan's army which still threatened Richmond on both banks of the Chickahominy. Nothing could have been more skilfully accomplished than this difficult operation, but once in touch with the main Confederate army it is said that Jackson failed to sustain the great reputation he had won while commanding independently. McClellan's army divided by the river was indeed severely defeated at Gaines' Mill, but the victory might have been more decisive had Jackson's attack been better timed. In the retreat of the Federals from the Chickahominy to the James Jackson's command had the task of harassing the rearguard while Longstreet's divisions fell on the flank of the enemy. Again the operations failed to achieve complete success; McClellan reached the strong position of Malvern Hill on the left bank of the river James, and turning to bay inflicted a sanguinary check on the pursuing army. It is perhaps impossible now rightly to apportion the blame for McClellan's escape. He had a very short distance to go, the direction of the roads and the natural obstacles of the country greatly favoured his evasion. There was probably one means and one only by which it might have been prevented, and that was to have headed off the Federal advanced guard at Malvern Hill by a strong force of cavalry. Physical exhaustion may have dulled the edge of Jackson's energy during these critical days, as Henderson suggests. Inexperience of working in concert with the other Confederate leaders, especially with Longstreet, who required to be studied, a staff without any practice in the most arduous work of handling large masses of raw troops in a forest country, and above all that lack of

a due proportion of cavalry which so often mars the best conceptions of commanders in the field, all unquestionably enhanced the difficulty of the enterprise.

Even before Lee was of the same opinion, Jackson saw through the feeble character of the Washington strategy, and said McClellan might now be safely neglected while the army gathering under Pope on the northern frontier was being attended to. It is hard to say whether the campaign in the Shenandoah Valley his first independent command, the three days in the Wilderness which, like Trafalgar, ended the career of the conqueror, or the brilliant operations which culminated in the overthrow of Pope and the pursuit of his broken army to the works of Washington, rank as the most skilful of Jackson's performances. Taken together they prove him beyond question to have been a military genius of the highest order, and go far to sustain the affectionate claim of his Virginian countrymen that he ranks high among history's greatest generals.

Throughout the war Jackson tendered sound advice so far as his position in the army and chivalrous loyalty to the commander-in-chief allowed. He never ceased to advocate the concentration instead of the dispersion of the Confederate armies; he foresaw that Southern independence must be won by military success which involved the destruction of the Army of the Potomac; and there is every reason to concur with the opinion expressed by General Lee after the war, that if Jackson had survived to lead the attacking columns at Gettysburg the result would have been the crowning victory at which all his strategy aimed. It is his greatest claim to fame as a commander that like every great master of the art his method of making war was in its essence aggressive. His eyes always sought the enemy's weak part to attack; the object of his attack was ever the complete ruin of his opponent. His motto might well have been 'To defend is to suffer war, to attack is to make war.'

That his character was eccentric and his piety rather old-fashioned and puritanical never interfered with his judgment in political and military affairs. So soon as he had

had the chance of showing his capacity men readily accepted his leadership and were inspired by his enthusiasm and fire.

The possession of such a leader is of priceless value to any state in time of war. In most armies of long-established tradition every circumstance usually militates against the rise of a great leader, and history records very few who were not born in the purple. His contemporaries will dislike him and his superiors will become jealous and suspicious when they note his rising talent and impatience of stupid control. But having regard to the preciousness of the possession it is wise not to render its existence impossible. While a certain dead level of reliable mediocrity may be required for the higher ranks of any army, it is not therefore necessary to stamp out of the ranks all critical faculty, all original talent. The richer and more civilised a nation becomes the more desirable are the prizes to be won by courage, energy and ambition, and the more attractive will peaceful pursuits become in comparison with the monotonous and poverty-stricken career of a soldier in times of peace. Yet for many years to come heredity will provide a certain number of capable men ready to endure poverty in order to follow the military professions by land and sea. If some scope is given to rising ability it will never be impossible to find a leader to whom the 'good ordinary general' of the scoffing French proverb is a mere plaything made to be beaten. The success or failure to discover him will generally spell victory or defeat in a life-and-death struggle between nations.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA

GENERAL ORDER, No. 61

'With deep regret the commanding general announces the death of Lieut.-General T. J. Jackson, who expired on the 10th instant at $\frac{1}{4}$ past 3 P.M.

'The daring skill and energy of this great and good soldier by the decree of an all-wise Providence are now lost to us.

‘But while we mourn his death we feel that his spirit still lives and will inspire the whole army with his indomitable courage and unshaken confidence in God as our hope and strength. Let his name be a watchword to his corps who have followed him to victory on so many fields. Let his officers and soldiers emulate his invincible determination to do everything in the defence of our loved country.

‘R. E. LEE, *General.*’

CHAPTER IV

THE INVASION OF THE NORTH

The Military Situation—Summary of Events—Robert Lee—Reorganisation of the Confederate Army—The Army of the Potomac: June 3—Hooker penetrates Lee's Design—The Cavalry Review at Culpeper: June 8—The Cavalry fights at Beverley Ford and Brandy Station—Hooker's Proceedings—Lincoln's Letter to Hooker—March of the Second Corps—March of the First Corps—Considerations of Strategy—Description of the Loudoun Valley—Cavalry Fight on June 17—Cavalry Fight on June 19 at Middleburg—Cavalry Fight on June 21 at Upperville—Dispositions of the Opposing Armies before the Passage of the Potomac—The Confederates cross the Potomac and begin the Invasion—Route of the Second Corps from the Potomac to the Susquehanna.

THE aspect of the war in the days which followed the retreat of General Hooker became more and more critical. On two lines of operations the main efforts of the Northern invaders of the Confederacy were concentrated; the most important issue of this period of the war was still the duel in Virginia between the armies of Lee and Hooker, but in the Valley of the Mississippi, nine hundred miles from the capital of the Confederacy, a campaign was in progress which was second only in importance to the struggle on the Atlantic seaboard, and which became finally the decisive factor in the war.

Vicksburg, the fortress into which the Confederate army led by Pemberton had retired after its defeat by Grant, was already invested. It was known both at Richmond and Washington that the limit of its endurance was the amount of food in its magazines, which would hardly suffice till July 1. There was little or no prospect of its relief by the Confederate army left in the field under Joseph Johnston, which was held at a distance by a strong detachment under Sherman, while Grant led the main Federal

forces against the strong works and gallant defenders of the place.

Grant had had a remarkable career of success in the western theatre of war. From Shiloh's blood-stained field, where he had so nearly seen his army destroyed, and where timely reinforcements and the death of the Confederate commander had enabled him to snatch victory at the eleventh hour, he had fought and marched ceaselessly for twelve months; in co-operation with Faragut's naval forces he had recovered for the Federal Government control of the Mississippi, excepting a length of 120 miles, the reaches dominated by Vicksburg and Port Hudson the last Confederate posts on the stream. Banks, commanding the Unionist forces at New Orleans, was entrusted with the work of reducing Port Hudson, which was defended by ten thousand men, while Grant in the middle of May concentrated his efforts against Vicksburg, into which thirty thousand Confederates had been driven by his skilful strategy. Pemberton, the Confederate commander, repulsed the first attempt of the Federals to carry the place by storm, but in the battle known as Champion Hill the Grey army was beaten and the investment was completed by a line of counter-fortifications.

At Vicksburg the Confederates made one of their most disastrous mistakes, for which Pemberton was responsible, in erecting works so vast as to necessitate the detention of their field army to hold them, when a smaller circle garrisoned by ten thousand men, as at Port Hudson, would have served the purpose equally well. A powerful corps would then have remained over to co-operate with the forces assembling under the able command of Joseph Johnston, and the siege of Vicksburg would have become a far more serious undertaking for the Federals. The fall of the place, if not altogether averted, might have been deferred until the following year; but discord prevailed between the Confederate generals and the unworkable arrangement of divided command in the field, controlled by instructions from the remote Cabinet at Richmond, proved fatal to the Southern cause in the Mississippi Valley.

The last day of 1862 had witnessed a severe battle at

Murfreesboro in Tennessee between the opposing armies of the central States, which had imposed inaction on both sides for a long while. In May 1863 Rosecrans with forty thousand troops had occupied this town and had raised extensive field fortifications to defend it. Bragg commanded the Confederate army, which had fallen back upon Tallahoma, where he had fixed his headquarters. He disposed of about ten thousand men less than his adversary, but neither army was in a condition to undertake offensive operations in the open country, the best troops having been withdrawn from each to reinforce Grant and Joseph Johnston respectively. All along the borders of the contending Republics partisan corps on horse and foot continued a warfare of raids and incursions, destroying much property but effecting no great military purpose; the Confederates kept more troops of their enemy busy in this guerilla warfare than they employed themselves, but Southern men were more sorely needed in the line of battle, and the South could far less than the North afford the destruction of resources entailed by the prolongation of this type of warfare.

Besides various forces of militia, small columns, and stationary garrisons, the Confederacy had about one hundred thousand field troops at the disposal of its generals west of the Alleghany Mountains on the day when Hooker recrossed the Rappahannock. They were opposed to not less than one hundred and fifty thousand Federals, better equipped, better commanded, and supported by the flotilla of warships which had penetrated high up the Mississippi. The result of the contest was in consequence almost a foregone conclusion. Nothing but a concentration of force by which local superiority might be gained for a time could secure victory for the South; to accomplish this was hard but not impossible, seeing the Southerners fought on interior lines, though their vast territory, badly supplied with the means of transporting troops, rendered the problem very complicated.

When Jackson turned the tables at Bull Run and the first Federal levies fled back to Washington, when McClellan retreated from the Chickahominy, the night after Burnside's repulse at Fredericksburg, and again immediately after

Chancellorsville, the Confederates neglected, or failed to make the most of, golden opportunities; and the last of these chances was far the most promising.

In order to change the face of affairs three courses were open to the Cabinet at Richmond during the short space of time in which the Army of the Potomac was in no condition to attack. First the army of Joseph Johnston might have been reinforced with an army corps from Virginia by the help of which he might have defeated Grant and raised the siege of Vicksburg; or, secondly, sufficient forces might have been detached from Virginia to ensure the destruction of Rosecrans' army and the recovery of the State of Tennessee; all Grant's conquests would by this strategy have been threatened and he would probably have had to abandon the siege of Vicksburg to defend his base of operations; thirdly, to have concentrated without the loss of a single day not less than one hundred thousand troops under Lee's command for the prompt invasion of the North. To collect so many troops the forces under Bragg and in the Carolinas must have been drawn upon, disregarding the bites of expeditionary columns sent by sea, and leaving the task of checking them to local militia. Bragg's diminished command might have had to retire eastward before Rosecrans, but nothing of vital importance could have happened before Lee's advance paralysed the whole offensive power of the Federal Government. Joseph Johnston's corps served no good purpose where it was, but although it was too weak to relieve Vicksburg its presence elsewhere might have turned the scale in a decisive battle. Nothing less than a hundred thousand men would enable Lee to keep open his communications and still to retain under his hand sufficient forces to strike at the Army of the Potomac on Northern territory. This plan was the boldest of the three and alone promised decisive results.

The Confederacy was now at the high tide of its military success. In spite of the loss of New Orleans and the border States the Southern forces still held on to the Mississippi river at Vicksburg and Port Hudson. The fifth attempt to capture Richmond had met with ignominious failure before a fraction only of the army entrusted with its defence, and

the Southern troops were correspondingly elated. The vital communications of the interior were everywhere open, and no position was held as yet by the enemy which could serve as a base for decisive attack.

Looking, however, a little further into the future, on every side appeared the handwriting on the wall which should have warned Mr. Davis' Cabinet that their opportunity would be short and that if they failed to seize it the tide would speedily turn. Every month the naval blockade was pressing harder on the whole population and limiting the supplies of the armies in the field. While the resources of the Southern States diminished every month, precisely the opposite was happening in the North, whose enormous latent power had begun to develop; and although the strain was impatiently borne, yet the Federal armies after each campaign returned to the field more numerous, better supplied, and better led.

In the South the lack of men for every purpose had begun to be a most serious cause of anxiety, and the gaps in the field army caused by wounds, capture, disease and exposure, threatened to put an end to her power of resistance by mere attrition, even if the genius of Lee continued to win such victories for his country as Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville.

There were other reasons which rendered the weeks following the retreat of Hooker exceptionally favourable for a Confederate offensive. The absurd plan of enlisting men for a fixed period instead of for the duration of the war had greatly reduced the musters of the Army of the Potomac, while the new recruiting laws were causing grave discontent; resistance to them was threatened and actually broke out later in the New York riots. The political adversaries of the Government, incensed at the abolition of slavery and encouraged by the defeats of the Federal troops, and the general incapacity for waging war evinced by Lincoln's Cabinet, began openly to say that the subjugation of the South was a hopeless undertaking, and to advocate peace. There was every reason therefore to expect that a decisive victory on Northern soil would not only relieve the pressure

on the Confederacy at every point of contact, but that it might compel the Federal Government to concede independence. Lastly as an incentive to carrying the war over the border came the urgent and growing difficulty of supplying the army even with daily rations. In reply to Lee's representations on the subject, the quarter-master-general at Richmond had replied, 'If General Lee wants supplies, let him seek them in Pennsylvania.'

The Confederates, having had all the winter to prepare for the inevitable campaign in the spring, should have been ready to assume the offensive in the event of such a success as they actually obtained. The North could afford to waste its chances and yet could renew the strife with increased strength at a later period; this was not, however, possible for the South, whose power to make war was strictly limited by time. A whole month had elapsed before Lee's army was ready to move, a month during which his enemy over the river had to a great extent recovered from the shock of Chancellorsville, and in which Vicksburg had been reduced to so perilous a dilemma that, even if Lee won his victory north of the Potomac and broke up the army opposed to him, his success would be largely discounted by the now inevitable fall of the fortress on the Mississippi.

Conflicting counsel, as well as administrative failure to provide him with the sinews of war, had much to do with delaying Lee's march. Even after he had embarked on his adventurous enterprise no clearly defined objective was set before him by the Government. It was the commander-in-chief who had constantly to stir up the energy of the President by putting before him the real solution of the problem. Jefferson Davis, with all his military knowledge and experience, could not rise to appreciate the necessity for throwing his whole strength into a decisive campaign at the sacrifice of minor interests, however painful. His conception of Lee's expedition never rose above a raid on a great scale to supply the army with its immediate wants on Northern territory and to harass and frighten the Northern people and their Government. He made no effort to increase Lee's army to adequate dimensions, but he did do his best

to spoil the nerve of its leader with discouraging despatches which implored him to be cautious and depicted the defenceless state of the capital and of the railway junctions south-west of it. One of these despatches fell into the hands of the enemy's cavalry on July 5, immediately after the repulse at Gettysburg, when it was of the last importance to conceal the weakness of the Confederacy from its foes. It seems quite clear that no one in high authority at Richmond appreciated the prime factor of the situation, which was that the triumph of the Southern cause depended on the complete defeat and ruin of the Army of the Potomac.

In spite of every blunder and mischance, however, it nearly happened that Lee and his gallant army accomplished the feat. Their failure to do so was caused in the end by tactical errors on the battlefield itself, but the narrative will show how far the feeble military policy of the Confederate Government reacted on its soldiers at the principal crisis of the war.

The invasion of Maryland in the previous year had followed hard upon the defeat of Pope's army, which had been chased behind the forts of Washington. Before another invasion could be initiated, the Army of the Potomac must be either defeated or eluded; in the latter case it would be left nearer to Richmond than Lee's army, so that a counter-attack on the meagrely defended capital was a possible contingency. Lee, however, better than any general since Napoleon understood the peculiar frailties of his opponents and traded upon them. He felt certain that in his absence no really earnest attempt would be made to capture Richmond, and the event showed that he was right. Nevertheless to slip past the Federal army without a series of battles was not by any means a simple task. Hooker was incomparably a better general than Pope, and the manœuvres which had outwitted the latter in 1862 would not answer the purpose against the former who, warned by his predecessor's fate, would be on the watch to foil them. The direction of the Rapidan and Rappahannock, and of the roads westward from Fredericksburg, also militated against

any chance of reaching the neighbourhood of Manassas Junction before Hooker; a wider curve must be made. The Shenandoah Valley, which had already proved so useful to Southern strategy, enabled Lee once again to turn the flank of the Army of the Potomac, but the distance he was compelled to march in order to reach it increased the hazards of the campaign by lengthening his lines of communication with Richmond, and by giving opportunities to the enemy of cutting him off from his base. The words Strategy and Tactics sometimes frighten the lay reader because he only dimly grasps their meaning, and indeed it is impossible to give a mathematical definition of them. By Strategy is usually meant the art of controlling military forces before contact takes place with the enemy; by Tactics the continuation of Strategy when once that contact has been obtained. Tactics in fact have the same relation to Strategy that war has to peaceful politics. To master the main principles of the conduct of war is not difficult for any intelligent person who has studied history in general and military history in particular, and who is acquainted with the geography of the country in question. To be able to form a correct judgment on more complicated questions requires a special aptitude for the work improved by study and practical experience.

A democratic State whose politicians pride themselves on ignorance of war, which they leave to its professors, is in an evil case; but it is hardly less mischievous when the leading men of a country, however able, are not aware of the limit of their knowledge and seek to direct matters without the best professional advice—a state of things generally brought about by the incompetence of the military chiefs at the time, who, having forfeited the confidence of their political colleagues, have induced the latter to think they could manage the whole business far better themselves.

It will be necessary to examine in greater detail the strategical problem presented by the invasion when the narrative reaches the point at which the Confederate army for the second time was preparing to cross the Potomac.

On June 3 the first division of Longstreet's army corps marched from the cantonments of Fredericksburg. On the Summary 4th and 5th the other two followed. On June 7 of events. the whole First corps had assembled at or near Culpeper Court-house distant thirty-five miles from Marye's Heights. On June 5 Hooker warned his Government that a blow was impending. On June 5 also Ewell in command of the Second Confederate corps, left his cantonments and proceeded by swift marches into the Shenandoah Valley passing behind the First corps at Culpeper, which thus screened his movement. On the morning of June 13 Ewell reached the neighbourhood of Winchester, having marched nearly one hundred miles from Fredericksburg. On June 14 Ewell fell upon the Federal corps under Milroy and cut it up.

On June 9 Hooker felt each extremity of the Confederate line. He sent an army corps across the Rappahannock below Fredericksburg and attacked Stuart's cavalry with his own at Brandy Station. The result of the day's work was to convince him that trouble was brewing and he again warned Washington. On June 12 Hooker was informed of Ewell's march and began the northward march of the Federal army to meet him; as soon as Hooker's main body quitted the cantonments at Falmouth, A. P. Hill, commanding the Third Confederate corps, hurried off to join the rest of his army. On June 15 the First corps marched north from Culpeper while the cavalry covered the exposed flank. On June 17, 19 and 21 sharp fighting took place between the cavalry of the two armies, the result of which was on the whole advantageous to the Federals, who were no longer in any doubt as to Lee's intention. On June 21 and 22 Ewell passed the Potomac at Shepherdstown. Hill followed on the 24th, while Longstreet crossed the river on the 25th and 26th at Williamsport. On June 25 Ewell marched up the Cumberland Valley, raiding the country as he went and aiming at the Susquehanna Valley. Early's division passed on the eastern side of the mountains and reached Gettysburg on June 25.

The First and Third Confederate corps were concentrated

round Chambersburg in Pennsylvania by the evening of June 27. On the 29th and 30th they marched on Gettysburg where they were joined by the Second corps, recalled by Lee in order to concentrate for battle. On June 25 Stuart began his raid round the Federal army: he had to make wide détours to avoid the Federal columns, so that he only succeeded in crossing the Potomac on the night of June 27, twenty miles above Washington. On the 28th he caught a Federal convoy; on the 29th he had to fight at Westminister and on the 30th at Hanover. In absolute ignorance of all that had happened between the two armies, he had to grope his way in the dark, heading for York, where he hoped to join his own infantry. On July 1 he heard of the concentration of the Confederate army, but did not succeed in reaching their left wing until late on July 2.

Robert Lee, on whose shoulders now rested the entire burden of directing the Army of Northern Virginia unaided by his great lieutenant, had completed his fifty-seventh year. He was a very handsome man of grave and imposing appearance, tall, with gentle brown eyes, and the blond hair of our northern race which had become grizzled by the cares and physical strain of two years' incessant warfare. In the tact and diplomatic skill with which he softened the jealousies of his people and tightened the combination of the different States he is only to be compared with the great Duke of Marlborough. In the boldness and sagacity of his strategy and in the affectionate devotion he inspired in his troops he resembled Napoleon himself. He enjoyed alike the confidence of the nation, government and army, which he never lost for an instant in the darkest days of misfortune.

His serene and dignified manner gave confidence and his manners justified the traditions of the aristocracy from which his family was descended.

As leader of an army Lee had one great fault: he was too modest, too lacking in the stern self-assertion which compels obedience and exacts the utmost efforts of subordinates. Such as he was, chivalrous, brave, and conscientious to a fault, he will remain the most attractive personality

among American heroes and one of the most famous of the world's great generals.

The army which followed him was worthy of its chief and ranks in value with that which Napoleon led to Jena or with the matchless crews which manned the British battleships at Trafalgar as one of the most perfect military forces in history. The two divisions of the First corps had returned from Suffolk leaving that ill-judged expedition to come to an abortive ending; but one of Longstreet's divisions, that of Anderson, and two made up from Jackson's command, reinforced by fresh levies, formed a Third corps under the command of A. P. Hill. Ewell had succeeded Jackson in the command of the Second corps and Stuart had returned to lead the cavalry. The army was thus organised in three corps each of three divisions. By the first week of June many of the slightly wounded from Chancellorsville had rejoined their regiments with other convalescents, and strong drafts of recruits had replaced the seriously injured. The artillery, better equipped than heretofore, was distributed between the army corps, and the spoils of Chancellorsville had replaced the waste and wear in the armament of the troops. The nine divisions had an average strength of seven thousand infantry and the whole corps of cavalry had been reinforced with men and horses. Five brigades of Horse, commanded by the two Lees, Hampton, Jones and Robertson, with an average strength each of eighteen hundred mounted men, brought the total strength of Stuart's command to about nine thousand well-mounted and for the most part well-trained cavaliers. To these was afterwards added Jenkins' brigade. The horses had rested, the men were eager for action; confidence indeed ran to the dangerous extreme of contempt for the foe, a foe by no means to be despised. Such was the leader and such the army which attempted the conquest by invasion of the Northern States in the midsummer of 1863.

On June 3, just one month after the battle on the Chancellorsville plateau, the first movement of the Confederate army was made by the despatch of one division of

the First corps from Fredericksburg to Culpeper Court-house. It was followed each day by another division; in this way secretly and quickly two-thirds of the army was sent on the long march, while one corps remained to hold the Federals in check on the road to Richmond. So skilfully were these movements timed and executed that the space of time during which only one corps was left out of reach of support and within range of a hostile attack was very short, although on June 15 a distance of no less than one hundred and fifty miles by road separated Ewell's outposts by the Potomac from Hill's rearguard by the Rappahannock when the last Confederate corps was hurrying across the battlefields of the Wilderness to join Lee in the Shenandoah Valley.

While the Confederate army had been regaining its strength, resting and refitting, the Federal forces on the Rappahannock had been greatly reduced owing to extensive 'mustering out of short-term troops.' The command of the cavalry had been transferred from Stoneman, the unsuccessful leader of the raid in the Chancellorsville campaign, and conferred upon Pleasanton, who had greatly distinguished himself with one brigade in the forest fighting. Averell had also been removed. The fighting strength of the three divisions had been reduced to about five thousand mounted men owing to the large number of horses lost or lamed in the raid, which had not yet been replaced. But great efforts were being made to bring the army up to strength. Recruits from the depots in the entrenched camp at Washington and horses from all the remount stations in Kentucky and Pennsylvania were daily arriving; the troops, quick to forget misfortune and eager for new opportunities of distinction, were daily becoming more formidable in morale as in numbers. If Lee could have started on his expedition as soon as Longstreet rejoined from Suffolk, and if he could thus have brought about the decisive battle three weeks earlier than he actually did, he would have encountered a far weaker opponent, so vitally important is the value of time in all the operations of war great and small.

The Army
of the
Potomac.
June 3.

Although the Southern press and people were under better control than the North, yet there were not wanting people in Richmond whose vanity or loquacity prompted them to babble about the projected invasion, and in this manner conveyed a warning to the enemy, which would likewise have been prevented by prompter action. Other signs, too, there were as the weeks passed by : the inevitable preparations for a long march and distant operations, and the growing audacity of the Confederate cavalry and troops of mounted militia under Mosby along the border. The over-confidence engendered by their victories seems to have infected the Confederate headquarters, for it is impossible to exonerate Stuart, and even Lee himself, from neglecting some of the precautions which had so cleverly veiled the movements of the army on former occasions.

Hooker's spies had not failed to inform him of the movement westward executed by a large force of the hostile infantry, and he became convinced that another offensive stroke was impending. He at once informed General Halleck, and sought permission to fall upon the diminished forces left to mask his army at Fredericksburg, which he rightly conjectured would soon be still further reduced. Halleck's reply was a formal order to remain on the defensive, and in the event of the enemy marching northward to cover Washington by a corresponding movement on a smaller arc. Hooker no longer possessed the confidence of his chiefs, and indeed a general who believed in himself would have seized the occasion to strike without waiting for instructions.

The spring campaign had made it clear to Stuart that the enemy had at last grasped the importance of the cavalry arm and that he must spare no effort if he would retain the supremacy which he had won. Hooker's invasion had overtaken him before his preparations were complete, but a month later five brigades of cavalry, the finest force he had yet commanded, were concentrated near and around Brandy Station, on the Orange and Alexandria railroad. The regiments had been well supplied with remounts ; the men

Hooker
penetrates
Lee's
design.

The
Cavalry
Review at
Culpeper,
June 8.

were inured to war, and good riders, who could fight as well on horseback with revolver or sabre as on foot with the rifle. They included in their ranks excellent scouts, so that it has seldom been the good fortune of a cavalry leader to command a finer force; with justifiable pride Stuart had begged Lee to come over and pass it in review 'with some of his friends.'

On June 7 an order reached Stuart to meet Lee on the following day at Culpeper Court-house, and to assemble what cavalry he could concentrate from the outpost line on the plain north of Culpeper. Stuart awaited the Commander-in-chief under the folds of a huge Confederate flag opposite to three brigades of horse and thirty light guns. At length Lee and his staff arrived on horseback; the group included Longstreet and a large number of superior officers. As the blue haze lifted from the plain Lee pointed to the masses of the First corps forming up in the background to watch the review. 'You see I have brought my friends,' said he, 'as you invited me to.'

The scene must have thrilled all who took part in it. Twenty thousand veteran soldiers on their way to the decisive battle of the war beheld the march past of the imposing mass of cavalry, while Lee's thoughtful face shaded from the hot sunshine by a wide-brimmed hat glowed with pride at the warlike appearance and gallant spirit of his troops. The march past was followed by some manœuvres, and the horse artillery fired some blank rounds which were plainly audible to the astonished Federals doing outpost duty on the Rappahannock. Inspiring as the review must have been, it was unwise in the highest degree thus to give away the dispositions of the army. In a few hours it was known at Washington that Lee with a whole army corps was at Culpeper.

From the brilliant parade of June 8 the Southern cavalry defiled leisurely to the bivouacs of the several brigades. The edge of the plain was blurred by the dust of the marching squadrons as the large group, formed by Lee, Longstreet, Stuart, and their respective staffs rode across it. The generals discussed the details of the great march, which

Stuart was to keep concealed as long as possible from the prying eyes of the enemy's cavalry. Longstreet's infantry

The Cavalry would be at hand to support him if pressed—an unlikely contingency as it seemed to the sanguine cavalry leader.

Fights at Beverley Ford and Brandy Station. Then they separated, Lee and Longstreet returned slowly to Culpeper, while Stuart, in high good humour at the magnificent display he had given to his comrades, overtook his troopers at a striding gallop and cheerily acknowledged their salutations as he passed the regiments. When the sun disappeared behind the Blue Ridge the Confederate squadrons had settled down in their bivouacs, some in the patches of forest which remained alongside of the railway, some round the farmhouses which were dotted about the country. The troop horses in long rows cropped the grass and munched their forage. The men gathered round the camp fires to tell and listen to yarns, to sing or play poker and to discuss the thrilling events of the war. The little town of Brandy Station was filled with troops; Stuart and his staff had their quarters there, and it was midnight before the place ceased to echo with the clatter of couriers coming and going with orders to the different regiments. Along the river bank five miles away small patrols had ridden to look out for any sign of the enemy and had returned easily satisfied that 'all was quiet.' At Beverley Ford, close to the broken railway bridge, a post was established on the bank. The glorious summer's night made life in the open air a joy in itself, and as the fires flickered out the troopers sank into slumber and dreamed of a happy hunting ground of raids and victories.

Everything had been prepared for a forward move at dawn; even the batteries had been thrust forward into the outpost line to cover the passage of the river, and it never occurred to anyone that the Federals would be the first to attack. The early light of the June morning was dimmed by the mist which so often clung to the Virginian river valleys. The Confederate piquets watching Beverley Ford were preparing their morning meal when the sharp ring of

carbine fire gave warning of an attack; for covered by the mist a squadron of Blue riders had crossed the river unperceived. Then there followed all the confusion of a surprise. Horses and teams were being hastily saddled and harnessed. Officers were hurrying the muster of their men, fearing that any moment would see the enemy's cavalry shooting and sabring in their midst. While the Confederates were getting under arms a broad column of Federal horsemen were splashing through the ford and galloping up the opposite bank to be received by sharp fire from the dismounted men of the watch-posts who had rallied along the edge of the wood covering the bivouac. The Blue soldiers likewise dismounted and the fight began; at the same time the Confederate artillery, lucky to escape, galloped some furlongs to the rear and came into action on rising ground so as to afford a framework to their fighting line.

On the flank of the hastily formed Confederates the rush of a hostile squadron was met by a troop, some riding barebacked, and a hand to hand fight followed in which the Federal Colonel Davis, who had already shown brilliant promise, was killed; then, too late to save him but in time to avenge him, another Federal squadron joined in the struggle and drove the Grey cavalry back on their dismounted men. The short delay in forming for attack on the Confederate position was its salvation. A surprise should be followed up by continuous blows in quick succession or its effect is soon lost. The light breeze from the north-east which had raised the curtain of fog from the river had also borne the sound of firing to the head of Stuart's column already on its way to the Rappahannock Fords. In hot haste the main body was sent forward; from a trot they broke into a canter and quickly reached the scene of the engagement. First the centre was reinforced; then fresh troops extended both flanks into the woods which bordered the road and which now re-echoed with the sharp crack of the rifle. Each side was feeling the pulse of the other, neither felt equal to a decisive attack, when couriers on sweating horses announced to Stuart, who was directing the fight, that yet another strong Federal column threatened his flank and rear, which

was covered only by the single brigade he had left at Brandy Station.


The situation in all its danger flashed across his mind in an instant, and his orders were quickly given. His plan was to keep the Federal division under Buford, which had fought its way through the ford, busy with the dismounted men of one brigade, while he stealthily drew off the other and countermarched at a hand gallop to Brandy Station, there to deal with the new enemy. On a small scale Stuart repeated Lee's tactics of Chancellorsville, rendered possible once again by the friendly shade of the woods. With a despatch which proved the discipline of the troops and the technical skill of the officers, the Confederate squadrons were quietly withdrawn from the fight, swiftly mounted and led back to the hill upon which they had bivouacked the previous night. Their comrades extended the line of dismounted riflemen like a piece of elastic to its utmost limit, and by increasing the rapidity of their fire concealed the weakness of their numbers.

The hostile force whose unlooked-for approach had been thus notified to Stuart, consisted of the cavalry divisions commanded by Gregg and Duffie, which had crossed the Rappahannock at Kelly's Ford, six miles south of Beverley Ford. They had pushed rapidly forward by cross roads covered by the same white mist, so as to reach a point whence they could strike at Stuart's flank and rear while engaged to the hilt with the assailants of Beverley Ford.

Then the Federals made the mistake which cost them the victory. The two divisions separated; Duffie's was sent southward to reconnoitre the road connecting Culpeper Court-house with Fredericksburg and to find out what troops were marching westward by it. Three or four well-mounted patrols led by bright young officers would have done this work as well or better than a whole division whose presence was essential to victory in the cavalry fight which Pleasonton had resolved to bring about. Two Federal divisions of cavalry were approximately of the same numerical strength as three Confederate brigades. On the wide open space surrounding the eminence known as Fleetwood Hill, within

a mile of Brandy Station, Robertson's Federal brigade had been left by Stuart in reserve with a battery of guns. The long Federal column as it emerged from the woods formed line one regiment at a time, and as soon as each regiment completed its formation at a gallop it charged. An English officer named Wyndham led the first Federal brigade and by these tactics broke up Robertson's squadrons, drove them in confusion through Brandy Station, and captured their guns. At this critical moment Stuart reappeared on the scene, and a great cavalry fight ensued. As Stuart brought up his squadrons somewhat blown by their long and rapid advance, Kilpatrick, who led the second Federal brigade, struck at his flank, but Kilpatrick's manœuvres were slower than Wyndham's; Stuart had time to form his line and a desperate *mêlée* took place. The squadrons clashed against one another like ships in collision; the troopers emptied their revolvers in one another's faces and then fought fiercely with the sabre. The trimly equipped soldiers of the Union, having learnt to ride, began to show an aptitude for mounted combat of which the rough and ready horsemen in grey and brown homespun jackets had hitherto possessed the monopoly.

After the fight had swayed to and fro indecisively for some minutes, the Southerners established their superiority and the Federals drew off, leaving behind the guns they had captured. They were just in time, for already a train had stopped and another was drawing up west of Brandy Station; from the cars and trucks a swarm of Grey jackets were scrambling and forming ranks. Further off a long column of troops of the same complexion was seen approaching to aid the sorely pressed cavalry, but the day's fighting was not yet over. While the dark cloud of Federal horsemen rolled eastwards the Confederates advanced on their track, extending their left so as to join hands with the brigade left to hold Buford's Federals at Beverley Ford. The weakness of the Confederates at this point had become known to Buford, who pressed them furiously, and Stuart's return in force was only just in time to save a disaster. He promptly dismounted his whole command and a struggle on foot took



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place between the two opposing lines. Some battalions of Federal infantry had reached the scene and an advance of the whole line would doubtless have thrown back the Confederates; but Pleasonton had gained the information he wanted, and grudged losing any more of his precious troopers, so he gave the signal to mount and retire. By five o'clock the Blue troops were once more splashing through the ford, while the rattle of musketry showed that the rearguard was still being pressed. The Confederates made no effort to follow their enemy across the river. On both sides about six hundred men had received wounds more or less grave; both had lost several hundred horses killed, wounded or lamed. The result of the contest which had so nearly been disastrous to the South may be said to have been tactically a drawn game. The skill of Stuart and his officers, the discipline of his men and their ability to fight equally well on horse and foot, had saved them from the tight corner into which their carelessness had led them. Both sides acquired useful information. The Federals learnt for certain that Lee with at least one army corps, one third that is of his army besides the cavalry, was at Culpeper. The Confederates, though they persisted in believing the Federal strength to be greater than it actually was, found out that they now had opposed to them a cavalry force little if at all inferior to their own, an event which also marks an epoch in the war.

It is hard to exaggerate the advantages which superiority in the mounted arm confers on a general. He can never be surprised, but can often himself inflict disastrous surprises. The possession of coveted points, the right of way on coveted roads, access to supplies, the choice of whether to fight or to decline battle, will in most cases rest with the commander who possesses the cavalry superiority and who knows how to use it. The greatest military triumphs have ever been obtained by its possessor. Frederic by means of it defied the Continent in arms for seven bloody years; Napoleon ruled Europe for ten years while he retained it, nor did his power collapse until his peerless force of cavalry had perished in the frozen forests and steppes of Russia. Infantry hardly

less formidable than that which had won Jena and Wagram was rapidly levied for the gallant campaigns of 1813 and 1814, but the cavalry which alone had made the daring strategy of the Emperor possible, could not be replaced in the time. Both Frederic and Napoleon had a large proportion of cavalry in their armies, and they used it with decisive effect in the battlefield and in pursuit. Lee and Moltke restricted the use of the arm generally to its strategic rôle, though with notable exceptions. The American general had not horsemen enough for the double purpose; the Prussian, partly for the same reason, and partly because his cavalry leaders did not understand how to fight infantry with the new armament, had likewise to content himself with half results, though he chafed at the necessity.

On receiving Pleasonton's report of the fight on June 9, Hooker's suspicions of Lee's aggressive intentions became a certainty. He again warned Halleck and pressed his opinion that the most effective way of bringing the Confederate army to a standstill was to fall on the reduced forces confronting him at Fredericksburg. Hooker was one of those soldiers who saw very clearly when not overwhelmed with responsibility. Halleck, not without some reason, doubted his capacity to inflict disastrous defeat on Hill before Lee came back to the rescue, and even feared the whole Confederate plan might be a snare to induce Hooker to cross the Rappahannock once more. The views of the Government were clearly, if picturesquely, set forth in a letter from Lincoln to Hooker :

Hooker's proceed-ings. ' If Lee should leave a rear force at Fredericksburg tempting you to fall upon it, he would fight you in entrenchments and have you at a disadvantage, and so man for man worst you at that point, while his main force would in some way be getting an advantage of you northward. In a word, I would not take any risk of being entangled on the river, like an ox jumped half over a fence, and liable to be torn by dogs front and rear without a fair chance to gore one way or kick the other.'

The vague fears expressed in this letter convey better than any other record the moral superiority achieved by the

great Confederate general, and the conviction he had established that any sort of match between Lee and Hooker would end in the discomfiture of the latter.

On June 10 Hooker began to move his army northwards so as to cover his capital as he had been directed. On June 12 he heard from a negro of the march of the Second Confederate corps to Chester's Gap, and he hesitated no longer. He ordered the march of the army in two principal columns. Four army corps were directed to move on the Orange and Alexandria railway towards Manassas Junction: three corps with the artillery reserve and trains marched up the Potomac through Stafford Court-house and Dumfries to Fairfax Court-house; Pleasonton with the cavalry corps was to cover the left rear of the army as it marched north. When the thick smoke of the rubbish-fires and confirming reports notified to Hill that the mass of the Federal army had left Falmouth, he started to follow the road taken by the other army corps. At that time the Second corps had gained seventy-five miles on the First, which in its turn was separated by thirty-six miles from the Third. A march and a half would bring Longstreet to Hill: a single march would have united them if they had moved towards one another, but for a few hours it lay in Hooker's power to compel a battle with two only of the three Confederate corps, or to compel them to abandon their communications.

In the meanwhile Ewell with rapid marches had been skirting the Blue Ridge undeterred by the cavalry fight on June 9. Dawn of the 10th had seen the brigades of Jackson's old corps joyfully marching across the wooded spurs of the mountains towards the scene of their first victories; moving with great rapidity for so large a column, they crossed the mountains at Chester's Gap, and bivouacked on the 12th by the waters of the Shenandoah within a day's march of Winchester, which was garrisoned by seven thousand Federals under Milroy. Longstreet remained with his corps at Culpeper until the move of the Federal army was reported; then he followed Ewell.

During June 13 Ewell drew the net around Milroy, who

had been bewildered by contrary instructions and imperfect information from Washington. Harper's Ferry was strongly garrisoned by Unionist troops; Halleck as before was especially anxious for its security and determined to defend it to the last. Instructions to this effect somewhat carelessly worded seemed to convey that Winchester likewise must be held to the last. Almost without any horsemen, Milroy was taken by surprise at the appearance of the Confederate army corps; one of his brigades was detached westwards so that a swift retreat, besides being as he believed contrary to orders, would have led to the isolation of this brigade, the loss of the place and of the stores accumulated there. On the night of the 13th he might have made good his escape; on the morning of the 14th the Confederate divisions were closing in on the town. Johnson's troops made play on the south and east, Rodes pushed round to the north-east, while Early moved round by the west to attack the Federal works north of the place.

Ewell, who had lost a leg at Chantilly, was skipping about on his crutches in an agony of impatience, lest his prey should escape him, when a salvo of twenty guns announced Early's attack, and late in the afternoon the Federals were assailed on all sides. They held out till it was dark; then Milroy evacuated the entrenchments, and tried to escape northwards by the main road to Martinsburg. At about 3.30 A.M., however, he fell foul of a Confederate brigade sent to intercept him. A fight ensued which at first was favourable to the retreating Federals, but the sound of firing soon drew more Confederate infantry to the spot, who fell upon the enemy's column and cut it in twain. An utter rout of the whole of Milroy's force followed. Jenkins' cavalry brigade, which had preceded Ewell's march, took up the pursuit and chased the fugitives over the Potomac into Maryland, where they soon spread panic and dismay.

Four thousand prisoners and twenty-three guns were captured by Ewell's corps, but the moral effect of this the first combat of the new campaign was far greater than the material result. Alarm took hold of the people of Maryland and Pennsylvania, and infected the Government, which plied

the unfortunate leaders in the field with contradictory orders and impracticable proposals.

Hard on the heels of the routed detachment Jenkins' cavalry brigade crossed the Potomac on June 15, and began the invasion by systematically sweeping the Cumberland Valley of horses and cattle, which were driven southwards. At the same time Imboden, with a mixed brigade of mounted and dismounted riflemen formed in the Valley of Virginia, reached the Baltimore and Ohio railway on the 16th and cut it. These incursions secured a certain quantity of live stock badly needed for the immediate use of the army, but otherwise it was probably a mistake to give the alarm before the blow actually fell.

On June 15 the First corps marched from Culpeper. In order to puzzle the enemy as to the real objective it kept east of the Blue Ridge, which it traversed by Ashby's and Snicker's Gaps, while the Third corps crossed the trail of the First and followed the road already taken by Ewell. In this manner the three corps of Lee's army moved rapidly but cautiously towards the Potomac, keeping four brigades of cavalry and the First corps as a buckler between the main body and the enemy. While the Second corps was executing its coup against Milroy, thereby clearing the Shenandoah Valley, and securing the fords of the Potomac, an army corps held fast to Culpeper and another to Fredericksburg, near enough for mutual support, and strong enough to cover the two railway lines southwards to Gordonsville and Richmond. As soon as the northward march of the Federal main body became known to the Confederate generals they carried out his programme without further reference to Lee; on June 17, Longstreet crossed the Loudoun Valley, and occupied the passes of Snicker's and Ashby's Gaps.

On June 16 Hooker had his army concentrated on the line Manassas Junction—Centreville—Fairfax Court-house; hearing from Halleck that Lee was collecting his forces about Winchester, for a pounce on Harper's Ferry, he gave orders for an advance of the whole army in that direction, covered by the cavalry. These orders were communicated

by wire to Halleck, who did not approve of them ; in telegraphing his reply, Halleck for the first time informed Hooker of the destruction of Milroy's detachment and of the state of affairs in the neighbourhood of Winchester. Hooker was still doubtful of Lee's intentions ; he was reluctant to believe that the Confederates would cross the Potomac without a battle, and in order to clear up the situation he allowed Pleasonton to continue the advance as already prescribed. The leader of the Federal cavalry nothing loth promptly took the offensive and brought on the fights of June 17, 19, 21, with the Confederate squadrons, which were guarding the passes of the Bull Run Mountains and the valley called the Loudoun contained between them and the principal range of the Blue Ridge. Before describing the events which followed it is necessary to make a further study of the objects the two armies had in view and the strategy employed to attain them.

The military frontier of the contending Republics had been carried southward of the Potomac by the forces of the Union ; in the spring of 1863 it ran roughly up the course of the Rappahannock to Fredericksburg, and thence to Winchester in a straight line. Opposite the centre of this frontier and only sixty miles from it lay the Federal base at Washington. Lincoln had probably good reasons to dread the political effects of the capture or isolation of the capital, but in reality neither catastrophe was much to be feared, for Washington had been strongly fortified and garrisoned. It was also connected by water with Chesapeake Bay, and by this channel with all the other ports of the North so long as the Federal navy controlled the course of the Potomac and the Atlantic coast. The military chiefs on both sides had appreciated this fact ; all the Federal commanders-in-chief from McClellan to Grant had tried to convince the President of it, while the Confederates skilfully exploited the fears of the Northern Government from the beginning to the end of the war.

As a set off to the harm which this unnecessary anxiety for the safety of Washington had done to the Federal cause, the place had proved a tower of strength at the most critical

phases of the struggle. Its works, then but lightly constructed, had received the fugitives from the Bull Run defeat. A year later Pope's beaten army found safety within the forts which by that time had been strongly built. The fortress had covered the debarkation of McClellan's army brought by water from the Peninsula, and had enabled that general to reorganise the forces which he then led against Lee, and which rid Maryland of the invaders in September 1862. Washington in short furnished the Federals with a base of the most useful type, for it was in reality beyond the reach of attack, while it was near enough to the theatre of operations to give the most powerful succour to the army in the field.

Washington was not, however, the only sensitive point of the Federal territory. Baltimore, Harrisburg and Philadelphia itself would lie at the mercy of the Confederates if once the Army of the Potomac were disposed of; and the mines, factories and network of railways in Pennsylvania were known to have been the goal of Lee's march in 1862 when McClellan's reappearance with his Peninsular troops put an end to the enterprise. Lee's plan in fact both in 1862 and 1863 was to strike at the heart of Pennsylvania, and thus to induce the Northern army to march a considerable distance from its base and to give battle. The victories of 1861 and 1862 on the Bull Run had been rendered abortive by the proximity of Washington to the defeated Federal army. By drawing it northward and fighting the decisive battle seventy miles from any fortress, it might be possible to annihilate the chief army of the Union. Another important consideration was that the Federal forces could not march as well as their opponents. Any long march means a certain diminution of numbers, and Lee foresaw that the diminution would be far more considerable in the Federal army than in his own. Lastly, he counted on being able to take up a defensive position as at the Antietam and so to deliver battle on a ground of his own choosing.

It was this last calculation which spoilt his scheme. Offensive strategy, such as Lee contemplated when he crossed the Potomac, absolutely depends upon offensive

tactics. So Hooker had found in the Wilderness, so Lee was to find in Pennsylvania; but he made the discovery too late to use the best opportunities which befel him.

Richmond bore the same relation to the strategical combinations of the South that Washington did to those of her enemy; but, owing to its position at an extremity of the military frontier instead of in rear of the centre, and owing to the naval blockade, it was as great a hindrance to the Confederates as the rival capital was a help to the North. Only so far as it had formed a bait to lure the Federal armies from a more decisive objective had the defence of their capital been of use to the Confederates.

The vital point of the Confederacy was in reality the network of railways which converged on Richmond from the south and south-west, and which linked the capital with the broad Southern States, the Carolinas, Georgia and Tennessee. These lines ran through a comparatively narrow strip of country south of Richmond, between the mountains and the sea which formed the throat of the Confederacy.

When Grant and Sherman seized its throat with an iron grip the Confederacy fell, and not till then. Directly Lee moved from Fredericksburg, which was the right centre of the frontier he had to defend, to Winchester in the Shenandoah Valley, its extreme left, he laid Virginia open to attack. He knew well, however, that no great danger was to be feared so long as his army threatened Northern territory; nevertheless, every mile he marched north of the Potomac made his communications with his base longer and consequently more vulnerable, while a number of other advantages accrued to the Federals operating in their own country. Of these the most important was their continual reinforcement by fresh levies. It became therefore a matter of vital importance for the small invading army to fight a decisive battle as early as possible; the only way to force on such a battle was to threaten the enemy's vital points by the shortest line, and to be prepared if necessary to attack the enemy's forces as they marched to the rescue.

As an instance of an alternative plan of campaign which Lee might have followed instead of striking at the heart of

Pennsylvania, let us take the case of a march threatening Baltimore by the shortest way after Lee crossed the Potomac.

On the night of June 21, Hooker's army was quartered on the left bank of the Potomac; its advanced troops were at and near Leesburg, from twenty-five to thirty miles south of Frederic City. Close to this place he caused the river to be bridged with pontoons. The rearmost Federal corps were at Haymarket and Manassas, and the army filled the intervening country. The three Confederate corps lay on the banks of the Potomac; the greater part of Ewell's corps had already crossed, and Hill's corps lay within a day's march of the ford; Longstreet's troops, some of whom had countermarched to Stuart's assistance, could all have reached Shepherdstown in twenty-four hours. The same evening, June 21, Lee sent his orders to the corps commanders for the march of the army northwards. From the ford of the Potomac at Shepherdstown to Frederic City is about thirty miles to march. The distance therefore which each army had to march to concentrate its whole strength at that place was about the same, but Ewell's advanced guard lay much closer to it than any Federal corps, for none had as yet passed the river. If Lee had decided to march direct on Frederic he must have been able to anticipate any part of the Federal army with Ewell's corps, and since the initiative would have given all his troops at least one day's start, his concentration would have been more quickly effected.

Ewell's corps could have been in occupation of a position covering Frederic on the morning of June 23; Hill could have joined him before dark on the 23rd and Longstreet twenty-four hours later. The collision between the two armies which any attempt by the Federals to recover possession of the place must have brought about would then have given Lee the opportunity of defeating the Federals in detail as they pressed forward to meet him. Hooker could not have concentrated his seven corps before the evening of the 25th, nor could he venture to leave Lee in undisputed possession of a strategic point which not only threatened Baltimore, but also the communications of Washington and of

the Federal army with Pennsylvania. Two alternatives would have been at the choice of the Confederate leader. He could, if he wished, have awaited the Federal attack in position; or he could have struck at the Federal columns as they approached. The last course would have offered the best chance of a great victory, but implied a swift and thorough offensive, since the opportunity would exist for a few hours only. Ten days later the fortune of war and the mistakes of the Federal generals gave Lee the same chance in his own plan of campaign of dealing a thundering blow at a fraction of the enemy's forces before they could concentrate at Gettysburg, but it is folly to count on the same enviable chance presenting itself twice in a fortnight.

The plan of attacking Frederic instead of trying to lure the Federal army northward in defence of Pennsylvania had the additional merit of not exposing the Confederate communications with Virginia, when once the Federals had crossed over the Potomac into Maryland. The temptation would be great for Hooker to intercept all supplies and convoys of wounded and prisoners in order to bring Lee to a halt if he tried to penetrate along the Cumberland Valley without fighting the army of the Potomac. Hooker was actually hesitating as to whether he should interrupt his enemy's communications with a single corps, or whether he should throw all his forces across the path, so as to compel Lee to fight an offensive battle against the whole Federal army in order to reopen the road to the Potomac. Meade, who superseded Hooker, had not the courage to execute this decisive move; but the fear that he would do so paralysed the invasion, and the march of the Federals westward which culminated in the occupation of Gettysburg brought the whole of Lee's army back in haste, and compelled it eventually to attack the enemy completely concentrated in a strong position. To avoid this necessity and to impose it on the adversary had been the principal object of the manoeuvres of both armies.

The scene of the next encounter between the cavalry forces of the North and South was the fertile Loudoun Valley bounded on the east by the Bull Run Mountains and

on the west by the loftier Blue Ridge. The road from Washington to Winchester crosses the Bull Run Mountains through Aldie's Gap; at the little town of Aldie it forks in two; the northern and most direct road is carried over the Blue Ridge at Snicker's Gap, while the southernmost, after connecting the small towns of Middleburg, Upperville and Paris, follows Ashby's Gap through the Blue Ridge. At Middleburg, in the centre of this valley, Stuart established his headquarters on the 17th while the infantry divisions pursued their march to the Potomac on the western side of the chain of mountains. The four brigades of cavalry under his orders were disposed to occupy the Bull Run passes, to watch the movements of the enemy's army and to keep his patrols at a distance. The plain was about fourteen miles broad at Middleburg and was covered by fields of ripening corn, though large patches of forest clothed the lower slopes of the hills.

When the advanced scouts of the Confederate brigade which had taken Aldie for its objective reached the foot of the pass they suddenly found themselves in the presence of a strong force of Blue cavalry. The scouts wheeled about and disappeared like chaff before the wind; before the Federals had time to deploy the leading Confederate regiment charged them at top speed. The result was to throw back the Blue column; but Colonel Munford, who commanded the Southerners, saw that he was not strong enough to press his advantage; he therefore quickly dismounted his men and took up a defensive position overlooking a fold of the ground into which the road dips, and brought his battery into action in support. The Northerners then attacked on foot, but did not succeed in clearing the road; the fight became stationary and desultory. It was Kilpatrick's Federal brigade of Gregg's division which had in this manner collided with the enemy. Both sides were taken by surprise. The Unionists believed their enemy to be west of the Blue Ridge and the Confederates, having last heard of the Federals at Manassas Junction marching north, had not troubled to keep in touch with their later movements.

Description of the Loudoun Valley.

Cavalry Fight on June 17.

When Kilpatrick passed the Gap with his brigade he sent one of his regiments, the 1st Rhode Island Cavalry under Colonel Duffie two hundred and eighty strong, through Thoroughfare Gap twelve miles south of Aldie to feel for the enemy in that direction. Duffie boldly pushed across the country until he met a Confederate brigade, but he manoeuvred so cleverly that he imposed upon the enemy's superior force and made them believe his regiment to be the advanced guard of the main body of the Federal cavalry. The Grey horsemen accordingly fell back before him; he pressed on into Middleburg, which he overran with his troopers, compelling Stuart to quit very hastily in order to avoid capture. A message was at once despatched to Munford at Aldie, warning him that he might be cut off; at the moment this information reached him the Federals reinforced by one regiment began to press their attack more boldly. It was plain that they counted on speedy support, so with another hostile force in his rear Munford resolved to break off the fight, which he skilfully did, and retired towards Snickersville. In the meanwhile Stuart, having snatched up his nearest brigade, had driven the 1st Rhode Island Cavalry pell-mell out of Middleburg, and but for the gathering darkness would have destroyed the whole regiment. As it was, Duffie escaped by the way he had come with the loss of two-thirds of his men, having compelled the enemy to cede the right of way at Aldie's Gap by his diversion, which, however, he carried too far.

During the night Stuart sent out orders to his brigades to concentrate at Middleburg; the Federal headquarters despatched a division of infantry to support their cavalry. Pleasonton spent June 18 in collecting his forces and in feeling his way cautiously to ascertain the enemy's strength, while Stuart awaited the arrival of his fourth brigade under Jones, whose tardy movements delayed the concentration. On the 19th Pleasonton renewed his attack. Stuart deployed two brigades on foot, keeping Munford's brigade, which had borne the brunt of the first skirmish, in reserve.

Cavalry
fight on
June 19,
at Middle-
burg.

The Federal leader deployed both his divisions, Buford on the right and Gregg on the left, giving orders to press the attack with dismounted riflemen. These fights on foot usually resulted in the defending side holding its adversary at bay; but on this occasion the Federals, encouraged by success and feeling themselves to be the stronger side, pressed the enemy vigorously in front, while the extending line of skirmishers overlapped both his flanks. The Southern line seemed on the point of breaking when the trumpeter of the 9th Virginia sounded the charge; before it could be checked, the regiment in a swarm galloped down on the dismounted Federal line, rolling it up and inflicting some loss. Stuart took advantage of this diversion to mount his soldiers and to retire, leaving two guns in the enemy's possession.

On June 20 Jones' brigade joined Stuart, and Vincent's Federal infantry brigade, which had been following Pleasonton, caught up his main body. Throughout the day the opposing forces watched one another, but early on the 21st the fight was resumed by Stuart, who having formed his four brigades into two groups of two each, and having covered with them the roads which led to the Gaps of the Blue Ridge, made a converging attack upon Pleasonton's command. The Confederates now outnumbered their foe in cavalry, but the brunt of the attack was borne by the newly arrived infantry and artillery, upon whom the dismounted troopers could not make great impression. When they gave up the attempt and fell back out of reach of the infantry, Pleasonton launched Kilpatrick's indefatigable brigade on horseback in pursuit. Combining fire and shock tactics as Stuart had so often done successfully, Pleasonton followed up his advantage, and after some hours' fighting it seemed as if the left wing of the Confederate force would be driven off its line of retreat and cut up. Stuart, however, in time to prevent disaster realised that he was defeated, and manœuvred cleverly to extricate his men. He retired a brigade at a time, which then quickly dismounted and took up a defensive position supported by the guns. The next brigade

Cavalry
Fight of
June 21,
at Upper-
ville.

followed suit, and in this manner the whole force fell back into the hills with the firm belief that they had encountered a great numerical superiority; in reality the contending troops were about equal, and if the Confederate patrolling had been properly done on the 17th, one at least of the Federal brigades might have fallen a prey to them by a swift concentration towards Aldie's Gap.

The result of the tournament was highly satisfactory to the Federal leader, Once again his officers and men had found by experience that they could cross swords successfully with their renowned adversaries on horseback and on foot. In three days' fighting they had driven the opposing squadrons right across the valley from the Bull Run range to the Blue Ridge, but they also won another material reward. While Gregg's division slowly retired across the valley, Buford's marched in a northerly direction skirting the foot of the mountains, and his scouts and patrols gained the crest of the chain and peered over into the country beyond. What they beheld left no further doubt as to the whereabouts and intentions of Lee's army. Looking westward across the broad valley and northward as far as the banks of the Potomac, the Federal horsemen saw the roads filled with interminable processions of troops and vehicles, whose dust blurred the lovely summer sunset. Shading their eyes from the slanting rays and closely scrutinising the landscape with their glasses, they found that, while most of these columns were hurrying northward, yet considerable forces were also heading towards the Blue Ridge. These were the brigades which Longstreet had countermarched to succour Stuart's defeated cavalry. The scale on which these movements were being carried out made it certain that the Army of Northern Virginia was marching northwards to the fords of the Potomac.

In this manner Pleasonton lifted the curtain which Stuart had until then spread over the movements of the Confederate army, thus enabling the Northern commander-in-chief to prepare for a campaign north of the Potomac, whither the enemy's main forces were evidently moving. The three fights had cost the Federals eight hundred men

disabled, and the Confederates acknowledged a loss of more than five hundred.

When Hooker received the information obtained by his cavalry he caused two pontoon brigades to be prepared over the Potomac at Edward's Ferry, four miles from Leesburg, and closed his army towards the right bank of the stream. Three corps, to which was afterwards added a fourth, were designated to cross the river first under the command of General Reynolds, the leader of the I corps, in case it became necessary to operate at the same time on both banks. On June 19 Longstreet's infantry had passed the Blue Ridge at Ashby's Gap. On the 20th and 21st the First corps had marched through Berryville towards the Potomac, but the news of Stuart's engagement had brought it to a standstill and induced Longstreet to countermarch one division to assist him. Ewell had now established his advanced troops across the Potomac, covering the ford at Shepherdstown; on the night of the 21st Lee sent orders to Ewell to advance northwards through Hagerstown, Chambersburg, and Carlisle to the Susquehanna river, to lay the country under requisitions as he went, and if he could get across the Susquehanna to capture Harrisburg. Lee counted on forcing the Federal army to quit Virginian soil by this daring stroke, but he still hoped that the absence of one corps might induce Hooker to come and attack the other two. He felt certain of being able to resist the utmost efforts of the enemy with them until Ewell countermarched to their assistance. He had resolved to pass over the border with the rest of the army at any hazard as soon as Ewell's divisions were beyond the reach of recall.

Preceded by Jenkins' cavalry, Ewell set his corps in motion in the early morning of June 22. The long columns of weather-beaten soldiers had been most joyfully received by the patriotic inhabitants of the Valley, who had not beheld their own troops since the retreat from Maryland in the previous autumn, but whose hopes had been kept alive by the news of repeated victories on the Rappahannock. Now they clustered to the roadside or lined the streets of

Disposi-
tions of
the
opposing
armies
before the
passage of
the
Potomac.

the towns, cheering the regiments as they passed with their dingy uniforms and bright-coloured standards, on some of which were already embroidered the names of the principal battles of the war. What the devastation of the struggle had left to the Virginians was at the disposal of the army without stint, but the desolation of their beautiful State fired the soldiers with a keen desire to visit some of the miseries of war upon the inhabitants of the North.

Dawn of the 22nd saw Hill's three divisions following on the track of Ewell's towards Shepherdstown to execute the attack on Northern territory, for which the whole army so ardently longed. The sky was cloudy and the weather close and sultry, but nothing affected the high spirits of the troops as they plodded along the dusty roads leading to the fords of the Potomac once more. 'Marse Robert will make sure of it this journey, yeh be sure:' was the prevailing opinion. All day Ewell's regiments and countless waggons were fording the broad stream, and for four days following the rest of the army splashed and stumbled its way from bank to bank. On June 23 heavy rain fell, which increased the difficulty of the passage by swelling the river and delaying the approach of the marching columns. The soldiers sat down on the bank, and stripped themselves below the waist before stepping into the water; they carried their clothes, cartridge boxes, and precious boots fastened in a bundle to the muzzles of their rifles. Chaff and repartee such as delight the quick-witted American flew from mouth to mouth, so that the thoughtful faces of the superior officers cleared when they marked the confident and enthusiastic bearing of the troops. Gaily they clambered on to the northern shore, cheering and singing, 'Maryland, my Maryland,' at the top of their voices. To not a few, however, the fateful character of the enterprise must have been apparent, as well as its surpassing difficulty.

Marching swiftly forward the principal column of Ewell's corps, including the divisions led by Rodes and Johnson, occupied in succession Hagerstown, Greencastle and Chambersburg. Strict discipline was maintained by the invaders

The Confederates cross the Potomac and begin the invasion.

but everything which could be of use to the army, live stock, clothes, carts, hats and boots, were swept into the net by Jenkins' troopers, and by parties of infantry detached for the purpose. Everything was paid for with Confederate paper, of which there was more in the South than was wanted. When the frontier line between the States of Maryland and Pennsylvania was passed the Confederates for the first time found themselves among a population that was bitterly hostile to them, and which as yet knew nothing from experience of the Civil War. It is much to the credit of the 'ragged rebels,' who had seen their own homes desolated and had heard the inevitable tales of outrage which spread on such occasions, that they attempted no sort of reprisal, though at the time they had just reason to believe the fortune of war had inclined to their side.

While Ewell with two divisions traversed the Cumberland Valley from south to north, Early's division, covered by a single regiment of Horse, pushed its way through the South Mountains, the range of hills which bounds the Cumberland Valley on the east. On the night of June 26, Early dispersed a detachment of militia and occupied the town of Gettysburg, which manufactured boots. Having seized as many pairs as the inhabitants failed to hide, for new boots were at all times scarce in the Confederate stores, Early continued his march on the 27th through Berlin to York, laying the country under contribution in the same way as Ewell.

Jubal Early, the leader of this detached force, was an original character whose rough bluntness and candour verged on disrespect to his superiors. His worth as a commander more than compensated for his rugged manners, while his fearlessness of responsibility and power to hold his own caused him to be greatly respected in the army. On one occasion Jackson had ridden in rear of his division on the march and encountered many stragglers. Next morning Jackson sent for Early and sternly asked why he had seen so many men straggle from the division. Early answered at once, 'You saw so many stragglers from my division

Route of
the Second
corps from
the Poto-
mac to the
Susque-
hanna.

probably because you rode behind my division.' It was not every superior officer who ventured thus to reply to Jackson.

Smith's brigade was the first to enter York; partly out of curiosity, partly to look after their property, the inhabitants turned out in a mass and surrounded the troops. General Smith, who dearly loved to hear his own voice, harangued the crowd in a bantering vein until he was interrupted by a storm of malediction both loud and deep from Early, who had come up behind him. 'I was just having some fun, General,' was his explanation. Late in the afternoon of the 28th, Early's advanced guard approached Wrightsville, intending to rush the fine bridge which carried the railway over the river to Columbia. The militia, however, offered resistance long enough to enable the bridge to be destroyed by fire; the conflagration extended to the houses of Wrightsville and whole sheets of flames lit up the wide river and dark sky with a red glare of light, rousing the inhabitants of the Valley and spreading the terror of invasion as far as the busy streets of Philadelphia.

On June 27 Ewell reached Carlisle, and on the following day pushed on as far as the river bank, which he searched with patrols to find a ford. On the morning of the 29th he received Lee's orders, despatched on the 28th, to concentrate at Cashtown and at once took steps to set his troops on the march. In the afternoon of the 29th the whole Second corps was countermarching southward by three separate roads.

CHAPTER V

THE MARCH TO GETTYSBURG

Confederates concentrate at Chambersburg: June 27—Hooker crosses the Potomac—Comments on the situation of June 25—Stuart's Raid—The Snrpersession of Hooker: June 27—The Appointment of Meade—Meade's Plans and Lee's Orders—The country South of Gettysburg—Movements of the Federal Army on June 29—Federal Movements on June 30—The Encounter at Gettysburg: June 30—Concentration of the Confederate Army—The Race for Gettysburg—The Raid of Stuart's Cavalry—The Eve of Gettysburg—Detached Forces in Virginia and North Carolina.

THE Third and First corps had marched in a leisurely manner as far north as Chambersburg, which they reached on the 27th. There they halted to await developments and to collect spoil.

Confederates concentrate at Chambersburg, June 27.

Twenty-four hours after Ewell began his march from Shepherdstown Hooker heard of his advance and immediately ordered the three corps under Reynolds to file over the bridges at Edward's Ferry, and to concentrate at Poolesville on the northern bank; this movement was completed on Thursday, June 25. On

Hooker crosses the Potomac.

the 25th Hooker heard of Hill's passing the Potomac, and he then took the decisive step of transferring the remainder of his army to the north bank; at the same time he directed Reynolds to march on Frederic, and to occupy the Gaps of the South Mountain with his advanced troops. On June 26 and 27 four Federal corps with artillery, cavalry and train crossed the Potomac at Edward's Ferry and immediately took the road to Frederic. The whole army was concentrated in two groups on the eastern and western slopes of the Katocktin hills on the evening of the 27th, excepting the XII corps, pushed up the

river bank towards Harper's Ferry and the detachments holding the Gaps of the mountains, through which Lee might attack eastward and Hooker westward, and for the use of which McClellan had been obliged to fight hard in 1862.

The transfer of the Unionist army from the right to the left bank had been completed just twenty-four hours after the last battalion of the Confederate rearguard formed its ranks on the soil of Maryland. The time did not count for much in Lee's plan of campaign; in fact, he threw away the advantage by halting for a whole day at Chambersburg, but if he had planned otherwise and kept a strong force of cavalry between his army and the enemy, the start he got would have been of priceless value. Unless Hooker had managed to acquire information of Lee's intentions, and had in consequence changed his dispositions, nothing could have saved the three corps under Reynolds from having to sustain the attack of the two Confederate corps which time and space would have enabled Lee to concentrate in the neighbourhood of Frederic on June 26; two thirds that is of Lee's forces against less than one half of Hooker's. A careful study of the movements of the two armies during the last week of June, remembering the object each had in view and their respective line of communication, illustrates the principles of the great game of war as played with two armies before they come in contact with one another. They cannot be moved about the country with the ease and speed which an impatient public looks for. All sorts of obstacles invariably interpose to cause delay and frustrate the best laid plans, of which the greatest are the opposition of the enemy's cavalry and the difficulty of adequately supplying more than twenty-five thousand men with food and ammunition directly they move more than one day's march away from a working railway. When, like the Army of the Potomac, the forces in the field are largely composed of raw levies led by an officer-corps devoted indeed, but having in most cases only a few months' professional experience, the difficulties and dangers which beset swift manœuvres and long marches in the open

Com-
ments on
the situa-
tion of
June 25.

country, with uncertain supplies of food and no shelter at night, can easily be understood. In drawing the Union army away from Washington to pursue him northwards Lee hoped to trade on these difficulties, which affected his own troops far less owing to their greater mobility and capacity for enduring hardships of all sorts, hard marching and scanty supplies.

The situation of the two armies so advantageous for Lee if he had wished to follow up the invasion by a vigorous tactical offensive, an attack that is by the shortest way on the enemy's forces, lasted from June 21 until Hooker had collected his whole army on the northern bank. On June 27 the advantage had disappeared, and by the evening of the 27th it lay with Hooker, who, having secured the passes through the hills, might have attacked the two corps Lee had at Chambersburg with his whole army before Ewell's corps could have got back from the Susquehanna to join in the fight, or if Lee shirked the encounter his communications with Virginia would be entirely severed by the Federals until he opened them again by attacking his enemy, who would probably have entrenched himself athwart them.

Two days later the balance of advantage had gone back to the Confederates who once again were in a position to attack with superior numbers a fraction of the Federal army on the march, but who missed the chance from want of information in the absence of their cavalry. It will therefore be seen that when armies manœuvre in one another's presence it must happen that chances arise which are susceptible of being improved upon by one side or the other, but without the co-operation of an enterprising cavalry these chances will pass unknown and unheeded, while the enemy may exploit to the full the secrecy which veils his movements.

The order to cross the Potomac had reached Longstreet on June 22, and he then placed himself in communication with Stuart, who for some reason he believed to be under his orders, directing him to follow the First corps. Stuart, however, had been in direct communication with Lee, and was awaiting a reply to the proposal he

had made for executing a great raid across the communications of the Federals with the intention of rejoining the main army in Pennsylvania. Stuart's reply to Longstreet's instructions was consequently rather curt, and the First corps followed the rest of the army, leaving to the cavalry the task of guarding the Gaps of the Blue Ridge, and of watching the Federal forces.

Lee's orders to Stuart were somewhat vague and may be said to have authorised the raid on which the cavalry chief was bent. He was smarting under the defeat which he had just suffered at Aldie from Pleasonton, for whom he had entertained strong personal dislike ever since the pair had met in the old army. He was longing to avenge the mortification by a daring stroke which should throw every previous performance of the sort into the shade. He only took with him three of the six brigades belonging to the Army of Northern Virginia. Jenkins' brigade was with Ewell, Jones' and Robertson's still continued to hold the passes of the Blue Ridge after Stuart marched southwards to cross the trail of the enemy. Late on the 23rd Stuart received Lee's reply which he and his chief staff officer McClellan held to authorise the projected raid. The order was destroyed, so it is impossible to verify its wording. It seems certain that it amounted to an approval of Stuart's plan, though it seems likely that Lee did not gather how far afield Stuart meant to go with the detachment, and that he believed it would follow on the enemy's tracks and not attempt to go right round his army. In any case much was left to Stuart's discretion; the town of York in Pennsylvania was given as the probable point of concentration for the Confederates, and it was notified that Early would probably reach that place on June 29. From the want of precision in Stuart's orders, but still more from the feeble use made by Lee of the other half of his cavalry retained under his immediate orders, it seems that he had not realised at this period the necessity for close co-operation between infantry and cavalry in offensive strategy, and also that he did not contemplate the tactical offensive for some days, nor fear it from the enemy.

In the misty dawn of June 25 while the ground reeked from the recent downpour, Stuart's division of three brigades rode away from the army on its adventurous quest, nor was it able to rejoin until the decisive battle of Gettysburg was actually being fought and had well-nigh been decided.

We left the Federal army on June 27 massed in the hands of its chief, whose headquarters were established at Frederic City, which a short branch line connected by rail with the Baltimore and Ohio railway at Monocacy. Frederic is distant forty miles by road from Washington and Baltimore, thirty-four from Gettysburg and twenty-five from Westminster. Covering as it did all the approaches to Washington and Baltimore from western Maryland, and focussing all the means of communication of that part of the country east of the South Mountain, its strategical importance was very great in the impending campaign. At and around the city were concentrated three army corps, the II, V, and VI, and the reserve artillery. Reynolds with the I, III, and the XI corps had his headquarters at Middletown and held with strong detachments the passes through the hills. The XII corps under Slocum had been thrust up the left bank of the Potomac to join hands with a division commanded by General French, made up from the garrison of Harper's Ferry, which Hooker had resolved to abandon in spite of Halleck's affection for the place. With the XII corps together with the troops thus placed at his disposal Hooker planned to interrupt Lee's communications, while he kept the remainder of his army concentrated between Lee and the capital in accordance with the instructions he had received. Having made his plans Hooker telegraphed to Halleck late in the evening of the 26th demanding authority to execute them and calling for reinforcements from the troops in garrison at Washington and Baltimore. The troops at Harper's Ferry had already been placed under Hooker's command nominally, so that unless he wished to involve Halleck in the responsibility of his plan, it is not plain why he should have demanded further authorisation on what was after all a matter of detail.

Now Halleck detested Hooker, and distrusted his capacity for command of a large army; the idea of giving up Harper's Ferry was very repugnant to him, and his obstinacy in clinging to his opinion about the strategical importance of this isolated post had brought about its disastrous capture by Jackson in the Maryland campaign. Actuated by these motives, Halleck replied by telegraph refusing to part with control over the troops in the great depots, and ordering that Harper's Ferry should not be abandoned except in case of absolute necessity. While these messages were being exchanged along the wires, Hooker had spent the day of June 27 in visiting Slocum's corps, which had reached Knoxville, five miles from Maryland Heights, and in preparing for his intended attack on the road which linked Lee's army with Virginia.

The situation was very favourable for the project. The Army of the Potomac covered its own line of retreat and lay within two days' march of the enemy's, having a strong advanced guard one day's march from the passage of the river by which Lee must retreat. Judging from the weakness of character which Hooker displayed in the campaign of Chancellorsville, it is not certain that he had the nerve to execute his own plan in the present instance any more than he had in the former. It is impossible to avoid the suspicion that he dreaded to measure himself once again with the great Confederate leader and that he courted dismissal. He returned to his headquarters at Frederic in the evening of the 27th, and found Halleck's reply to his urgent representations, whereupon he telegraphed a request to be relieved of the command. His conduct in so doing cannot be admired. Had he felt confidence in himself he might very well have severed the knot, and have acted with or without Halleck's sanction, trusting to the event to justify his action. If on the other hand he knew himself to be no match for Lee, or if he considered that Halleck's jealousy rendered his position impossible, he should not have waited till the eve of the decisive battle, the very crisis of the war, to change the chief command. The proceedings of the Administration at Washington are still less to be commended. After Chancellorsville there was ample

excuse for relieving Hooker if a better man was available for the post ; but nothing had happened in the brief course of the present campaign to justify his removal. Though differing from the plan of operations in favour with the President, Hooker had most ably carried out his wishes, and at the moment of the resignation had secured great strategical advantages for his army, which were of course lost by the delay in changing command. As regards the specific grounds of difference, the retention of Harper's Ferry was folly, and the refusal to subordinate the forces at Washington to the commander of the field army utterly unreasonable. Before retiring to rest on the 27th Hooker drafted orders for the army to march northwards, so as to keep it on a course parallel to Lee's and thus to continue to interpose between his enemy and Baltimore, such being as he believed the wishes of the President and of his chief military adviser.

The short summer night during which the Government at Washington had to choose their next commanding general was one of the most important in the history of America. To recall McClellan, as they had done a year ago when the enemy knocked at the gates of Washington, would have been the best move from a purely military point of view, but for political reasons was not to be thought of. The choice eventually fell upon Meade, an officer who had served in the Engineer corps of the old army and who had distinguished himself as a corps commander in the last two unfortunate campaigns. General Hardie was sent to Frederic with the instructions of the Government and with orders to make his way with the least possible delay and at any hazard to the headquarters of the army. He was provided with a large sum of money to facilitate his journey, which he performed in plain clothes. With some difficulty he found his destination in the course of the forenoon of the 28th, though his route seemed so precarious that he had been instructed to destroy the despatch if necessary and convey its purport by word of mouth. That very night Stuart crossed the Potomac, and while Hardie was speeding on his way, Grey troopers were overflowing the country within ten miles of the White House. Panic

prevailed throughout the great cities of the New England States, the backbone of the Union. The strength of the Confederate army was of course exaggerated, and it was conjectured with reason that Lee would not again have risked its safety by crossing the frontier without a good chance of success.

Hooker handed over the command and proceeded to Washington, where with petty malice he was put under arrest for not going direct to the place where he had been ordered to report himself. His career is remarkable among many others of men who have unusual talents for war, and who can lead ten thousand men with marked vigour and ability, but who fail when called upon to execute manœuvres on a greater scale. He was an excellent strategist and could feel the pulse of troops in action, but the responsibility of carrying out his own strategy in the teeth of such leaders as Lee and Jackson was altogether too much for him.

George Meade the man who conquered at Gettysburg and who retained the command of the Army of the Potomac under Grant the commander-in-chief of the Union forces, until the end of the war, was very unlike the conventional type of a great warrior. The victor of one of the fiercest battles in modern history, which was decisive in the great contest for the empire of North America, had more the appearance of an engineer than of a troop leader, and his subsequent career bore out the cautious methods of his character and training. Though tall and gentlemanlike in appearance he stooped and wore spectacles, for he was very short-sighted. Yet under an exterior which hardly seemed to answer to the important part he was called upon to play, he possessed valuable qualities as a chief at this particular crisis. He was just, modest, and courteous; determined though cautious, and a good judge of men. He was personally brave and had the moral courage which is so often lacking to men who never fear for their own safety. In Reynolds, Warren, Pleasonton and Hancock, the Army of the Potomac possessed more brilliant commanders, but his appointment was not unpopular; he received the most loyal support alike from chiefs and troops, and the dislocation in-

evitable from the change of supreme leaders was of remarkably short duration.

Meade retained General Butterfield, Hooker's chief of the staff and other staff officers; he spent the 28th in gathering up the threads of the problem which he had to solve, and in preparing to execute the northward march indicated in Hooker's last orders. Lincoln had given him everything for which Hooker had contended in vain, the command over all the troops in Maryland and Washington, and a free hand concerning the defence of Harper's Ferry. His cavalry was strongly reinforced by fresh levies, and another division was constituted to be commanded by Kilpatrick which consisted of one new brigade under Farnsworth and one brigade of regulars under Merritt. Of the thirty-six thousand infantry at Washington more or less fit to take the field, none reached the army before the battles at Gettysburg. The neglect to form another army corps with them and the division withdrawn from Harper's Ferry was the most foolish blunder of the military administration at this time, for the presence of one more strong army corps at Gettysburg would have removed the danger of crushing disaster to a comparatively remote chance.

Hooker had believed that Lee, having no bridge equipage, would not attempt to cross the Susquehanna in force, but would wait to be attacked in the Cumberland Valley.

Meade's
plans and
Lee's
orders.

Meade, on the contrary, knowing the daring and resource of the Confederate general, feared for the safety of the Northern cities and especially of Baltimore and Philadelphia; he therefore determined to march northwards in order to cover them. It was not until the evening of the 28th that Lee heard of the passage of the Potomac by Hooker's army and of its threat against his line of retreat, so badly was he served in the matter of information in the absence of his cavalry and in the presence of a hostile population, which instantly reported every movement of his own troops to the foe. There were three lines of operation possible for the Confederate army. First, Lee might march direct on Washington; this move was certain to bring about a great battle, and if victorious he might pen up the

beaten enemy in the lines of the place while he worked his will in the adjacent country. Secondly, he might strike at Baltimore, where strong sympathy with the South was known to exist, and which was unfortified. Thirdly, he might persevere in his attack on the country north of the Susquehanna in order to bring about a battle far from the Federal base. This last plan involved the hazardous measure of ceding for a time the road back to Virginia, the interruption of which was the most likely offensive measure to be taken by Meade. In order to checkmate it, Lee, when he heard of the Federal movements of the 26th, commanded a concentration of his army east of the South Mountain in the neighborhood of Gettysburg. He thus replied to the menace against his communications by threatening the enemy's vital parts; nor was he mistaken in assuming that whoever commanded the Army of the Potomac would be compelled by the Federal Government to fight for the possession of Baltimore. Thus it was Hooker's manœuvre and not Meade's march northwards which arrested the Confederates' advance. The possession of Gettysburg would still leave it open to Lee to prosecute an offensive campaign in either of the three directions stated above and at the same time he protected his own line of communication by bringing Meade's army northwards to fight.

An examination of the map of Maryland and Pennsylvania of the date will show that if a line be drawn from Frederic to Baltimore, the two places north of it having most military importance were Westminster and Gettysburg. Both were at the end of a branch line of railway and each formed a centre whence radiated all the principal roads of their respective districts. Gettysburg was about thirty-four miles to march from Frederic and thirty-six from Westminster, which lay some twenty-five miles north-east of Frederic. Both at Frederic and Westminster the Federal supply department collected, by rail, great stores of food and ammunition, for which the Confederates now mainly depended on what they could seize from the enemy or collect in the country. The river Monocacy rises a few miles north of Gettysburg and flows

The
country
south of
Gettys-
burg.

almost due south, receiving many small tributaries from the South Mountain on the west and from a range of low hills on the east which bounds its basin. In the midsummer of 1863 the country was cleared of forest and well cultivated, though here and there a rocky tangle of hills still protected patches of wood which it had been of no use to cut down. The roads were numerous and unusually good for America at that period; the weather had become warm and showery. The possession of Gettysburg as a point of concentration east of the South Mountain was of supreme importance to the Confederates, whose two wings were widely separated, and Westminster had a like importance for the Federals to give them a railhead for their supplies whence they could easily advance or retire. West of the last named town were to be found several favourable positions for a defensive attitude and Meade resolved to occupy one of these which followed the valley of the Pipe Creek, a little stream cutting the roads to Emmetsburg and Gettysburg ten miles west of Westminster. He sent engineer officers to survey the position and to report on its fitness for a defensive battlefield.

Contrary to his intentions an alternative plan was forced upon Meade by the bold initiative of his cavalry; it had the effect of forestalling the Confederates in the possession of Gettysburg, and of compelling them to attack the Federal army in position or to retrace their steps. For the invaders to have retired through the passes of the South Mountain in the presence of the enemy would have been difficult and it would have been construed far and wide as an admission of weakness.

On Sunday evening, June 28, the orders of the new commander-in-chief were distributed to the seven army corps of the Federal army. Three corps, the II, V and VI, forming as before the right wing of the army, were directed on positions covering Westminster from the west and north-west. The III and XII corps were given Taneytown for their destination, and at this place army headquarters were established on the night of June 29. The left wing, still under the immediate command of Reynolds, was to form a

Move-
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29.

flank guard for the rest of the army and Emmetsburg was assigned as its immediate objective. The I corps covered by cavalry was to push an advanced guard forward towards Gettysburg. The cavalry had moved from the rear to the front of the army and spread out before it like a fan. Kilpatrick's division had gone in pursuit of Stuart, Gregg's was ordered to cover the advance of the infantry while Buford's covered the left wing. Meade's dispositions were not unskilful to carry out the object he had in view, but his corps were too widely extended for rapid concentration. In particular the left wing was equivocally situated. It was not strong enough to contend with the enemy's army, but it was strong enough to be involved in a very serious contest which was likely to attract all the other Federal corps, and the V and VI had been directed too far eastward to be easily recalled in time to assist if the left wing were suddenly attacked.

The army over which Meade took command on June 28 numbered approximately one hundred thousand combatants of infantry, cavalry and artillery. On the evening of the 29th it lay down to rest on a front of fourteen miles. Its left rested on the road to Gettysburg from Frederic, its right on the road to Westminster. Numerous cross roads rendered a rapid concentration possible, but it behoved Meade to decide whether he meant to fight at Gettysburg or on the Pipe Creek before his army undertook another march which would still further extend the front. As is usual in war he continued to receive contradictory information. Stuart's cavalry, which passed between him and Washington on the 28th and 29th, had made communication with that place precarious. Nevertheless Halleck sent word of the presence of the Confederates on the Susquehanna and indicated York as their probable point of concentration. It was probably on this theory that Meade extended his right wing so far eastward.

While the infantry columns were marching rapidly northward by every parallel road available, Buford's cavalry division had pushed its patrols into the Cumberland Valley, but failed to find any Confederate troops. Buford accord-

ingly directed his two brigades on Fountain Dale, where the roads to Gettysburg and Emmetsburg join to cross the hills by the Fairfield Pass. The two columns of cavalry marched on either side of the hills, but when they bivouacked on the night of the 29th they had not yet encountered the enemy.

The march of June 30 helped to clear up the situation. The III corps on the afternoon of the 30th was ordered to join the left wing at Emmetsburg, thus placing three corps at Reynolds' disposition, nearly one half of the army. The II corps took the place of the III with the XII and still forming the centre these two corps marched to Taneytown, where headquarters remained. Their right wing, consisting now only of the V and VI corps, continued the journey to Frizzelburg and Westminster. Remembering that the rear of the different columns had started from a considerable distance south and west of Frederic on the morning of the 29th, it will be seen that the two days' marching for such a large army in hot weather had been a good performance. On the night of June 30, then, the Federal forces extended across the country from Emmetsburg to Westminster, a distance of twenty-four miles by a good road. Late in the evening Meade received from Washington the news of the withdrawal of the enemy from the Susquehanna Valley: the despatch also stated that Chambersburg would probably be his point of concentration. Meade thereupon sent orders to Reynolds to march on Gettysburg, with the object of occupying the place and of delaying the enemy's advance, while the rest of the army reached the line Taneytown—Littletown—Hanover. Meade still clung to his plan of fighting a defensive battle, and his orders for the 30th involved a wheel of his whole army to the left, while his advanced guard seized Gettysburg. The execution of these orders required two days free of hostile interruption, but on the afternoon of the 30th events had already occurred which settled the locality of the struggle.

On the night of the 30th the advanced squadrons of Buford's division had seen reflected on the northern sky the glare of numerous watch-fires which must belong to hostile troops. Word to that effect was sent to Reynolds at

Federal
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ments on
June 30.

Emmetsburg, who forwarded the message to Taneytown and ordered Buford to occupy Gettysburg. The cavalry resumed its march, but before it had gone far tidings of the counter at 'rebels' began to pour in from many zealous assistants. The Grey columns were said to be streaming through the South Mountain and converging on Gettysburg. Next the news came that the town was held by hostile infantry who were making themselves at home and preparing for the night. During the afternoon the Blue scouts encircled the place and peeped into it from the ridge which overlooked it from the south. The Confederates, having neither friendly population nor mounted patrols to ascertain the enemy's power, took fright and retreated by the way they had come. Their retirement was as promptly notified to the Federals as their appearance had been, and Buford's troopers rode into the streets at one end of the town as the Grey rearguard quitted it at the other.

A few shots were exchanged between the two forces as the Confederates fell back towards Cashtown, and the cavalry eagerly welcomed by the townsfolk clattered through Gettysburg. Buford soon discovered from prisoners and from the wealth of reports which reached him how near the mass of the Confederates were; he recognised that if the possession of the place was to be denied to the enemy, a rapid concentration of the Federal army must take place. Couriers were sent off in the evening to Reynolds and Pleasonton with Buford's report, while the cavalry division was quartered for the night on the western outskirts of the town ready to turn out and fight; scouts and patrols rode out in the gloaming to feel for the Southern advanced guard.

The presence of the Army of the Potomac at Frederic was notified to the Confederate headquarters on the afternoon of the 28th after orders had been given for the First and Third army corps to move towards Carlisle. These instructions were promptly countermanded. Couriers were despatched on good horses to recall Ewell from the Susquehanna, and a concentration of the whole army on the eastern side of the hills near Gettysburg was ordered.

The en-
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Lee's messenger found Ewell with Early concerting an attack on Harrisburg, instead of which the divisions of the Second corps were headed now southward by parallel roads. Johnson's division was sent by Carlisle, Rodes through Petersburg to Mummasburg and Early's to Heidlersburg. They were well on their way by night-fall of the 29th, and during the 30th the two divisions marching east of the hills reached cantonments from ten to fifteen miles north of Gettysburg. Ewell soon had reason bitterly to regret that he had not kept Johnson's division with his army corps, for by reason of the détour it had to make in order to rejoin him it failed to reach the field in time for the first battle, which as so often happens was fought earlier than the leaders expected.

While Ewell was hurrying towards the little borough of Cashtown at the eastern outlet of the pass through the South Mountain, which he concluded to be Lee's point of concentration, the rest of the army was marching somewhat leisurely by the turnpike, the one direct road which connected Chambersburg and Gettysburg. Hill's corps led the way followed by Longstreet, who left Pickett's division of Virginian infantry to hold Chambersburg and protect the rear of the army until the three thousand cavalry remaining behind to watch the Federals south of the Potomac should reach the scene of action. That no disaster had already happened in the complete absence of all cavalry from the front of the army was due to good luck, to the excessive caution of the Federal dispositions and to the confusion and delay in their plans caused by the change in the supreme command. The evil consequences of this mistaken distribution of the cavalry now made themselves felt to the full. Doubt and hesitation beset every movement of the Confederate army and no reliable reports reached it of the enemy's movements, nor of the country ahead of it. The occupation of Gettysburg by the enemy under the very eyes of Lee's advanced guard was the first unfortunate result.

The three divisions of the Third corps followed by two of the First, with the artillery, baggage-train, ammunition-waggon, ambulances &c, which must accompany the

forward movement of even the most mobile forces, formed an immense column. The infantry alone numbered forty thousand soldiers and teamsters, and occupied about fourteen miles of road; the artillery and trains occupied not less than ten miles. Behind the First corps Johnson's division of the Second corps had tacked itself on by marching from Greenwood to the western end of the pass on June 30. Including the artillery and non-combatants, there were over sixty thousand men making their way by the single road through the hills. In such a long column the best troops find it difficult to maintain perfect order, and progress was necessarily slow. Lee fixed his headquarters at Cashtown on the night of the 29th and there he still was when the report reached him of the encounter with Buford's cavalry.

Pettigrew's brigade of Heth's division had been ordered to occupy Gettysburg where no enemy was expected, in order to seize all the boots which it was believed the inhabitants had concealed from Early when he passed through the town on June 27. Pettigrew's men marched into the town with their waggons and were establishing themselves there for the night when they were disturbed by Federal troopers as already described. Pettigrew, believing his small force to be dangerously isolated, beat a hasty retreat to the Marsh Creek six miles from Gettysburg, where he met Heth and Hill, the generals of the division and army corps. Hill realised that the enemy's force was but a cavalry advanced guard and ordered a rapid advance early next day to reoccupy the town. When the incident was reported to Lee the situation seems for the first time to have been clear to him. He saw the importance of Gettysburg as a rallying point for his divided forces, and divined the enemy's intention of withholding it from him. He resolved to accept their challenge and sent couriers back to hurry the march of the long column and to establish concerted action with Ewell next day, whose two divisions were ordered to take Gettysburg not Cashtown as their objective.

On the night of the 30th Pender's division and the bulk of Heth's of the Third corps slept at Cashtown. Anderson's

was due next morning. The two divisions of the First corps could be counted on to come into action late on July 1 and the Second corps to arrive at Gettysburg by noon. There was still a good chance of gaining possession of the place without a battle.

The situation of the two armies on the march to Gettysburg was entirely unique. The Confederates were pressing eastward so as to establish themselves on that side of the South Mountain, the Federals were hurrying north to forestall them on the road to Baltimore or even in the Susquehanna Valley, while Stuart's command was moving on a wide outer circle separated from his friends by all the marching columns of the enemy's army and by a broad tract of hilly country. The commanding generals on both sides were planning a defensive battle; both reckoned on plenty of time to take up a position of choice, both expected that his opponent would be obliging enough to come and attack it. Events, however, shaped themselves otherwise. On the morning of July 1 instructions were sent to the Federal corps commander to fall back on the defensive position which had been reconnoitred on the Pipe Creek; two of them remonstrated against any retreat and raised doubts as to the probability of Lee's advancing so far east to attack. While these communications were being exchanged, and while the V and VI corps of the Federal right wing were continuing their march eccentrically to the real focus of action, the attraction which two hostile armies in presence exert over one another had already brought about a collision at Gettysburg; but before proceeding with the narrative of the battle it will be necessary to follow the course of Stuart's adventurous ride across the Federal communications.

Few campaigns have been the subject of more controversy in the press and in books than the one which culminated in the battles round Gettysburg; and of all its incidents probably Stuart's raid has excited most discussion. That the raid was bold to rashness does not of necessity condemn it. Such apparent rashness often reaps the richest rewards; but the principal error of which both Lee and Stuart were guilty lay in that they

failed to make their plans fit in with sufficient exactness, probably because neither realised how essential the close co-operation of cavalry is to the infantry of an invading army. Since the Confederate leaders had just taken advantage of the same error committed by their enemies in the Chancellorsville campaign, it is remarkable that they should have jeopardised their own enterprise in exactly the same way.

By the light of what happened it may now be said that the raid was a mistake, and especially when Stuart found the Federal army to be moving northwards did he commit an error of judgment in attempting to traverse its lines of communication, thus severing his connection with Lee at the crisis of the campaign. Yet the expedition had much to recommend it. The Federal army was believed to be slow and its commander to be cautious. Both depended to an unusual degree on uninterrupted communication with their base. Pressure on this line of communication seemed the surest way of retarding and embarrassing the hostile forces, and—which was perhaps of equal moment—of alarming and confusing the hostile Government.

That Stuart fulfilled these objects to some extent cannot be denied, but the force at his back did not permit him to remain long enough in one place to do serious harm, and his anxiety about the fate of the main army equally compelled him to hurry. Moreover the Federal army which marched to Gettysburg was far more formidable than even the resolute host with which McClellan had rescued Maryland a year before. It took more than the annoyance which five thousand raiding cavalry could inflict in their rear to shake the determination of the Northern soldiers in 1863; balancing what might be gained against what was certain to be lost for the invading army by the absence of the best half of the cavalry with its distinguished chief, the same judgment must be made as Jackson pronounced on Stoneman's raid six weeks earlier.

Major McClellan, who had succeeded the Prussian officer, Von Borcke, as Stuart's chief staff officer, relates how a courier arrived from Lee just before midnight on the 23rd to

find Stuart sleeping under a tree rolled up in his cloak while the pouring rain dripped from the branches. By the uncertain light of a lantern McClellan read the despatch which gave Stuart permission to exercise his discretion as to rejoining the army. Without awaking his chief, the staff officer drafted the necessary orders for the proposed march and went to sleep. At break of day he showed Lee's despatch to Stuart, and after some correspondence with Longstreet, whose infantry still protected the rear of the army, the cavalry commander ordered three of his five brigades to join him but to remain in position one day more in order to give the infantry a start on their northward march, and to enable Jones and Robertson to occupy the gaps of the Blue Ridge with their cavalry brigades. It was somewhat carelessly assumed that the whole Federal army was echeloned along the eastern slopes of the Bull Run hills, but it was soon found that this theory was incorrect, and that hostile cantonments extended further to the south and east than was expected.

On the 25th the division concentrated at Salem numbering about six thousand men and horses; six guns, their waggons and a few light ambulance carts formed the whole impedimenta of the column. The general whose new grey tunic embroidered with silver had suffered from exposure to the recent wet weather, rode at the head of his company like a baron of old starting on a foray and directed the march. His troopers resembled the cavalry of no regular army that had yet existed; they were mounted on well-bred, wiry horses, who thrived on long marches and short rations. Each man was armed with a rifle generally slung across his back, and a revolver; most of them also had swords, but the pistol was the favourite weapon for hand to hand fighting; all carried what rations they had been able to collect with perhaps a feed of oats and several packets of cartridges. Instead of dotting the country with detachments which betray everything and discover nothing, the Southern cavalry marched in concentrated columns ready for action, while a few trusty scouts and small patrols cantered out to the front and flanks, moving swiftly from one cover to another, and

keeping far enough in advance of their main body to give ample warning of danger.

Soon after it started the column turned southward, by which move Stuart hoped quickly to get clear of the enemy; he, however, encountered the marching columns of the II Federal corps moving northward, which showed that the Federal army still extended further south than he had calculated, but that it was marching towards the Potomac. Stuart was unable to refrain from the pleasure of throwing a few shells in among the hostile infantry, which caused some disorder and delay; he then diverged still further south to cross the trail of the army. On the 26th and 27th the cavalry made but slow progress. The whole country was covered by the Federal troops who had been quartered along the three main roads leading from the Bull Run Mountains to Washington through Leesburg, Aldie and Thoroughfare Gap, and who were now converging in long columns on Leesburg. Until the country was clear of them the Confederate cavalry could not cross the Potomac, and long halts were necessary to graze the horses, for no hay was to be found.

In the afternoon of June 27 the raiders passed through Drainesville, and there they learnt for certain the direction and object of the hostile army. The information was sent after Lee by two couriers, neither of whom succeeded in reaching him before Stuart, so precarious had all communication with Lee's army already become. Having acquired this knowledge Stuart would certainly have done well to have marched up the right bank of the Potomac and so made sure of rejoining the army, but his character was not one to lightly abandon an enterprise which he had once undertaken. If Lee held to his purpose it would still be possible to reach York as soon as the rest of the army. So Stuart reasoned, and as soon as it was dusk the column moved down to the river bank near the waterfalls whose roar helped to keep the movement secret.

The moonlight fitfully penetrated the cloudy sky as the endless string of horsemen splashed through the stream. The rocky and uneven bottom of the Potomac at this ford

delayed the passage, which had to be most cautiously made. Now and then a horse would slip into deep water above his girths to swim a length or so before he regained his feet. To get the guns and waggons over was still more difficult. The limbers were emptied and the cartridges distributed among the troopers who carried them over dry, and the guns were dragged through the water which flowed over them. So silently and successfully was the venturesome operation performed without any loss that the inhabitants of some neighbouring houses slept throughout the night without becoming aware of it. The early hours of June 28 were spent in drying, feeding and resting the men and horses, but it was not possible to halt for long. Stuart's first act of hostility was to damage as much as possible in a short time the Potomac Canal which the Federals used to transport supplies. Soon after midday his men were in the saddle converging on the small town of Rockville, through which ran the direct road to Frederic from Washington. Here a halt was ordered, but as the men were off-saddling the approach of a big Federal convoy was notified coming from Washington. In a very few minutes the greater part of a brigade had turned out and was galloping to meet it. The escort, little expecting to come across the enemy within a day's march of the capital, was speedily put to flight and the waggons captured. Some were burnt, about one hundred were unwisely marched off by the Confederates, for they proved a serious hindrance later. The flying troopers and drivers sped back into the camp at Washington spreading tales of the Confederate approach. Stuart was tempted to make a dash between the forts in the dusk, but the necessity for pressing onward and the little damage he could do forced him to forego the pleasure of still further terrifying the Washington politicians.

Before the close of the short summer's night the march was resumed after a few hours' rest. The next spring forward carried the cavalry on to the Baltimore and Ohio railway at Woodstock, only fourteen miles from Baltimore, having ridden twenty-four miles from Rockville. This precious line connected the Atlantic seaboard with the

western States and the capital with the rest of the Union ; at this moment it served as the principal line of supply for the depots of the army in the field at Frederic and Westminster. Stuart burnt two small wooden bridges and did what mischief he could during a short halt, for he dared not tarry, though the interruption of this line might have been considered as the principal object of the raid. At sundown on June 29 his advanced patrols were pushing their way through the small borough of Westminster, twenty miles further north. At the outskirts of the town a Federal regiment was found dismounted and the place was only occupied after a sharp fight in which some men were killed on each side.

During the night came tidings of a whole division of hostile cavalry in cantonments at Littletown on the road to Gettysburg which Stuart hoped to have followed. To avoid a fight he was obliged to take the direction of Hanover very early in the morning of the 30th. Two brigades escorted the prisoners and captured waggons, while one brigade marched on the left by a parallel track as a flank guard. The new force and activity which Pleasonton had infused into the Federal cavalry, again came as an unpleasant surprise to the Southerners, who had for two years become accustomed to take such liberties with the adversary. The plan of the Federal cavalry commander was to thrust Stuart's force as far apart from Lee's army as possible ; for this purpose he detached the recently organised division under Kilpatrick, consisting of two brigades drawn from the new levies of cavalry trained by General Stahl at Washington. One brigade was commanded by a gallant youth named Farnsworth, a lieutenant in the United States army, who fell in the hour of victory at Gettysburg ; the other by Custer, who survived the Civil War, but was killed thirteen years later fighting the Red Indians. Merritt's brigade of regulars was substituted for Custer's transferred to Gregg's division on July 2.

As soon as Stuart's march was notified to Pleasonton he sent Kilpatrick in pursuit. A forced march brought the Federals on to the flank of the raiding column, but the newly levied cavalry had not had time to learn much about

scouting and patrolling, and so failed to locate the enemy's large force at Westminster, in spite of the skirmish of the preceding night. In the afternoon of the 30th the leading Federal brigade blundered on to the marching column of the Confederates near Hanover Junction. Two Southern brigades swiftly formed for action, and had Stuart been as free to manoeuvre as his opponent he might have gained an important success. The same inexorable necessity to rejoin the army without delay again robbed him of his prey. He shook off the enemy as quickly as he could and directed his march through Jefferson in a north-easterly direction so as to unite with Early's division, which was due at York on the 30th.

All night the weary cavalcade proceeded, but the march was a fearful expenditure of strength. Ever since the morning of the 24th the troops had been marching hard mostly by night, and by day they had been working or fighting. Want of food, but still more want of sleep, had exhausted the men as much as the horses; many fell from the saddle as they rode along in spite of the brave efforts of the officers to keep the men awake, while every now and then a horse would stumble and come down on his knees. July 1 dawned on a struggling column of riders whose faces were as grey as their coats. None but the best cavalry soldiers mounted on well-bred horses could have borne the strain, nor was the worst of their trials over.

Soon after it was light Dover was reached, seven miles from York. The scouts brought the intelligence that Early, whose troops had been in occupation of the surrounding country, had marched northward on the 29th. Weary as they were Stuart compelled his men to proceed in the chase of the friendly legions which seemed to disappear like a will o' the wisp as they approached. The situation was perplexing and anxious in the highest degree, while excessive fatigue had strained everyone's nerves and thus increased the difficulties of the Confederate chief. Late in the afternoon of Wednesday, 1st, at the very hour of the Confederate victory before Gettysburg nearly thirty miles away, Stuart with the leading regiment of his corps reached the neighbourhood of Carlisle, only to find as before that

the Southern infantry which had been in occupation had marched away. A detachment of hostile militia held the town and prepared to defend it. Rest and food for the men and horses must be got at any price, so Stuart brought up his horse artillery to clear the town, when a courier found him who brought Lee's orders to concentrate at Gettysburg without delay. The guns had opened fire, and the troopers revived by the prospect of a fight had dismounted and were pressing forward to attack the Pennsylvania militia, when the 'rally' sounded and the attack was abandoned. Once more the march was resumed; each brigade took a different road and late on July 2 the cavalry reached the left flank of the Southern army to find it in the midst of the decisive struggle.

The ill-success of the enterprise was in some measure due to the failure both of Stuart and Lee to keep touch with the movements of the Federal forces during the critical days of the passage by both armies of the river Potomac. In spite of the change of plan and earlier concentration of the Confederate army, Stuart by forced marches succeeded in bringing his squadrons on to the enemy's flank at Gettysburg in time to follow up victory or mitigate defeat, a great achievement of courage and endurance. Following immediately on the march to the Potomac and passage by night of that river the cavalry had covered one hundred and fifty miles in three days and fought a sharp action. Well nigh used up as the men and horses were, they had gamely responded to their leader's call for a supreme effort to reach the battlefield, and the great raid remains a record of what such a large body of cavalry can accomplish by forced marching when they are well led and well mounted, but the occasions are rare indeed when it is worth while thus to expend the strength of men and horses.

While Grant's army on the Mississippi sat on guard over Vicksburg, like a terrier watching the hole of a rat, waiting till lack of food should force the brave garrison to capitulate, and while the other mobile forces of the two Republics were blocked by one another at Jackson and in Tennessee, the principal armies of both

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burg.

belligerents alike from numerical strength and perfection of organisation were converging for the death-grapple at Gettysburg. There existed, however, a considerable number of good troops on both sides which were concentrated neither on the principal nor even on the secondary field of action, but which were held guarding or threatening Richmond and in places of subsidiary importance.

The Federal Government sinned most in this respect because it had the largest forces detached from, and within reach of, the decisive point, but the Confederate War Administration was hardly less to blame, seeing that it had in Lee an officer who had proved himself worthy of implicit confidence and who had plainly informed his Government of the measures of concentration necessary to win. The principal Federal detachment was the IV army corps under General Keyes, about fifteen thousand infantry with a brigade of cavalry, which had been transferred by sea to the peninsula of Virginia, the theatre of McClellan's unsuccessful campaign. This force attempted no serious enterprise either against Richmond or the communications of Lee's army, and, indeed, it was not strong enough to have done either with success, though its presence with the Army of the Potomac might have turned the scale in a doubtful struggle. Besides the IV army corps there was the detachment under General French at Harper's Ferry, about eleven thousand field troops, and the entrenched camp at Washington held levies of whom more than twenty thousand had reached a fair degree of military training, and from whom at least a strong brigade might, with advantage, have been added to each Federal army corps. Meade certainly withdrew French's troops from Harper's Ferry and concentrated them at Frederic City. This disposition has been sharply criticised because the force in question was not strong enough to fight if Lee's army fell upon it, while its presence with headquarters would certainly have been of great value. Before blaming Meade, however, it should be remembered that his plan was not to fight at Gettysburg, but in a position covering Westminster where he could have drawn to his main body the troops at Frederic. Also it

should not be forgotten that the possession of Frederic was of great strategic importance to both sides, containing as it did the Federal supply depots and situated as it was on the flank of the Confederate communications. The seizure of Frederic by the Southern troops would have severed the Northern army from its base at Washington, and Meade could not tell but that Lee's suggestion to his Government of putting one more army corps in the field on the northern frontier of Virginia might have been adopted, and then the contingency provided against by holding Frederic would have been imminent. If, however, the Federal Government had made the best use of the troops at its disposal, the garrison of Washington could have guarded Frederic against a raid while the forces of Keyes and French reunited with the Army of the Potomac would have given Meade so great a numerical superiority that he might have counted on victory instead of narrowly escaping defeat in the decisive battle.

Besides other smaller detachments the Confederates had three brigades in North Carolina at the end of June, and five brigades at Petersburg, Richmond and Guiney Station. From these eight brigades it would have been worth incurring great risks to have drawn four, in order to reinforce Lee's army or to comply with his suggestion of putting Beauregard at the head of an independent command threatening Maryland and Washington as Jackson had done from the Shenandoah Valley in May and June 1862.

In the absence on a distant expedition of the fine troops which had so long protected them, the people of Richmond were not unnaturally the prey to the keenest anxiety and suspense. Communications with Lee's headquarters were most precarious, as the capture of Government despatches showed, and if any disaster overtook the army no further means of resistance remained in Virginia. The gloom which hung over all social life and which was intensified after each great clash of arms by the widespread mourning for friends and relations seemed to have permanently settled on the heroic capital of the Confederacy. The business of war and the business of Government were the only ones that could be carried on. The few men in the prime of life who were

not with the army were ministering to its needs; the old men and children helped the women to carry on the toil of daily existence from hand to mouth. The hospitals taxed the energies of volunteer nurses and doctors. The manufacture of artificial limbs to replace those lost in battle had become a regular industry, as also the manufacture of coffins.

There was a grim humour in the enterprise which took advantage of the American sentiment for preserving as long as possible the features of the dead, in order to make money and to console the mourners at the same time. A Charleston newspaper of that date had all its advertisement sheets covered with a single announcement. '*Good news to soldiers! Air-tight coffins! Good news to soldiers!*'

OFFICIAL STATE OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC

JUNE 30, 1863

	Troops	Guns
Headquarters and Escort	2,580	—
Artillery Reserve	2,868	150
I Corps	10,355	28
II "	13,056	24
III "	12,630	30
V "	13,211	26
VI "	15,710	48
XI "	10,576	26
XII "	8,597	20
Total of Infantry and Artillery	89,283	352
Corps of Cavalry	10,192	—
Total of all arms	99,475	352

STATE OF THE ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA

MAY 31, 1863

Staff	47
Infantry :	
Hood's Division	7,720
Pickett's "	6,687
McLaws' "	7,311
Anderson's,,	7,440
Hill's "	9,299
Early's "	6,943
Rodes' "	8,473
Johnson's "	5,564
Cavalry : Stuart's	10,292
Artillery	4,703
Total strength	<u>74,479</u>

ARMY OF THE POTOMAC

JULY 1, 1863

Commanding General	Major-General	GEORGE MEADE.
Chief of the Staff	"	BUTTERFIELD.
" Engineer	"	WARREN.
" of the Artillery	Colonel	HUNT.

I ARMY CORPS

Major-General JOHN REYNOLDS

1st Division : Major-General WADSWORTH

- 1st Brigade ('Iron Brigade') : Brigadier-General MEREDITH, 19th Indiana, 24th Michigan, 2nd, 6th, and 7th Wisconsin.
 2nd Brigade : Brigadier-General CUTLER, 56th Pennsylvania, 14th, 76th, 95th, 147th New York.

2nd Division : Brigadier-General ROBINSON

- 1st Brigade : Brigadier-General PAUL, 94th, 104th New York, 107th Pennsylvania, 16th Maine.
 2nd Brigade : Brigadier-General BAXTER, 83rd New York, 2nd Massachusetts, 88th and 90th Pennsylvania.

3rd Division : Major-General DOUBLEDAY

- 1st Brigade : Brigadier General ROWLEY, 20th New York, 121st and 142nd Pennsylvania.
2nd Brigade ('Bucktails') : Brigadier-General STONE, 142nd, 149th, 150th Pennsylvania.
3rd Brigade : Brigadier-General STANNARD, 12th, 13th, 14th, 15th, and 16th Vermont.

II ARMY CORPS

Major-General WINFIELD SCOTT HANCOCK

1st Division : Brigadier-General CALDWELL

- 1st Brigade : Brigadier-General CROSS, 5th New Hampshire, 61st and 81st New York.
2nd Brigade : Brigadier-General KELLY, 28th Massachusetts, 63rd, 69th, 88th New York, 116th Pennsylvania.
3rd Brigade : Brigadier-General ZOOK, 52nd, 57th, and 66th New York, 140th Pennsylvania.
4th Brigade : Brigadier-General BROOKE, 27th Connecticut, 2nd Delaware, 64th New York, 53rd and 145th Pennsylvania.

2nd Division : Brigadier-General GIBBON

- 1st Brigade : Brigadier-General HARROW, 19th Maine, 15th Massachusetts, 82nd New York, and 1st Minnesota.
2nd Brigade : Brigadier-General WEBB, 69th, 71st, 72nd, and 106th Pennsylvania.
3rd Brigade : Brigadier-General HALL, 19th and 20th Massachusetts, 7th Michigan, 42nd and 59th New York.

3rd Division : Brigadier-General HAYS

- 1st Brigade : Brigadier-General CARROLL, 14th Indiana, 4th and 8th Ohio, 2nd West Virginia.
2nd Brigade : Brigadier-General SMITH, 14th Connecticut, 1st Delaware, 10th, 108th, 136th New York, 12th N. Jersey.
3rd Brigade : Brigadier-General WILLARD, 37th, 111th, 125th, and 126th New York.

III ARMY CORPS

Major-General SICKLES

1st Division : Brigadier-General BIRNEY

1st Brigade : Brigadier-General GRAHAM, 57th, 63rd, 68th, 105th, 114th, 141st Pennsylvania.

2nd Brigade : Brigadier-General WARD, 4th and 5th Maine, 20th Indiana, 99th Pennsylvania, 86th and 124th New York, 1st and 2nd Sharpshooters.

3rd Brigade : Brigadier-General TROBRIAND, 17th Maine, 3rd and 5th Michigan, 40th New York, 110th Pennsylvania.

2nd Division : Brigadier-General A. A. HUMPHREYS

1st Brigade : Brigadier-General CARR, 1st, 11th, 16th Massachusetts, 12th New Hampshire, 11th New York, 26th Pennsylvania.

2nd Brigade : Brigadier-General BREWSTER, 70th, 71st, 72nd, 73rd, 74th, and 120th New York.

3rd Brigade : Brigadier-General BURLING, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th New Jersey, and 115th Pennsylvania.

V ARMY CORPS

Major-General SYKES

1st Division : Brigadier-General BARNES

1st Brigade : Brigadier-General TILTON, 11th and 22nd Massachusetts, 118th Pennsylvania.

2nd Brigade : Brigadier-General SWEITZER, 9th and 32nd Massachusetts, 4th Michigan, 62nd Pennsylvania.

3rd Brigade : Brigadier-General VINCENT, 16th Michigan, 44th New York, 83rd Pennsylvania, and 25th Maine.

2nd Division : Brigadier-General AYRES

1st Brigade : Brigadier-General DAY, 3rd, 4th, 6th, 12th, 14th United States Infantry.

2nd Brigade : Brigadier-General BURBANK, 2nd, 7th, 10th, 11th, and 17th United States Infantry.

3rd Brigade : Brigadier-General WELD, 140th, 146th New York, 91st and 155th Pennsylvania.

3rd Division : Brigadier-General CRAWFORD

1st Brigade : Brigadier-General CANDLESS, 1st, 2nd, and 6th Pennsylvania Reserves, 1st Pennsylvania Rifles.

2nd Brigade : Brigadier-General FISHER, 5th, 9th, 10th, 11th, and 12th Pennsylvania Reserves.

VI ARMY CORPS

Major-General SEDGWICK

1st Division : Brigadier-General WRIGHT

1st Brigade : Brigadier-General TORBERT, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 15th New York.

2nd Brigade : Brigadier-General BARTLETT, 5th Maine, 121st New York, 95th, 96th Pennsylvania.

3rd Brigade : Brigadier-General RUSSELL, 6th Maine, 5th Wisconsin, 49th and 119th Pennsylvania.

2nd Division : Brigadier-General HOWE

1st Brigade : Brigadier-General GRANT, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th and 6th Vermont.

2nd Brigade : Brigadier-General NEIL, 7th Maine, 61st Pennsylvania, 43rd, 49th, and 77th New York.

3rd Division : Brigadier-General WHEATON

1st Brigade : Brigadier-General SHALER, 23rd and 82nd Pennsylvania, 65th and 122nd New York.

2nd Brigade : Brigadier-General EUSTIS, 7th, 10th, and 37th Massachusetts.

3rd Brigade : Brigadier-General NEVIN, 62nd New York, 93rd, 98th, and 139th Pennsylvania.

XI ARMY CORPS

Major-General HOWARD

1st Division : Brigadier-General BARLOW

1st Brigade : Brigadier-General VON GILSA, 41st, 44th, and 68th New York, and 153rd Pennsylvania.

2nd Brigade : Brigadier-General AMES, 17th Connecticut, 75th and 107th Ohio.

2nd Division : Brigadier-General VON STEINWEHR

1st Brigade : Brigadier-General COSTAR, 73rd Pennsylvania, 134th and 154th New York.

2nd Brigade : Brigadier-General SMITH, 33rd Massachusetts, 55th and 73rd Ohio.

3rd Division : Major-General SCHURZ and SCHIMMELPFENNING

1st Brigade : Brigadier-General VON AMESBURG, 74th Pennsylvania, 61st Ohio, 82nd Illinois, 45th and 157th New York.

2nd Brigade : Brigadier-General KRYZANOWSKY, 75th Pennsylvania, 26th Wisconsin, 82nd Ohio, 58th and 119th New York.

XII ARMY CORPS

Major-General SLOCUM

1st Division : Brigadier-General WILLIAMS

1st Brigade : Brigadier-General RUGER, 5th and 20th Connecticut, 3rd Maryland, 123rd, 146th, and 149th New York.

2nd Brigade : Brigadier-General COLGROVE, 13th New Jersey, 27th Indiana, 2nd Massachusetts, 107th New York.

3rd Brigade : Brigadier-General LOCKWOOD, 1st West Virginia, 1st Maryland, 150th New York.

2nd Division : Brigadier-General GEARY

1st Brigade : Brigadier-General CANDY, 28th, 128th, and 147th Pennsylvania, 5th, 7th, and 66th Ohio.

2nd Brigade : Brigadier-General KANE, 29th, 109th, and 111th Pennsylvania.

3rd Brigade : Brigadier-General GREENE, 60th, 78th, 102nd, and 137th New York.

CAVALRY CORPS

Major-General PLEASANTON

1st Division : Brigadier-General BUFORD

1st Brigade : Brigadier-General GAMBLE, 8th and 12th Illinois, 8th Indiana, and 8th New York.

2nd Brigade : Brigadier-General DEVIN, 17th Pennsylvania, 6th and 9th New York.

2nd Division : Brigadier-General GREGG

1st Brigade : Brigadier-General McINTOSH, 1st and 3rd Pennsylvania, 2nd Massachusetts, 1st New Jersey.

2nd Brigade : Brigadier-General IRVIN GREGG, 1st Maine, 10th New York, 4th and 16th Pennsylvania.

3rd Brigade : Brigadier-General HUEY, 8th Pennsylvania, 1st Maryland, 6th Ohio, 2nd New York.

Attached to 2nd Division : Brigadier-General CUSTER's Brigade.
CUSTER's Brigade : 5th and 7th Michigan.

3rd Division : Brigadier-General KILPATRICK

1st Brigade : Brigadier-General FARNSWORTH, 1st Vermont, 1st West Virginia, 18th Pennsylvania, 1st Ohio, and 5th New York.

Brigadier-General MERRITT's Brigade : 1st, 2nd, and 5th United States Cavalry.

ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA

JULY 1, 1863

Commanding General : ROBERT LEE

No one held the post of Chief of the Staff.

The principal Staff Officers at Headquarters were Colonel VENABLE, Colonel TAYLOR, Brigadier-General PEMBERTON, and Major LONG.

FIRST ARMY CORPS

Lieutenant-General JAMES LONGSTREET

1st Division : Major-General J. B. HOOD

1st Brigade : Brigadier-General D. R. ANDERSON, 7th, 8th, 9th, and 11th Georgia.

2nd Brigade : Brigadier-General BENNING, 2nd, 15th, 17th, and 20th Georgia.

3rd Brigade : Brigadier-General LAW, 4th, 15th, 44th, 47th and 48th Alabama.

4th Brigade : Brigadier-General ROBERTSON, 1st, 4th, and 5th Texas, and 3rd Arkansas.

2nd Division : Major-General LA FAYETTE McLAWS

1st Brigade : Brigadier-General BARKSDALE, 13th, 17th, 18th, and 21st Mississippi.

2nd Brigade : Brigadier-General KERSHAW, 2nd, 3rd, 7th, 8th, and 15th South Carolina.

3rd Brigade : Brigadier-General WOFFORD, 16th, 18th, and 24th Cobb's and Phillips' Legions, Georgia.

4th Brigade : Brigadier-General SEMMES, 10th, 50th, 51st, and 53rd Georgia.

3rd Division : Major-General PICKETT

1st Brigade : Brigadier-General KEMPER, 1st, 3rd, 7th, 11th, and 24th Virginia.

2nd Brigade : Brigadier-General ARMISTEAD, 9th, 14th, 38th, 53rd, and 57th Virginia.

3rd Brigade : Brigadier-General GARNETT, 8th, 18th, 19th, 28th, and 56th Virginia.

The Brigades of CORSE and JENKINS were detached.

SECOND ARMY CORPS

Lieutenant-General RICHARD EWELL

1st Division : Major-General JUBAL EARLY

1st Brigade : Brigadier-General SMITH, 31st, 49th, and 52nd Virginia.

2nd Brigade : Brigadier-General HOKE, 6th, 21st, and 57th North Carolina.

3rd Brigade : Brigadier-General HAYS, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, and 9th Louisiana.

4th Brigade : Brigadier-General GORDON, 13th, 26th, 31st, 38th, 60th, and 61st Georgia.

2nd Division : Major-General EDWARD JOHNSON

1st Brigade : Brigadier-General JONES, 21st, 25th, 42nd, 44th, 48th, and 50th Virginia.

2nd (the 'Stonewall') Brigade : Brigadier-General WALKER, 2nd, 4th, 5th, 27th, and 33rd Virginia.

3rd Brigade : Brigadier-General STEWART, 10th, 23rd, 37th Virginia, 1st Maryland, 1st and 3rd North Carolina.

4th Brigade : Brigadier-General NICHOL, 1st, 2nd, 10th, 14th, and 15th Louisiana.

3rd Division : Major-General RODES

- 1st Brigade : Brigadier-General NEAL, 3rd, 5th, 6th, 12th, and 26th Alabama.
- 2nd Brigade : Brigadier-General RAMSEUR, 2nd, 4th, 14th, and 30th North Carolina.
- 3rd Brigade : Brigadier-General DOLES, 4th, 12th, 21st, and 44th Georgia.
- 4th Brigade : Brigadier-General IVERSON, 5th, 12th, 20th, and 23rd North Carolina.
- 5th Brigade : Brigadier-General DANIEL, 2nd, 32nd, 43rd, 45th, and 53rd North Carolina.

THIRD ARMY CORPS

Lieutenant-General AMBROSE P. HILL

1st Division : Major-General R. H. ANDERSON

- 1st Brigade : Brigadier-General MAHONE, 6th, 12th, 16th, 41st, and 61st Virginia.
- 2nd Brigade : Brigadier-General WRIGHT, 2nd, 3rd, 22nd, and 48th Georgia.
- 3rd Brigade : Brigadier-General PERRY, 2nd, 5th, and 8th Florida.
- 4th Brigade : Brigadier-General POSEY, 12th, 16th, 19th, and 48th Mississippi.
- 5th Brigade : Brigadier-General WILCOX, 8th, 9th, 10th, 11th, and 14th Alabama.

2nd Division : Major-General PENDER

- 1st Brigade : Brigadier-General MCGOWAN, 1st, 12th, 13th, and 14th South Carolina.
- 2nd Brigade : Brigadier-General THOMAS, 14th, 35th, 45th and 49th Georgia.
- 3rd Brigade : Brigadier-General LANE, 7th, 18th, 28th, 33rd, and 37th North Carolina.
- 4th Brigade : Brigadier-General SCALES, 13th, 16th, 22nd, 34th, and 38th North Carolina.

3rd Division : Major-General HETH

- 1st Brigade : Brigadier-General ARCHER, 1st, 7th, and 14th Tennessee, 5th and 13th Alabama.

2nd Brigade: Brigadier-General PETTIGREW, 11th, 26th, 47th and 52nd North Carolina.

3rd Brigade: Brigadier-General CHARLES FIELD, 22nd, 40th, 47th, and 55th Virginia.

4th Brigade: Brigadier-General DAVIS, 2nd, 11th, 26th, 42nd Mississippi, 55th North Carolina.

CAVALRY DIVISION

Major-General JAMES E. B. STUART

1st Brigade: Brigadier-General ROBERTSON, 4th, 5th, 59th, and 63rd North Carolina.

2nd Brigade: Brigadier-General WADE HAMPTON, 1st North Carolina, 1st and 2nd South Carolina, Legions of COBB, JEFFERSON DAVIS, and PHILIPPS.

3rd Brigade: Brigadier-General FITZHUGH LEE, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, and 5th Virginia.

4th Brigade: Brigadier-General W. H. F. LEE, 9th, 10th, 13th, and 15th Virginia, 2nd North Carolina.

5th Brigade: Brigadier-General JONES, 6th, 7th, 11th, 12th, and 35th Virginia.

6th Brigade: Brigadier-General JENKINS, 14th, 16th, 17th, 26th, and 34th Virginia.

Attached were six batteries of Horse Artillery.

Brigadier-General IMBODEN commanded a mixed brigade of Mounted Riflemen and Infantry, which joined the army on the retreat from Gettysburg.

CHAPTER VI

GETTYSBURG—JULY I

Description of the Field of Gettysburg—Description of the Ground—The Roads—The Position—Situation on the night of June 30—The Federals—Summary of Events: July 1—The Advance of the Confederates—The Fight begins at 9.15 A.M.—Arrival of Reynolds at the Seminary, 10 A.M.—The March of the I Corps—10.30 A.M.—11.30 A.M.—Noon—Arrival of Howard and the XI Corps—Deployment of Howard's Corps, 1.30 P.M.—2 P.M.—The Fight with the I Corps—3 P.M.—Attack of Early's Division, 3 P.M.—Losses on July 1—The Headquarters of the Army of the Potomac on July 1—Hancock's Mission—The Confederate Army after 4 P.M.—Lee's Plans and Orders for July 2—11.45 P.M.

THE series of fights round the little town of Gettysburg took place on July 1, 2, 3. In history they have hitherto been described as one battle which lasted three days, but the independence of action in the several fights gives them really the character of separate battles; besides, the struggle on July 1 was fought more than three miles from the scene of the great contest of July 2.

Both armies were wound up to the highest state of patriotic enthusiasm. Both knew well how much depended on their efforts and were inspired by the fact that the whole world awaited in keen anxiety the result of the contest; in no battle of the war did the American soldier display greater dash, courage and endurance. On the Federal side the generalship rose superior to any previous performance, while the Confederate leaders fell far below the average of former campaigns. Gettysburg was the worst battle Lee ever fought, not excepting Malvern Hill. To what extent he was personally to blame and how far his failure is to be attributed to accident and to the mistakes of his subordinates is an interesting study. One thing seems certain; from the

soldiers in the ranks to the chief of the Confederate armies a feeling of undue contempt for the adversary engendered a want of that caution which should mingle even in the most audacious enterprises of war.

In order to follow the movements of the troops in the engagements which we shall try to describe a close study of the map of the field of Gettysburg is necessary, and a short description of the principal features of the land may be of use to the reader.

The town at that time was a small borough of about ten thousand inhabitants, but covering a large area for its population, and including many gardens and orchards. It lay in a hollow at the foot of the chain of hills called the South Mountain so often mentioned in this history as continuing the Blue Ridge mountain range of Virginia northwards from the Potomac. These hills rise somewhat abruptly from the rolling plain, and close the horizon west and north-west of the town. Close to Gettysburg is the water-parting of the Potomac and Susquehanna, and from it, as we have already said, radiated all the principal roads in the county. The ground on which the fighting took place is enclosed between two streams which flow parallel to one another in a southerly direction, and about three miles apart. The easterly one is the Rock Creek, the westerly of the two is called the Willoughby Run. In the area contained by these streams there are two principal elevations of ground, and both are of the same peculiar shape. The most westerly, on which the battle of July 1 was fought, consists of a round hill known as Oak Hill from the grove of oaks which clothed its slopes, with two ridges stretching southwards from it like the legs of a pair of compasses. These ridges run from north to south and are separated by a little valley. The westerly one of the two overlooks the Willoughby Run. Its western side was wooded south of the high road from Chambersburg and bare to the north of it. It had several homesteads on it, the most important of which was called McPherson's farm. The other leg of the compasses has been called Seminary Ridge, from the now famous Lutheran Seminary whose lofty clock-tower overlooked the whole

landscape. Seminary Ridge likewise was wooded principally on the western slope and open on the eastern. A deep cutting had been made north of and parallel to the Chambersburg road for the new railway ; the road and cutting ran about three hundred yards apart. The banks of the Willoughby Run were in places rocky and covered with scrub affording good shelter to skirmishers.

The other principal elevation of ground had for its apex the hill overlooking the town on which was the Cemetery and known therefore as Cemetery Hill. Two ridges splayed from it as from Oak Hill. The most westerly has an almost due southerly direction, and ends in two round knobs of hills called the Little Round Top and the Round Top. The other leg of the compass is far shorter, runs almost due east, and is also ended off by a round height called Culp's Hill, which overlooks the Rock Creek. From the Cemetery Hill to Great Round Top is two and a half miles ; to the eastern edge of Culp's Hill but three-quarters of a mile. Such is the country west and south of Gettysburg ; to the north a rolling plain extends to the foot of the South Mountain.

Taking the battlefield of July 1 for closer consideration the weakness of a defensive line facing west and north is at once apparent. The Willoughby Run afforded a fair position to the Federal riflemen, but the wood which ran down to the edge of the stream from McPherson's farm gave their enemies a covered line of approach into the heart of the position, while the whole of the undulating country north of Gettysburg was overlooked from Oak Hill and presented no natural line of defence. Any plan of checking the advancing Confederates on this field should then have included the occupation of this important height ; but the troops available were not strong enough for the purpose, so that they should have limited themselves to a delaying action, such as Meade intended. When, however, bodies of troops numbering several thousand come within touch of one another it is most difficult to prevent collision if both are eager to fight, and collision once having taken place it is still more difficult to limit its

dimensions or to withdraw from the struggle without serious loss.

The crest of the ridge from McPherson's farm to Oak Hill is well defined and the low stone walls which fenced the fields gave some shelter to troops; otherwise the ground was bare. Moving eastward from the Willoughby Run by the straight road to Gettysburg the traveller comes next to the Seminary Ridge on which the Federals rallied when driven from their first position on Wednesday, and which sheltered the Confederate army and screened its dispositions in the subsequent actions. Its character and surface resembled the first position. It was separated by a valley averaging fifteen hundred yards in width from Cemetery Ridge. This valley was cultivated and the road to Emmetsburg traversed its length from north to south on a slight ridge. Nearly two miles south of Gettysburg this ridge merges into Seminary Ridge at the famous Peach Orchard which overlooks the sole of the valley and connects with Seminary Ridge by a low col at a farmhouse known as Warfield's. The depression of ground between the Peach Orchard and the wooded height on which stands Warfield's sheltered the Confederates in both the battles of the 2nd and the 3rd. Right along Cemetery Ridge the surface of the ground is scarred by rugged shelves of rock jutting out of the soil; here and there were big boulders; a few stone walls fenced the hill-side, of which the most noticeable traced a line on the western side of the ridge and half way up it, which was held by Federal riflemen. Along the crest of the ridge stood several homesteads, and a few clumps of trees, otherwise it was open and sloped gently to the west but more steeply to the east.

The height of the Cemetery above the town is about eighty feet; opposite the Peach Orchard the crest line stands but thirty feet above the source of a streamlet called the Plum Run which cuts a rocky ravine round the base of the Round Tops. These hills rise sharply one hundred and two hundred feet respectively, thus dominating the position. Between the Round Tops and the Peach Orchard lies the ground so fiercely contested on July 2, and a most

difficult problem it presented to the commander of the defending army. More than a square mile is covered by thick jungle traversed by two rocky ravines of which the principal was known as 'Devil's Den.' The woods are intersected by steep dingles clothed in shrub and afforded a covered approach to the Round Tops from the Peach Orchard. South of this piece of jungle the land is once again open and undulating. Between the Round Top and Culp's Hill lies a narrow bottom cut by several small ravines which run into the Rock Creek. The slopes which enclose it are steep and rocky and are clothed here and there with patches of wood and dotted with cottages. The Taneytown road traverses it from north to south, and the Baltimore pike crosses its northern part. The curtain of hill which encloses this hollow on the north extends in an easterly direction fourteen hundred yards from Cemetery Hill and terminates as already stated in Culp's Hill, a height resembling the Round Tops in its characteristics though they are less pronounced. Culp's Hill, like the Round Tops, was thickly wooded and broken by stony dingles on the side whence an attack would come; its base on the east is bounded by the Rock Creek. To the south of it lies the smaller group of heights called Power's Hill, from which it is separated by a streamlet called Stevens' Run; this streamlet formed a bog between Culp's Hill and Power's Hill which materially assisted the defence. Thus the hollow south of the Cemetery was almost entirely sheltered by surrounding heights and formed a most useful background to the position along the crest.

Three 'pike' or main roads radiated from Gettysburg; the road to Chambersburg along which Lee's army was approaching; the road to York, and the road to Baltimore. In 1863 these pikes were the only roads in America macadamised throughout and therefore reliable in all weathers, but the roads in Pennsylvania were exceptionally good. Three good roads lead northwards from the town to Mummasburg, Carlisle and Heidlersburg. The Hanover road runs eastward and the Fairfield road south-westward. The latter was the shortest line of retreat for the

Confederate army to Hagerstown and the passages of the Potomac. Due south ran the road to Taneytown from the Cemetery, a quarter of a mile south of which it sank below the crest of the ridge on its eastern slope, and was thus sheltered from the view and fire of the Confederates on Seminary Ridge. This road was in the centre of the widely scattered Federal army and formed its main line of approach to the battlefield.

Such, then, was the field, of Gettysburg. It afforded a position of great strength having regard to the range of The Posi- artillery and rifles of that date, though it would be tion. of far less value to-day. The gentle slope of the heights toward the enemy gave a good field of fire, while the steepness of the reverse slope protected the defenders from fire, and the hollow ground thus enclosed not only sheltered reserves but enabled them to be moved swiftly and unseen from one point to another of the defended line. The Cemetery Hill dominated the town, while the heights south and east of it commanded the roads by which the Federal army effected its concentration. In those days the extent of the position fitted the force, about eighty thousand men, available for its defence; it formed a line but three and a half miles in length, while the attacking army must extend five miles in length to form a continuous opposing front, and considerably more if it would envelop one or both of the wings. Tactically and strategically the Federal army had a good position, but like every position it had its weak points.

Both right and left wings rested in broken ground by the favour of whose folds and woods attacking infantry could close with the defenders before exposing themselves to heavy fire. If the defenders held the town they unduly extended their line and made it weak towards the north; if they did not, the southern part of it might serve like the broken ground on the flanks as a covered approach to the enemy. From the clock-tower of the Seminary the defender's position could be overlooked, while the Seminary Ridge facilitated the operations of the attacking army in several ways. It gave them a good artillery position within

a mile of the defended crest, and although this was not then a decisive range, yet for the same reason it formed a most effective defensive line for the Confederates if repulsed in their attacks, and connected their right and left wings by a screen of high ground behind which troops could be moved unseen.

The situation of the contending forces on the night of June 30 was as follows. Six Confederate divisions, three of Hill's, two of Longstreet's and one of Ewell's, bivouacked along the Chambersburg road at distances which varied from five to twenty miles from Gettysburg. A great column of forty thousand infantry, besides artillery and train, but protected by no cavalry, was marching on this one road. Pickett's division had been left behind to guard the rear of the army at Chambersburg, and Longstreet had also detached an infantry brigade to cover the right flank for want of cavalry. The divisions of Rodes and Early, which had been marching on Cashtown, bivouacked on the northern roads from Middletown and Heidlersburg. Johnson's division of Ewell's corps having marched from Carlisle on the western side of the mountains, had been obliged to fall in rear of the whole column while defiling through the mountains, but had by Lee's order passed Longstreet's corps on the morning of Wednesday in order to unite again with the Second corps. During the night Stuart's cavalry was painfully making its march on York, and no other troops were within hail. That evening orders were issued to the whole army to concentrate on Gettysburg, and Hill was instructed to sweep away the Federal advanced troops who might try to interfere with the movement.

The Federals were disposed as follows. Kilpatrick's and Gregg's cavalry divisions having driven Stuart away from the scene of action were closing in to guard the flanks of their army from any further enterprise of his. Buford's division, which had so dexterously induced the Confederate vanguard to give up the town of Gettysburg, was now disposed to defend it as long as possible against the forces which were known to be converging

Situation
on the
night of
June 30.

The Fed-
erals at
nightfall
June 30.

on it. Buford had two brigades each mustering about 1,500 riders and these he ordered to bivouac on the Chambersburg and Mummasburg roads, while his patrols rode out in the darkness to give early notice of a hostile advance. The nearest infantry corps was the I led by Reynolds; it passed the night in bivouac where the Emmetsburg road crosses the Rock Creek. Next came the XI and III corps both at and around Emmetsburg. These three corps formed the left wing of the Federal army which according to Meade's plan was to check the enemy at Gettysburg, and cover the concentration on the Pipe Creek position twenty miles further south. In the near neighbourhood of this position were grouped the four remaining corps, the XII at Two Taverns, the II at Taneytown with army headquarters, while of the right wing the V corps lay at Union Mills with orders to march on Hanover at dawn, the VI on the road from New Windsor to Manchester. Thus five of the seven Federal corps could concentrate for battle at Gettysburg during Wednesday, but the right wing could not come into line for another day. In order to seize the place and forestall the adversary in the choice of its best position, rapid marching was necessary for either army, but the necessity to hasten was not realised by Lee nor by Meade, but only by Buford, Pleasonton and Reynolds. These leaders succeeded in delaying the Confederate advance long enough to enable Meade to concentrate on Cemetery Ridge, but only at heavy cost and thanks to the slow movements of the adversary. The Federal commander-in-chief was no doubt puzzled by the sharp fight with Stuart's cavalry at Hanover, which corroborated the information from Washington to the effect that the Confederate army was still heading northward, and reports from Gettysburg only gradually developed the situation. Buford, for example, had sent his reports to Reynolds at Emmetsburg on the night of the 30th, whence they had been forwarded to Taneytown, consequently they did not reach Meade until the next morning. These reports threw uncertainty upon the situation without convincing the general of the necessity of at once changing the direction of his troops, so that the early hours of Wednesday saw the

Federal columns of the right wing marching away from the decisive point.

The battle divided itself into periods as each important body of troops reached the field. First the delaying action carried on between Buford's Federal cavalry and Heth's advanced guard. Just as the cavalry had exhausted their power of resistance the I corps reached the ground and took their place. About noon the XI Federal corps prolonged the line of the I corps round the town to the north and east only just in time to meet the attack of Rodes' division. Then Rodes was joined by Early and a combined advance crumpled up the XI corps and hurled it in fragments into the town. The I corps whose flank was thus uncovered was involved in the disaster, and though it behaved with great courage, suffered disastrous loss in its retreat to Cemetery Hill, upon which the Federal corps rallied. There the fight ceased. No attempt was made by the victorious Confederates to sweep Cemetery Hill of its defenders, and when the sun went down strong Federal reinforcements had taken post on the coveted heights.

The dawn of Wednesday was obscured by the mists which the rising sun drew out of the rain-sodden country. Light clouds of vapour floated on the hill-sides and clung to the valleys. As it became lighter the Federal signal officers on the clock-tower looked over a fair landscape covered by green grass and gold patches of ripening corn. The fresh air and sweet smell of the morning revived the vedettes whose white faces attested the weary work of night patrolling. Every eye was turned westward and sought to distinguish signs of a marching column, while Buford personally reconnoitred the ground he meant to defend and posted his dismounted troopers. Two thousand yards west of the town the road crosses the Willoughby Run, and the railway-cutting runs parallel with it and just a furlong to the north of it. At this point the river bank is well wooded, and gave good cover to the Blue horsemen, whose left brigade extended their line to the Fairfield road, while the right brigade held the northern side of the highway, the railway-cutting and the open ground north of

Summary
of Events
July 1.

The
advance
of the
Confede-
rates.

it. Patrols watched the roads which converged on Gettysburg from the north, and Buford's horse artillery was posted to sweep the ground over which the first attack was expected. The cavalry soldiers had hardly ensconced themselves in their designated positions when the advent of a great column of infantry was announced by excited scouts galloping in from the west, and very soon its head was visible from the signal station.

Soon after eight o'clock had struck the Grey scouts were pushing over the vale and preparing to search its eastern side, when the first few shots were fired, and a white puff of smoke from the crest followed by a dull explosion announced to Heth's soldiers that the right of way was to be conceded no further. Very soon whole companies in skirmishing order were descending into the brook. Right and left the fire kindled and extended; by nine o'clock a sharp action had begun.

Often as the opposing forces had exchanged hard blows in the last two years the encounter on the Willoughby Run marked a new epoch in the war. Never before had The Fight begins at 9 A.M. the Federal troops displayed the same confidence in themselves and eagerness to engage. The tenacity with which they clung to their ground imposed on the Confederate infantry who expected only to have a weak detachment to deal with. Two brigades, Archer's and Davis', deployed and gradually became involved in the fire fight, and an hour had passed before the superiority of the infantry began to tell. Buford threw his last reserve in to strengthen his line and betook himself to the clock-tower to look for the reinforcements he expected, while he anxiously wondered if his men could cling to their ground long enough to enable his friends to come up. From the clock-tower the two roads to Chambersburg and Emmetsburg could be traced for some distance, and both were filled with troops. The first was choked by the advancing Confederates, but the latter was conducting a long serpent of Blue whose head was now close at hand.

At this moment Reynolds in person arrived and the two generals held a brief consultation. The position which

the steady fire of the cavalry still held seemed so good that the brave commander of the I corps resolved to make his stand upon it, and the two clattered down the stone steps, Buford to prolong the resistance of his men to the last gasp, and Reynolds to direct the heads of his advancing troops to their places in line.

This decision of General Reynolds has been extolled as an inspiration, and made as it was in the stress of combat and with the correct appreciation of the value to his army of staving off the Confederate columns as long as possible, it undoubtedly showed an inspiring resolve. What precise information concerning the Confederate columns advancing from the north Reynolds had we know not. It seems probable that he believed these troops to be too far from the field to join in the fray, otherwise he would have done better to have occupied the Cemetery Ridge at once, and to have brought Buford's cavalry out of the fight, trusting to their horses, which were held in groups of four behind them, to enable them to escape without severe loss. When once infantry troops are committed to a fire fight it is a far more serious task to withdraw them, as the day's work showed. It is very remarkable how often a battle is lost owing to the ignoring of hostile forces which are within striking distance. The troops which are present seem to absorb every thought. The neglect to locate the Prussians at Waterloo, the same error committed by the Austrian general Benedek at Sadowa, are the examples on the biggest scale we have of this fatal disregard of the enemy's detached forces, but the first battle at Gettysburg is hardly less remarkable.

The troops of the I corps had passed the night on both sides of the Emmetsburg road six miles from Gettysburg.

In spite of the damp the men slept sound. Long marches had induced fatigue and much fighting had taught the soldier to rest while he could without troubling himself for perils to come. The brigades had prepared for a leisurely advance on Gettysburg, which they expected to occupy without opposition. The early morning was spent in preparing breakfast and packing

Arrival of
Reynolds
at the
Seminary,
10 A.M.

The
March of
the I
corps.

waggons for the road. Regiment after regiment filed from the fields, barns and outhouses, where they had spent the night, to join in the stream of men which fed by so many tributaries flowed steadily northward. Colours were furled, rifles were carried as the men pleased, and in front of the column rode a group of superior officers at a foot pace discussing the situation. Some one of them with sharp ears detected the faint sound of distant firing and every man's attention became fixed. The sound reaches them again, this time with unmistakable clearness, and sends a thrill of intense excitement from man to man. The struggle on the soil of Pennsylvania for supremacy in America had then begun. No orders to hurry the march are needed; every man of the I corps presses eagerly forward to the field where most of them are destined to shed their blood.

As the leading division approached the town breathless orderlies came galloping to meet it, asking for this and that general and replying nothing to the eager questions from the ranks. Then the troops diverged from the road and assumed a broader front as they crossed the fields. General Wadsworth led the head of the column direct to the Seminary, while battery after battery rumbled along the road as far as the town, whence they turned westward to relieve the horse artillery, whose ammunition was exhausted from an hour and a half's unequal fight. It was not a moment too soon. Archer's Tennessee riflemen were swarming through the copse and more Confederate infantry were extending the line of attack northwards, and were threatening to sweep the sorely pressed cavalry from the railway-cutting and bare hillside north of it. The imminent capture of McPherson's Wood so menaced the security of the whole Federal position that the first efforts of the newcomers were directed to driving back the enemy at this point.

Leaving Wadsworth, the divisional commander, to direct Cutler's brigade north of the road, Reynolds himself accompanied Meredith's, known as the 'Iron Brigade,' into the wood, where a fierce encounter took place between its leading regiment and the Grey skirmishers, who were pushing boldly forward.

In this fight General Reynolds was shot through the head at close range and fell dying from his horse. Thus
10.30 A.M. fell at the very beginning of the contest the chief who had the greatest individual share in bringing it about. He is described by the Comte de Paris, who had served on the staff with him, as incontestably the best officer in the Army of the Potomac who died on the battlefield throughout the war. Like most of the officers who distinguished themselves on either side he had been educated at West Point, had served in the United States army, and had fought in the Mexican campaign. He was a very good-looking man whose general appearance recalled the typical British naval officer; he was remarkable for neatness of dress even in a campaign, and for his soldier-like bearing, which inspired the confidence and won the hearts of his troops. To the people of the North Reynolds is the chief hero of Gettysburg among so many heroes who there gave up their lives.

The Iron Brigade, unaware of the general's death, pressed furiously upon Archer's regiments, which had become somewhat disorganised by the wood-fighting with the cavalry, and drove them headlong across the brook, capturing Archer himself and several hundred prisoners. This success, however, was balanced by the repulse of Cutler's men north of the road, who were exposed to heavy fire before they had deployed for action, and who soon were compelled to fall back on the wooded slopes of Seminary Ridge in great confusion. Meredith promptly sent his reserves to the help of the sister brigade, and moving them from left to right attacked with two battalions the flank of the advancing Confederates. Cutler's men then rallied and came back into the fight capturing many prisoners and inflicting heavy loss, so that by 11 A.M. the Confederate advanced guard had received a severe check, and the I corps had established itself strongly across their path.

The fight then developed into a stationary duel of guns and rifles. Both antagonists had deployed a strong force of artillery which was constantly being reinforced on the Confederate side as their batteries gradually made their way to

the front from the road, encumbered as it was by troops halting and advancing, mounted men and carts, and by the inevitable back wash of wounded and stragglers
11 A.M. from the fight. Blue infantry held the wooded margin of the Willoughby Run and lined the stone wall and fences on the Oak Hill Ridge; their guns kept up a spirited contest, and took toll from each opposing force as it came within range; so bold a front did the defending troops present that the vastly superior forces of their enemy hesitated and delayed to bring their strength to bear.

For many a mile the long Grey column stretched from the defile through the South Mountain which was still disgorging troops and waggons while the head of the column was fighting hard. Accustomed as were the soldiers in that army to deadly strife, an unwonted excitement pervaded the ranks in anticipation of a decisive field; when the roar of artillery and the crackle of rifle-fire made itself heard and a faint cloud of blue smoke mingled with the summer haze to the eastward, the magnetic current which becomes so mighty when it tingles through a crowd of men flew along the Southern ranks, making eyes to sparkle with the lust of battle and feet to step quickly forward. As they approached the field, groups of prisoners met them under escort on their way to the rear; here and there a wounded man with white face and red spots of blood on his shabby jacket was sitting by the road-side, awaiting an ambulance or faintly trying to divest himself of the weight of his accoutrements. The nearer the troops approach the rise beyond which the conflict is beginning to rage the more evidence there is of its importance. Mounted officers and riderless horses come from the front at a gallop, and one general after another with his staff presses past the dusty column of infantry. Then the guns overtake them. Many batteries with their waggons come thundering down the road, which must be cleared to let them pass. Up the opposite slope they go to draw by their appearance on the top a storm of hostile shells, in the midst of which they unlimber and come into action. Their deep and steady tones inspire confidence in the regiments, which now begin to form on a broad front on either side of the road

still sheltered from fire and awaiting keenly the orders to take part in the action. Whoever has marched with a column to a field in expectation of desperate strife has experienced sensations such as no other situation in life can give.

In rear of Hill's three divisions Lee was riding with Longstreet when the first message reached him of a sharp fight on the Willoughby Run; as the messages became graver and more frequent he left Longstreet and galloped forward with his staff. In the meanwhile Hill, though sick and suffering, had also ridden forward to take direction of the battle. The cumbrous length of the Confederate column had woefully delayed the advance of the troops and Heth's orders had prescribed great caution in prematurely engaging his troops before the next division could come to his assistance. For this reason he had still kept two brigades idly in reserve after the repulse of Archer and Davis, fearing to involve his whole command until a greater force had deployed. Hill now commanded the attack to be resumed by Heth's whole force, and directed Pender, who commanded the 2nd division, which included one South Carolina brigade, two from North Carolina and one from Georgia, to second the attack as fast as his troops could be brought up.

Before these reinforcements, however, could join in the fight the remainder of the I corps arrived and was quickly and skilfully disposed by General Doubleday, who Noon. had succeeded Reynolds in command of the I corps to support his line of battle. Each division of the I corps consisted of two brigades, about three thousand men. One, Wadsworth's, was already engaged to the hilt; another, Robinson's, stacked its arms and proceeded to throw up light entrenchments round the Seminary, which proved very useful later; while the third, under Rowley, five of whose six regiments were Pennsylvanians, was sent into the fight to help defend the soil of their native state. Stone's brigade of this division, called the 'Buck-tails' from the ornament in their shakos, strengthened the Federal right. Between 11 A.M. and noon the artillery fire of the Confederates had begun to gain the ascendancy. Their guns were well handled and inflicted considerable loss in the well-defined positions of their

adversaries, but still the general advance of the infantry was delayed, and when it took place it was once again repulsed by the steady fire of the Northern riflemen and by the skilfully directed counter-strokes of the reserve.

In the meanwhile large forces were closing up to the help of both sides. The XI corps of General Howard was already on the march to Gettysburg when it received an urgent command from Reynolds after his interview with Buford to march to the cannon. Thereupon Howard pushed his leading division and artillery along the Emmetsburg road, while the other two cut across country on to the Taneytown road, in order to form a short column instead of a long one, and marched rapidly towards the town. Leaving his men tramping sturdily along, Howard galloped on to the Cemetery Hill and thence surveyed the battle, whose progress was marked by the lines of smoke arising beyond the Seminary. Howard claims the honour of having been the first to select the Cemetery Ridge as the defensive position for the Union army to concentrate upon; certainly he at once perceived its advantages and ordered his reserve division to halt and entrench upon Cemetery Hill while he directed his other two divisions to prolong the line of the I corps and to occupy Oak Hill. Soon after noon the leading troops of the XI corps were tramping through the streets of Gettysburg to the cheers of the excited inhabitants, while Howard himself went to hold a brief conference with Doubleday, whom he simply ordered to hold his ground, undertaking upon his part to protect the right flank. Howard by virtue of his rank as corps commander now became responsible for the leadership of the whole Federal force engaged; as officers of superior rank one after the other reached the field the command kept changing.

The reader will remember it was upon Howard's corps that the full fury of Jackson's attack had fallen in the surprise at Dowdall's Tavern. This corps consisted largely of Germans from New York and Pennsylvania under General Schurz, who took over the corps from Howard, von Steinwehr, a retired Prussian officer, and Schimmelpfenning.

After the disastrous rout at Chancellorsville these troops had come in for a good deal of undeserved obloquy, because almost any troops would have fared as they did under the circumstances. The term 'cowardly Dutchmen' had been thrown at them by newspaper critics who knew more of the war from hearsay than personal experience; they were now eager to redeem their reputation, and responded bravely to their leaders, though the recollection of defeat had certainly impaired their confidence. Howard returning from his visit to the I corps met his men debouching from the town, and personally indicated the direction of their advance. He sent orders to Sickles, who commanded the III corps at Emmetsburg, to march to the field, and an urgent appeal to Slocum commanding the XII corps at Two Taverns to do likewise. He also despatched an account of the situation to General Meade's headquarters.

Howard's orders were very similar in character to those of Reynolds: like Reynolds, he noticed the fine position on Cemetery Hill, and strove by keeping the advancing enemy at arm's length to secure it for the Federal army; like Reynolds, he failed to realise the danger which threatened from the north, and probably for the same reason, namely want of information. To supply such information is the duty of cavalry working in close combination with infantry divisions. Very generally in war this duty is neglected even when cavalry divisions are actively employed, and many a surprise has been effected like Jackson's at Dowdall's Tavern by an attacking column which has inserted itself between the protecting cavalry and their army. In the present case Buford's patrols had scoured the northern roads and had reported the advance of hostile infantry from that direction. Not only, however, is such active patrolling necessary, but there should be some systematic plan for the collection, and, as far as possible, for the verifying of all news bearing on the day's work; this business in the armies of Europe is among the principal duties of the general staff officers attached to each army corps and division. If Reynolds and Howard had had the assistance which every German corps commander, thanks to the foresight of Moltke,

found at his side in 1870, to enable him to collect information and appreciate its value, the Federal dispositions would probably have been more cautious. Such details of staff organisation are of vital importance to the success of armies.

Oak Hill then was assigned to Schimmelpfenning's division as its objective, while Barlow was ordered to extend 2 P.M. right across the north of the town. It was nearly two o'clock before the troops began to execute these orders, but when the Blue scouts approached the grove of oaks already mentioned, a fierce squall of bullets met them in the face and drove them back in haste. Howard was just too late; Ewell's infantry had already seized the height, and his guns could be seen driving up at the full speed of the teams. Daylight had found the divisions of the Second—Jackson's old corps—stirring in their bivouacs. Of the three divisions which composed it Johnson's, as already related, was following Lee's great column; Rodes' had skirted the South Mountain range and was moving on Cashtown, while Early's column was heading for the same place when Ewell was informed of the encounter with the Federal Horse the night before, and of the order to concentrate on Gettysburg. Disposing of only two-thirds of his corps, he nevertheless turned southward by two roads, so as to admit of the rapid deployment of his full fighting strength. Some delay was caused by the change of orders; but the columns were of manageable length and the men fine marchers, so that a ten-mile tramp had taken nothing from their freshness for the fray, and by one o'clock Rodes' brigades were forming for action. Their leader, however, showed the same hesitation and tactical timidity which had marred the efforts of Heth, and only after an hour's unnecessary delay were his two leading brigades launched against the Federal troops south of Oak Hill, while a formidable line of guns took up the tale of Hill's batteries and swept the ridge with a crossfire.

We left the I Federal corps engaged in fending off attacks which were being pushed home with ever increasing numbers supported by a powerful artillery. First
 The Fight with the I corps. Heth had engaged two brigades which had been checked by Buford's dismounted cavalry and thrown back into

the brook by Wadsworth's division on its arrival. Then the brigades of Pettigrew (North Carolina) and Brockenborough (Virginia) had renewed the struggle, but without success. In obedience to A. P. Hill's orders to support Heth, Pender had sent in two of his brigades—those of Lane and Scales, and later that of Thomas; but a most lamentable want of combination had characterised the handling of the Third corps, and it was not until Heth's division had been fearfully cut up and Rodes' two advanced brigades very severely handled, that the whole weight of Pender's three brigades was thrown into the contest. Thus the result which should have been gained before midday by a prompt deployment was still doubtful in the third hour after noon, when events in another part of the field settled the fate of the day.

It was probably the want of information due to the lack of co-operating cavalry which lay at the root of the halting tactics of the Confederate leaders. Thus every move of the enemy took them by surprise and inspired them with unnecessary caution at the very moment when boldness would have gained so much, while the unlucky circumstance of having to march by a single road rendered their movements still more slow and inactive. Rodes did no better than Heth, and with less excuse, for once in touch with the main body of the army the situation should have been made clear to him. One after another his brigades, no stronger than a European regiment, went into the fight, to be repulsed with heavy loss by Doubleday's stubborn infantry. His brigade commanders, too, seem to have failed in their part of the task, though on such occasions it is most difficult justly to apportion the blame. The fact remains that Rodes' division like Heth's was exposed to severe and unnecessary loss which checked it at the time, and impaired its morale in the fierce contest on the morrow.

If the XI corps had offered as fierce resistance as the I to the Confederate advance, the day would have probably resulted in a Federal victory, but once again misfortune clung to this unlucky command from the moment it came into action. When Howard found himself forestalled on Oak Hill, he posted a strong line of guns to check an

advance from that direction and to connect the XI corps with the I corps. Four brigades of his infantry were extended north of the town from the Mummasburg road to the Rock Creek, about six thousand men on a front of one mile. These troops had no natural cover to assist them, and posted as they were one mile from the town, along a small ravine which ran from west to east, they were liable to be turned on either flank, which is just what happened.

From the crest of Oak Hill, Ewell, as on the day of his successful attack on Milroy's detachment at Winchester, was 3 P.M. skipping about on his crutches and anxiously searching the horizon for the head of Early's column. Rodes' two brigades had just recoiled in confusion: uneasiness was depicted on the faces of his officers when, emerging from a light cloud of dust, troops of infantry came into sight on the road from Heidlersburg as they topped the crest overlooking the Rock Creek, and dipped down the incline, extending as they did so across the fields on either side of the road. Great was the relief of the Confederate general at their appearance, for all depended on the result of their attack. Already the fire of his guns was obtaining the mastery over the Federal artillery, and Rodes was directing Doles' brigade of Georgians against Schimmelpfenning's men, who stood up with difficulty to the losses inflicted by the Confederate shells.

While this action developed and superior officers exposed themselves freely in rallying Rodes' first attacking column, Attack of Early's Division. 3 P.M. in order to secure a simultaneous movement in the coming struggle, Early's soldiers formed a line of battle. On their right Gordon's Georgian brigade had left the road and was moving straight at the front of Barlow's position; next came Hay's Louisiana brigade in the centre, while Hoke's North Carolina men extended the line to the left as far as the eye could reach. Smith's Virginian brigade followed in reserve. Without waiting for artillery to prepare their way, or for skirmishers to feel for the enemy, the array of Georgian troops descended on both wings of the XI corps, and with the precision acquired on many battlefields swiftly and silently moved forward to

the assault without firing a shot. The sight of Jackson's veterans once more threatening to close with them in hand-to-hand conflict struck a chill to the hearts of men they had so recently defeated, and who now had to face that long brown line hardly distinguishable from the corn over which it trampled save for the fringe of steel glittering above it in the July sun, and for a dozen crimson standards which flaunted defiantly the starry cross of the Confederacy. Like the sickles of a great line of reapers the sharp bayonets came nearer through the ruddy gold of the ripening wheat; then the line disappeared, only to emerge a minute later unbroken and unhesitating from the willows which lined the little stream. The sight was too much for the nerves of Barlow's men. Some there were who gallantly stood to be bayoneted when their comrades fled. Barlow himself and many superior officers fell in the fire which precluded the Southern charge, but the first line was borne back half a mile before it rallied on its reserves at the Almshouse.

The advance of the other Georgian brigade against the Federal left had been equally successful. First the defending infantry gave way, then the batteries had to limber up and retire to avoid capture. When the flow of fugitives with troops and guns retiring towards the town gave the aspect of defeat to the Federal army, Heth and Rodes ordered a general advance of their infantry, and Doubleday in vain sent to Howard for orders, for reinforcements, or for permission to retire on Cemetery Ridge. It seems that an officer charged with a message to him mistook Seminary for Cemetery Hill by a not unnatural confusion; at any rate the commander of the brave I corps beheld his right uncovered by the receding of the XI corps, and the victorious enemy surging round both his flanks and striking hard against his front. Reluctantly he gave the signal for the retirement of what remained of his devoted brigades to the Seminary and to the hastily constructed trenches round it, which gave some shelter and breathing space to his shattered troops.

Returning to the progress of Early's attack: the stand of Barlow's troops at the Almshouse did not delay him long. The Georgians swept forward in their impetuous attack, the

Louisiana and North Carolina brigades outflanked and threatened to envelop the defender, who speedily gave way. Before the outer edge of the town was reached the rout was complete, and pressed by shells and bullets two converging streams of fugitives tore in wild confusion into the streets already blocked with guns and waggons, thus repeating the stampede from Dowdall's Tavern. The Confederate victory was now assured. The stand at the Seminary had enabled most of the guns of the I corps to escape, but the retirement thence to Cemetery Hill was only possible thanks to the bold front offered by a brigade of Buford's cavalry, who threatened to charge the pursuing Confederates. So at Gettysburg as at Chancellorsville the resolute conduct of a handful of cavalry stopped the pursuit and staved off complete disaster, while the want of a thousand lancers cost the Confederates the chance of utterly destroying the two Federal corps and capturing all their guns.

The rearguard of the I corps which had to retreat through the town was involved in the rout of the XI corps, but the rest of it reached Cemetery Hill in military order, and was quickly disposed for its defence. Steinwehr's Prussian training had stood him in good stead; he had thoughtfully kept his men digging trenches and piling earth against the wall of the Cemetery as a rallying point in case of reverse. Howard now brought forward one of his brigades to the southern edge of the town to check the panic and stop pursuit, while he did all that was possible to restore order among the defeated troops; two thirds, however, of the XI corps had temporarily ceased to exist as a fighting force. The I corps was posted on either flank of Steinwehr's division and what remained of the shattered divisions of the XI corps were rallied in rear. The Confederates yelling, shooting and stabbing had chased the flying Federals for half a mile into Gettysburg, where they took several thousand prisoners, for the converging stream of retreating troops from the field of Oak Hill, mingling with Barlow's men, had blocked the streets and prevented escape. The breathless Georgians, incapable for the moment of further enterprise, were halted by bugle sound and rallied round

their regimental flags, while Early rode forward to examine the ground south of the town. Up the slopes of Cemetery Hill were to be seen the mob of fugitives getting out of the range of the rifle as fast as possible, but on the summit were visible formed bodies of troops with a long array of Stars and Stripes ostentatiously put forward and the muzzles of a respectable line of guns pointing down the hill.

The arrival of strong reinforcements successively to both sides during the battle had made the fighting stubborn and Losses on sanguinary beyond even the average of this fierce July 1. Civil War. So soon as the contest languished from exhaustion fresh troops like fuel on a smouldering furnace revived the fury of the combat and brought back the survivors of the earlier hours into action. Both sides, as we have said, recognised the critical period of the war. The Northerners were fighting for the sacred soil of their native States, the Southerners in the full expectation of final and decisive victory. Rather more than forty thousand men had been engaged altogether, of whom nine thousand strewed the field slain or wounded. More than five thousand prisoners were taken by the Confederates. Some two thousand fugitive Federals carried news of the disaster along the marching columns of the corps hurrying to the rescue, and by exaggerated accounts spread panic in the country and along the wires to the great cities of the North.

Considerable as the defeat of the Federals unquestionably was, it would have been far greater had Heth and Rodes displayed the same energy and quick perception as Early, whose swift deployment and whole-hearted attack on Barlow with three-fourths of the force at his disposal was in sharp contrast to the piecemeal engagement of the two divisions on Oak Hill Ridge. We have said that want of information which it should have been the duty of co-operating cavalry to supply probably caused the errors of the Confederate generals and prevented them from taking full advantage of the impetuous courage of their men. The same want of cavalry, or failure to use it—for Buford's command was still available—was the immediate cause of Howard's disaster. Had he seized Oak Hill with dismounted troopers

or checked Early's deployment by the same means the blow which ruined him would have been delayed and would have lost half its force. Just as the timidity of a rider in the hunting field is communicated to his horse and daunts the finest fencer in his leap, so the hesitation of their leaders, and the unnecessary loss it had exposed them to, lowered the fighting value of Heth's and Rodes' divisions, which made itself evident in the next two days. Even when the victory had been gained and the whole Federal force driven from their ground in confusion, there was no one present to deal the coup de grâce and to hurl the victorious troops against the last bulwark of the defence. Throughout the campaign the Confederates missed the hero whose instinct for aggressive war never let the opportunity slip of striking while the iron was hot, and on this, as on many other occasions, the Confederate soldier might have paraphrased the cry of the old Highland chief in 1715 and prayed 'for one hour of Stonewall Jackson.' Early indeed sent for permission to storm the Cemetery, but while staff officers were seeking Ewell, and Ewell was referring the case to Lee, the Federal leaders rallied and sorted their men, large reinforcements came in sight tramping resolutely along the roads to Gettysburg from the south and south-east, and the short opportunity was lost never to recur.

On the night of June 30 General Meade had his headquarters in a quiet little homestead by the roadside not far from Taneytown, whose owners little expected to be connected with a great historic event. The chief officers of the army snatched a little slumber in turn while the insects buzzed round the lanterns and lamps, by whose light clerks and adjutants wrote out orders, received and compiled reports and other documents. The stillness of the night was broken from time to time by the passage of waggons and by the clatter of hoofs as mounted men came and went. Yet the morning light crept into the cottage before any tidings of importance reached the grave and anxious man who had but three days before assumed the command with all its fateful responsibility. After pondering thoughtfully over the complicated

The Headquarters of the Army of the Potomac on July 1.

problem which contradictory reports presented, he issued orders to the corps commanders for a retreat of the whole army to the Pipe Creek. These orders had hardly been despatched when couriers arrived announcing the attack on Buford's cavalry by the Confederate advanced guard, and they were shortly followed by others telling of Reynolds' arrival on the field and fatal wound. Meade at first adhered to his plan, but as fresh reports followed revealing the gravity of the situation at Gettysburg and the impossibility of withdrawing the two corps already engaged without disaster, he took counsel with Hancock, Warren and Butterfield. Then followed Howard's messages despatched at 11.30 A.M. and received soon after 1 P.M., the distance being fifteen miles, saying that two corps were deeply committed in the struggle and that the III and XII had been summoned to their aid. Like Buford and Reynolds, Howard insisted on the tactical advantages of the Gettysburg position for defence and begged General Meade to come and inspect it personally. Meade, reluctant to leave the central point where reports from his whole army could be most rapidly received, sent General Hancock to take command at Gettysburg, and to decide whether or no the whole army should concentrate there for battle. Hancock had hardly started on his mission when Meade sent orders to the V and VI corps to march in the same direction so as to be within reach if Gettysburg became the point of concentration. Meade should have gone himself on learning the importance of the action which was in progress, but he did wisely to rely on Hancock's judgment and decision; perhaps he reposed more confidence in his lieutenant than in his own powers, for Meade was modest and unassuming.

Leaving Hancock galloping along the metalled road followed by a troop of staff officers and couriers, threading his Hancock's way through the troops and trains which filled Mission. many miles of his route, let us glance at the position of the several Federal corps at the moment when the Confederates dealt their successful stroke. The I and XI were fighting north and west of Gettysburg; the III left behind by Reynolds at Emmetsburg had answered Howard's summons

to the field in spite of Meade's contrary orders to fall back on the line of the Pipe Creek ; for Sickles its commander knew that Meade had issued his orders before he was informed of the situation at Gettysburg. He sent four of his six brigades off at once under Birney, while Humphreys, his other divisional commander, was ordered to rally the remaining two, which were watching the defile through the South Mountain, and to follow on his tracks. The XII corps had marched at daybreak from Taneytown to Two Taverns, distant only five miles from Gettysburg, and Slocum its commander on receiving news of the battle resumed the march from Two Taverns with his weary troops, whose advanced guard reached the field late in the afternoon. The II corps had already been sent from Taneytown, where it had relieved the XII sent towards Gettysburg, and when Hancock overtook it on the road he directed it to march to the Cemetery Ridge. There only remained the V and VI corps, numerically the strongest and including some of the sturdiest troops in the army, among whom were two brigades of United States infantry. The V corps was on the march from Union Mills to Hanover and the VI only reached Manchester in the afternoon. Both Sykes and Sedgwick promptly obeyed the orders to concentrate and all night their weary columns were tramping to the trysting place, but could not hope to reach it even by forced marches until Thursday ; with the exception of the right wing the whole army would be concentrated before nightfall on Wednesday if Hancock should advise the measure.

At a quarter to four Hancock reached the Cemetery overlooking Gettysburg and the picture which presented 3.45 P.M. itself might well have daunted the bravest spirit. Through the streets of the town rolled the débris of the XI corps mingled with one division of the I. The rest of the I were falling back from the Seminary on to Cemetery Ridge covered by Buford's horsemen, and although its regiments preserved some order the inevitable confusion of a retirement from a victorious enemy existed ; it was also plain that the ranks had been fearfully thinned. Many hundred stragglers, some bleeding from bayonet and bullet

wounds, streamed southwards. Carts and guns jammed the roads to the right and left in their efforts to escape capture, while the heights on the west and the town itself swarmed with hostile troops. It was with this appalling spectacle before his eyes that Hancock had to decide whether or no the Gettysburg position could form a rallying point for the defeated corps and for the troops hurrying to their help. Gradually the scene assumed a more hopeful aspect. A long line of guns was established on Cemetery Hill and the ridges south and east of it, while riflemen manned the hasty breast-works which had been constructed and lined the walls and fences. Blue infantry in serried masses came into sight on the roads from the south, and, most fortunate circumstance of all, the victor unaccountably held his hand and stopped the attack, which, if it had been pressed without delay, must have swept the Unionist forces from the Cemetery. After 4 P.M. Howard, who had done all that was possible to rally his troops, met Hancock on Cemetery Hill and made the situation clearer by his personal explications. It seemed that the place could be held if only fresh troops arrived before the enemy renewed his attacks, and this he showed no disposition to do. A note to this effect was sent to Meade. At 5.15 P.M. Hancock wrote again in the same sense; he stated that the precious hour had enabled him to rally the troops and that the XII and II corps were on the ground and fast coming into line. A quarter of an hour later Slocum joined Hancock and took over the command from him while concurring in his opinion. Hancock, thus relieved of his responsibility on the ground, hurried back to Taneytown to report to Meade, only stopping to direct the troops of his own corps, the II, to the places on the ridge which he wished them to occupy temporarily, so as to protect the left flank and rear of the army; at half-past seven he was once more at the side of his chief.

Meade listened anxiously to his report and adopted his view that Gettysburg must be the rallying point of the army. Urgent orders to this effect were then despatched to each corps commander, and an officer started in the dusk on the Baltimore road carrying despatches which kept the

Washington authorities sick with anxiety until they heard of the result of the struggle. Before the headquarters of the army could be moved there remained much to be done in working out the details and making the calculations involved by the concentration, so that eager as he now was to reach the decisive point it was late at night before Meade mounted his horse, and accompanied by Hancock set out in the moonlight on the road to Gettysburg.

Soon after four while Hancock was labouring to restore order and confidence in the Federal ranks, General Lee arrived at the Seminary and accompanied by A. P. Hill reconnoitred the field of battle. While so engaged the message from Early asking for permission to storm the Cemetery reached him, but the state of affairs must have presented itself very differently to the two commanders. Early flushed with success wrote from among his victorious troops whose triumphant yell was still tingling in his ears. Around him he beheld every sign of a complete victory; for more than a mile the road was littered with the arms of the Federal fugitives and crowds of prisoners were in the hands of his men; beyond him the hillside was still covered with retreating troops, and though the crest was firmly held by reserves, yet there were still three of his brigades intact with which he might assail their flank, for the Georgians had disposed of the XI corps almost unaided. Lee on the contrary had crossed the ground which had been sternly contested for six hours and which was soaked with the blood of his men. At his side was the corps commander whose natural intrepidity seems to have been spoilt that day by sickness. It was certain that fresh troops occupied the Cemetery and quite uncertain in the absence of cavalry patrols what their strength might be. Doubtless the fatal repulse of the too carelessly conducted pursuit of McClellan at Malvern Hill just one year ago was present to the mind of the commander-in-chief, and the reports of the officers who had endeavoured to approach the Cemetery strengthened the belief that it was held in force. Then there were other considerations which may well have influenced Lee on the side of caution.

The Con-
federate
Army after
4 P.M.

The Confederate troops had already marched far that day and fought hard. As the fierce excitement of battle cools down a sharp reaction follows, and the victor is apt to think that he has done all that can reasonably be expected of him for the present. The vanquished on the other hand also lose their impression as the time passes and every hour's grace increases their powers of resistance. Five of the nine Confederate divisions were still on the march, and the whole of Longstreet's corps, which had been passed by the trains of the Third corps owing to indifferent staff arrangements, was too far distant to reach the field that night. Lee had to remember that he was fighting on hostile soil without any cavalry at hand to cover a retreat in case of reverse, while swarms of hostile militia would join in a pursuit and would seek to bar his way back to Virginia. Of the four divisions present on the field two were exhausted by the tough struggle on the Oak Hill Ridges; there remained but Pender's and Early's fit for immediate action, with Anderson's in reserve. Nevertheless great risks must be run to win great successes, and if the advance against the Cemetery had followed sharp on Early's victory the result would have been the capture of the position which two costly battles failed to achieve, and the corps of the Unionist army would probably have been flung southwards in diverging directions.

As the evening fell Lee rode from the Seminary to confer with Ewell about the next day's operations. His first idea was to attack and carry the Cemetery Hill at dawn, but Ewell objected that the enemy was massed on its reverse slopes and would certainly entrench during the night. Lee then suggested withdrawing the whole of the Second corps from its post on the enemy's right flank with the intention of concentrating the entire army for a decisive blow against the enemy's left. Ewell again objected that Cemetery Hill was the key to the enemy's position and he proposed to outflank it with Johnson's division, while he held it in front with Rodes' and Early's, and while at the same time Longstreet threw his whole weight against the Federal left. By this scheme the

Lee's
Plans and
Orders for
July 2.

entire Third corps (A. P. Hill's) was left at the disposal of the commander-in-chief to reinforce either wing as the occasion arose. In this plan Lee eventually concurred. He ordered that the attack should be made as early as practicable the following morning, but Ewell was not to begin before he heard Longstreet's guns. Of the three plans discussed the one adopted was probably the worst because it was the hardest to execute; and its success depended on very exact execution of the design, separated as the wings of the army would be with the enemy concentrated under cover between them. Longstreet's corps was still so far distant that it could not come into action at break of day, the most favourable time for the attack; every hour's delay brought reinforcements to the Federal army, and revived the strength of the Federal corps which had been exhausted by forced marching. Neither wing would be strong enough to be sure of victory, while Hill's corps in the centre was too far from either to give support at the crisis of the fight. It is easy to see now that an attack at dawn against Cemetery Hill with the whole available strength of Hill's and Ewell's corps would have been the best course for the Confederate general. Longstreet's corps coming up in reserve would have been available before noon to turn the scale had the victory been doubtful, and to have initiated a relentless pursuit had the battle been won by that hour. Dawn on Thursday found less than two thirds of the Federal army in position to fight; their whole right wing was still absent, and the ridge had been imperfectly occupied by the troops which had arrived in the dusk and which had been hastily posted without careful examination of the ground. Except on Cemetery Hill there were no entrenchments; the divisions were a good deal mixed up from their hasty disposition and from the general confusion attending Wednesday's battle.

The question has been discussed as to whether Lee should have attacked the Gettysburg position at all, and he himself thought it necessary to explain in his report of the operations that he had done so because a retreat through the South Mountain was not advisable and hardly practicable on the night of July 1. It would certainly have been a difficult

operation to have reversed the march of that huge column cumbered now with several thousand wounded and prisoners. The point on which the question really depended, however, was, what chance the Confederates had of inflicting decisive defeat, and there can be no doubt that the opportunity was the brightest they had made for themselves since they let McClellan escape from the banks of the Chickahominy. One third of the Federal army had been severely defeated, the remainder were concentrating with difficulty by forced marching; a prompt deployment of all his available forces would have placed victory within Lee's grasp. / The resolution to attack was therefore sound and wise; the failure lay in faults of execution which were caused to some extent at any rate by the want of sympathetic co-operation of the corps commanders.

Having decided to attack on the morrow, Lee fixed his headquarters close to the Seminary, whence he sent orders to Longstreet to hurry his march and to bring his corps up into line on the right of A. P. Hill, so as to outflank and roll up the enemy's left wing. Lee had not been able that evening to examine the ground on which he directed Longstreet to fight, nor were the arrangements for the deployment of the troops, artillery and reserve ammunition which were coming up to the front along the Chambersburg pike as forward as they should have been that night, which caused a disastrous delay the following morning. News of the victory, however, had run like wild fire through the Confederate ranks and better than some of their leaders the men appreciated the situation created by it. They knew that to remain on the defensive would enable the enemy to swell his ranks, not only by bringing up all the Army of the Potomac, but with levies from Washington and the Susquehanna Valley. The high spirit of the troops demanding a vigorous offensive was worth many battalions and a retreat without fighting would have done incalculable moral harm to the cause of the South.

In the gathering darkness of the night Johnson's division of Ewell's corps reached Gettysburg and was directed to march through the town on to the slopes north of Culp's Hill,

from which point they could conveniently make their attack at whatever hour it might be ordered. They had bivouacked on Tuesday night twenty-two miles from Gettysburg and had been on the march all Wednesday, so that the men sank wearily to the ground when they reached the post assigned to them on Benner's Hill. Gradually the smoke of many camp fires began to curl upwards as the exhausted soldiers in both armies, having established themselves for the night, proceeded to cook. Parties of Confederates were busy clearing the field of battle, picking up the wounded, collecting arms and counting the dead. A bright moon assisted the efforts of those who went out to succour the wounded, of whom all night a ceaseless procession was carried to the field hospitals. The deep sleep of exhaustion closed the eyes of Federal and Confederate alike, saving the sentries, who forced themselves to keep awake along the outpost line and beside the colours of the different regiments.

CHAPTER VII

GETTYSBURG—JULY 2

Gettysburg: July 2—The Position of the Federal Corps—The position of Sickles' III Corps—12 noon—The Confederate Army at daybreak: July 2—The March of Longstreet's Corps—Summary of Events: July 2—Characteristics of the Fight—Deployment of Hood's Division, 3 p.m.—3.30 p.m.—Warren's Mission to the Little Round Top—McLaws' Division deploys, 5 p.m.—McLaws' Division is engaged, 5.30 p.m.—The Assault on the Peach Orchard at 6 p.m.—Advance of Anderson's Division Third Corps at 6.30 p.m.—The Position of the Federal Left Wing, 7 p.m.—The Attack of Anderson's Division, 7.30 p.m.—The Fight of the Second Corps—The Culp's Hill Position—Johnson's Division engaged, 6.30 p.m.—Early's attack, 7 p.m.—Movements of the Cavalry—Losses in the Battle.

ABOUT one o'clock in the morning the Federal sentries were challenging a large group of horsemen who had gained the Cemetery from the Taneytown road, and whose horses were clattering over the stone pavement inside. The cypress trees cast long shadows in the moonlight and in among the tombs lay many a slumbering form which stirred without waking as the riders passed on. All around them in countless stacks the piles of arms, and the colours resting on them, divided the groups of sleepers; on the opposite hill the tall clock-tower stood out in weird prominence watching like a giant sentry over the Confederate host. Behind the new arrivals could be discerned the two Round Tops and to their right curved the outline of Culp Hill; the town full of hostile troops lay at their feet with here and there a light burning as a precaution in case of a night alarm. From time to time orderlies and visiting rounds moved from point to point, and at rare intervals the distant thud of horses' feet could be heard. General Meade peered through his spectacles among the shadows and tried to realise the lie of the ground

while he listened to Howard's tale of misfortune and to Hancock's suggestions for strengthening the line of battle. Nothing much could be done except listen to reports until the first ray of sunlight fell upon the landscape and then Meade again rode over the ridge and reconnoitred its slopes. Hancock had described it to be weak on its left flank and Meade was at first disposed to undervalue its defensive strength; in case of a forced retreat orders were drawn up to meet the emergency.

In the profound ignorance of all warlike matters which characterised so many of the writers on the war in America it has been cast as a reproach at Meade that he performed this most essential duty of a general in his position. Well might he feel anxious at the unlooked-for defeat of the previous evening, and at the prospect of meeting under its famous leader the full force of the army which had already triumphed in four campaigns over his own. His utter ruin and with it the fall of the Federal supremacy must have been the result had that army been led at Gettysburg as it was at Manassas and Chancellorsville. Meade was not a great general, but his clear common sense, his manly courage and loyal confidence in such subordinates as Warren, Slocum and Hancock, whom he still had at his side, rescued the Northern power from the peril which threatened it and gave it time to organise ultimate and complete victory.

While the commanding general was examining the position which he had to defend the Federal corps commanders set to work to rectify their line taken up somewhat haphazard the night before. Steinwehr's division of the XI corps still held the slopes of Cemetery Hill facing the town; the remainder of the XI corps was in reserve. On the right of Steinwehr stood Wadsworth's division of the I corps facing north and holding the curtain of hill which connected the Cemetery with Culp's Hill. Robinson's division stood at right angles to this line facing west, while Doubleday, who had resumed command of his division on the arrival of General Newton to command his corps, took post with his troops in the angle and remained in reserve. It is only since the war

The Position of the Federal Corps.

that Doubleday has had the credit he deserved for his skilful and gallant handling of the I corps on Oak Hill Ridge. At the time he was blamed for the defeat which Howard wrongfully attributed to the I corps instead of to his own. The II corps (Hancock's) continued Robinson's line southward along the heights which overlook the Emmetsburg road. Opposite to them and almost parallel stood the Seminary Ridge, on whose crest the enemy's troops could already be discerned. The extreme left of the line was formed by the four brigades of Sickles' III corps, which had arrived overnight; the extreme right by Slocum's XII corps. Williams' division held the ground between Culp's Hill and Power's Hill, and Geary's division, posted at first on the Round Top, was brought across to support Williams on Culp's Hill during the morning. To Slocum was given a general command over the right wing, and Hancock exercised it over the centre of the Federal army; they confronted their opponents till the V corps appeared, at 9 A.M., with no more than forty thousand infantry and artillery and two hundred guns; of these troops nine thousand had been involved in the previous day's defeat. At the same hour Lee disposed of six divisions—some thirty-four thousand infantry and one hundred and fifty guns; of this force the divisions of both Heth and Rodes had suffered severely overnight, but four of the finest divisions in the army were fresh and eager to fight, and could probably have completed the defeat of the enemy by themselves had they been launched upon him simultaneously at dawn of day. The Federals still had two brigades of the III corps to come up four thousand men, the V corps with twelve thousand infantry, and the VI with fifteen thousand but the latter could not reach the field till late in the afternoon, and would then be very exhausted. By moderately active measures the Confederates should have disposed of Longstreet's two leading divisions by 11 A.M.; Pickett's, five thousand strong, marched from Chambersburg on Thursday morning and could not reach the scene of the battle till Friday. Longstreet's two leading divisions, under McLaws and Hood, numbered each about seven thousand men. Thus

it was of vital importance to the Confederates to begin the battle without an hour's delay. A comparison of the strength of the two armies at different times of the day gives some idea of the value of time to a general who takes the offensive, and who achieves his concentration before the adversary and forces an unexpected situation upon him. As in strategy before troops meet in battle the events of a single day may completely alter the situation to the advantage of one side or the other, so in tactics, when once the two adversaries are face to face on the field, the events of an hour or two will completely change the balance of force.

The moonlight and fine weather had greatly facilitated the march of the Federal columns, but the immense effort had been too much for a large proportion of the men, who were overladen with equipment and indifferently inured to the peculiar fatigue of marching, even when they were not also deprived of sleep. For many miles, therefore, along the road the troops straggled, and several thousand of the army did not reach the field with their regiments, but could be counted on to rejoin in a day or two. Thus a march of this sort, in the critical hours of a campaign, was hardly less to be dreaded than an unsuccessful action. The Confederates, on the contrary, were much more lightly equipped and better marchers. When they straggled the reason was generally that want of boots had made their feet too sore to use, and want of food coupled with continuous marching will exhaust the toughest troops. On the present occasion they were unusually well off for boots, and their regiments reached Gettysburg by comparatively easy marches fresh and well fed. During the day frequent changes were made in the disposition of the Federal troops as reinforcements arrived and events developed.

Having to deal with an enemy who had given such striking proofs of his ability to execute bold manœuvres and turning movements, Meade very properly feared that his position might be turned by its left, which would have placed Lee nearer to the lines of Washington than the Federal army if once he established himself on the Emmetsburg road south of Gettysburg. Had this happened Meade was deter-

mined to fall back so as still to cover Baltimore, and compel Lee to come and find him in another defensive position of his own choice. Nevertheless, a vague apprehension of what his versatile enemy might accomplish induced Meade to think of snatching the initiative from him by falling upon Ewell's corps, which was somewhat isolated and extended on a broad front along the north of his position. It was in pursuance of this plan that Geary's division of the XII corps was moved about from the Little Round Top to the southern slopes of Culp's Hill in support of the right wing. The contemplated offensive stroke would certainly have attained its object by fixing the Confederate army on the field at Gettysburg, but with the forces available on Thursday morning it would have been a very bold measure. Meade reconnoitred the ground with Warren and Slocum, who were opposed to leaving the defensive rôle at present, and who did not like the ground over which the attack must be made; so they persuaded their chief to await the arrival of his right wing before risking an advance. The events of the day, however, diverted the energies of the Federal army into a different channel.

When Geary's division moved from the extreme left to the extreme right of the Federal position a general movement took place of the troops on the ridge to close towards their left. Gibbon's division of Hancock's corps extended its flank until it faced Spangler's house on the opposite ridge, while two regiments were sent to hold the plantations round Godori's farm, so as, at any rate, to delay the enemy's advance on that line. From Godori's house the Emmetsburg road is carried by a small swelling of the ground or subsidiary ridge to the Peach Orchard. Between the Peach Orchard and the Round Tops are the thickets already described as lying on the banks of the Plum Run rivulet, and when Sickles reached his post he became very uneasy as to its capacity for defence. Thick woods closely approached it; no natural feature gave either a line of defence or obstacle to the enemy's advance, which was, on the contrary, facilitated by the woods. To add to his uneasiness, Buford's cavalry, which

The Position of Sickles' III Corps.

had during the night and early morning guarded the left flank, had now disappeared, leaving the duty of patrolling the extensive area in front and on the flank of his corps to infantry skirmishers. When the activity of these riflemen discovered movements of considerable hostile forces to be in progress on and beyond the opposite ridge Sickles' uneasiness was greatly increased. Buford had been sent to Westminster to guard the rear of the army and its communications with Baltimore, in the belief that Gregg's cavalry division, which had been assigned to the left flank in relief of Buford's decimated command, had reached the field. By some mistake, however, no cavalry covered the left flank during the critical hours of Thursday's battle—an oversight which greatly facilitated any enterprise directed against it. This is another instance of the absence of essential co-operation between cavalry and infantry on the field. Had the Confederates made the most of it, the mistake might have been as fatal as at Chancellorsville.

At 11 A.M. Sickles sought General Meade's headquarters and urged his views regarding the dangerous position of his troops, and about the same hour the other generals were summoned to hear the orders of the commander-in-chief. It seems certain that Meade made the mistake of assuming that the enemy's principal attack would be directed against Cemetery Hill and his right wing; it is otherwise inexplicable that he did not yield to Sickles' request either to visit the ground himself or to send Warren. He finally consented to despatch General Hunt the chief of the artillery: this officer, however, limited himself to pointing out how and on what ground artillery could best join in the defence, but offered no opinion on the general question. As the day wore on and no sign of action came from the opposing army Sickles became more and more uneasy; he felt sure the delay on the Confederate side was being turned to good account, and that a flank attack would develop itself against his army corps before it could be succoured or withdrawn. The part of the ridge which fell to his lot to defend stood but thirty feet above the source of the Plum Run, and was actually lower than the ground about the Peach Orchard, while its view and fire were

impeded by the Emmetsburg road. To hold the Cemetery Ridge in prolongation of the II corps, and properly to secure the jungle at the foot of the Round Tops as well, required twice as large a force as the III corps; it appeared to Sickles that by seizing the Peach Orchard he would extend the Federal line far enough to prevent it from being turned until the arrival of fresh troops secured his left flank. This decision has been severely criticised, and to Sickles' faulty dispositions has been attributed the disaster which overtook him. It is at least open to question whether he would have fared any better had he stayed on the ridge. Unless the reserves had been freely used to help him he would certainly not have been able to hold his own against the two divisions of Longstreet's corps, on ground which locally was less favourable to defence than the Peach Orchard, and defeat on the ridge would have been far more serious to the whole army than the local reverse in front of the main position. With the range of the rifle in 1904 the possession of the Round Tops would have secured the lower ground which connected them with the position of the II corps, but in 1863 nothing of the sort was possible. It is easy to forecast the course of the action, now that we know Longstreet's dispositions, if Sickles had remained where he was told. Hood's division would have engaged his whole corps in a mortal struggle for the possession of Little Round Top, while McLaws' division penetrated between the II and III corps, thus breaking the Federal line; everything would then have depended on the handling of reserves on both sides.

As to the general question of how far each corps commander is justified in exercising his judgment in the disposition of his troops, it must be remembered that when the most necessary initiative is left to subordinates some risk must be run of disturbing the harmony of the general plan, and this risk is always greater on the defensive than on the offensive. The danger can only be obviated by a proper selection of superior officers by whom certain sound general principles of action are invariably accepted and acted upon, and this is of course only possible in an army which in peace-time has been carefully trained and organised for war.

By noon the infantry of the V corps were forming on the 12 noon. eastern slope of the ridge where the regiments threw themselves on the ground to recover from the fatigue of their forced march, covering it with broad blocks of Blue. On the western side another column arrived at the same time along the Emmetsburg road; this consisted of the two brigades brought up from Emmetsburg by General Humphreys which completed the III corps. These troops had drawn the fire of skirmishers from the Warfield heights and had had some stragglers cut off and captured, but had otherwise reached the field intact. So soon as Sickles had them to dispose of he took the bold step of carrying his corps right forward to the Peach Orchard. Thus the corps formed a salient angle towards the enemy which would be exposed to cross-fire and converging attack; the distance, too, of the Peach Orchard from the main position is one mile and the nature of the intervening ground rendered it difficult if not impossible to reinforce its defenders. The only merit of the new position was that it acted like a breakwater upon which the fury of the attack spent itself, and by the delay enabled all the Federal troops to come into line.

It was about 2 P.M. that Birney's three brigades moved forward to take up their new position. Graham's Pennsylvania regiments were posted in and around the Peach Orchard enclosures; the other two brigades carried the line back to the Devil's Den Hill between the two forks of the Plum Run. One of Humphrey's brigades, Burling's from New Jersey, was posted by Sickles as a reserve to this line, leaving only two to connect the Peach Orchard with the II corps on the ridge, an insufficient force for the purpose. Humphreys posted his men eight hundred yards along the Emmetsburg road and a strong battery of guns supported his right flank. The third hour after noon had passed before all these troops had reached their designated positions under Sickles' personal superintendence and the time had been used by all the Federal generals to prepare for the storm they knew to be impending. Signal stations all along the crest kept up communication between the different corps and headquarters. Field hospitals had been prepared

for the wounded and cleared so far as possible of the victims of Wednesday's engagement; food and water had been served out to the different regiments, supplies of ammunition brought up and batteries conveniently posted. Large parties of men had been kept busy improving the fences along the ridge by piling up excavated earth, loopholing the walls and felling timber for breast-works. Not the least encouraging preparation for those who had seen Malvern Hill and Fredericksburg was the posting of more than two hundred guns, whose grim muzzles pointed towards the enemy and promised protection against the coming danger. Although every hour increased the strength of the position and the readiness of the Federal commanders, yet the suspense of several hours' delay under a hot July sun had not been without its trying effect on the troops, and caused no little uneasiness at headquarters. What infernal surprise were the wily rebels preparing for them now; and from what unexpected direction would the bolt fall! An outburst of firing had been elicited by Sickles' patrols about noon which had soon subsided, and an occasional exchange of shots had been heard on Culp's Hill and along the Rock Creek. What information there was seemed to point to a movement of hostile troops southwards behind the screen of Seminary Ridge, but then Ewell's corps remained in position from Gettysburg to the Rock Creek. At about 3 P.M. Meade became uneasy lest the enemy should be marching round his left flank and once more he convoked the corps commanders in council. What passed at this council of war has been the subject of keen and contradictory dispute. It has been asserted that Meade meditated a retreat and had the orders drawn up by Butterfield the Chief of his Staff. Meade emphatically denies having ordered such instructions to be drawn up. The point does not seem very important. The possible necessity for a retreat may well have been considered, and however determined to give battle the Federal general was only doing his duty in providing for the contingency. Sickles was the last to reach the small cottage at Zeigler's Grove where the group of superior leaders surrounded their chief; he had not even

had time to dismount when the council was rudely interrupted by the roar of artillery fire gradually increasing in intensity. This time Sickles had no difficulty in persuading Meade to accompany him on his return journey.

Soon after it was light Lee rode from his headquarters to examine the position of the Federal army which it was his mission to destroy. Having decided to make his main attack with Longstreet's corps against the enemy's left, he might have expected that this general and his Staff would also have been engaged in the early morning on the same task so that no delay might occur in bringing the divisions into line. Nothing of the sort, however, seems to have been done, but on the contrary Longstreet sought out his chief to try to persuade him to renounce the offensive and to march round the enemy's flank in order to take up a defensive position. Through a glass the Confederate leaders could discern the Blue soldiers on the Cemetery Hill forming little groups to answer their names at roll-call, or scattering to perform the numerous household duties of troops in bivouac, duties which had to be hurriedly performed that the regiments might be ready with their full strength to repel the attack which they had reason to expect at any moment.

The Confederate outposts like the advancing tide pushed right round the rock on which their enemy was posted and lapped against its base. Ewell's three divisions were in position as follows: Johnson's on the slopes of Berner's Hill east of the Rock Creek, with a battalion of artillery. From Gettysburg to the Rock Creek stretched Early's advanced posts, and the town itself was occupied by Rodes' division, whose right flank connected with A. P. Hill's corps at the foot of Seminary Hill. The Third corps had Pender's division in and around the Seminary; Pender himself had been slightly wounded in the advance of his troops overnight and Pettigrew had temporarily taken his place; Heth's division had slept in the woods on the western slope of the ridge south of the Fairfield road, while Anderson's division rose from its quarters on the ground at 4 A.M. to extend the Confederate line southwards as far as the

group of cottages and farm-buildings which we have called Warfield's. Anderson led five brigades. The 1st, Mabone's, was Virginian; the 2nd, Wright's, Georgian; the 3rd, Perry's, from Florida; the 4th, Posey's Mississippian; the 5th, Wilcox's, from Alabama. These troops had shared with McLaw's division the glory of having fought two battles in the same day in the Chancellorsville campaign; they lost no time in stretching quickly and skilfully a curtain of outposts right along Seminary Ridge behind which their comrades of the First corps could march to attack the enemy's flank. A strong force of artillery including the batteries of both Third and First corps was deployed under the shelter of the woods ready to come into action, and by 9.30 A.M. the Confederate army was ready and eager to engage, only awaiting the arrival in line of Longstreet's troops who were to deliver the decisive blow.

James Longstreet, the general to whom Lee entrusted the principal share in the execution of his plans in the battles of July 2 and July 3, was born in South Carolina.

The
March of
Long-
street's
Corps. He had already greatly distinguished himself as a divisional commander and as the leader of the First corps in the two campaigns which terminated at the battles of Sharpsburg and Fredericksburg.

There seems to have been some jealousy between him and the distinguished Virginian officers whom Lee had promoted. Although he was personally attached to his chief, who gave him the affectionate nickname of 'my old war horse,' Longstreet's character had faults which militated against the success of his cause in the Gettysburg campaign. Without the sure *coup d'œil* which distinguished Jackson for detecting at once the decisive point in a warlike situation, he was enamoured to an unjustifiable degree with his own views to the detriment of sympathetic co-operation in the plans of the commander-in-chief. With Jackson he had worked in harmony, partly because Lee had accompanied, and to some extent controlled, the First corps, while Jackson had worked more or less independently with the Second; and partly because the victories then gained silenced jealousy and compelled harmony. We have seen

that at the crisis of the Chancellorsville campaign Longstreet was absent from the army of Northern Virginia on an independent expedition against the Federal intruders at Suffolk, and that he failed to respond to Lee's plan for rejoining the main army in time to meet Hooker's invasion. It was Longstreet's pet plan to reinforce the Confederate army under Bragg in Tennessee by troops under his own leadership, instead of the plan favoured by Lee and Jackson of invading the Northern States; and now instead of grasping the necessity forced on the army by the strategical situation of seizing the offensive and then winning a decisive battle, Longstreet tried to impose his idea on Lee which was to manœuvre in order to compel the enemy to attack, and spent precious time in arguing with his superior which he should have used in zealously carrying out the orders he had received.

Like all the events of this campaign the relations of Lee and Longstreet have been the subject of much discussion both in books and in the press, but no publication gives a much better idea of Longstreet's frame of mind and responsibility in the failure than his own book 'From Manassas to Appomattox,' and his contribution to 'Battles and Leaders of the Civil War,' which clearly reveal his character and degree of military insight. After the retreat from Gettysburg he continued to command the First corps with distinction. He was allowed to attempt the execution of his own plan of attacking the Federal army in the Central States, but as he says himself, probably with truth, the blow was delivered too late to succeed in its object; later he took a distinguished part in the defence of Virginia until the final tragedy at Appomattox Court-house. By a curious coincidence of fate Longstreet was struck down by the fire of his own men at a spot in the Forest of Virginia, not far from where Jackson received his mortal hurt and under very similar circumstances. In the battle of the Wilderness he had directed a great attack and was preparing to follow it up with all his force. Like Jackson he had ridden forward by a forest road to see for himself the enemy's line, and on his return received the fire of his own skirmishers, who failed to

recognise to what army the group of horsemen belonged. He recovered to enjoy long life and a prosperous career under the Federal Government. His portrait is familiar to Americans, with the determined face and long beard, and in spite of Gettysburg he will ever remain one of the heroes of the Civil War.

Lee's orders to Longstreet had been conveyed in the same form which he had been accustomed to use with Jackson, and which left wide discretion to his subordinate. It had never been necessary to urge Jackson to fight, nor to give him precise directions as to how his attacks were to be delivered. It had always been enough to briefly indicate the object to be attained and the degree of co-operation to be counted on from the rest of the army. But then it was Jackson himself who on the most important and successful attacks had inspired the purpose of his chief, and, to be fair with Longstreet, not only was he out of sympathy with Lee's purpose on this occasion, but the force entrusted to him for his share of the operation was altogether inadequate. He should have pressed for more troops instead of trying to dissuade Lee from fighting.

The divisions of McLaws and Hood had bivouacked by the roadside on the banks of the Marsh Creek, where they had piled their arms between 10 P.M. and midnight. With the first streak of dawn the men had been aroused to continue the march. They had gone no farther, however, than the Willoughby Run when the column was halted and the men stretched themselves on the ground under what shade they could find to continue the too short repose of the night. There they remained until noon, awaiting the arrival of Law's brigade detached to do the work of the absent cavalry in guarding the right flank of the army.

After his first inspection of the hostile position on Cemetery Hill, Lee had ridden over to see Ewell, and to reconnoitre on that flank also. To Ewell he repeated the directions given overnight; the Second corps was to await the sound of Longstreet's artillery and then to engage the enemy's right wing in such a manner as to prevent him reinforcing his left: if the attack prospered it was to be

pressed home. Then Lee returned to his headquarters, which he reached about 9 A.M. At the Seminary he met Longstreet and the discussion ensued between the two generals to which allusion has already been made. Longstreet tried to dissuade Lee from his plan of attack, until Lee cut short the conversation, and gave his lieutenant definite orders to move forward without waiting any longer for Law's brigade. Longstreet, who wished, if fight he must, to put off the attack until his whole corps was assembled, persuaded Lee to reconnoitre with him the enemy's positions opposite Seminary Ridge as far as Warfield's. Two hours were thus spent and then at length Lee gave the definite order to set the First corps in motion.

It was nearly midday when the signal was given ; twelve thousand men of the two divisions snatched up their weapons and fell into the marching column. McLaws' division led, then Hood's, to the tail of which Law's brigade very soon afterwards attached itself. When the long procession set forth on its adventurous journey, the men were in high spirits, and as the column wound its way by a path through the woods the recollection of their exploits at Chancellorsville must have been present to the soldiers who with 'tattered uniforms and bright muskets' stepped lightly along in spite of the weight of their arms. Their faces were bronzed by exposure and were for the most part unshaven ; they gripped their rifles with the familiarity of constant use and their pockets and haversacks bulged with packets of cartridges. Little resemblance these troops bore to the smart battalions of a parade in peace, nor was there any sign of spectacular display save where the silken folds of a regimental standard had become unfurled giving a touch of colour to the russet-brown uniforms. There was little conversation in the ranks ; veteran soldiers keep their breath on the march for the business in hand ; but now and then a dry jest showed the keen intellectual delight of an American who thinks he is outwitting his opponent.

The march was badly directed. Longstreet, who should have ridden ahead of his troops, had deputed a Colonel Johnstone of the staff to guide them. This officer when he

caught sight of the Federal signal flags waving on Little Round Top feared lest the enemy might see the movement and led the head of the column down the Fairfield road as far as Black Horse Tavern, where he struck a lane leading across the country to the Schoolhouse close to Warfield's. As soon as Longstreet became aware of this *détour* he was considerably disconcerted at the further delay it involved and annoyance it would cause at headquarters. It was too late to get back McLaws' division, but Hood's was directed to march direct on Warfield's by the shortest road along the western slope of Seminary Ridge, which thus screened the movement. It was 3 P.M. before Hood's brigades had begun to deploy with their right on the Emmetsburg road at the point where a lane leads to the Round Top through Snyder's farm and two hours later before McLaws' troops came into line, while the distance in a straight line from the spot where the head of the column started to the extreme right of the new line was but three miles; dearly the troops had to pay for the dilatory directions of their leaders. In the meanwhile the Confederate guns along Seminary Ridge had unlimbered and had been pushed up so that their muzzles looked over the crest; the infantry of Anderson's division lay ready in the wood to support the First corps if success attended its advance. It was 3.30 P.M. before these preparations became intelligible to the Federals, who thereupon opened fire with the batteries on the Emmetsburg road, and drew the fierce fire of the Confederates in reply. It was this duel of guns which opened the battle and whose clamour had disturbed the consultation at Meade's headquarters.

The second battle of Gettysburg consisted of attacks on both wings of the Federal army while its centre was kept in check by artillery fire. These attacks took place approximately at the same time, but otherwise had no connection in design or execution. First Longstreet with the divisions of Hood and McLaws fell upon the III corps pushed forward by Sickles into the Peach Orchard. After a prolonged and fierce struggle in the woods and ravines at the foot of the Round Tops and in the more open ground round the Peach Orchard, that post was captured and

Summary
of Events,
July 2.

the Federal troops driven back from it on to Cemetery Ridge; but the Grey army, in spite of heroic advances of isolated brigades, was unable to break the main Federal line on this wing. The attack on the Federal right was not prosecuted with the same energy; while ten brigades were spending themselves in the fight with the Federal left, four only were closely engaged with the right wing out of eleven available, and the efforts of these troops were thrown away for want of timely co-operation and support. The result of the day was thus very indecisive; locally the Confederates gained considerable successes, but in the main the situation of both armies had not greatly changed in favour of one side or the other when the sun set on Thursday. Perhaps the advantage lay with the Union army on the whole, for it had shown its capacity to hold on to its position in spite of the most gallant attacks, and on this assumption its leaders acted in deciding to continue the defence on Friday.

The struggle which took place between the Confederate right and the Federal left wings is one of the most remarkable in the annals of war, and has a just claim to the title of a soldiers' battle. The Southern riflemen surging into the rocks and thickets where rested the Federal flank engaged in a mortal struggle which lasted about five hours with the defenders, who were continually reinforced. McLaws' attack, delivered three-quarters of an hour later, swept through the Peach Orchard and aided by two brigades of Anderson's division his men impetuously assaulted the position on the ridge. In this combat sixteen thousand Confederate infantry drew on themselves the efforts of about thirty-five thousand bayonets and at a fearful cost to themselves inflicted a loss of probably not less than seven thousand men on their enemy by fire and steel. The bayonet in this war was often used with deadly effect, and in such places as the Devil's Den where bodies of hostile troops found themselves suddenly in presence of one another it was again and again appealed to. The most effectual range of the rifle hardly exceeded one hundred yards, or less than one-fourth of the distance at which it is most to be feared to-day. It was

Character-
istics of
the Fight.

about as formidable up to four hundred yards as the Mauser and Mannlicher is at twelve hundred, after which distance its aim soon became too erratic to compare with present-day arms. On the other hand it was used with a far greater economy of ammunition, aim was more carefully taken and the larger bullet inflicted far more serious injury. The troops generally fired standing in a line deployed two deep with supports in closer formation behind them, but among the rocks, boulders and wooded cliffs in which Longstreet's men were engaged on July 2 snap-shooting between swarms of skirmishers at close range, who took what cover they could, followed at intervals by a rush with the bayonet when some formed body entered the fight or rallied round a standard, was the principal feature of the struggle. It was the Inkerman of the Civil War.

When darkness put a period to the fierce encounter the rocks and thickets were strewn with the best of the American nation. Many a gallant soldier bled to death unnoticed and unaided huddled up in the dingle where he fell, after performing acts of daring which no one saw, for the honour of his arms and the success of his country's cause. No one to whom valour appeals as the first essential quality of manhood can read the sad record of this slaughter without the sickening feeling of its uselessness, and the regret that so many of the best of those who spoke our mother-tongue should have been prematurely cut off from the pleasures of life and from the duty of transmitting their peerless qualities to another generation. Yet a heritage perhaps as precious they did transmit. The gallant defenders and attackers of the Gettysburg rocks established a record of conduct and devotion which has sealed the unity of the great republic and which will become a mighty incentive whenever in the future it is called upon to take up arms.

To give a just idea of the series of struggles which took place that summer evening is a difficult task. As each fresh body of troops became involved and lost the impetus and order of its first onset, the tendency to dissolve into a fight between little groups and even individuals asserted itself.

Men stalked one another among the rocks and lay in wait for one another in the underwood; the branches of the bigger trees held opposing skirmishers. Death lurked behind every leaf and stone.

When the silence of the afternoon was first broken by the Federal batteries the lines of skirmishers on and beyond the Emmetsburg road took up the tale, and the fringe of white smoke puffs extended from the Peach Orchard to the foot of the Round Top; then Hood's division, formed in two columns of attack, began to circle round the Federal left. His scouts had already crossed the Plum Run south of the Round Tops and had seen the lowland beyond covered by the trains of two army corps with waggons of every description. When this report reached Hood he wished to continue his outflanking movement so as to strike the hostile position from the south and then sweep along the ridge, and he applied to Longstreet for permission to execute this manœuvre. The corps commander, however, had already become uneasy at the prolonged delay of his troops coming into action, and he recognised that the proposed enterprise would still further put off the attack; he had already sent word to Lee that his troops were about to begin their work, and it was to be expected that Hill and Ewell had been notified with orders to co-operate. Accordingly he refused to entertain Hood's proposal and ordered him to strike at the enemy in front without further delay. Longstreet's decision was singularly unfortunate. The fact that McLaws could not come up for another hour rendered it expedient to wait that much time at least, and an hour would have enabled Hood to reach the point he wished whence his attack if successful would have been far more decisive. McLaws should have taken the Devil's Den and Anderson's division the Peach Orchard as objective points. Hood's plan was the only one which gave a reasonable chance of decisive victory with the troops available and in rejecting it Longstreet obeyed the letter but not the spirit of Lee's instructions, which authorised him to turn every opportunity to account. It is very probable that Longstreet failed to grasp the tactical advantage of the movement from the south.

Deploy-
ment of
Hood's
Division,
3 P.M.

Hood was a divisional leader of the highest value ; he perceived that the Federal line extended further south than even his last instructions assumed and without again applying to his superior he formed his troops so as to outflank it. His right column was formed by Law's Alabama brigade in first line followed by Benning's Georgians, his left attack by Robertson's Texans followed by the other Georgian brigade under Anderson¹ in support.

It was half-past three ere these troops moved forward against the Federal division which lined the right fork of 3.30 P.M. the Plum Run watercourse and the slopes of the hill contained by it and the Devil's Den ravine ; but before closing with the enemy Hood perceived how the Little Round Top dominated the position, and extended Law's brigade still further to the right in order to get possession of it. It was while this movement was in execution that the first collision occurred about 4 P.M. ; firing at once began along the whole Federal line facing south, which had to fight for its life in the din caused by the echoes of artillery and rifle fire among the rocks. Birney's division III corps was charged with the defence of this line. Its brigades consisted of regiments drawn from several states, but Pennsylvania predominated. Graham's brigade was on the right, then Trobriand's, with Ward on his left. Sandwiched in between the infantry brigades were posted several batteries wherever the ground gave them any field of fire, and these guns did yeoman's service in sweeping the ravines and thus checking several victorious onsets of the adversary. The New Jersey brigade of Burling detached from Humphreys' division to strengthen Birney's line, became gradually absorbed in the fight, which began by Robertson's Texans inclining to their right to keep touch with the Alabama brigade creeping through the underwood in order to rush the Little Round Top. The two Georgian brigades following in second line had not changed direction and therefore came into action on the left of the Texans.

The first Confederate attack was made with all the

¹ This General Anderson must not be confused with the commander of a division of the Third corps.

impetuosity for which they were famous, in a broadly deployed line with glittering bayonets and flying colours. Never doubting the result of the fight, they charged with the ringing 'yell' their enemy had such good cause to fear, and at first swept everything before them. Soon, however, fresh regiments were thrown into the fight to restore the Unionist line while the nature of the ground broke up the assailants into groups, and these with difficulty held their own. The Georgians fared worse. They had to cross the ravine at the foot of the Devil's Den Hill under heavy fire which threw them into disorder and beat them back. In the meanwhile the Alabama brigade, followed by a Texan regiment which had got detached from Robertson, crept up the Little Round Top, but as the leading companies emerged from the thicket to take possession of the summit they were fiercely charged by a column of men who came running up the reverse slope, and so were thrown back into the woods. A fight with the rifle then began which lasted till it was dark, varied by several desperate rushes with the bayonet by the Southerners to clear the coveted height, but each attempt was repulsed by the Federal reserves constantly coming into action from the V corps.

A quarter of an hour after the fight began Hood made his pounce on the Round Top. He was only too late by a very few minutes, for when Sickles had carried his line forward to the Peach Orchard the summit of Little Round Top had been left undefended. We have related how Meade accompanied Sickles to inspect the new position of the III corps when the fire of artillery announced the opening of the Confederate attack. The corps commander, seeing how little his chief approved of the change, would have brought his troops back on to their former alignment, but the ringing of single rifle shots in the woods, followed by the echoing volleys of a general fight, showed that it was too late to go back. Meade had already sent orders to Sykes to bring up the V corps to reinforce Sickles; he now despatched Warren to meet him and to examine the ground about the Little Round Top for a suitable position to post the reserves. He then returned

Warren's
Mission to
the Little
Round
Top.

to his headquarters in the centre of the position at Zeigler's Grove.

Warren accompanied by a couple of couriers rode to the Little Round Top. On its summit the signallers were at work with their flags, and it was a signalling officer who drew the general's attention to men creeping towards the edge of the wood like Red Indians, on whose rifle barrels shone an occasional ray of sunshine through the foliage. Warren instantly perceived how great might be the danger if the enemy should establish himself on the hill, so he directed the signallers to go on vigorously using their flags which they were just packing up, while he went off to fetch troops to defend the place. This artifice succeeded. The short delay in the enemy's advance, while he tried to find out what was in front of him, enabled Warren to reach the leading regiment of Weed's brigade V corps, the 140th New York commanded by Colonel O'Rorke, a personal friend and former comrade of his. This officer did not hesitate to respond to the urgent circumstances of Warren's appeal, and leaving his own brigade he made for the hill top at a run. His men arrived with rifles unloaded and bayonets unfixed, but without halting they threw themselves upon the head of the hostile column. In the meanwhile Vincent's brigade of the V corps had reached the southern edge of Little Round Top and there found itself in presence of the advancing Confederates whom they immediately engaged and brought to a stationary fight. From four till five the contest continued with varying fortune between these two groups of combatants. Soon after 5 P.M. fresh brigades on each side joined in the fray.

The incident of the Confederate check on Little Round Top has acquired an exaggerated importance. Law's single brigade could not have held this position against the reserves from the V and VI corps which could have been brought to bear upon it, though by diverting troops from aiding the III corps considerable mischief might have been done. Nor is it correct to say that the main position would have been enfiladed from this point, for the short range of the rifle made it essential to bring up artillery for such a purpose,

and a considerable time must have elapsed before a single Confederate gun could have been planted there. Far otherwise would it have been if Hood's plan had been sanctioned and the whole of his division brought to this point. His two leading brigades could have been counted on to storm it even after its occupation by the advanced guard of the V corps, and the other two would then have been free to descend on the Federal flank below it. It was the fear of such a stroke that inspired Warren's action, which is none the less praiseworthy because Longstreet's blunder had put it out of Hood's power to deliver it.

The plan of the Confederate attack was that Hood should turn the Federal flank believed to be resting on the Peach Orchard, and that as soon as this movement declared itself the divisions on his left should in succession join in the battle. This plan is always difficult of execution. The hostile wing nearly always extends further than was anticipated: ground is seldom what it looks like at a distance and so delay takes place in bringing troops up, and when at last the main attack is launched the outflanking detachment is checked or repulsed. To co-ordinate such attacks in point of time is a most delicate operation requiring skilled tacticians as leaders and staff officers to accomplish with success. In the present instance McLaws had unusual difficulty in estimating the progress of Hood's division owing to the jungle which hid the combatants.

The extension of Hood's division to its right had necessitated a corresponding movement by McLaws, and more time was expended before his leading brigade Kershaw's of South Carolina, crossed the Emmetsburg road and linked itself to the Georgian troops who were fiercely engaged with Birney. In the meanwhile the fire of the batteries of the First and Third corps was concentrated on the Peach Orchard and on that portion of the Emmetsburg road held by the Federal riflemen, who nevertheless clung to it. Reinforcements from the V corps now came into line and faced the fresh troops which at length were launched by McLaws into the fight. Ker-

McLaws' Division deploys. 5 P.M.

McLaws' Division is engaged. 5.30 P.M.

shaw's riflemen at first carried all before them, then like the troops on their right they encountered the enemy's reserves and were flung back bleeding and panting across the ravine. Semmes' Georgians attacked with the same courage and with like result. At 6 p.m. the whole Confederate line of six brigades after two hours' bitter conflict was at a standstill, though pressing the enemy with a ceaseless fire and threatening to close once again hand to hand. The losses on both sides had already been very severe. Of the Federal superior officers Vincent and O'Rorke had fallen; of the Southern leaders Anderson was wounded, and about this time Hood had his arm shattered by a bullet while organising a fresh advance against the defenders of Little Round Top.

In the enclosures round the Peach Orchard Graham's Federal brigade reinforced by several regiments faced the storm of shell with which they were pelted without yielding, but at heavy cost. The Federal guns had been dismantled or drawn back by hand, for the horses were killed, and at 6 p.m. McLaws at length gave the signal for the assault. Out of the circle of fire which surrounded the post on the south and west emerged the storming columns of Wofford's Georgians and Barksdale's Mississippi brigade. Yelling like fiends, black with smoke and lusting for hand to hand conflict, the enveloping mass of Confederates rushed the enclosures and speedily gained possession of them. Several hundreds of the defenders stood to be bayoneted or taken, the remainder fled, and a great gap was opened in the Federal line. Besides the two brigades of the V corps sent to reinforce the III, the whole of Caldwell's division of the II had also by Meade's orders been drawn into the fight and was now involved in the wreck. Wofford and Barksdale handled their troops in masterly fashion, and turned at once against the flanks of the Federal lines commanded by Humphreys and Birney, which had hitherto held their ground with rare tenacity, but whose positions were now raked with fire and quite untenable. At the same time McLaws rallied his other two brigades and organised a fresh attack with them while an advance of the artillery of the First corps on to the captured

The
Assault on
the Peach
Orchard at
6 P.M.

ground took place by Longstreet's orders. Between 6 and 7 P.M. the whole aspect of the struggle changed in favour of the Southerners. First Birney's then Humphreys' divisions with the troops which had reinforced them sullenly receded from their positions; the Devil's Den was cleared of its defenders and the hills between the two ravines occupied by the victorious assailants. North of that lay the open ground known as the Wheat Field and across this little plain Wofford and Barksdale's men chased a crowd of fugitives from many different commands and threatened to sweep the Federal left wing from the field.

As soon as the capture of the Peach Orchard had uncovered the right of the Third corps, Hill, as had been preconcerted, gave Anderson the order to move, and this general sent three of his five brigades forward to join in the general advance. From the north a light wind bore the sound of heavy firing and the smoke from a gradually extending line of battle.

The most critical period of the day for the Federal arms was reached about 7 P.M. when attacks pressed upon both their wings, and at that hour victory was without doubt within reach of the Army of Northern Virginia had either of its wings been adequately supported. The crest of Cemetery Ridge still bristled with cannon and was decked with standards, but its defenders drawn in a constant stream towards the south were reduced to a thin Blue line; the field hospitals were full of bleeding men and the ground was dotted with mutilated horses in their death agony. The amphitheatre behind the defended ridge was choked with a vast mass of carts, led-horses and non-combatants of every description, while a stream of wounded and unwounded stragglers continued to trickle from the fierce furnace in front on some pretext or on no pretext, scattering confusion and alarm in the rear of the army. Across the deep bottom, from the reverse slopes of Culp's Hill where they had lain waiting in vain all day to be attacked, the infantry of the XII corps about 6.30 P.M. were pushing their way through the mob of carts and encumbrances of all sorts to the assistance of their comrades, and very soon after the dark masses of the VI corps were

Advance
of Ander-
son's Divi-
sion Third
corps at
6.30. P.M.

clambering the eastern slopes of the Round Tops with the same set purpose.

On July 1 the VI corps was thirty-five miles distant from Gettysburg when Sedgwick received the order to concentrate; he had therefore been obliged to march all night and the head of his column only reached the Rock Creek after 2 P.M. on July 2. When his leading brigade passed this point the weary troops were allowed to rest awhile. Having formed the extreme right of the army they had had long marches to perform on June 28, 29 and 30, and their appearance on the battlefield on Thursday was a fine feat of endurance. Exhausted as the men were, their presence alone was of great value, ensuring as it did a solid reserve of fresh troops for Friday's work in case the fighting should continue for a third day.

Sickles had been struck by a bullet which had shattered his leg, and on this being reported to Meade he had given Hancock the order to assume command of the III as well of his own corps. Once again this general had thrust upon him the task of rallying the Federal forces when defeat appeared imminent. Humphreys' regiments were so reduced in strength that Hancock could only recognise them by their colours, which a brave band of survivors brought out of the fight. Further to the left the mass of Birney's division with the reinforcements it had received from the II and V corps were in full retreat. In the wood which bounded the Wheat Field on the north and west, some regiments gradually rallied round their standards, and along the Plum Run Ayres' division of United States infantry formed a solid line of battle. On the crest of the ridge sweeping the ground towards the Peach Orchard the reserve artillery under Major McGillivray formed a battery with a front of six hundred yards, which protected the guns of the III corps abandoned for want of horses in the retreat from the Emmetsburg road. Hancock performed prodigies in restoring order and organising a new defensive line while awaiting the reinforcements which were marching from all points of the field to help the left wing. It was at this hour, between seven and

half-past, that the great opportunity for a general advance of the Confederate army occurred. A most gallant attack was certainly made, but by too few troops and on too partial a scale to achieve decisive victory, though it went near enough to show what might have been done by an adequate force. Once again a great chance for a local pursuit by cavalry was lost when the line of the III corps was broken ; its retreat to the ridge, carried out with the greatest difficulty in the face of infantry, would have involved destructive loss if it had been seriously molested by cavalry.

The fire of the great battery of reserve artillery sweeping the open ground between the ridge and the Peach Orchard had the effect of splitting up the Confederate attack. While Wofford's Georgians drove against the broken troops in front and sought to dislodge them from the wooded margin of the Wheat Field, and Barksdale's Mississippi brigade continued its victorious career to the gorge of the Plum Run, the three brigades of Anderson's division followed Humphreys' retirement to the main position and inclined to their left after they crossed the Emmetsburg road. This movement brought the attack against the heights held by what remained of the II corps after its numerous detachments to the help of the III corps. At the same time the general retirement of the Federal troops led to a corresponding advance of the Confederates, and from the extreme right of their line where Law's regiments were still fighting the defenders of Little Round Top, a series of furious attacks were delivered against the new Federal line. The United States infantry in the Devil's Den were driven back by a fierce onslaught of Texan and Georgian troops after half the men had been cut down. The Wheat Field became the arena of a desperate struggle, and here the Georgians of Wofford's brigade threw themselves on the enemy as if they had not been marching and fighting for many weary hours. On their left Barksdale, conspicuous on horseback, led his Southern riflemen who single-handed had barred the passage of the whole Federal army at Fredericksburg, right into the hostile masses, where he fell mortally wounded, and whence the remnants of his

The
Attack of
Anderson's
Division,
7.30 P.M.

gallant troops cut their way back with difficulty through the enveloping mass of Blue infantry.

The advance of Anderson's infantry was as gallant and more successful. Wilcox's Alabama brigade, followed by Perry's weak Florida brigade in support, marched through the thick smoke and engaged in a bayonet fight with the gathering regiments of the XII and I corps, while Wright's Georgians delivered their attack still further north. Perry's brigade, coming under artillery fire, staggered, and checked its advance, but both Wilcox and Wright's troops charged home against the very centre of the Federal position. On the field where the representatives of each State earned so much glory the Georgians were conspicuous for their gallant achievements. Wright's men bore the starry cross on their standards to the crest of the ridge, which they held for ten memorable minutes. As they overlooked the Baltimore road and the scene of confusion in the Federal host they may well have believed the victory theirs, and they held on to the captured ground with a gallant tenacity which increased their losses without reaping the reward it deserved. This was the moment for every soldier at Lee's disposal to have been flung into the struggle; besides the remaining two brigades of Anderson's division, two whole divisions of the Third Corps watched the feat of their comrades and chafed to rush to their help. Pender, the commander of one of these divisions, was killed by a shell, probably as he was about to give the longed-for signal. Then there was a delay in turning over the command to Lane, the next senior, and during this delay the opportunity passed. Of all the leaders present—Anderson, A. P. Hill, and Lee himself—not one rose to the occasion, and the golden chance passed away never to return.

Under a sound system of command it would have been Anderson the divisional commander's duty to see that the one half of his troops engaged with superior numbers of the enemy were not left unsupported by the other half. It may have been the presence of superior officers which stopped him from exercising his rightful authority. Perhaps the thick smoke of the battle, caused by several hours' firing

of so many guns and rifles, prevented the spectators on Seminary Ridge from following the fortunes of their men. Whatever the cause or excuse may have been, the result was fatal to the success of the Confederate arms; Wilcox and Wright saw their men falling fast, while no support followed them to meet the reserves which Meade and Hancock continued to pile upon them in order to mend their broken line; so reluctantly one after the other they gave the signal to retire and brought their commands, diminished by more than one third, out of the mêlée. About the same time the XII corps and Doubleday's division of the I corps came into line, while the Round Tops were securely held by the VI corps; a general advance of the Federals now took place towards the Devil's Den, which regained some of the ground lost in the previous hour, but both sides were too exhausted to prolong the conflict, and soon after 8 P.M. the firing was reduced to spasmodic outbursts and gradually ceased, though the roar of distant artillery could be more distinctly heard from the north. The Confederates held, generally speaking, the position which Sickles had taken up after noon, and which they had wrested from him. Separated by Devil's Den, the Wheat Field, and the open ground east of the Peach Orchard, the exhausted troops flung themselves on the ground to gain what rest they could without removing the stained bayonets from their rifle barrels in anticipation of what the morrow might bring forth.

It is now time to turn our attention to the Second corps, which, according to Ewell's orders, was to strike into the fight as soon as the thunder of Longstreet's artillery announced him to be seriously engaged. To Ewell, as to Longstreet, was left a wide discretion, and it can hardly be said that either one or the other showed sufficient initiative to deserve the confidence on this occasion, when all the Confederate generals seemed to be under some baneful influence which prevented them from acting up to the great reputation already deservedly acquired. Perhaps the long delay in Longstreet's march induced Ewell to think the battle had been put off for that day,

The Fight
of the
Second
Corps.

though Lee's headquarters were near enough for frequent reference on doubtful points. It has been suggested, too, that it was not until the artillery of the III corps opened fire along Seminary Ridge that Ewell's staff knew the action to have begun. However that may be, nearly two hours elapsed between the first advance of Longstreet's infantry and the movement of Ewell's brigades to assail the enemy's right. The first trial of strength took place between the Federal batteries on the slopes of Culp's Hill and the batteries which Ewell had posted opposite to them on Benner's Hill at a range of fifteen hundred yards. The contest soon decided itself in favour of the Federals, whose guns were well covered by a breast-work, besides being superior in number. All but one Confederate battery was silenced and the commander, Major Latimer, killed. Thus unfortunately for the assailants the struggle began.

On the previous evening Early had been induced to detach the brigades of Smith and Gordon, half that is of his division, up the York pike to meet and repel a rumoured advance of hostile troops from this direction. Here again we find the fatal consequence to infantry of trying to work independently without the close co-operation of cavalry with each division. The false alarm was probably caused by the movement of Kilpatrick's cavalry division, and a single squadron of Confederate Horse would have cleared up the situation in three hours. As it was, no less than half a division was detached for twenty-four critical hours to guard Ewell's flank, which was not menaced. Before embarking on the attack Ewell recalled these troops, but only got one of the brigades back in time to form a reserve to Early's column.

The position which the Second corps was ordered to attack closely resembled the ground south of Cemetery Hill which we compared to the leg of a pair of compasses. From the Cemetery to Culp's Hill the ridge, however, preserves a well-defined crest, nor does it fall more than thirty feet below the two summits which are approximately the same height, one hundred and fifty feet above the Rock Creek. Cemetery Hill and the

The
Culp's
Hill
Position.

ridge were not wooded, but tall trees and underwood clothed the steep slopes of Culp's Hill on the north, east and south. In the middle of this wood rise the round tops of two summits, both of them open, and a ravine cuts a deep trench round the western and southern edge of the hill. The ground thus favoured an obstinate local defence, nor was its capture of such value as might appear at first glance, since it was almost impossible for the Confederates to bring up their artillery on to the heights through the underwood and rocks in time to join in the action. Culp's Hill, like the Round Tops, would only have been of use to the Confederates if they could have assembled a very strong force intact within the wood to fall upon the flank and rear of the defenders of Cemetery Ridge. For this purpose the converging attack of both Early and Johnson's divisions would have been necessary. Accident more than design gave Ewell the chance of dealing just such a stroke as Hood planned against the southern extremity of the Federal position two hours earlier.

The object of Ewell's attack was, according to the orders he had received, to prevent the reinforcement by the Federals of their left wing fighting Longstreet's corps, but the time which had elapsed had enabled the Federal headquarters to draw off as many troops as they pleased from all points of their line. They had in fact imprudently reduced the strength of their right, and at 6.30 P.M. when the pressure of Ewell's attack began to be felt, there was but a single brigade of the XII corps, Greene's of New York, holding the entire zone of Culp's Hill and its southern slopes. On their left stood Wadsworth's division of the I corps, then the XI corps, and on Cemetery Hill itself barring an advance from the town was posted Robinson's division of the I corps. The artillery of the I and XI corps provided a powerful line of guns which, as we have seen, had knocked Ewell's batteries on Benner's Hill out of action. Guns and riflemen on Cemetery Hill were disposed in two tiers. The walls on the ridge had been loopholed and shelter trenches had been dug in the twenty-four hours accorded by the Confederates to the

defenders before the attack took place. On the north an underfeature gave some shelter to Early's troops, while Rodes occupied the southern edge of Gettysburg. Johnson's four brigades had crossed the Rock Creek and between 6 P.M. and 7 P.M. were cautiously feeling the Federal position in the glens which split up the height on its right bank. This division consisted of Walker's, the famous Stonewall brigade originally formed by Jackson, Virginian, Jones' Virginian, Nichol's Louisiana, Stewart's composed of regiments from Virginia and North Carolina, and the 1st Maryland. The attack of the Second corps took the form which had been originally prescribed, an advance of each division in succession from the left; as each division cleared the flank of its neighbour and appeared to be making headway the next was to move forward. If the only object of the operation had been to keep the Federal troops employed the plan would not have been such a bad one, though unlikely to lead to any more solid results; but the time for this manœuvre had passed. The enemy had reinforced his left and his right denuded of troops remained an easy prey to a simultaneous and whole-hearted attack. It may be asked who could be aware of this, and what method was there for Ewell to discover the strength or weakness of the forces opposed to him. There is but one way to accomplish this task and that is to attack all along the hostile line, warily and gradually committing troops to the fight and supporting them at the proper time by reserves from the rear.

The advance of Johnson's division was made in two groups or columns. Stewart's brigade on the left moved up the ravine in which flowed a rivulet from the spring called Spangler's. Half a mile up the ravine the enclosures of Spangler's farm ran back to the Baltimore pike, forming a post of great importance which was held after the withdrawal of five brigades of the XII corps by only a weak detachment from Greene's. Stewart's brigade was followed by Walker's an hour later, for it had been detached to guard the flank on the left bank of the Rock Creek; the right column of attack was formed by Jones' brigade with Nichol's in support.

Johnson's
Division
engaged,
6.30 P.M.

The advance of both columns was extremely slow in the tangled ground which prevented them from seeing the weakness of the line of riflemen opposed to them. The New York men fought with cool courage, and, skilfully using all available cover, detained the whole mass of Confederate infantry seven thousand strong for over an hour on the eastern slopes of the hill before they began to emerge on the open ground on the top after 7.30 P.M. By that time a brigade of the XI corps had come to Greene's assistance, and Kane's brigade of the XII had been recalled from the left wing. The left group of Confederate troops slowly and cautiously penetrated as far as Spangler's farm, but in the gathering dusk and thick smoke which rolled over Cemetery Ridge and clung to the folds of the ground their leaders failed to see how close they were to the Baltimore pike, and how important was the ground they had captured. They accordingly stopped their advance and engaged in a desultory fire fight with the intention of pushing home the attack at dawn if circumstances permitted. Circumstances, however, did not permit. They very rarely do offer a second chance of snatching a rich prize to the leader who fails to make use of the first opportunity. When morning came it was the turn of the Confederates to find themselves thrown on the defensive.

The right group of the division deployed in a broad line and attempted in this formation to sweep through the wood. The enemy's skirmishers firing from behind trees and rocks fell back slowly to the position on the crest already prepared, where a sanguinary fight took place between 7 P.M. and 8 P.M. Jones was wounded; Nichol's brigade came to the rescue, but failed to capture the summit of the hill, and as the darkness increased and the Federal reinforcements arrived, giving the defence a numerical superiority as well as the advantage of position, the Confederate commander saw that he could do no more that night. He therefore fell back with his troops to rest and refit in the woods with the fixed intention of renewing the contest in the morning.

Early had watched Johnson's infantry disappear into the leafy shade of Culp's Hill Wood and had allowed an interval

of time during which the echoes of the firing and the blue wreaths of smoke above the trees gave evidence that fighting

Early's was in progress ; he then gave the signal to Hoke's
Attack, and Hay's brigades to advance against Cemetery Hill.
7 P.M.

Under a very heavy fire of artillery and riflemen the two brigades moved forward in the same faultless order which had dismayed the enemy on the previous evening. The steep slope of the hill caused the missiles for the most part to fly over their heads, and once again the troops of the XI corps, the same hapless division of Barlow's now commanded by Ames, broke and fled. Into the Federal battery the assailants penetrated and there among the guns which the artillerymen defended in hand to hand fight, a savage struggle took place. For about one hour Early's men held their captured ground, and then, like Wright and Wilcox's brigades at the same hour, they found themselves unsupported and gradually enveloped by the fast increasing reinforcements of the enemy, swollen by Carroll's brigade, which Hancock had detached from the ubiquitous II corps directly the crisis on the left was over. Finally the remnants of the two brigades fell back fighting to the ground whence they had charged, leaving one brigade commander and several hundred comrades bleeding in the enemy's works.

Here again the Confederate commanders sustained defeat because they failed to support one another's efforts and to combine the movements of neighbouring troops. Rodes' division, awaiting like the others the result of Early's attack, stood shivering on the brink without a serious effort to support it. Early dared not throw in his last reserve brigade without the co-operation of Rodes, and in this respect he probably made a great mistake, for even a single brigade would not improbably have enabled his gallant troops to hold on until dark, and urgent representations to Ewell might at length have brought Rodes into action. Ewell in this battle showed himself quite unequal with the staff at his disposal to co-ordinate the efforts of his troops in attack on the broad front they had assumed ; but more unaccountable than any of the Confederate mistakes on this fatal day was Rodes' failure to co-operate. His orders were

sufficiently explicit. The combat on his left on the bare hill-top becoming every minute more acute urged him into action, while his troops eager to advance crowded the outskirts of the town. Some sort of an attempt to deploy was made but abandoned almost as soon as begun, and Early's brave soldiers were left to die in vain. Like Hood's, McLaws' and Anderson's they had done all that men could do only to be robbed of their prize by the converging masses of the enemy hurrying from one point to another of the defended circle, while the brigades of their own troops who could have turned the scale in their favour stood idly massed in reserve, spectators of the demoralising failure of their commanders.

It was ten o'clock before the rattle of musketry on the banks of Rock Creek gradually became fainter and died away. On this part of the field as on the other the combatants sank down exhausted on the ground where they found themselves, to gain what rest they could before the bloodshed of another day began. A bright moonlight fell upon the groups of sleepers and threw a white glare on the stark faces of the slain; by the help of its friendly rays the surgeons and their assistants ranged the battlefield, and continued all night to succour as many of the injured as possible.

The absence of all news of Stuart's movements had caused Lee grave anxiety on the night of July 1 when he had to plan the attack on the Federal army. Late the same evening Stuart near Carlisle at length received the order to concentrate at Gettysburg, and he lost no time in setting his brigades on the march by parallel roads. Kilpatrick had foreseen the event and had attempted to intercept him at Hunterstown, but owing to the energy with which the Confederate leaders had thrust forward their exhausted troops he arrived too late, and only found a rearguard with which he skirmished. Kilpatrick then resumed his march southward, and reached Two Taverns in the early morning of July 3, whence he was sent by Pleasonton to take the place vacated by Buford on the left flank. Buford had meanwhile reached Taneytown

Move-
ments of
the
Cavalry.

on the road to Westminster; Gregg's division of Federal cavalry had marched from Hanover, and an encounter took place on the heights east of the Rock Creek between his advanced guard and Jenkins' brigade, the one cavalry brigade of which Lee disposed on the battlefield. When the attack on the Federal right was ordered Jenkins was sent to guard against any enterprise of the large force of hostile cavalry known to be hovering about in the direction of Hanover, and a sharp skirmish took place in which Jenkins was wounded. His brigade then retired, and rallied on the main body of Stuart's division, which bivouacked on the York pike that night. The Federal Horse made no effort to follow them up nor to molest the left wing of the Confederate army, hard marching and short commons having greatly reduced the aggressive power of the cavalry on both sides.

The last rays of the setting sun pierced with difficulty the haze of dust and smoke which now covered the vast battlefield. Some time before the fighting had ceased the troops on Seminary Ridge and the officers of Lee's staff, straining their eyes to decipher the movements of the combatants across the valley, could only distinguish the blurred outline of the enemy's position. After darkness had closed on the scene and the fight had finished on the south, the crest of Cemetery Ridge was still for some time lit up by the flash of rifles and bursting shell. Then from left to right of the Federal position the short truce of night began and comparative silence reigned.

The battle of July 2 ranks as one of the finest performances of the Confederate soldier. Had larger reinforcements been available next day to follow up the successes obtained, his sacrifices would probably have been crowned with decisive success. That they were not so rewarded then and there was no fault of his, but of the leaders who on so many occasions before and after rose to the highest plane of military achievement. The soldier and regimental officer had done all that was possible and the immense loss inflicted on their enemies attests the skill and daring with which the attacking side fought. What

those losses were can only be approximately calculated on account of the battles of the 1st and 3rd, whose lists of casualties were never separately made out. So far as it is possible to compute, not less than nine thousand men were killed or wounded on each side and in the Federal army the losses probably exceeded this dreadful total. Adding the losses of killed and wounded in the previous day's fighting, about nine thousand in the two armies, it will be seen that some twenty-eight thousand men had already been stricken, besides fugitives and prisoners. Ere the third day's struggle began the strength of an army itself had been cut down on the field of Gettysburg.

CHAPTER VIII

GETTYSBURG—JULY 3

The Eve of the 3rd—The Federal Council of War—Disposition of the Federal Forces on July 3—Lee's Orders for the 3rd—Aspect of the Battlefield at Daybreak—Summary of Events—The Struggle for Culp's Hill—Preparations of the Confederate Right Wing—Pickett reports himself at 7 A.M.—Longstreet and Lee—10 A.M.—Operations of the Cavalry—Stuart's Fight with Gregg—Kilpatrick's Attempt—Godori's House burnt, 11 A.M.—The Artillery Duel, 1 P.M.—Silence of the Federal Artillery, 2 P.M.—General Pickett—The Advance of the Confederate Infantry, 2.30 P.M.—The Federal Troops who opposed it—The Attack—Its Repulse—3.15 P.M.—Lee rallies his Troops—Lee orders the Retreat—Tactics at Gettysburg.

THE fire fight on Culp's Hill was still in progress when Meade returned to his headquarters from the scene of The Eve Sickles' disaster, and thither he summoned the of the 3rd. commanders of his army corps to a council of war. Leaving their troops to gain what repose they could and their staff officers at work preparing for the morrow, the senior surviving general in each corps rode in the twilight to the rough cottage by the Taneytown roadside where Meade awaited them. From all sides came reports of losses, requests for orders and assistance of all kinds to the roughly improvised offices of the different generals, so that while the soldiers slept staff officers with haggard faces were compelled to work, for many calculations had to be done before the next day's orders could be issued.

The situation as it presented itself to the chief of the Federal army was certainly of the gravest description. He had personally beheld the defeat of his III corps, the capture of its advanced position, and the confused retreat on to the ridge in spite of every effort made by constantly arriving reinforcements to hold and recover it. He knew that the

wooded ravines round the Devil's Den, which had already given access to his position, swarmed with a victorious enemy. His whole army had been dislocated and its higher units mingled by the necessity for snatching help wherever it could be had in the stress of the battle and sending it to the most sorely pressed troops whenever occasion arose. Before the enemy had developed their double attack the whole Federal army had reached the field; nearly two-thirds of it had been engaged in the struggle for the Peach Orchard position against a portion only of the enemy's forces, and had failed to hold it. Isolated attacks had almost ruined the defence by piercing its vital parts, and information from the right wing was hardly more encouraging than from the left. Here, too, unsupported columns of attack had forced their way into the heart of the position and had held their ground for a considerable time, inflicting very severe loss before relaxing their grip. Beyond the extremity of Meade's right flank, threatening the rear of the defenders of the ridge and the Baltimore road, the crash of musketry was still audible when the corps commanders assembled, nor could they tell at how great a sacrifice the Confederate army had gained its successes; but, on the contrary, there came in quick succession from each division and brigade of their own troops the appalling tale of loss which rendered doubtful whether there remained Federal soldiers enough to continue to man the whole position. Both the higher commands and staff were seriously crippled by casualties, and in an army which contained so small a professional element such losses were of unusual importance. Lastly, the condition of the troops had to be considered; they had fought with splendid courage in two very severe battles following hard on marches which had sorely tried their strength. Could their endurance, physical and moral, be relied on for a third after the terrible destruction already accomplished, and in spite of the demoralising impressions which must greet their senses at the peep of day? The Army of the Potomac was the last bulwark between the Northern States and the invasion: was it wise to stake everything on the result of another battle with troops who had already suffered so much? Such were

the considerations which pressed upon the commander-in-chief as worn with bodily fatigue and mental stress he met his corps commanders that Thursday night.

One after another the generals arrived and presented themselves with grimy unshaven faces and soiled uniforms in the little room which was hardly big enough to accommodate the whole group. There was a bed in one corner of the room and a small table in another corner; three or four chairs completed its furniture; Warren, sitting on the end of the bed, was overcome by exhaustion and slept throughout the deliberation. Four of the officers present had been temporarily promoted to take the places of their seniors disabled by wounds. Reaction from the intense nervous strain of the day's work and the capacity of the American to see the humorous side of the gloomiest situations, gave rise to some jesting conversation before Meade initiated the discussion as to whether they should give battle to the enemy a third time at Gettysburg, and if so what form offensive or defensive their action should take. Butterfield, the Chief of the Staff, with methodical precision closed the somewhat informal interchange of views which followed by tabulating questions which were submitted to each one present, beginning with Gibbon, the junior officer who had taken Hancock's place in command of the II corps. Each general when his turn came pronounced in favour of fighting it out at Gettysburg, but no one of them was bold enough to advocate passing to the offensive until the enemy had exhausted himself by unsuccessful attacks. Meade said little; he concurred with the replies of his colleagues, though he expressed the opinion that the army was in a bad situation. Having assumed the responsibility for a third day's battle, the orders he issued were wise and prompt.

First the intrusion of Johnson's division into the positions of the Federal right was to be met by an energetic offensive at dawn of day. A strong line of guns was to be posted on Power's Hill, to enfilade the enemy's troops, while the XII corps already massing on that flank was to be thrown into the breach in the line. The III corps shattered beyond recognition was withdrawn

The
Federal
Council
of War.

Disposi-
tion of the
Federal
forces on
July 3.

from the first line and posted in reserve behind the V corps ; these troops under General Sykes held the Round Tops and Cemetery Ridge as far north as a copse in which was posted Stannard's Vermont brigade of the I corps ; the Vermont men reached the field on Thursday night after a splendid march, the last reinforcement to join the Unionist army. In rear of the V corps stood the VI in reserve, excepting two brigades detached on the Baltimore pike to prevent the right from being turned. Caldwell's and then Gibbon's divisions continued the Federal line northward from the copse held by Stannard's men to Cemetery Hill, on which Robinson's two brigades were entrenched. Then came the XI corps in their old positions facing north. As on Thursday Wadsworth's division held the crest connecting Cemetery with Culp's Hill, and Geary's division, now once again intact, faced the assailants on the summit of Culp's Hill. Of the cavalry, Buford was at Westminster on the 3rd ; Gregg with one strong division faced Stuart on the heights east of the Rock Creek, while Kilpatrick was to harass the right wing of the enemy with two brigades, and to connect Gregg with the right wing of the Federal army by detaching Custer's brigade. There had been added to Kilpatrick's division Merritt's brigade of United States cavalry. Thus disposed, the army presented a far more formidable front than on the previous day. All its corps were present, and so posted as to be able quickly to reinforce any part of the line. Cavalry guarded the flanks and the topography of the position was now well known to the Federal leaders.

Orders in accordance with Meade's plan of defence were sent out to the different divisions at midnight and in part executed by the tired generals and staffs, but so great was the confusion engendered by the fighting, and so exhausted were four fifths of the Federal army that a general assault by the Confederates at dawn with all the troops who had not fought on the 2nd might well have captured the disputed heights, and possibly even have settled the fate of the campaign. Only three brigades of the Third corps had fought on the 2nd ; two whole divisions had not been engaged, besides the two fine brigades of Anderson's division. Of the Second

corps Rodes' division and two brigades of Early's had taken no part in the battle; all these forces lay sleeping within a mile of the Cemetery. In addition Pickett's division of Virginians was in bivouac five miles away on the Chambersburg pike. With this division moving up in reserve the others might have stormed Cemetery Hill at the first streak of daylight, while feints on the wings by Hood's and Johnson's divisions prevented the reinforcement of the defence. Instead, however, of this bold measure, which would have been in consonance with the traditions of the Confederate leaders, another long pause was granted by them to their opponents, and as each hour of daylight passed new life came back to the Federal legions.

Soon after Meade convoked his council of war Lee returned to his headquarters and received the reports from his three army corps. The situation of his army was certainly a not less anxious one than Meade's. Not only was it, like the Army of the Potomac, the last hope of its country, but it had advanced far into the enemy's territory and must fight for the means of subsistence and for freedom of movement. Should the assault of the Gettysburg heights be renewed on the morrow, and if so with what disposition of the attacking troops? or should the offensive be abandoned and an attempt be made to lure the enemy on to a chosen field where his columns might be hurled back with disastrous loss as they had been at Fredericksburg? These were the alternatives considered, for the scheme of marching past the left flank of the Federal army, though again put forward by Longstreet, was never seriously entertained by the commanding general, who considered it impracticable. It had to be kept in mind that to abandon the offensive rôle was now in a measure to acknowledge defeat, and the delay it involved was all in favour of the adversary who could choose his own time for striking after reinforcing his own army, and after taking measures to cut the communications of the Confederates. If any possibility of decisive victory remained, the attack had to be renewed, but on what portion of the defensive line and with what fractions of the attacking force had yet to be decided.

Lee's
Orders for
the 3rd.

At Gettysburg Lee was not himself.¹ His orders issued on Thursday night gave no clear instructions as to the general plan of action for Friday's battle. His first intention seems to have been the same as on the previous evening, namely the concentration of the army towards its right flank, so as to renew the struggle with overwhelming strength against the hostile left, an intention prompted by his correct military insight; but unfortunately for the Southern cause he allowed himself to be unduly influenced by the reports of success gained over the enemy's extreme right, which magnified the importance of those results. To take advantage of them in any case demanded the most careful harmonising of the action of the whole army, and this was exactly what he neglected to ensure. Of the capture of the Peach Orchard and the victorious advance from that point to the Little Round Top he had himself been witness, and the last reports from the brigades of Wright and Wilcox showed how nearly the Federal centre had been pierced. At this point accordingly Lee resolved to make his great effort, and there is no doubt that he meant to do so with concentrated strength, but his design was badly executed. It is clear also that the degree to which the divisions of the First corps had been spent to gain their victory had not been duly appreciated, since they were originally designated by Lee to renew their attack in concert with Pickett's division, while the Third corps, in the midst of whose bivouacs lay the army headquarters, was nursed with unnecessary care.

The only definite orders sent out on Thursday night were to Ewell informing him that the attack on the Federal position would be renewed early in the morning, and instructing him to be ready to participate. No officer was sent to Pickett to hurry his march, nor even to inquire at what o'clock he could reach the field. It was not until several hours of daylight had passed that the troops intended for the great attempt were warned and directed to their preliminary positions.

When morning dawned and the diminished numbers of the Federal regiments rose to meet the perils and exertions

¹ See correspondence in note to Chapter IX.

of another day, the scene which the soft light of the morning gradually revealed was calculated to shake the nerves of the staunchest troops. All around each bivouac the ground was soiled and poached from its occupation by many thousand men for two days. At the places where the last attacks had been made on Culp's Hill and Cemetery Ridge the half-awakened soldiers found themselves surrounded by hundreds of corpses, many of whom had died from bayonet stabs and whose countenances still retained in death the expression of agony from those fearful wounds. The trampled grass was stained with blood, and a sickening stench from so much carnage filled the warm air. Further away in the valley the slopes were dotted with the corpses of men and horses and with all the débris of a hardly contested battlefield. Further still on the opposite line of hills men could be seen on the move like swarms of ants, and the guns of many batteries were plainly visible as the light grew stronger. It seemed certain that the survivors of Thursday's slaughter would soon have to face another test as stern. Down in the hollow behind them the fields which bounded the roads to Taneytown and Baltimore were covered with all the apparatus of a huge picnic; masses of carts with horses standing by harnessed were ranged by the road-side, a crowd of teamsters in civilian garb mingled with numbers of soldiers in Blue, and drifted about in the confined space, thus adding to the confusion. Dotted about the fields the Geneva cross showed where a field hospital was struggling to deal with the wounded who continued to be brought from the other side of the hill; along the crest already scored and furrowed by shells and shot signallers were at work with their flags. Very soon after the darkness lifted a haze of blue smoke on the north and the sullen snarl of artillery and rifle-fire in chorus proclaimed the renewal of the strife.

All those, rich or poor, who never in their lives have missed for twenty-four hours the comforts of the daily routine of life will find it difficult to realise the situation of the two armies at Gettysburg that morning. For the most part the troops had been marching hard for four days preceding the

struggle. Some had walked all night to reach the field on Thursday and, too weary to eat, had been flung into the fight after a very brief repose. The officers of all ranks were more used up than the men by reason of their additional exertions. Food indeed had been plentiful, but fuel and the leisure to cook had not. The only comforts of any kind available were carried in the men's pockets and haversacks, for the trains had been far outstripped in the forced marches to battle. Where so many thousand men are crowded together in so small a space water for drinking is always scarce and for washing it is unattainable, except for those lucky regiments who found themselves posted on the banks of some stream. Add to the general discomfort and horror the grief caused by the killing of comrades, friends and kindred, and the reaction which was bound to follow the fierce exertions of the preceding days, then the frame of mind of the opposing armies can be faintly understood.

It is a remarkable proof of the spiritual unity of the human race, and of the constant craving for aggregation in every human mind, that when death is rife the fear of death vanishes or is merged in a longing to share the fate of others. This curious craving, which found expression from some of the bravest lips that morning, has to be taken count of in calculating the fighting power of an army. There supervenes a fashion to die, or a dangerous indifference as to what may happen next induced by physical and mental exhaustion.

The events of Friday, July 3, decisive in the annals of the great war, are easier to describe than the complicated action Summary on the more difficult field of the previous evening's of Events. battle. On the 3rd as on the 2nd the struggle focussed at two points, and the cavalry which had now joined both armies fought on the flanks. The first collision occurred between the Federal right wing and Ewell's troops; it ended in the complete victory of the former. Then an incursion of Federal Horse was made into the zone of the Confederate right, to be repulsed with heavy loss; finally a mass of troops headed by Pickett and his three Virginian brigades sought to break through the Federal centre, which had been bombarded for about an hour by a concentrated

fire of artillery. This attack was repulsed with annihilating loss, and the Confederate army thrown on to the defensive. The Federals had, however, suffered too heavily to follow up their success, and the evening of the third day still found the armies in position facing one another. Tactically the result of the gigantic struggle was approximately equal: strategically the victory was with the Federals. The material losses on each side were nearly the same in the three days, but the North could alone replace them, and the failure of the Confederate leadership impaired for a brief space of time the morale of the troops, whose only chance of conquest lay in defeating superior numbers by superior skill. To take the events in the order in which they occurred, the fighting was resumed on Culp's Hill very early in the morning.

Almost as soon as they could see to take aim the Federal artillerymen of the XII corps opened fire from the position they had taken up overnight on Power's Hill, against

The
Struggle
for Culp's
Hill.

the Virginian infantry on the southern slopes of Culp's Hill. General Ewell had reinforced Johnson's command with three brigades, Smith's Virginians which had been detached on the 1st and 2nd along the York pike, and two of Rodes' brigades, thus making up Johnson's force to seven brigades. These troops faced the enemy as on the previous day in two groups. The principal one now strove to make good its hold on the triangular wood whose edge lay but two hundred yards from the Baltimore pike and which divided the two divisions of the XII corps. The right group of Grey troops clung to the wooded sides of Culp's Hill and tried to gain ground westward from Geary's division, which now manned the entrenchments on the summit with three brigades. The unfavourable result of the artillery duel on Thursday afternoon and the nature of the ground, which prevented the Confederates from bringing their guns into action on the western bank of Rock Creek, deprived them of any assistance from their artillery, while their troops were exposed to enfilading fire from the Federal batteries throughout the struggle, except when the advance of the Northern infantry masked the guns. For seven hours the contest continued, during which the efforts of the Blue

troops were powerfully seconded by their guns; they raked the enemy's line at a range of from twelve hundred yards to a mile, and although the broken nature of the ground gave some shelter against the projectiles, yet their explosion among the rocks, lopping off branches of trees and scattering splinters and stones, caused great confusion and wounded many men. Throughout the war artillery had been used with skill and effect by both sides in defence. The third day at Gettysburg was one of the few in which it played an important part in preparing and sustaining the attack.

Ewell was the only one of the three corps commanders who had his troops ready for action at daybreak. With three of Early's brigades he continued to hold the ground from the Rock Creek to the town, which was still occupied by the two remaining brigades of Rodes, thus connecting Johnson's division with the Third corps. His artillery joined in the bombardment of Cemetery Hill later in the day, and had Pickett's attack prospered a general advance of his infantry against the Federal right was intended. So far his arrangements were good, but no proper measures seem to have been taken to communicate the state of the fight on Rock Creek to Lee's headquarters. Had its vicissitudes been properly reported there, greater efforts might have been made to support the attack of the Second corps by earlier action of the Third and First corps.

The front on which the infantry fight took place was about three-quarters of a mile. From the first the Federals took the offensive against the left column of the intruders, while they met the attacks of the right column with a deadly fire from the shelter of their breast-works. To and fro the combat swayed, and as the regiments broke up into groups the struggle assumed the same character as the fight on the previous afternoon below the Round Tops. The Confederate leaders had become aware of the proximity of the Baltimore pike and tried their utmost to break through the circle of fire with which the XII corps had surrounded them, in order to carry confusion in among the trains of the defending army. Several brave rushes were made, but the superiority of the Federal fire triumphed over the valour of the assailants; the

VI corps having relieved Ruger's division south of the brook, by degrees the pressure on the Confederate left flank proved too much, and finally the two Federal divisions united to make a combined attack, which swept the Grey riflemen back through the wood and across the Rock Creek, captured three standards and four hundred prisoners, thus gaining a decided success over the left wing of the Confederate army before ever the right came into action.

In any battle the tendency is strong for everyone to become absorbed in his own immediate affairs to the complete neglect of his neighbours, and, considering the perilous nature of the occupation, this is natural enough. In no part therefore of the business of war is the help of a good staff of capable officers well versed in the tactics of the three arms more necessary than in the crisis of an engagement, to watch over events and to keep the commanding general informed of their progress and relative gravity. The bigger the field of action the more urgent the necessity. In the American armies the supply of officers qualified for such work was very limited; very few had had a professional education, and all whom the events of the war had shown to be skilful and reliable were wanted as leaders of troops.

The lack of staff officers always increased the difficulty of combining the movements of troops in attack; nevertheless the inaction of Lee himself during the struggle on Culp's Hill, the unmistakable signs of which must have reached his eyes and ears, is difficult to account for. Only one mile and a half separated him from the fighting lines, and no one better than he should have appreciated the absolute necessity of winning a decisive victory and the necessity of harmonious action to obtain it.

Johnson's regiments recoiling before the successful counter-stroke of the XII corps rallied on the eastern bank of the Rock Creek and remained there throughout the day. Their losses had been severe enough to exhaust their aggressive energy, but they had inflicted severe punishment in return; the result of the contest was practically to immobilise the troops of both armies which had taken part in it for the rest of the battle.

Prepara-
tions of
the Con-
federate
Right
Wing.

It was eleven o'clock; the hot glare of the July sun smote upon the long lines of troops on the ridge exposed to its heat with little or no shade, but the Confederate soldiers were for the most part lying down in the woods. The air was still and close, and became very sultry as the day advanced.

At 7 A.M. General Pickett reached the Seminary and reported the near approach of his regiments, which might have reached the field two hours earlier had it been so ordered; for, although they had marched twenty-two miles on the previous day, they were burning to take part in the battle. Lee then issued his first instructions to Longstreet, which were to renew the attack with Hood's and McLaws' divisions where Barksdale's and Wofford's brigades had attacked the night before, while Pickett, supported by the Third corps, took the same objective as Wright and Wilcox in their gallant incursion into the enemy's position. On the brow of the hill the little wood occupied by the Vermont brigade was conspicuous with its tall trees, and at that point the ridge curved outwards a little so as to present a salient angle which could be subjected to a cross fire. If the position was at this point exceedingly strong, its capture would on the other hand lead to the most decisive results by cutting the Federal army in twain and commanding the roads to Taneytown and Baltimore, the only line of retreat.

Longstreet, however, vehemently objected to the proposed plan. He represented, not without reason, the severe strain that had been endured by his troops and the strength of the enemy's forces on and below the Little Round Top, and he once again urged the plan of turning the Federal left by extending his own right. But Lee had resolved on the direct attack; yielding so far to Longstreet's insistence, he returned with him to the Peach Orchard and made a long reconnoissance of the ground, with the features of which he should by that time have been familiar. Then the generals visited Wofford's brigade on the western edge of the Wheat Field and asked the gallant leader, so it is said, whether a direct attack to the front with his troops were possible, and received a decided reply in the negative. Much

Pickett
reports
himself
at 7 A.M.

time was thus consumed, and it was ten o'clock before the orders were finally given for the grand attack. Longstreet received them with ill grace and tried to continue the discussion in a manner little calculated to attain his object. He writes that when Lee explained the plan of attack and the number of troops to be placed at his disposal for its execution he replied, 'I have risen from private soldier to my present rank, and have yet to see the fifteen thousand men who can storm that position.' Lee said nothing, but showed by his manner that he did not wish to continue the conversation. Longstreet thereupon returned to his troops, and set to work to organise the attack, but he allowed his disapproval of the scheme to be seen by his officers, in which he was greatly to blame. The more hazardous the enterprise the more it depended on the whole-hearted co-operation of all ranks to give it a chance of success.

Pickett's division had reached the Seminary Ridge between 8 and 9 A.M. and had breakfasted where they had 10 A.M. formed up, the last meal that so many of these brave men were fated to eat. At ten o'clock the division was called to arms and conducted to the wooded heights west of Godori's house. The First corps had withdrawn its outposts from the open ground between the Emmetsburg road and Cemetery Ridge, and it now occupied from the foot of the Round Top to the Peach Orchard, and thence northwards along the road, the same line which Sickles had taken up the day before, but facing the reverse way. In front of the hidden mass of infantry the artillery of the First and Third corps gradually got into position from the Peach Orchard to the Seminary, but considerable delay ensued before they could bring up the rough waggons carrying the reserve ammunition which would be needed in a long contest; at the same time six brigades of the Third corps were brought into position on the western slope of the Seminary Ridge, so that the whole mass might move forward together through the guns when the signal should be given. These six brigades were the four of Heth's division now led by Pettigrew on which had fallen the brunt of the hard fight of July 1, with Lane's and Scale's, both of North Carolina,

of Pender's division. Heth's four brigades stood in the first line, Pender's were to follow in support. On their left still remained two of Pender's brigades and the line of guns. On Pickett's right it was intended that Wilcox's brigade should be thrown forward to guard his flank while McLaws' and Hood's divisions checked any attempt of the Federal left to assist their centre. All the forces to be employed in the attack were placed under Longstreet's orders, and he had as well four brigades of Anderson's division in reserve. The corps organisation was thus broken up and a fresh command given to Longstreet, such as it had been Lee's custom to give to Jackson on critical occasions, but Longstreet failed to fill his place.

We left the cavalry of Stuart's command resting in bivouac on the York pike after its extraordinary march during the night of July 2 and covered by the outposts of Smith's Virginian infantry. The next morning this brigade was recalled by Early as already related, and once again the cavalry resumed work independently. The division had in the meanwhile been reinforced by Jenkins' brigade. Horses and men were terribly worn by their long ride and by want of sleep, but both were of unusually tough quality, so that on Friday morning Stuart was able to advance in two columns mustering about five thousand riders.

The plan of the Confederate leader was to pass round the Federal right flank and to attack their army in rear, to carry havoc along the Baltimore pike, cut up the trains, scatter the stragglers and thus to alarm and harass the defenders of the Gettysburg position. If Lee's attack succeeded, then he intended to hurl his squadrons in among the retreating troops and convert the defeat into a rout. Pleasonton had no difficulty in foreseeing and providing against this scheme. Gregg's division posted on this flank had moved out on the Hanover road during the morning and both forces felt cautiously for one another; about ten o'clock they came in touch on the hills four miles east of Cemetery Ridge.

Stuart tried to give the Federal cavalry the slip so as to get between it and the Federal army. With this intention

he left two brigades to skirmish on foot while he withdrew his other two, intending that the left wing should follow his right ; but events happened otherwise. In front of Stuart's right were four strong brigades numbering not less than his own command and they lost no time in assuming the offensive and pressing the dismounted troopers of Stuart's left, so that instead of slipping round the Federal left, the whole Confederate division became gradually drawn into a fierce dismounted fight, in which the horse artillery on each side took part. Then Stuart caused his regiments to mount in succession, and charged the Federals, who were lining a fence with riflemen : Gregg followed suit, and a sanguinary mêlée followed as one regiment after another successively reinforced the mounted combatants. Finally the Federal Horse were forced back, but their guns protected their retreat, which they accomplished slowly and in good order towards the Rock Creek, still covering the right flank of the army, and ready to meet any renewal of Stuart's advance. In this fight the Federals lost one hundred killed and more than three hundred wounded, besides a considerable number of prisoners. The Confederates suffered as severely in casualties ; they remained in position all day awaiting the opportunity, which never came, of attacking a beaten army on its line of retreat. As in the other cavalry fights of this campaign, every effort was put forth by both sides ; rifle, sword and revolver were called into play, with fire and shock tactics as opportunity offered. That so little was accomplished by these encounters was due to the equality of the opposing forces, which therefore neutralised one another's efforts, and not, as has been foolishly deduced, because they were incapable of mischief against infantry.

While this tournament was taking place the Federal division of Kilpatrick, which had taken post south of the Round Top, advanced against the Confederate right, in pursuance of the same plan as Stuart had attempted. On this flank there were on Friday morning no Confederate cavalry. About eleven o'clock Kilpatrick passed the Round Top and moved through the wood south of it, crossed the stream, and headed for the

Emmetsburg road. His movement had been reported to Law, now in command of Hood's division, who promptly detached the Texan brigade to protect his right. Anderson's Georgians also were already posted across the road to guard against any such danger. As soon as Kilpatrick saw the Texans he ordered Farnsworth, the leader of one of his brigades, to charge them. A discussion took place in which Farnsworth with some temper asserted his view that the venture had no chance of success, and in the meanwhile what hope there was of surprising the infantry vanished. Kilpatrick insisted on the attack, and it was made with great gallantry, but the nature of the ground greatly favoured the defending infantry, who clustered in little groups behind rocks and thickets whence they shot down the horsemen, who were insufficiently trained for difficult manœuvres. The brigade charged home, and fell upon the Confederate supports close by Snyder's house; Farnsworth and about half his horses were shot, and the greater part of the brigade dispersed. He was a very young officer, who had already given promise of great talent, and his loss was much lamented in the Federal army. Merritt's brigade of regular cavalry pursued their course to the road and then turned northwards; they were, however, speedily brought to a standstill by the Georgian riflemen. Finding it impossible to attack them in flank, the regulars, who were more addicted to fighting on foot than on horseback, took their rifles and engaged in a desultory fire fight, from which they were withdrawn about noon by Kilpatrick, who then rallied his division to guard the flank of the army.

Nothing could have been less skilful than the handling of this division. The two brigades attacked independently of one another. Neither the charge nor the advance on foot was made under circumstances which gave any kind of advantage to the assailants, and against a numerical superiority of veteran troops. And yet, the bold if unskilful incursion of the cavalry in spite of their severe losses had the effect of disturbing the arrangements of the Confederates by alarming them for the safety of their right flank at the crisis of the battle, and the result suggests how much more

might have been effected if a proper force had been employed and directed with skill.

When the division of Virginians reached the depression of ground in which they were to await the result of the artillery preparation, Pickett sent out several companies to drive in the enemy's skirmishers and to facilitate the advance of his troops by breaking down the fences in their path and burning the ricks and farm buildings of Godori's homestead. This step led to some sharp firing between skirmishers and an exchange of greeting between the opposing lines of artillery, which, however, subsided and died out in half an hour. Then came a long silence so oppressive that it could be felt in the suspense which hung over the two armies. The Confederate infantry gradually crept into all the hollows between the Emmetsburg road and the Seminary Heights, and the men sprawled on the ground with their rifles by their sides; many slept face downwards, some smoked, or played cards. Meanwhile the Federal leaders had worked indefatigably to rectify the position of their different commands, and to strengthen the breast-works with working parties. The concentration of troops opposite their centre had been seen and reported by the signallers on the Round Tops, and although the long dreaded flank march of the enemy was at first believed to be in execution, it was finally concluded that a direct attack was contemplated, from the fact that the columns were observed no further south than the Peach Orchard. To meet such an attack therefore all efforts were directed, but it was also believed that the flanks would be assailed at the same time; and as in every conflict of the war the strength of the Confederate army was greatly exaggerated by the Federal headquarters, it was credited with the means of undertaking more than in reality was possible.

The event of the battle proved that the manœuvre contemplated by Lee was possible; its failure was chiefly due to want of depth in the assaulting column, which was left unsupported to be cut up by the converging reserves of the defender, while no help was given to the main attack by the

Godori's
House
burnt,
11 A.M.

action of the Confederate wings. The tactical formation which deployed whole divisions in the same line was here seen at its worst, and the difficulty it involved of striking simultaneously and of feeding the leading troops with reinforcements was greatly increased. Napoleon was very fond of striking at the centre of his enemy's line. He always sought to keep the wings busy as well, and neglected no artifice to give his troops every advantage obtainable. He prepared the way for his attacking columns by a concentrated fire of artillery, and closely combined the attacks of infantry and cavalry with a skill which has not been equalled since by any modern commander. The decisive effect of cutting the enemy's army asunder and rolling up one or both of the divided parts suited the bold policy by which he always sought to obtain complete victory when he joined battle. The overthrow of the French army at Waterloo has often been compared with the failure of the Confederates to triumph at Gettysburg, and there are many points of resemblance. Both had to win victory against time, before the overwhelming resources of the enemy could be brought to bear. In the Waterloo campaign these resources were present in the field and took part in the actual battle. In 1863 they were looming on the horizon to be brought into action the following year. The assaults on Wellington's position failed by the same tactical mistakes which ruined the Confederate offensive at Gettysburg. Attacks were made disjointedly in respect of time and of supporting bodies. Both French and Southerners made all possible use of their artillery, but did not turn their cavalry to the best account. In both cases the commanders and their troops underrated the capacity of their opponents and failed in performance to reach their own standard of excellence.

The sun had reached its highest point when the whole artillery force of Lee's army had got into position with its ammunition conveniently at hand. From the edge of the Wheat Field to the Peach Orchard and thence for six hundred yards the line of guns followed the road northwards, then it bent back with the curve of the hill. Along Seminary Ridge the batteries of the

The
Artillery
Duel,
1 P.M.

Third corps were ready in position, and north of the Cemetery the Second corps continued the line and enfiladed the Federal position. The short range of guns at that date nullified this advantage, which only seven years later proved decisive at Sedan, where the Prussians triumphed by the converging fire of rifled guns. Longstreet had seventy and Hill sixty-five guns bearing on the Federal positions at ranges which varied from eight hundred yards on the right to fifteen hundred yards on the left of the line, and the practice of the previous day had given the distances with considerable precision. Opposite to them Hunt, the artillery commander of the Federal army, had skilfully disposed his batteries. On the left McGillivray with forty guns was posted between the base of the Little Round Top and Werkert's House, facing the Peach Orchard, where they had done very good service in rallying the III corps on the previous night. The II corps had its twenty-four guns on the crest of the ridge facing west, and on Cemetery Hill in a curved line the guns of the I and XI corps faced west and north. The Federal artillery was thus disposed in three principal groups; the batteries of the reserve had been withdrawn under the lee of the ridge and were destined to replace any knocked out of the contest. Behind the guns the Federal infantry lay in wait, and in front of the centre group a stone wall was held by crouching riflemen. Little or no movement was discernible on the ridge save the occasional appearance of men among the guns, or of a single horseman carrying an order showing for an instant and then disappearing behind the crest.

Longstreet still hesitated to give the order to commence the fight, but at length in reply to Colonel Alexander's inquiries he gave the required signal. At one o'clock a couple of shots gave the warning to both armies, and in a few minutes the whole Confederate line spat fire and became gradually enveloped in a thick white blanket of smoke. For some minutes more there was no reply: the Federal officers strained their eyes in trying to locate the hostile batteries and to regulate the aim. Presently the answer came; a fierce squall of missiles tore up the ground round the

Confederate guns, and bounded over in among the infantry beyond. Some regiments had to be moved, not before they had lost many men. For a whole hour the duel lasted between more than a hundred guns on either side, which caused a tempest of noise and confusion, but less destruction than consternation. The Confederates fired their batteries in salvos, six at a time, like volleys of musketry, so that when they found the mark the destruction was proportionately great. The crest of Cemetery Ridge was swept with a hurricane of shot and splinters which struck down the Federal gunners and dismounted some guns and waggons. Shells fell on the hill-side beyond among the infantry and increased the confusion in the crowd in rear. Carriages were smashed, horses and men were mutilated and terrified, and while everyone found what cover he could the stream of fugitives and stragglers on the road to Baltimore quickly increased. The Stars and Stripes over Meade's headquarters was struck and the tiny cottage reduced to a heap of ruins; Butterfield his Chief of the Staff was wounded. The gunners, sustained by the fascination of their fight, coolly and methodically served the guns and brought up ammunition; the infantry crouched behind their breast-works and lay hugging the earth, while the iron missiles sang an uncanny chorus overhead.

The crisp edge of the Federal position gave a better mark than the Confederate batteries, which the direction of the wind helped to envelop in smoke, but they did not go scatheless. Both sides fought with unabated courage, and the result showed how hard it is for artillery to drive stubborn defenders from their post when covered by slight fortification, and still more so if protected by such natural obstacles as boulders or the slope of the ground, a lesson which many a hard fight has enforced since. It seems that the Confederate superior officers interfered unwisely with their artillery commanders by designating different points to be fired upon, instead of allowing a crushing concentration of effort against the guns of Hancock's corps, and the salient angle it occupied right athwart the path of Pickett's troops. It has often been related how General Hunt met Colonel Long

of Lee's Staff, whose instructor he had been at West Point, after the end of the war, and how he reproached him with neglect of his teachings, to which Long replied, 'Yes, I thought at the time how astonished you would be that we had profited so little by your lectures!' Want of ammunition was the skeleton at the feast on both sides, but it troubled the Confederates most, for their magazines were distant and inaccessible, while long trains followed hard on the footsteps of Meade's army, but could not arrive in time for the present struggle; thus both forces were tied by a short tether. The Confederates had to think of the next battle, the Federals hardly knew if they could last out this one.

Before two o'clock Colonel Alexander, commanding Longstreet's artillery, intimated to General Pickett that he had done his worst, and there seemed to be no prospect of silencing the enemy's guns; but Longstreet still refrained from giving the order for the infantry to advance. A little later the fire of the guns on Cemetery Ridge ceased right along the line. As the smoke gradually lifted a weird scene was disclosed. The ground seemed deserted by the host which had peopled it all the morning. Round the guns the detachments lay down to avoid the shot which continued to fly and the marks of destruction looked as if the path of a blizzard had been drawn across it. Some of the men who had been hit were disfigured beyond recognition, a few horses limped about bleeding from ghastly wounds; trees, fences and farm buildings bore the signs of exploding shells. Presently the firing ceased on the other side of the valley, and men emerged from their cover like hunted animals out of caves to look about them. Then there came another hot gust of fire which precluded the final attack.

It was General Hunt who had given the order to the Federal batteries to cease fire, anticipating by a few minutes an order from Meade himself. There only remained a few rounds of case in the batteries of the II corps, which must be kept to resist the infantry advance, and at the same time Alexander and Pickett were in consultation. When the Federal guns became silent a ray of hope cheered the Southern

Silence of
the
Federal
Artillery,
2 P.M.

chiefs and Pickett for the second time went to Longstreet for permission to advance. Longstreet, unable to bring himself to articulate the fatal words, only nodded assent; Pickett saluted, gathered up his reins, settled himself gracefully in the saddle, and followed by Trimble cantered back to his command, where he took from his pocket a letter addressed to the lady whom he was engaged to marry and wrote on the envelope, 'If old Peter's nod means death, then good-bye, little one, and God bless you.' Old Peter was Longstreet's nickname.

The officer whose name has become immortal as the leader of the famous charge was conspicuous throughout the war as a capable and dashing leader of infantry. In appearance he was one of the most picturesque of the many striking figures of this dramatic page of history. Following the fashion of the Texan ranchers, his hair flowed in long ringlets down his neck and his portrait reminds one of the Cavaliers who figure on the canvas of Vandyke. His ardent disposition had in early youth led him into high-handed action with a British vessel, when detached on duty with some United States infantry in Central America, and this had given him some notoriety at the time. On the outbreak of the war he had imitated the example of the Southern officers in the regular army and followed the flag of his native state. From the first fights of the war to the last sad scene at Appomattox Court-house he played a distinguished part and won a high reputation for skilful leading as well as for reckless daring.

Although the infantry which was to compose the attacking force had been placed as near to the enemy's positions as available cover permitted, the brigades were not exactly opposite to the goal to be attained, and careful supervision was necessary to ensure that all of them took the right direction and moved off at the right moment. To this end the utmost exertions of Lee himself might well have been directed, considering the immense importance of the event, but neither he nor Longstreet, who was directly in command, took any personal share in directing the march. When

General
Pickett.

The Ad-
vance of
the Con-
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Infantry,
2.30 P.M.

the order to advance was given the commanding generals watched the manoeuvre from different points of Seminary Ridge. Including Wilcox's brigade, detailed to cover the right flank, more than fourteen thousand troops were to make the venture, and so formidable a mass of infantry accustomed to victory might well expect to storm the strongest positions. All depended on simultaneous action. Pickett himself took great pains to point out to all his mounted officers the objective, and he described what was required of everyone, so that his men thoroughly understood. Then he gave the signal, and his two leading brigades under Garnet and Kemper, followed closely by Armistead's, stood to their arms and moved forward with confident bearing and light-springing step in well-ordered lines. A large proportion of the regiments of the three divisions had been lying down in the woods, so that the bright glare of the July sun may well have dazzled their eyes as they stepped out of the shade of the trees; when they reached the crest, they beheld the long line of the Federal position rising like a wall on the other side of the valley. The high ground above Godori's house, where Pickett's troops first became exposed, was twelve hundred yards distant from the objective of their advance.

The array presented by the forlorn hope of the Southern States as it swept down the slope to the Emmetsburg road differed in outward appearance from the trim regiments which have fought decisive fields in Europe. The quaintly picturesque Guards of Napoleon moving forward to cut asunder the Red line of the English at Waterloo, the prim stiff legions of Prussia stamping across the deadly *glacis* at Gravelotte and St. Privat, had little outwardly in common with the actors of this event even more historically important. A martinet's eye would have ached to have passed in review the Virginian brigades clad in rough homespun cloth which had been soiled by foul weather in many a bivouac. Their accoutrements and arms had mostly been captured from the enemy, every man wore them as he pleased and gripped his rifle like a trusty friend. Instead of the conventional military head-dress, shako, bearskin, or

helmet, every man wore any slouch hat he had been able to find and many covered their heads with a plait of straw. Nevertheless the long lines tipped with steel moving steadily forward gave the impression of irresistible strength like the rising tide, while as far as the eye could reach fresh troops emerged from the shelter of the woods and pressed resolutely across the valley.

A gasp of excitement burst from the crouching defenders of the threatened position when the cry was heard along their line 'Here come the infantry!' For an instant they watched in admiring silence that magnificent display; then they swarmed to their posts. Meade and Hancock galloped along the line to rectify its formation. Every rifle was loaded and bayonet fixed. The standards waved defiantly over the brave volunteers, and orderlies sped to summon the reserves to the point threatened by the enemy's advance. The guns were loaded with case and their muzzles depressed to join in the final affray.

It was about half-past two when the mass of Confederate infantry was put in motion. Their formation was a vast echelon of which Pickett's division was the leading fraction, followed at a distance of about two hundred yards on their left by Pettigrew's division, whose four brigades marched in a long line. One hundred yards behind them followed the brigades of Scales and Lane under Trimble. A battery of light guns had been ordered to accompany them, but they were not at hand when the advance took place, and no attempt was made by any fraction of the Confederate artillery to support the attack after it was obliged to cease fire for fear of hitting their own men. In order to gain ground to the left and to get opposite their objective point Pickett made each brigade wheel quarter left and then quarter right again, which was done with perfect order. The advance was then resumed while the spectators on either side of the valley were enthralled with breathless suspense. The fences and enclosures which bounded the Emmetsburg road delayed the lines for an instant, while the armed men clambered over them, and the skirmishers who had been firing from them at the Federal line seeking to pick off a man here and there


joined their companies. Then once again the line sprang forward and approached near enough to their enemies for the hoarse words of command to be plainly distinguishable.

Deployed on the broad back of the ridge from a group of trees called Zeigler's Grove at the foot of Cemetery Hill to the salient copse held by Stannard's brigade of Vermont men were five brigades of the II corps which were largely composed of regiments from the state of New York—two brigades of Hay's division and three of Gibbon's. Thus six Federal brigades were opposed to nine Confederate, but the defenders were greatly favoured by the ground. Along the crest a rough breast-work of stone sheltered the guns and the two brigades in the second line, which fired over the head of the first line; a stone wall skirt-ing the foot of the rise was lined with riflemen, thus furnishing a double tier of fire; the two copses flanked this line like bastions. When the Grey troops arrived at a distance of two hundred and fifty yards from the wall, and while their right was still swinging round and their left lay athwart the Emmetsburg road, a violent fire of artillery and musketry burst forth and staggered the gallant Virginians. The left group of Federal guns had swung some batteries round half right and so enfiladed the advancing lines, but the guns of the II corps were still silent, reserving the few rounds which remained to them for close quarters. Had it been otherwise a cross-fire of artillery might have broken up the Confederate attack at this point. In spite of heavy loss the Virginians pressed on, while Gibbon's men ensconced behind their stone wall fired as rapidly as they could reload, at close range and with deadly effect. Can the open space swept by thirty guns and four thousand rifles be crossed by troops however brave? The line reels and bends; some regiments open fire, but the effect is as nothing against the protected defenders, and still the men are falling fast. It is certain that they must charge or retire. At this moment Armistead's brigade, which formed the second line, closed up and merged with the first. The 'rebel yell' was heard above the firing and the whole mass of Pickett's division rushed forward to charge. One after another the mounted officers fell. Kemper was badly

hit ; Garnet, who was ill, received his fatal wound right ahead of his men. Then the defenders of the wall broke and fled, but rallied on their second line among the guns.

In the few minutes which had elapsed since the infantry rose to make their attack the Federal reinforcements had been brought at a run to meet them. The supporting brigades led by Pettigrew and Trimble encountered a hurricane of shot as deadly as that directed against Pickett, in spite of which they continued their advance to the foot of the ridge. Wilcox, it seems, lost sight of his objective in the thick smoke and diverged slightly to his right, so that his brigade struck the Federal line south of the copse held by Stannard. Stannard accordingly brought up his left flank and began a rapid fire against the flank of the Virginian troops, who recoiled under it and thronged towards the centre of their line, which thus became a swarm of men running to the front. On the left of the Confederates, Willard's New York brigade was also firing at the flank of Pettigrew's line, which was unable to face the storm. His two left brigades broke up, but his right, reinforced by Scales' and Lane's brigades, and covered on their right by Pickett's troops, succeeded in breaking the Federal line and penetrated on to the crest, while several companies joined in the rush of the Virginians. Led by Pickett himself and by Armistead, who having had his horse shot under him raised his hat on the point of his sword, these matchless troops leapt over the stone wall and charged the battery. Right along the crest the bright colours of the Virginian battle-flags floated triumphantly, but around them a frantic mêlée ensued. Every Federal regiment within reach had been snatched up by Hancock and flung into the breach thus closed by a line of men four or five deep from many different commands, who opposed a living wall to the last rush of the Confederates. Right and left of the stormers the enemies they had thrust aside swiftly rallied, and closing in on their flanks threatened to surround them, while they fought furiously with the troops in front; bayonets crossed and rifles were discharged point blank. Gibbon was shot down as he strove to make his commands

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ATTACK ON FEDERAL POSITION AT GETTYSBURG BY CONFEDERATE INFANTRY, 2.30 P.M., JULY 3, 1863.

heard in the uproar, and Hancock fell severely wounded. Almost all the Southern leaders fell; Trimble was disabled, and the pressure on the left flank of the storming column gradually became too great; the brigades of the Third corps in utter disorder recoiled from the crest of the ridge leaving two thousand prisoners behind them and a dozen colours. The enemy drove them down the hill with the bayonet and pursued them across the valley with a sleet of bullets which struck down many of the fugitives. For a space, brief but glorious, the Virginians alone carried on the hand-to-hand struggle with the II corps; no reinforcements came to their aid, no sign of help from any quarter was discernible, and the circle of foes closed round them. In despair Pickett gave the signal to fall back, but few were able to follow him. Like a huge Atlantic wave breaking on a rock-defended shore the brave charge had spent itself. A little band led by Armistead had penetrated farthest, but had all fallen fighting hard amid the dying Federals. Armistead himself lay dead beside the gallant Cushing, who fired the last Federal gun with his own hand. Several thousand soldiers clad in Grey and Blue lay heaped in that small space between the stone wall and the battery. A hundred of Pickett's men unable to face the perils of the return journey threw themselves unwounded on the ground and were thus captured, many more were too faint from loss of blood to move. Only three colours and less than fifteen hundred men were rallied from the mêlée; only one mounted officer beside Pickett was not struck down. The breathless victors intoxicated with success beyond all expectation chased them out of the position, and kept up a random fire on the retreating mass; for Pettigrew's and Trimble's men mingling with the Virginians tried to reach the shelter of Seminary Ridge by the shortest path. Some of the bravest of them retreated more slowly, facing about and firing at intervals, but the majority of the survivors had lost all military formation. In groups of blood-stained fugitives they emerged from the dust and smoke, rushing back in a disorderly stream through the Confederate batteries close to where Lee had taken up his position to watch the attack.

In the meanwhile Wilcox's Alabama brigade had repeated its feat of the previous evening and had charged past the copse occupied by Stannard's Vermont brigade, which was then re-forming after its attack on the right flank of the Virginians. Facing about, the Vermont men quickly lined the southern edge of the copse and repeated the same operation with effect against the left flank of the new comers. Wilcox's regiments halted and opened fire, but finding themselves opposed by overwhelming masses they broke off the fight and retired, not without severe loss.

When Lee beheld the collapse of the attack and his ten brigades reeling back in disorder, he understood how great was the disaster, and set himself to remedy
 3.15 P.M. the confusion and to meet the counter-stroke which might be expected to follow. With all the personal charm which had won and was ever destined to keep their affection, he rode among his defeated soldiers encouraging them with kind words and taking all the blame of the failure to himself. There was an interval of time while the routed troops streamed back across the valley which, if it had been promptly seized, must have given complete victory to the Federal army; but there was no cavalry at hand to complete the destruction of the beaten Confederate infantry, and the Northern brigades, disorganised by the sanguinary hand-to-hand fights on the ridge, were in no condition to pass to the offensive on the spur of the moment. Thus the opportunity passed; it was just such a one as occurs from time to time in the history of war for achieving decisive victory by a cavalry attack, extremely rare and extremely fleeting, but capable of finishing a campaign at a single stroke if taken advantage of.

When the Southern soldiers heard Lee's voice and saw his kindly confident face and noble bearing they soon re-gained their courage and resumed military order.
 Lee rallies his Troops. The brigades of the Third corps were formed up in rear of the line of guns, and what remained of Pickett's division rallied as a reserve. A British officer who was present, Colonel Fremantle, testified in his account how quickly order was restored and a strong defensive line

established. Longstreet meanwhile took prompt measures to meet the enemy's troops should he move from his position. Anderson's division was ordered to meet the attack in front while Wofford's and Barksdale's brigades of McLaws' division were held in readiness to strike at the flank of any column which should attempt to move against the Seminary Ridge; the front was guarded by the powerful line of guns. Presently the cheers of the Federals were borne faintly to the ears of the Southerners, who gripped their weapons in expectation of an assault, but none came. They were the shouts of thankfulness of men unexpectedly delivered from great peril, not the cry for blood of troops launched on a desperate assault, and they had been provoked by Meade's appearance as he rode along the victorious line. The hours of the afternoon sped their course while on either side officers were busy counting the living and collecting the wounded and the captives. As the shadows grew long the Army of Northern Virginia gradually recovered from the moral shock of the defeat, and before any movement had been made by the cautious adversary to take advantage of it, the horns of the invading host had been drawn in from the positions they had captured on the 1st and 2nd, which stood exposed to a concentrated attack of the enemy's reserves.

After the repulse of Pickett's division Meade accompanied by Pleasonton hurried to the left flank of his army. What he saw of his own troops during the ride inspired him with no desire to assume the offensive. The bombardment, followed by the furious onslaught of the Southern infantry, had shaken the nerves of troops who had for three days been subjected to fierce attack and ceaseless exertion. Pleasonton indeed urged his chief to employ the V corps, which had suffered comparatively little on Thursday, and the VI corps, which was almost intact. He pointed to the divisions of Hood and McLaws holding with a long attenuated line the Peach Orchard position, and suggested an advance in force of the Federal left wing against them. Hancock had written a line from the stretcher in which he was borne from the field advising an offensive return, and had he been available to organise and lead it the thing might have been attempted,

but whichever way Meade turned his eyes he met anxious faces and doubtful looks. The loss among the Federal generals and staff officers was being severely felt; among the survivors no one felt confident but that the terrible Lee had still some more dangerous surprise in store. They feared they knew not what.

It is not by any means certain that an attack in force would have succeeded. Longstreet had expected the main action to fail, and was prepared to deal with the case which had arisen. When he cautiously withdrew his advanced troops from their exposed position, Meade directed a half-hearted pursuit by McCandler's brigade of the Pennsylvania reserves to reconnoitre. Soon after four o'clock Law had withdrawn the whole of Hood's division to the Emmetsburg road. McLaws followed suit, but owing to some mistake in conveying orders Benning's brigade became isolated and lost some prisoners to the Pennsylvanians. When at length Meade resolved on an advance of the VI corps in force, it was too late to effect much, and the Federal line got no further forward than the western edge of the Wheat Field.

When the red light of the setting sun pierced the murky haze of smoke which still clung to the battlefield a mournful silence had established its reign, disturbed from time to time by the cry of the wounded and by the challenge of sentries on the long outpost line which had been drawn like a curtain across the front of each army. As soon as order had been restored in the Southern ranks the measures rendered necessary by the failure of Friday's battle were promptly taken. Ewell withdrew his brigades from the Rock Creek, and concentrated his whole corps on the heights north of the Seminary, thus abandoning the town of Gettysburg. Longstreet's corps was concentrated on the heights overlooking the Peach Orchard, and during the night light entrenchments were thrown up to cover the defensive line. There can be no more convincing proof of the worth of the troops and of their loyal confidence in their chief than the rapidity with which they regained their fighting power. The successive defeat of several divisions in isolated attacks after local success had been gained, and the destruction of

Pickett's Virginians under the eyes of the whole army, was calculated to shake the confidence of any troops ; but the unconquerable and sanguine spirit of these Americans quickly rose from the depth of discouragement. On the morrow they were confident of their ability to whip the Yankee should he presume to attack ; only the numerical inferiority of the army put an end to further offensive enterprise.

Very late on Friday night General Lee reached his headquarters. The moral prostration which overwhelmed him was painted on his countenance, but he uttered no word of complaint to the few staff officers with whom he had to transact business, though questions were adroitly put to draw his opinion of the cause of the disaster. If his country suffered because want of sternness and self-assertion in his character brought about want of unison among his lieutenants at Gettysburg, it is to his eternal honour as a man that both officially at the time and in the subsequent controversies Lee assumed the whole responsibility and blame, which he might well have shared with others.

'It is a pity, it is a pity ! we must go back to Virginia !' was all that could be drawn from him in the agony of disappointment and defeat, and yet the full significance of the great reverse of fortune must have been clear to him. With the abandonment of the invasion vanished the bright hope inspired by so many successful feats of arms ; it was no longer a question of dictating peace in the heart of the Northern States after the ruin of the Northern army. Victory could only now be gained by such strategy as Lee's Virginian predecessor employed to foil the mighty power of the British Empire, and to secede from the hated rule of George the Third. The independence of the South must now entail years of suffering and bloodshed if ever it was to be accomplished ; but neither in the mind of the general bowed down by grief and self-reproach, nor round the camp-fires of the soldiers, thus unexpectedly cheated of the fruits of their gallant work, did the confident hope of ultimate triumph become extinguished. Fortunately neither knew in that hour of sorrow that one thousand miles away the last shot

had been fired in the defence of Vicksburg, and that the next day was to see access to the broad waters of the Mississippi finally wrenched from the Confederacy, and with it the succour of Texas and its invaluable resources of supplies and men.

Orders for a retreat were issued at nightfall. One day more the army would remain in position, since it had ammunition for one more pitched battle at hand. If the Federals should choose to cross the valley, a bloody repulse might yet be inflicted and the tables turned. The withdrawal of the First and Second corps from their advanced posts on to the Seminary Ridge was already in progress and the cavalry was distributed to protect the retreat. A great convoy of all the booty collected by the army since it had passed the South Mountain, together with a large proportion of its train, wounded and prisoners, was during the hours of darkness headed back towards the mountain pass under the escort of FitzLee's brigade of cavalry. The rest of the trains were directed to march by the Fairfield road, which was the shortest way to the fords of the Potomac, and which was securely covered by the position on Seminary Ridge. The day's halt would enable the trains to get sufficient start of the troops, and the passes of the mountains south of Cashtown would be held by Jones' and Robertson's cavalry brigades.

As a tactical study no battle furnishes more instruction than the great struggle at Gettysburg, both by reason of the determined valour of the troops and the experience and skill brought to bear in the leading of the brigades and divisions of both armies. It is also a very important consideration that truthful records are available for a close and accurate investigation of the three days' contest. The place itself is not inaccessible, and if the study of military history led more British officers to visit America they would gain nothing but good from the experience. The plain unvarnished tale given by so many of the participants in the battles to be found in the official records and elsewhere is incomparably more valuable as a tactical study than the official History of the Franco-German war, and can be read with greater facility.

After the two armies joined battle on July 1, the main determining cause of the Confederate defeat was the tactical error of the commanding general in repeatedly failing to support his attacking columns at the right moment. On the Wednesday first Heth's division, then Rodes' and Pender's, were disjointedly engaged; and but for the bold and skilful co-operation of Early's troops the day might well have been lost. So on Thursday the attacks on the Little Round Top position by Hood and McLaws needed but the forward impulse of another division at the crisis of the fight to carry the point. Wilcox's Alabama brigade and Wright's Georgians were in the same way left unsupported after reaching the very centre of the Federal position, and the same result attended the daring attempt of Early's two brigades to hold the Cemetery. On Friday the whole army looked on in idleness while Ewell's attacking troops were overwhelmed on Culp's Hill. The grand attack on the Federal centre, though preceded by artillery bombardment, was not assisted by any advance or feint against the enemy's wings; and, most important of all, the attacking lines received no timely support after they had penetrated into the position. The ablest contemporary writer on Tactics has stated that the most important part of the general's rôle in battle is the launching of reserves into the fight at the proper moment, and no battle better illustrates this principle than Gettysburg.

On the Federal side, though some mistakes were made in the posting and moving of the troops, yet the defence was ably conducted. It is now admitted that Meade should have gone to Gettysburg himself immediately he heard of the death of Reynolds. Similarly he should not have hesitated personally to examine the position of his left wing on Thursday morning when invited to by Sickles. The doubt as to whether his extreme right or extreme left would form the target for the enemy's decisive effort was perplexing; but it should have been solved by occupying both positions strongly enough to hold the enemy in check, while the mass of the reserves stood midway between the two points ready to reinforce either as soon as the attack became developed.

Instead of this, troops were moved first to one wing and then to the other, and then again recalled to their original position. Whether the Federal general acted wisely in awaiting the grand attack on his centre instead of frustrating it by himself assuming the offensive against Ewell or Longstreet with the fresh troops of the V and VI corps is a disputed point. The experiment of letting such a general as Lee work his will and make his preparations undisturbed was a very dangerous one, and at Chancellorsville the passive attitude brought about disaster; on the other hand, the country round Gettysburg was sufficiently open to make a surprise or flank attack less probable, and the event may be held to have justified the course adopted. Less question, however, exists about the mistake of not following up the repulse of the Confederate infantry by a blow at one of their advanced wings. Even if it led to no decisive success, it could hardly have had any result unfavourable to the Northern arms, and the moment after a sanguinary repulse is ever the most favourable for an offensive stroke. Moreover Meade had six thousand fresh infantry at hand for the purpose. The dashing attacks of the Confederates had at any rate accomplished this much, they had imposed on their adversary and paralysed his initiative.

The charge of Pickett's Virginians, their splendid devotion and hapless fate, forms the most thrilling incident in the great drama of the war. The spot where Armistead and Cushing died side by side is marked by a monument which shows the 'high-water mark' of the invasion. The tide had indeed turned. For nearly two years the Southern armies carried on the desperate conflict, and continued to cover themselves with glory, but no such chance of a great delivery recurred as was lost on Cemetery Ridge. After the short and gory struggle, which lasted barely thirty minutes on Friday afternoon, the events of the two succeeding weeks form an anti-climax to the dramatic and picturesque aspect of the history, but to the student of war they are perhaps even more interesting than any which had gone before. The retreat of the Southern army to the territory of Virginia from the unsuccessful encounter of July 3, in spite of the

efforts of the enemy's victorious army, aided by an accumulating host of reinforcements, and in spite of the floods which so nearly barred the way, will always be a model of skilful leadership and bold manceuvre. It is hardly too much to say that if the same skill and combination had been shown by the Confederate chiefs on July 1, 2 and 3, the history of the world would have taken a very different course.

CHAPTER IX

THE PASSAGE OF THE POTOMAC

July 4—Losses of the two Armies at Gettysburg—Number of Troops engaged—Destruction of the Confederate Pontoon Bridge at Falling Waters on July 3 by a Cavalry Raid—The Line of March—The Importance of Frederic City—Kilpatrick's Attack on the Convoy at Monterey Springs—Retreat of the Army—Movements of Troops: July 5, 6, and 7—The Cavalry Duel by the Potomac: July 6—July 7—Cavalry Fight on July 8—Events of July 9—July 10—July 11—July 12—July 13—The Passage of the Potomac—10 A.M., July 14—Extract from Correspondence between Lee and President Davis,

THE morning of July 4, the fête day of American Independence, brought the glad tidings to the rulers and people of the Northern States of the double victory which was destined to be the turning point in the war. At Gettysburg the morning passed without any collision between the armies; they still confronted one another in order of battle. During the night of the 3rd the Confederates had pushed forward their preparations for the retreat, and had collected a certain proportion of their wounded whom they could not leave behind them except as prisoners in the hands of the Federals. For this reason it was resolved to convey every wounded soldier who could endure the journey with the army; the country was scoured to secure carts for the purpose, while the work of collecting and attending to the sufferers from the battlefield proceeded all day, though it was necessarily of a rough and ready kind.

The losses suffered in the three days' contest had reached an enormous total. About five thousand men on either side were killed outright or died of their wounds within a short time. It is probably understating the case to say that ten thousand men lost their lives and almost as many more were incapacitated as fighting men. Some ten thousand less severely wounded filled the

Losses of
the Two
Armies at
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burg.

field hospitals on each side and demanded the assistance of comrades exhausted by the long strife, and who in addition had to prepare for the possibility of a fourth battle on the same field. Both Federal and Confederate commanders admitted a loss of about twenty thousand men from their muster-rolls. Six thousand six hundred prisoners were marched off the field by the retreating Confederates; twice as many fell into the hands of the Federals, but of these two thirds were the wounded whose injuries were too severe to permit of their being carried away and who consequently had to be left to the foe to look after. Each army captured some forty battle-flags and half a dozen guns.

The proportion of these losses to the numbers engaged proved the severity of the fighting and the desperate energy with which the troops on either side struggled for the victory. What those numbers exactly were has given rise to one of the many controversies which have thickened round the history of the campaign. The total number of combatant men present with the Army of the Potomac on June 28 when Meade took over command was eighty-six thousand, and it was reinforced by four thousand more. On the other hand the Comte de Paris in his careful calculation reckons that no less than fifteen thousand stragglers were absent from the colours at Gettysburg. Perhaps the best idea of the fighting strength of the two armies is obtained by comparing the number of units on each side. In the three battles Lee had at his disposal thirty-seven brigades of infantry in all; Meade had fifty-one. The brigades on each side may be roughly reckoned at fifteen hundred strong, though the Confederates had rather stronger musters; and owing to the straggling on the march to Gettysburg the Unionists had rather less. If we put the Federal infantry present in the three battles at sixty-seven thousand, and the Confederate infantry at fifty-seven thousand, we shall be very near to the correct numbers. The Federals had a stronger force of artillery than their enemy, but the number of batteries and guns counted for less than the quality of the ammunition and the organisation for using the guns and supplying them with ammunition; considerations

which have vastly increased in importance with every improvement in the machinery of guns and acceleration in the rate of fire. The Federals were able to oppose three hundred guns to the two hundred brought into action by the adversary, and six thousand Federal horsemen met the five thousand Confederates who reached the scene on the second day.

On the morning of July 4 only fifty-one thousand infantry and artillery soldiers answered to their names in the Federal bivouacs out of the seventy-seven or seventy-eight thousand we have calculated to have been present at the battles. In the Southern army there were hardly forty thousand left in the ranks. There was consequently no greater disparity than usual in the fighting strength of the two forces, but both armies had suffered so severely that neither was in a condition to resume the offensive without an interval of repose, and without replenishing supplies of cartridges; this state of things facilitated the withdrawal of the Southern army and helped to impose caution on the Northern general in attempting any pursuit.

Meade's direction of the campaign during the days which followed the battle has been very severely criticised, and it must be conceded that he failed to make the most of his opportunities. Lee's retreat was in itself sufficient evidence of the advantages he had gained, and no pains should have been spared to harass, if not to intercept, the Confederate marches, and to render their withdrawal as costly as possible. Nevertheless the men who blamed the leader in the field at the time were for the most part quite ignorant of military science, and expected, because they hoped for it, a surrender of Lee's army as a complement to the surrender of Vicksburg and Port Hudson on the Mississippi. Those who have condemned him since have done so by the light of information which was not accessible to the Federal commander-in-chief at the time, such as the want of ammunition in the Confederate army and its numerical inferiority. Every report on this last point had exaggerated the hostile numbers, so that Meade had reason to believe his opponents still to be at least as numerous as his own troops, and their

daring attacks contributed much to fortify this idea. We may say that while Meade failed to make the most of the situation, yet that situation was far from being as simple as the critics have represented.

At the very moment when the wreck of Pickett's fine command was reeling from the encounter with the Federal line of battle a new peril had arisen for the Southern army. On July 1 the cavalry brigades of Jones and Robertson, so unwisely left behind in Virginia by Lee, passed the Potomac by the pontoon bridge at Falling Waters, and in obedience to the summons to battle marched northwards leaving but a small post to guard the bridge. Information of this fact was conveyed to General French at Frederic City, which he held with his own ten thousand men and with the Federal cavalry brigade of Milroy's forces, which had been defeated at Winchester. A regiment of this brigade was promptly sent by a forced march to burn the bridge, and this was successfully accomplished after the post had been cut up and dispersed. The next day at noon rain began to fall, and in less than twenty-four hours the fords had ceased to be passable. So long as the rain continued the exodus of the Confederates was impossible unless they built another bridge, the materials for which were not at hand. In the meanwhile Meade's army which had baffled them at Gettysburg was being heavily reinforced, and fresh levies of militia were descending the Cumberland Valley and threatening to cut off the whole Southern army. That Lee brought his forces out of this dilemma, not only without serious loss but with an air of reluctantly relinquishing the theatre, was due to the skill of his dispositions and to the admirable co-ordination of the movements of his lieutenants; but the march was only possible thanks to the bold and skilful handling of the cavalry by Stuart, who excelled himself in these dark days of misfortune.

The two roads which led from Gettysburg to the passes of the South Mountain into the Cumberland Valley were both covered by the position of the Confederates on Seminary

Destruction of the Confederate Pontoon Bridge at Falling Waters on July 3 by a Cavalry Raid.

Ridge. By the pike to Chambersburg is twenty-eight miles from the Seminary, and thence to Williamsport, where Lee had resolved to cross the river as soon as he heard of the destruction of his bridge, is thirty miles. By the more direct road which enters the mountains at Fountain Dale, and reaches the top of the pass at a village called Monterey Springs, it is but forty-two miles, and it was by the latter that the whole column of combatant troops with many waggons was directed. The pass by Monterey winds through a narrow gorge, but is a good road. South of this pass a number of tracks lead over the hills, of which the most important are by Oeiller's Gap and Hannon's Gap, before we come to the main road from Frederic to Hagerstown by Turner's Gap to Boonesborough, so often alluded to as the route of McClellan's army in 1862.

The Cumberland Valley south of Chambersburg is cultivated and clear of forest, excepting about the lower ridges of the South Mountain, and where the Antietam Creek empties itself into the Potomac. It was therefore plain that the best way of bringing the Confederate march to a standstill would be by falling on their rearguard as the long procession of troops and carts wound its way through the defile. Once the Confederate columns were reunited in the valley, it would probably be impossible to bring them to battle, except by storming a position, just as McClellan was obliged to at Sharpsburg.

The possession of Frederic City was a point of capital importance for the Federal army. Abundant stores and supplies had been collected there, so that the town could be used as an advanced base for operations in the Cumberland Valley. Similarly its possession by the Confederates would have placed them once again in position to threaten Washington and Baltimore, or to resume their campaign northwards as they pleased. There actually was no chance of the resumption of the offensive by Lee's army, but this was not fully appreciated by the Federal headquarters, who still attributed dark designs and unknown resources to the Confederate leader. From Frederic to Williamsport is thirty-one miles.

The Im-
portance
of Frede-
ric City.

The course adopted by Meade shows that he was not really desirous of fighting another pitched battle north of the Potomac, unless the enemy gave him some unexpected advantage, but that he merely wished to show Lee the door, hanging as close to his footsteps as he dared, and worrying him as much as possible. He, however, despatched Kilpatrick with a division of cavalry to interrupt the march of the enemy, and to attack his convoys on the morning of July 4, while the infantry brigades were still busy clearing the field of battle and recovering themselves on Cemetery Ridge; at the same time an order was sent to Buford's cavalry division to march from Westminster to the South Mountain through Frederic, to assist Kilpatrick. These two officers were of a diametrically opposite temperament to Meade, and were unfettered by the grave responsibilities which often alter a subordinate's character when he reaches supreme power. Fired with the true cavalry spirit of restless aggression, they interpreted their orders in their own way, and lost not a moment in striking at the Confederate lines of communication.

The Confederate horsemen of Jones' and Robertson's brigades had occupied the pass through the hills on the morning of the 4th and received the long convoy of waggons which Lee had sent first from the battlefield, but the rain which began to fall at noon made the roads heavy and delayed the waggons on the steep inclines. When the Federal cavalry reached Emmetsburg the same afternoon, Kilpatrick heard of the movement of the convoy, and at once resumed his march to attack it. Late at night in the pouring rain and inky darkness his advanced squadrons overtook the last division of the Confederate waggons near to Monterey at the top of the pass. The fire of Jones' cavaliers sweeping the narrow roads soon threw the Federals in disorder back on to their main body. Then Kilpatrick personally rallied them and renewed the attack. The Confederates had been unable to get the waggons into Monterey, and in the narrow road the confusion was soon inextricable. The Federals succeeded in firing the carts and took some prisoners, but were

Kilpatrick's Attack on the Convoy at Monterey Springs.

unable to penetrate into Monterey village, which was solidly held by Jones' dismounted troopers. Kilpatrick drew off his squadrons by the fitful light of the waggons flaming in the storm, and retracing his steps bivouacked at the foot of the pass.

Soon after the Federal cavalry started on their expedition Stuart had taken post with the three brigades remaining at his disposal on the right flank of the army, and had thence marched southwards to cover its flank in the early morning of July 5. In order to interpose a broad zone of country between the retreating columns and their foes, he made a pounce on Emmetsburg soon after it was light. There he first heard of Kilpatrick's march, and knew that he had been forestalled. Fearing that the principal convoy of the army which had been sent through Chambersburg to Hagerstown was the objective of the Federal cavalry, Stuart marched swiftly in their track and came up with them in the neighbourhood of Smithburg, where skirmishing took place between dismounted troops of the two forces of cavalry; after this skirmish Stuart drew off so as to regain touch with his own army, while Kilpatrick pursued his course southward, in order to combine with Buford's division for an attack in force on the Confederate line of retreat.

Soon after nightfall on the 3rd, the infantry of the Second corps had fallen back on to Oak Hill, evacuating the ^{Retreat of} town of Gettysburg, which was crammed to ^{the} ~~Army.~~ overflowing with the wounded of both armies. The inhabitants had passed three days in cruel suspense trying to guess by the countenances of their enemy how the fortune of war was going. In among the gardens and outhouses were still hidden Federal fugitives of the first day's battle, one of whom was General Schimmelpfenning of the XI corps, who had hidden himself under a pile of faggots. When the Grey soldiers began to withdraw the news was joyfully conveyed to the Federals on Cemetery Hill, and their advanced posts cautiously reoccupied the town and crept forward to the foot of the heights on which the Confederate army halted.

All Saturday the 4th the two armies remained scowling

at one another across the valley which had seen the desperate fights of the 2nd and 3rd, but there had been no intermission in the preparations for retreat behind the thick curtain which the Confederate troops on Seminary Hill provided. The movements of trains had been reported by the signallers on the Round Top to Meade's headquarters, but the theory of a flank attack by Lee was still clung to, and the events reported were made to fit in with it. As twilight deepened into dusk the first move was made by the Third corps to abandon the Seminary.

The march was necessarily very slow. The same inky darkness prevailed which had embarrassed the movements of Kilpatrick. The rain beat pitilessly on the cloakless soldiers and on the wounded tightly packed in carts; the heavens wept for the fate of so many brave men, just as after the battles of Manassas, Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville. All night the First corps remained in position west of the Peach Orchard, ready to repel any attempt of the enemy, while the Second corps closed in from the left and took the place of the Third. Then the survivors of Pickett's division followed A. P. Hill, escorting more than four thousand prisoners. They in turn were followed by Hood's and McLaws' divisions, leaving the Second corps alone to confront the Federal army at break of day. Gradually the divisions of Rodes, Johnson and Early were moved off in succession, and towards noon the last Confederate soldier abandoned the scene of the glorious and fatal struggle.

The comparative ease with which this immense column was drawn off from the position, and, in spite of the darkness and rain, directed with all its waggons and its long procession of wounded and prisoners by a single road during the short hours of a July night, is as creditable to the Confederate leadership as the hesitations and delays which marked the manœuvres on the preceding days are inexplicable. The night march as described by some of the hapless wounded conveyed in rough country carts surpasses in horror even the bloodshed on the battlefield itself. Many of the patients had been carelessly bandaged and were far too seriously injured to be fit for the move. The escort

alongside was very small, since every man who could wield a rifle was wanted in the ranks in case the enemy should molest the retreating columns. When therefore the moans and cries of the tortured sufferers rose above the din of the tempest, either there was no one to help them or else the escort was too weak in numbers to render useful service. A considerable number, however, of the most serious cases were put down in the cottages beside the road; not a few were laid on the ground to die, or hastily buried in the ditch after expiring in misery. Numbers of men missed their places in the darkness and drifted along the immense column in search of their regiments, or lagged in the rear of it. In this manner the army made the first stage of its journey on the 5th; a long vulnerable procession of ambulances, carts, guns and infantry, who could only with the greatest difficulty have been deployed to offer resistance had the Federals attacked.

On the night of the 5th the advanced guard of the Confederate army passed through Monterey, and the rearward divisions slept all along the road as far as Fairfield. The charred framework of the waggons burnt by the Federal Horse and the corpses on the road gave warning that the pursuit had begun. An insignificant collision had been brought about by the pursuit of Wright's Federal division, but the bold face of Gordon's Georgians had quickly checked the Federal advance, and even induced Meade to issue orders to resist an offensive return which delayed and perplexed his corps commanders. During the day of July 6 the whole Confederate army crossed the South Mountain and turned southward through Ringgold and Leitersburg. The first great peril involved in quitting the field under the very nose of the enemy's victorious army had been successfully avoided and the confidence of the troops in their leaders and themselves was in no small measure restored. During the same interval of time important reinforcements were hurrying to join the Army of the Potomac.

The terror which the invasion had inspired in the Northern States had on the arrival of the news of the victory given place to a certain degree of presumption, which did

not, however, by any means extend to the leaders in the field. While the Cabinet at Washington was prodigal in placing all its troops and other resources at Meade's disposal, and busied itself in sending him instruction and advice at almost hourly intervals, he was cautiously debating with his principal officers as to what might next be expected from the enemy's forces, and whether he might venture to leave the strategic point at Gettysburg. Besides French's corps and the garrisons of Baltimore, detachments withdrawn from North Carolina and the militia at Harrisburg were directed to co-operate in the pursuit of the invaders. On the evening of the 5th Meade had issued orders for a march southwards in three columns in the direction of Frederic and Middletown on the eastern side of the hills, a route which was parallel to the line of Lee's retreat. The exchange of shots, however, with the Southern rearguard had induced him to cancel these orders, and July 6 passed without any considerable movement of the Federal army. The VI corps followed Early's brave division without pressing on it, and the rest of the Federal army was held in readiness to meet an attack which was little to be feared. It was not until the morning of July 7 that the march southward was resumed in earnest, and the infantry divisions pushed rapidly along the roads from Emmetsburg to Middletown and Frederic. During these two days, July 5 and 6, so precious to their chances of safe retreat, the Confederates by forced marches covered the most dangerous stage of the journey.

In the early hours of July 6 Longstreet's corps passed A. P. Hill's and turned southward as fast as possible in order to anticipate any Federal detachment at Williamsport ; towards the evening his advanced guard halted in sight of Hagerstown, which had already been raided by Northern cavalry. Ewell's veteran soldiers still continued to guard the eastern outlet of the defile, while all the long column of carts struggled through it, and the Third corps remained on the western slopes ready to extricate the Second in case of need. It was late and dark before the pass was clear and the protecting troops withdrawn to follow the First corps on the

Hagerstown road, so that the army lay down that night for its short repose on a line nearly twenty miles in length, but a start which was decisive had been gained in the race to the river.

The Federal troops at Frederic had on the 5th received orders to seize and entrench the passes of the South Mountain at Turner's and Crampton's Gaps, and to destroy the roadway over the railway bridge at Harper's Ferry. The object of these steps was to prevent Lee breaking through the mountains and seizing Harper's Ferry for his own retreat, or for an offensive movement, which Meade continued to apprehend. The too hasty destruction of the roadway over the river was destined to prove most unfortunate for the Federals in their subsequent attempts to press Lee's army, by depriving them of the ready means of throwing a portion of their forces across the stream to operate against the Confederates in the act of passing it. French methodically obeyed these orders, but made no further attempt to support the bold incursion for which Buford and Kilpatrick were preparing with the Federal cavalry, and for which Buford passed through his outposts on July 6 in the morning.

Trotting rapidly through the passes the Federal column of cavalry gained the banks of the Antietam at 2 P.M., and pushed forward small patrols to feel for the prey they expected to find. Parties of Grey horsemen were hovering on the opposite bank, and at the cross roads from Williamsport and Hagerstown a line of dismounted riflemen began to oppose serious resistance to the advance.

The long convoy escorted by FitzLee's brigade of cavalry, which had been sent by the Chambersburg pike, had marched incessantly all the 4th and 5th, hardly stopping at night for the most necessary repose. Imboden, with his brigade of cavalry, had joined the column, and although some waggons had been abandoned, it had eluded the pursuit of Gregg's cavalry division, which had followed it on the 5th. On the morning of July 6 the mass of waggons was being formed up close to the river bank at Williamsport, and it

seemed that all danger of being intercepted and captured had passed, but when Imboden's riders went down to the riverside they found the swollen waters quite unfordable and no materials for reconstructing the pontoon bridge. Up and down the stream they rode, while scouts and patrols spread out on the roads from the South Mountain to give early notice of an enemy's approach. That news was not long in coming: the advance of a strong force of Federal cavalry was signalled early in the afternoon, and the full gravity of the situation became apparent to the Confederate brigadiers, who knew that the loss of the convoy would be as serious a disaster for Lee's army as another defeat in the field. They at once prepared to offer the most stubborn resistance possible to the enemy's advance, while a detachment rode up the stream to search for boats.

Fortune favoured the brave; for, just as the crackle of carbines at St. James' College, four miles from the laager of waggons, gave notice that the attack had begun, two infantry regiments, left behind by Ewell when he crossed the frontier, appeared, having been ferried over the river in boats, and marched swiftly forward to assist in checking the Federal cavalry. A ferry was promptly established across the Potomac, which carried out of harm's way some of the baggage and wounded of the army, and brought back in return ammunition from the Virginian shore.

While the two lines of riflemen held one another in check at St. James' College about 3 P.M., another mass of Blue horsemen rose from the valley of the Antietam Creek, and moved forward to roll up the left of the Confederate line, which was staving off with difficulty the enemy in front. Nevertheless, a fierce resistance was offered; soon after 4 P.M. there came pouring along the road from Hagerstown yet another mass of horsemen, while a cloud of smoke and the din of firing proved that more forces on either side were engaged in the neighbourhood. These forces were the commands of Stuart and Kilpatrick, which had come into collision at Hagerstown, and which were now closing in on Buford's division. On the previous evening Kilpatrick, as soon as he had shaken off Stuart's unwelcome attentions,

had swept along the foot of the South Mountain and reached Boonesborough at midnight. There he was compelled to make a halt of several hours to rest and feed his horses and men. He found out the situation of the Confederate convoy, but he failed to arrive at an understanding with Buford as to the day's operations. So it happened that the efforts of the two divisions were put forth in divergent directions. While Buford marched to attack Williamsport, Kilpatrick took the road to Hagerstown, which his advanced guard occupied without difficulty, but before the rest of the division came up a flood of Grey cavalry rolled through the town, sabred or captured the intruders, and took up a strong position on foot to defend its outskirts.

Stuart had taken the road to Leitersburg after his encounter with Kilpatrick at Smithburg and there his men slept on the night of July 5, alongside of the advanced troops of Lee's infantry column. On the morning of the 6th, Longstreet's corps came through the place in a long broad stream of troops and waggons, while reports from the defile at Monterey showed that the danger at that point was over, so that the safety of the convoys became the guiding preoccupation of the Confederate leaders. In defiance of the rain and of fatigue induced by want of sleep and incessant marching, the infantry of Longstreet's corps pressed forward, and the cavalry threaded its way through the carts and troops which encumbered the road to place itself at the head of the force. Thus it happened that three o'clock in the afternoon of July 6 saw the squadrons of Kilpatrick and Stuart converging on Hagerstown, which fell into the hands of the latter, as already described. To the south Kilpatrick could hear the snarl of Buford's artillery, and he lost no time in taking his measures. A brigade and a battery were left across the pike road to hold the Confederates in check, while the rest of his command rapidly countermarched to the assistance of Buford and came into action in prolongation of his right. If Stuart had suffered himself to be fooled by this containing force, the victory of the Federal cavalry would have been

assured, but he at once penetrated the motive of his enemy's movement and hurled his squadrons on horse and on foot against the dismounted Federals with the utmost violence. After a short sharp conflict he swept them from his path. Then he sprang forward to fall on Kilpatrick's flank and rear, and, at the same hour, 5 P.M., the leading companies of the Confederate infantry trudged wearily into Hagerstown.

When Kilpatrick understood what had happened in his rear he, in concert with Buford, lost no time in drawing off his troops in the direction of Boonesborough. Stuart chased the Federal cavalry over the Antietam, and then halted his squadrons behind a line of outposts which they took up in the failing light. Undeterred by the fatigue of his men, Longstreet had marched through Hagerstown and rested that night with his advanced guard on the river bank at Williamsport and his other brigades on the roadside west of that place. The second stage of the retreat had been successfully accomplished when his soldiers came in sight of the river, but the flooded stream fed by the heavy rain still cut off the army from its base, and gave yet another unhopd-for chance to General Meade to accomplish its destruction.

The race between the two forces of cavalry had been won by the Confederates owing to Kilpatrick's failure to take the shortest way to the field of action on July 6, and also because he failed to time his movements in concert with Buford, probably because he wished to retain an independent command. It is difficult to understand why Pleasonton was not present to control and direct the pursuit, and why he did not concentrate for the purpose some of the cavalry detached under McIntosh to follow Lee's route, and under Gregg to press on the heels of the convoy through Chambersburg. The result of these mistakes was that the adversary accomplished his perilous march without important loss, and the advantage which had been gained over him by the prompt despatch of the Federal Horse from the battlefield at Gettysburg was lost. On neither flank were the Federals strong enough to strike home with any prospect of decisive success, and the long hesitation before the

advance of their infantry deprived them of the help which they ought to have been able to count on in heading off the Confederate retreating columns and convoys.

July 7 dawned in squalls of rain and rolling mist, in the midst of which the two armies held on their course. July 7. The Confederates closed up to the borough of Hagerstown, where the regiments were rested, refreshed, and supplied with cartridges, while the masses of the Federal army filled the roads between the Monocacy and the South Mountain; but although Meade had his headquarters at Frederic that night, the greater part of his army had not proceeded much further south than Emmetsburg when the sun set. The Federal commander-in-chief had already heard of the destruction of Lee's bridge and of the rising of the waters of the Potomac which prevented the passage of the river by his enemy. It is doubtful whether the situation thus forced upon him filled him with satisfaction. He was modestly aware of Lee's superiority over himself as a general, and recognised the worth of the Confederate troops; he was besides unduly impressed with the advantages of the defensive rôle and altogether failed to perceive how great opportunities could be created for overwhelming separated fractions of the enemy's army by swift marching and skilful manœuvres. He had been present with the Army of the Potomac in a number of unsuccessful attacks, and the very success which he had just unexpectedly gained went far to saturate his mind with prejudice against quitting the defensive attitude. The one event he was eager for was the departure of the invading army from the soil of the Northern States.

The disaster at Gettysburg seems to have supplied the stimulating force which put an end to the eclipse of Lee's genius. With perils thickening round him and bad news pouring in from every side his former audacity and sureness of judgment quickly returned. From his headquarters at Hagerstown on July 7 he issued orders which were to foil the plans of the Federal army and reopen the way to Southern territory. Relying on the exaggerated apprehensions of his opponent, of which he was well aware, he ordered

Stuart to assume the offensive on July 8, and to roll back the advancing tide of Federal troops to the foot of the hills; he personally spent the day in reconnoitring a defensive position to cover the point where he meant to construct another bridge. Every boat and plank that could be found on the Ohio Canal and neighbouring creeks was collected by search parties of infantry; the mass of the cavalry concentrated under Stuart's command marched out in the rain to engage the Federal advanced troops.

With four of the five brigades at his disposal the Confederate cavalry leader advanced against the Federal line of outposts on Beaver Creek, an affluent of the Antietam. Cavalry Fight on July 8. The country was so saturated with rain that rapid movements off the road were impossible, and the fight soon developed into a duel of guns and dismounted riflemen, which extended to the north and south as reinforcements came up on either side. Finally the fifth Confederate brigade which had been left on the river bank attacked the Federal left, and forced the whole hostile line to mount and retire. The retreat was skilfully conducted, and the Blue forces deliberately fell back to the spurs of the hills where they were strongly reinforced by French with infantry and artillery. The Federal cavalry having rallied behind a strong line of guns Stuart repeated his manœuvre and began to skirmish with them on foot. When he became aware of the presence of the Federal infantry, however, he drew off his squadrons and fell back to the Beaver Creek, followed at a respectful distance by the enemy; a running fight had taken place to and fro over four miles of country and had ended where it had begun, but Lee's object had been thoroughly attained. Experience had proved to the cavalry leaders on both sides that mounted combats between their respective commands were extremely costly in men and horses, but between rival forces so equally matched they were not more or less decisive than the repeated encounters on foot which characterised most of these fights, unless some unexpected and sudden event gave an opening for a charge to one side or the other.

Lee's inspection of the country resulted in his choosing

a line which extended from the Potomac above Mercersville through St. James' College to the Williamsport-Hagerstown road, beyond which his left flank would be thrown back, thus encircling Williamsport almost completely at a distance of about five miles. From right to left his position would extend more than ten miles, and to defend it he had but forty-one thousand riflemen and gunners; but Stuart's indefatigable horsemen could be counted on to render valuable help in delaying the enemy's advance and in guarding the left which was the exposed flank, if the enemy should venture to attack. All day on July 8 while the cavalry was fighting the rest of the Confederate army rested after the feat of marching which had brought it from Gettysburg to the Potomac. The Federal forces were gradually reaching the neighbourhood of Frederic, whence they also drew fresh supplies of food and ammunition.

On July 9 the Confederates marched on to the positions assigned to the three army corps by General Lee. The July 9. First corps on the right, the Third in the centre, and Ewell's trusty soldiers of the Second corps, who had so well performed the dangerous rearguard work on July 5 and 6, still held on to Hagerstown, with instructions to fall back if attacked. The cavalry watched with its patrols the course of the Antietam, but Stuart gave over the defence of the right wing to Longstreet and drew his brigades off towards the north ready to check any turning movement the Federals might try against Hagerstown. The rain ceased during the day.

No important advance of the Federal army took place on July 9, but on the following day the whole of Meade's July 10. army began the passage of the South Mountain while their enemies digged and delved on the works which were to enable them to keep their long position intact. The Blue cavalry resumed its activity, and pushing its incursions into the country west of Antietam, soon knocked up against Confederate infantry posts. Pleasonton accordingly imitated his opponent and drew the bulk of his troops off northwards. The moment had now come when Meade must decide whether or no to interfere seriously with the retreat of his

enemy. His army had been reinforced to a strength of sixty-five thousand infantry and artillery, and he still had about one thousand more cavalry than Lee. The situation closely resembled that of September 1862 when McClellan had marched to the battle of the Antietam; but McClellan had disposed of ninety thousand men against a force no larger than that which now confronted Meade. Was he justified in hazarding all that had been won by an offensive battle? Meade thought not, and fortified his own opinion by repeated consultations more or less formal with his principal generals, who liked the look of the Southern army less the nearer they approached it. On the other hand, each day brought him some accession of strength. The militia levies in the Cumberland Valley and the troops detached under General Kelly at Hancock, some eight thousand in number, were closing in on the flank and rear of the Confederate army, whose retreat was still barred by the flooded stream; but the most urgent motive which drove the Federal general to action was the tone of the despatches which poured in on him from Washington.

On July 5 a despatch from President Davis to General Lee had fallen into the hands of the enemy. This document revealed in all its nakedness and even exaggerated the defenceless state of Virginia, and the inability of the Government to reinforce their field army. It was a curious coincidence that the careless loss of an important despatch had done so much to mar the prospects of the Confederate invasion in the preceding year. Emboldened by the contents of this despatch, as McClellan had been by the other, the authorities at Washington rightly concluded that now if ever was the time to strike a great offensive blow, and public opinion throughout the North clamoured in support. For once the opinion of these men, who had already shown such conspicuous ignorance and inability to comprehend warlike matters was more correct than that of the leaders in the field. It is by no means certain that Meade would have gained any important success over Lee, but it was very unlikely that the Federal army would have been disastrously defeated. At worst it could have retired behind the South

Mountain and held the passes, while it could far better have afforded the cost of a sanguinary drawn battle than the Army of Northern Virginia, whose reduced numbers daily became more and more precious.

From exhortations Halleck finally passed to a peremptory order which reached Meade on July 12, bidding him not to assemble his generals to hear their opinions, but to take his orders; and to attack the Confederate army in Maryland so as to prevent its 'escape.'

During July 11 the Confederates established themselves strongly on the line they meant to defend covering their July 11. extended front with trenches and breast-works. Hagerstown was evacuated by Ewell and each corps defended one of the three roads which led to Williamsport from the east, while a line of picquets kept the Federal patrols at a distance of half a mile. The bridge at Falling Waters was completely reconstructed; during the night and on the following day a ceaseless procession of carts conveyed the trains of the army into safety.

On the Federal side extreme caution marked the advance; the line of the Antietam was passed at length and July 12. outposts thrown across the Sharpsburg-Hagerstown pike in touch with the enemy. It was not until the following morning that the Blue cavalry reoccupied Hagerstown, which Stuart had evacuated to cover the left flank of his army. Meade had taken two days to advance twelve miles unopposed. The morning of July 12 broke misty and gloomy; clouds of vapour hid the Confederate position, which had become so strong that Lee hoped to be attacked. His troops had rested and were once more eager for battle in the confident belief they could avenge the repulse at Gettysburg. The day passed, however, without serious fighting, although the attempts of the Federal generals to investigate the positions of their enemy led to some skirmishing. In the evening Halleck's directions to assume the offensive reached Meade, and might have been considered to have relieved him of responsibility in the matter. They influenced him so far as to issue instructions for an attack after feeling the Confederate line at a number of points.

On July 13, however, the rain began again and induced the cautious general to believe that the evasion of his opponent must once more be perforce delayed. He accordingly again put off the contemplated assault for which every preparation had been made; but Lee was now resolved to go. The approach of hostile forces from the Upper Potomac and from Chambersburg, the reinforcements which were known to be joining Meade, were daily changing the balance of strength still further to his disadvantage, and the falling rain renewed the danger of being reduced to the precarious communication of a single pontoon bridge for his whole army. On the 13th, therefore, every preparation was made to disappear during the night; the infantry lay ready to man the works and two hundred guns grinned at the Federal advanced guard like the teeth of a wild animal at bay.

At the Federal headquarters courage had at last been brought up to the striking point: the morrow was to see July 13. another decisive battle. All along the extended lines sentries peered anxiously across the narrow zone which divided the two armies, while dispositions were made for the contemplated attack by closing up the infantry divisions opposite to the points of the enemy's line which it was intended to assail, and by distributing ammunition and surgical appliances. Every sort of building and barn was filled with troops, but the greater part of the army had to be content with the shelter of the dripping trees, and the horses stood in the open exposed to the rain and rising wind. At the Federal headquarters anxious deliberations were still in progress. The advance of the army had been so cautiously conducted that little opportunity had been given to a Confederate attack had such a venture been attempted by Lee; but on the other hand the waste of time had given the enemy ample leisure to entrench and to reopen his communications. Humphreys, who had succeeded Butterfield as Chief of the Federal Staff, had already proved himself a skilful troop leader, but he lacked the experience of managing the staff of a large army, and of combining its movements on a big scale. Many of the officers who had hitherto assisted in

these all-important duties were slain or in hospital, and the doubts and hesitations of the commanding general communicated themselves to some of the subordinate leaders. The troops, however, were in excellent spirits and received with joy the orders which precluded another general action.

As the misty grey of the rainy afternoon merged into dusk the cavalry regiments of Stuart's command silently relieved the infantry outposts, and spread a thin veil of dismounted riflemen in front of the Second corps. The stormy weather rendered an attack improbable and so far favoured the Confederate evasion, but the darkness greatly increased the difficulties of their movements. Ewell's corps was ordered to ford the river at Williamsport, while all the artillery with one brigade crossed by the bridge; then Longstreet was to follow the guns, and finally the Third corps. The cavalry was directed to follow Ewell through the ford. Thus the movement was ordered to be executed in two columns.

It was already dark when Johnson's leading companies reached the river bank, and it was impossible to say how long the stream which was rising fast would remain passable. The tallest men sprang into the water and waded across, while huge bonfires were lighted on the banks to guide them. The rain and the wind put out these beacons from time to time, so that they only threw a fitful glare of light on the dark waters and on the struggling file of soldiers trying hard to keep their rifles and cartridge-boxes out of the water. A line of men was formed to stem the current, and many of the smaller were carried over on the shoulders of the taller soldiers with the water up to their armpits.

The passage was but slowly effected, and it was six o'clock before the tail of Early's, the last division, reached the southern shore and the cavalry squadrons began to splash and flounder through the water; not a single man, however, was lost at the ford.

At the same hour that the Second corps marched by the pike road to the ford at Williamsport Longstreet's infantry moved by country roads, which were little better than quag-

mires after the rain, to the bridge of boats. Besides the infantry there were still a number of guns and some waggons sandwiched in among the troops. One of the latter filled with wounded went over the side of the bridge and broke its framework, causing a delay of two hours before it could be repaired. During this time a mass of troops were collected on the steep bank which had hidden the bridge from Federal reconnoitring parties. They huddled together in the darkness and rain, or sat down in pools of water from sheer weariness, and many slept. Torches had been fixed along the roadway which flickered in the gale, but the light thus obtained was very inadequate for the purpose, and the grey of the morning still found half the infantry of the First corps, and all the Third, massed beside the stream waiting their turn, while the enemy's troops, but six miles distant, might any moment discover that the works in front of them had been abandoned. At last the bridge was clear of Longstreet's brigades and there remained but A. P. Hill's two divisions to cross; for two of his divisions reduced by the losses at Gettysburg had been merged into one under the command of Heth. At nine o'clock, just as the passage of the Confederate rearguard began, the sharp fire of Federal skirmishers brought it to an abrupt conclusion and forced the regiments to man a line of hasty entrenchments thrown up a mile inland from the bridge. The interruption was caused by an advance of Federal Horse, which was easily checked, and the march across the bridge was resumed.

A bright look-out had been kept along the front of the Federal army all night, but so silently and skilfully had the withdrawal of the enemy been effected that nothing was heard to rouse suspicion. With the dawn of day some cavalry patrols advanced to feel for the enemy and found nothing. A negro from Williamsport reached the Federal lines to tell of the fording of the river by large forces, but although these reports were conveyed to Meade by half-past six, he either disbelieved them or intentionally refrained from taking action on them. Kilpatrick and Buford unsupported by infantry still clung to the trail of the quarry they had hunted so staunchly since the beginning of the campaign,

and advancing cautiously, Kilpatrick's men first came up with the Confederate rearguard under Heth on the road from St. James' College. On the road from Hagerstown Blue horsemen reached the ford in time to see FitzLee's cavalry brigade dismounted on the bluffs of the Virginian shore, and wringing the water from their clothes, while the tail of an infantry column was disappearing inland. In the belief that they had only to deal with a weak rearguard some Federal squadrons charged along the road to Falling Waters and one pierced its way in among Pettigrew's brigade. In the short *mêlée* which followed all the horsemen were killed or taken, but the gallant Pettigrew, who had survived the carnage of Gettysburg, was mortally hurt.

It was not until ten o'clock that the orders to advance reached the Federal army corps which set the whole army in July 14, motion. A rapid advance all along the line would 10 A.M. even then have probably effected the capture of a Confederate division at any rate, but no serious attempt was made to come to blows; the cavalry, however, pressed upon the retiring troops, picked up stragglers and cut off small detachments here and there. Lane's brigade was the last to cross the bridge, and manfully the North Carolina men kept off the swarming skirmishers of the Federal cavalry. At length their turn came, and the last fraction of the invading host quitted the soil which had been sanctified by the blood of so many gallant soldiers of both armies. It was past noon when the last Confederate soldier crossed the frontier stream and the bridge was withdrawn.

With the passage of the Potomac by the Confederate army closed that period in the history of the war during which the issue really hung in the balance. Thenceforward a steady march of events sapped the vital strength of the Confederacy and ultimately compelled the surrender of her valiant armies. If the war had been confined to the struggle which followed on the soil of Virginia, it is hard to say whether the Northern victory would ever have been gained; but the occupation by the western army under General Sherman of the places whence the Government at Richmond drew the means of resistance finally broke up the military

power of the Southern States. The campaign of 1864 around Richmond was as remarkable for bold strategy and for gallant fighting as the one we have described, but never again did the Federal Government give their adversaries the chance of winning a decisive victory on Northern territory. The appointment of Grant as commander-in-chief, and the military policy which he had authority to carry out, of pinning all the Confederate armies down to the defence of Richmond and its railway connection with Georgia and the Carolinas by ceaseless and energetic offensive, decided the war; and it is probable that no other strategy would have achieved the victory.

In measuring the degree of success or failure which should be attributed to Lee's invasion of the North from the point of view of military science, all depends upon what is taken to be the object he had in view. It is easy to see by the light of subsequent events that the tactical victory on the field of Gettysburg, which was within his reach, not only might have ended the war, but that it was the only such chance he was destined to get. Yet neither the instructions which he had received, nor the means placed at his disposal, warranted the Confederate general to expect a decisive result. It was rather a raid on an immense scale than an invasion which the Southern army undertook when it crossed the border. The progress of events, the opportunities they offered, and the confident audacity of his troops, induced Lee to play for the maximum; but it was not until he reached the field of Gettysburg on July 1 that he took this resolution. In no small measure this delay in appreciating the strategical situation compromised the success of the campaign. Aggressive war does not admit of half-heartedness in design or execution; to strike without hesitation and with all available force is an essential condition of success.

If the expedition be treated as a raid it was successful in the highest degree. Cattle, horses, clothing and warlike stores of all kinds, without which the army could scarcely have kept the field much longer, were captured in abundance. The loss of men, though it bore most heavily on the South, was yet so severe for the Federal army as to forbid the

cautious Meade from any attempt to resume the offensive on a decisive battlefield until next winter's rains had come and gone, and the resolute Grant had been chosen to the supreme command of the armies of the Union. The loss in superior officers, the skilled workmen of the military machinery, had been especially severe. On the Confederate side seventeen generals commanding divisions and brigades had fallen, including Hood and Pender, Pettigrew, Armistead, Garnett, and Barksdale, who had been left in a dying condition in the hands of the enemy where he fell. Archer and W. F. Lee were prisoners. Five Federal generals were killed, of whom Reynolds was the most distinguished in rank and capacity. Ten were wounded, including Hancock, the soul of the defence at Gettysburg, and Sickles, who lost a limb and could serve no longer. Two were led into captivity with the mournful procession of wounded and prisoners which crossed the Potomac; though a yet longer column of Southern soldiers wound its way eastward on the Baltimore pike. Among regimental and staff officers of subordinate rank the loss had been proportionately great.

The respect inspired by the daring attacks of the Confederates had much to do with the cautious dispositions of the Federal headquarters after Gettysburg. A great chance was missed in the retreat from the battlefield itself when a single long column had perforce to offer its flank to the Federal attacks. The brilliant work of Stuart's Horse saved the first of Lee's convoys, and prevented the point of passage over the river from being seized by the Federal cavalry. Protected by their cavalry, the weary foot-soldiers who had tramped from the battlefield were able to recover from their exhaustion and to take post on the strong defensive line chosen by Lee on July 8, while Stuart was driving in the Federal horsemen; so that when McLaws rode through his bivouacs in the evening and inquired from groups of his men how they felt for another battle, and whether they could meet an attack in force of the Federals, they replied in chorus, 'We'll make the fields blue with them.'

The night of July 13 was also a critical one for the Southern army. Had Meade's troops kept touch with their

enemy's outposts by frequent small attacks at different points during the night, it would have been well-nigh impossible for them to have reached the river bank without the move being discovered, and a night attack on the troops in the act of crossing either by the ford or the pontoon bridge might have reproduced the horrors of the Beresina or of Leipzig. To have delivered such an attack would have been extremely difficult in the darkness of the stormy night but not impossible, and the destruction of a considerable fraction of the enemy's army was an object which would have justified the hazard. Each great event of the war illustrates the same broad principles of action: the need of co-operation between cavalry and infantry, and the fact that while every army which advances or retires must pass through awkward and critical times, yet these chances are reduced to a minimum by skilful leadership, and they must be keenly sought for and instantly taken advantage of if great successes are to be won. Cavalry that can obtain information both by scouting and fighting, generals and staff capable of appreciating it and acting swiftly upon it, as well as infantry capable of rapid marching, are indispensable instruments for the defeat of such a general as Lee in command of such troops as he led, even when greatly outnumbered.

The retreat from Pennsylvania and the losses of the army in battle came as a heavy blow to the Southern people on the top of the yet graver disaster by the Mississippi; but the tidings were received with courage which has never been surpassed in the history of war, and the six months' respite from invasion obtained by Lee's expedition was turned to account in preparing for prolonged resistance. After a few days the troops which retreated from Gettysburg recovered their confidence; they remembered their former triumphs and made light of their failure. Every Southern rifleman recalled with pride that with equal numbers on July 1, and with greatly inferior numbers on the 2nd, he had attacked and captured hostile positions of great natural strength partially fortified. The disaster of July 3 was easily forgiven to chiefs who had so often performed what appeared to be impossible in snatching victory from the

jaws of defeat. An army is like a pack of hounds; it loves the huntsman who shows it good sport.

So far as we are able to judge, another Confederate army corps would have turned the scale in the Gettysburg campaign even with every fault that was committed, and those faults were in no small degree due to lack of sufficient numbers. The fatal mistake of leaving behind the cavalry brigades of Jones and Robertson was induced by the fact that the long and vulnerable line of communication through the Shenandoah Valley was almost destitute of troops and within easy reach of hostile raids. So much blood spilt in vain, so much heroism which failed of its object, when the comrades who could have settled the matter were engaged at places of subsidiary importance or attempting the impossible in a distant corner of the theatre of war, form the tragedy of the story; the history of the prolonged struggle should drive home the lesson that no skill of the leaders in the field, no heroism in the humbler ranks, can be counted on to redress the blunders of supreme authority, and that when a nation goes to war it is of vital necessity to bring its whole resources to bear under the most capable direction obtainable.

The relations between the generals of the two armies which fought at Gettysburg and their respective Governments after the campaign are not without interest. The people of the North were bitterly disappointed when they heard of Lee's successful retreat, and raised the clamour which is often heard on such occasions. Halleck telegraphed a despatch to Meade which could only be regarded by that general as a direct censure, and which was clothed in somewhat irritating language. Meade in reply telegraphed the resignation of his command, and drew from Halleck another despatch stating that no censure had been intended, but only a stimulus to greater activity, and that it was not deemed a sufficient reason for his resignation. Setting aside the general question as to how far he might have interfered with the march to the Potomac, it must be admitted that the Washington authorities had more reason than on former occasions for their displeasure, seeing that Meade had failed to comply with a positive order.

Lee also resigned his command. In his report on Gettysburg he assumed full responsibility for the defeat of July 3, and for the comparative failure of the campaign. The reply of the Southern President was as wise as it was generous: there was no man in the service of the Southern States who so entirely held the confidence of the army and nation. Lee had therefore to remain at his post, and right well did he justify the decision. The mighty campaign of 1864 before Richmond was as much a masterpiece of defensive warfare as Napoleon's campaign in 1814, and excelled Lee's own performances at the beginning of the war, remembering that each battle reduced his gallant army, while the gaps he tore in the ranks of the enemy were quickly filled. Lastly and chiefly, he had no Jackson, as in 1862, and as in the spring campaign of 1863, to execute his fine conceptions; but Lee never repeated the mistake he made at Gettysburg of imposing on less able men the tasks of Stonewall Jackson.

*Extract from the letter dated Camp Orange, August 8, 1863, from
General Lee to President Davis*

. . . I have been prompted by these reflections more than once since my return from Pennsylvania to propose to your Excellency the propriety of selecting another commander for this army. I have seen and heard of expressions of discontent in the public journals at the result of the expedition. I do not know how far this feeling extends in the army. My brother officers have been too kind to report it, and so far the troops have been too generous to exhibit it. It is fair, however, to suppose that it does exist, and success is so necessary to us, that nothing should be risked to secure it.

I therefore in all sincerity request your Excellency to take measures to supply my place. I do this with the more earnestness because no one is more aware than myself of my inability for the duties of my position. I cannot even accomplish what I myself desire. How can I fulfil the expectations of others?

In addition I sensibly feel the growing failure of my bodily strength. I have not yet recovered from the attack I experienced in the past spring. I am becoming more and more incapable of exertion, and am thus prevented from making the personal examination, and giving the personal supervision to the operations in the field which I feel to be necessary. I am so dull that in making use of the eyes of others I am frequently misled. . . .

The general remedy for the want of success in a military commander

is his removal. This is natural and in many instances proper. For no matter what may be the ability of the officer, if he loses the confidence of his troops, disaster must sooner or later ensue.

Extract from the Reply of Jefferson Davis

Richmond: August 11, 1863.

. . . I am truly sorry to know that you still feel the effects of the illness you suffered last spring, and can readily understand the embarrassments you experience in using the eyes of others, having been so much accustomed to make your own reconnaissances. . . . I do not doubt the readiness with which you would give way to one who could accomplish all that you have wished, and you will do me justice to believe that if Providence should kindly offer such a person for our use, I would not hesitate to avail myself of his services.

My sight is not sufficiently penetrating to discover such hidden merit if it exists. . . . To ask me to substitute you by someone in my judgment more fit to command, or who would possess more of the confidence of the army or of the reflecting men in the country, is to demand an impossibility. . . .

CHAPTER X

MEADE'S CAMPAIGN IN NORTHERN VIRGINIA

Back to the Rappahannock—Lack of Federal Recruits—Riots in New York—Longstreet sent to Tennessee—Cavalry Outposts on the Rappahannock—Morgan's Disastrous Raid—Meade's Advance to Culpeper—The Battle of Chickamauga: September 20—Both Lee and Meade try to Attack: October 9—Summary of the Campaign of Marches: October 9—The Events of October 10—October 11—October 12—October 13—October 14—October 15—The Retreat of Lee to the Rapidan—Stuart's Adventure—The Pursuit continued—The sharp Fight at Bristow Station—Warren's skilful Leadership—Repulse of Confederates—Warren Disappears—Lee's Retreat—Meade's Offensive Plans—Situation of the Armies: November 5, 1863—Meade forces the Passage of the Rappahannock: November 7—November 7, 1 P.M.—The Night Attack—Retreat of Confederates—The Line of the Rapidan—Meade's Dispositions to cross the Rapidan—Lee's Dispositions: November 27—The Western Edge of the Wilderness—The Mine Run—The Events of November 27—November 28—November 29—November 30—December 1—Comments on the Campaign.

ELEVEN months elapsed after the battles at Gettysburg before the Army of the Potomac stood once more in sight of the spires of Richmond, to prosecute the enterprise which was destined to bring about the fall of the gallant city and with it the whole fabric of the Confederacy. The road which was traversed in the interval led the army through two campaigns fought against the Army of Northern Virginia, the first of which occasioned less fighting and was therefore less costly in life than any of its previous expeditions, while the second was of exactly the opposite character, for it led to severer and more sanguinary struggles, renewed from day to day and barely suspended for the few sultry hours of the summer nights, than any campaign of the same length and of the same proportion in history.

Back to
the
Rappa-
hannock.

It was not altogether hidden from the eyes of Lincoln and his advisers that Lee's failure at Gettysburg and retreat thence presented the best possible opportunity for striking home at his reduced forces with the whole might of the Union. If orders, despatches and advice could have enabled Meade to crush his mighty adversary, Lee would have fallen an easy victim in those July days; but the course of events interposed a long delay before another decisive struggle between the contending armies could be brought about in Virginia; nor could this untoward result have been prevented altogether by any exercise of wisdom or energy on the part of the Federal generals and rulers.

Launched in pursuit of the Confederate army, Meade actually crossed the Potomac at Harper's Ferry on July 17 and 18; taking advantage of the protection which the deep waters of the Shenandoah afforded to his exposed flank, he transferred his whole army to the eastern slope of the Blue Ridge, intending by a rapid march southward to secure the passes, and thus to cut off Lee's army from Richmond, or force upon it another offensive battle. The scheme failed. Lee by a clever disposition of his rearguard induced Meade to strike at it through Manassas Gap, where a small force held up the Federal army for several hours; in the meanwhile the Confederate main body traversed the mountain chain by passes further south, and successfully reached the small boroughs of Culpeper, Madison Court-house and Orange Court-house. Meade, finding that his enemy had slipped from the Valley, and was once more facing him athwart the principal line of communication from north to south in Virginia, concentrated his army between Warrenton and Warrenton Junction, where it could be easily supplied by rail.

The severe fighting and long marches which had brought the Federal army back victorious to the Rappahannock had, however, used up the forces of men and material to an important degree. Meade required drafts of men for his regiments, remounts and equipment for his cavalry, but just at this time the Federal Government was in its greatest difficulties to find soldiers trained or un-

Lack of
Federal
Recruits.

trained to replace the ever-increasing expenditure of human life. As service in the war had become less popular and the dearth of recruits more pronounced, the bounties offered to attract them had increased: every possible experiment had been tried in terms of enlistment and length of engagement, but the Conscription Act had not as yet been enforced. It remained as a rod in pickle for those States which failed to produce their quota of men. Early in July 1863 a number of volunteers who had enlisted for nine months only claimed their discharge. Men clamoured for the right to leave the army and held back from re-enlisting in the hope of the bounties being raised yet higher, or of being able to obtain a round sum of money for substituted service in place of wealthy men whom the conscription might catch, but who might be glad to pay high rather than join the army. This state of things produced so alarming a check in the flow of recruiting that the Government resolved to enforce their right to raise conscripts.

The invasion of Pennsylvania had not only attracted the whole field army of the Union but had compelled the Riots in New York. governors of the neighbouring States to send their militia forces to its help; consequently when the ballot offices were opened in New York and in the other great cities for the conscription there were neither troops nor militia available to preserve order and to enforce the law. In New York city, where the war had never been popular, and which complained of being rated unfairly high in the quota of men required of it, advantage was taken of the impotence of the authorities to resist them by force. The offices were wrecked and burnt, and the officials had to fly for their lives; a certain number of armouries were pillaged and liquor shops sacked. That night heavy rain quelled the excitement of the mob, but the following day, encouraged by impunity, it renewed the riots. The foolish policy of firing with blank ammunition on the rioters having had the natural result of infuriating without intimidating them, the state of things in New York itself and in other places became very serious. What might have proved a formidable insurrection was, however, held in check by

the hundred and fifty regular soldiers from the garrison of Fort Lafayette who cleared the streets by firing rapid volleys upon the insurgents, but not before much blood had been shed and much property destroyed, including an immense establishment for the education of negro children, which was burnt to the ground by the mob. Instead of receiving reinforcements, Meade's army in Virginia was required to send a whole division of the XI corps to New York, and detachments of considerable strength from the other corps to restore order and enforce the conscription. At the same time the cavalry command was sent to Washington, one brigade at a time, to be refitted with equipment and remounts. Thus reduced in strength the army was ordered to remain on the defensive, limiting its aggressive movements to demonstrations calculated to detain the enemy; a large number of officers and soldiers were allowed to go home on leave.

On August 1 Meade sent a strong division of cavalry under Buford to beat up the enemy and, if possible, cut up the Southern brigade of cavalry at Culpeper. The Confederates reinforced their horsemen and successfully evaded Buford, but the demonstration answered its purpose. Lee withdrew his infantry south of the Rapidan, leaving cavalry posts to watch the Rappahannock. The Southern army too was glad of the respite from hostilities, and as a reward for their services a liberal proportion of furloughs was granted to the troops. So the month of August passed and the first week of September; both armies reposed cantoned in the small towns of the district or bivouacking in the shade of the splendid forests which surrounded them. Men and horses rested their nerves and their limbs, having no more formidable enemies to ward off than the hosts of midges and mosquitoes which haunt the river valleys of Virginia in the hot weather; this blissful truce was first interrupted by news of an impending crisis in the western theatre of war.

After the surrender of Vicksburg with the large Confederate army invested there, the whole of Grant's forces became available for fresh enterprises, and they were at once directed by that energetic leader to assure Federal

supremacy along the coast of the Gulf of Mexico. At the same time the Cabinet of Richmond had exerted itself to the utmost in the task of reinforcing the army under Longstreet sent to Tennessee. General Bragg which was confronting Rosecrans. The decree of the Southern Congress which placed every male between the ages of eighteen and forty-five at the disposal of the State had been enforced to fill the muster rolls, and finally it was determined to transfer Longstreet's army corps, less the remnants of Pickett's division, in order to strike a smashing blow at Rosecrans before Grant could come to his rescue.

The news that two of Longstreet's divisions had been sent westward by rail, and that Pickett's division had been brought to Petersburg in order to cover the railway junctions, reached Meade's headquarters on September 9; he instantly resolved to attack without even consulting Halleck and set his scattered troops in motion concentrically towards Culpeper Court-house. The opportunity was indeed a good one, for the absence of the First corps and of many men on furlough had reduced Lee's total strength to three thousand cavalry and thirty-eight thousand infantry and artillery.

After Gettysburg the Southern cavalry had been re-organised in two divisions commanded by Hampton and FitzLee respectively, who were raised to the rank of major-general. Each division consisted of three brigades, and each brigade of four regiments. Cavalry Outposts on the Rappahannock. The failure of the invasion was believed to be due in a very large measure to the absence of co-operating cavalry from the infantry corps, and in spite of the general dearth of soldiers in the South the cavalry arm was increased to a greater strength than hitherto, but of both men and horses a large proportion was away on leave in the middle of September. Service in the cavalry had become so popular that it was possible to find volunteers for it in greater numbers even than before who brought their own horses.

The work done by Stuart and his men since the beginning of the war had justly earned the fame which they enjoyed. The daring raids round the enemy's flanks and

across his communications were the events which had caught the popular imagination, but the less dramatic though far more difficult and laborious duty of checking the hostile cavalry, of watching a broad zone of country so as to hide all friendly forces and quickly discover the movements of the enemy, had been executed with skill and precision never yet equalled in civilised war. It was this curtain which had clung to the Federal advanced troops and which had made possible Lee's daring strategy against McClellan, Pope and Hooker, by effectually hiding the Confederate columns until they were far on their way. Its absence had been just as important in the recent duel with Meade.

While the Southern army stood on the defensive along the Rappahannock, Stuart had fifty miles of the river with its numerous fords to watch. From the railway at Rappahannock Station to Falmouth, which a branch line connected with the Federal depot at Aquia Creek, is but forty miles to march by road. At any time the Federals could mass their troops for an advance along either railway, and by extending a few miles below Fredericksburg or above Rappahannock Station could turn the defensive line. To screen this operation in 1863 and 1864 the Northern commander wielded a corps of cavalry not only half as numerous again as Stuart's, but which improved every month until it became little if at all inferior in horsemanship and skill at arms to the Southerners. Nevertheless the short start which Hooker gained on Stuart in the Chancellorsville campaign, when the Confederates had reduced their strength to a very dangerous extent, was Stuart's only failure in the all-important duty of information and security. The most remarkable part of the performance is that in spite of the severe work, want of forage, and desperate straits to which the Southerners were reduced to shoe their horses, yet the ranks continued to be solid on the day of battle and the expenditure of horseflesh was astonishingly small.

It is a pity that more detailed records do not exist of what is perhaps the best example extant of cavalry outpost-work. We know, however, that all pedantry was put

aside; no stupidity or working by rule of thumb was allowed to shield men too lazy to use their wits. Messages were for the most part sent verbally. Small posts were as small as the task in question required. The soldiers being almost all accomplished horsemen knew how to get the most out of their horses and to look after them in the rough bivouacs. The greatest economy prevailed in distributing work. Pickets were posted on ground which it was intended to deny to the enemy and where their fire could be effective; they were not scattered over the country in a geometrical pattern. The general principle of the outpost line was a triple chain, the part nearest to the enemy being a line of small posts of observation, which were generally designed to act as moveable patrols too when occasion required. Secondly came the pickets, which held the roads, fords and all other paths likely to be used by the enemy; and thirdly, the fighting units, which would generally be a brigade quartered together and ready to turn out at the first alarm, within an hour's rapid ride of the most threatened point. The work of the patrols was especially skilful and successful. They were often led by officers of the highest rank; Stuart himself delighted in daring reconnaissance of the enemy's position. It was by such a reconnaissance that Stuart and FitzLee found out the weakness of Hooker's right flank at Chancellorsville, and other chances for decisive attacks were also discovered by the same dashing tactics.

The armament of the Confederate cavalry was feeble indeed compared with the volume of fire which present-day cavalry can deliver; but the ease with which the soldiers handled their horses, the skill with which they turned to account the tactical situation by fighting on foot or on horse, with fire or shock, in defence or attack, constantly imposed on the superior numbers of the enemy, and throughout the war contributed an essential share to the prolonged resistance of the South.

In sharp contrast to the good use made by Stuart of his power the futile expedition made by Morgan through Tennessee stands out as an example of how cavalry should not be expended. At the end of June Morgan was in

command of a strong brigade of cavalry which belonged to Bragg's army, and which was needed to cover the offensive stroke then contemplated against Rosecrans. Without obtaining Bragg's sanction Morgan gave the slip to the Federal outposts, traversed Tennessee and penetrated into the heart of Kentucky. Like the other raids this one had no leisure to effect permanent harm to the enemy. Hue and cry gathered troops of all sorts in pursuit, and remarkable though the raid was as an extraordinary feat of hard marching across formidable natural barriers, yet the inconvenience to the Federals was as nothing to the severe loss the Confederate army sustained when Morgan's command was hemmed in, cut up and finally captured. His object had been to unite with Lee's army in Pennsylvania, where he hoped to collect in arms the sympathisers of the Southern cause and all who were discontented with the Federal authority. The scheme was foolish not only because it was too hazardous, but because Morgan and his horsemen were at least as badly wanted by Bragg in Tennessee as by Lee in Pennsylvania.

Uniting two cavalry divisions on the plain between Brandy Station and the Rappahannock, which had already been so often fought over by the rival cavalries, and which was as well known to them as a drill-ground, Meade's Advance to Culpeper. Pleasanton attempted to surprise the Confederates at Culpeper, but the two brigades with a battery there under Lomax fought a good rearguard action and cleared out with the loss of three guns and some prisoners. The Federal infantry then occupied the country between the Rapidan and Rappahannock with the intention of continuing their march southward, but Meade on September 15 received peremptory orders from Halleck to stop. The situation in Tennessee had filled the Federal Government with alarm, and it was unwilling to risk the result of a big battle in Virginia while the issue was doubtful in the West, although the reduction of Lee's army gave a very favourable chance of gaining a decided victory, and sound strategy would have dictated an energetic offensive for the very reasons which induced Halleck to hug the defensive. Meade therefore contented

himself with reoccupying the line of the Rapidan ; he made Culpeper the central station for the distribution of supplies and grouped his whole army round the little town.

Following closely on Halleck's order to halt came the news of the battle of Chickamauga fought by the combined forces of Bragg and Longstreet against the Federals under Rosecrans, which went near to destroying the Federal army, and which compelled the Unionists to concentrate their forces in haste. Meade was ordered to send the XI and XII corps at once to Washington, whence they were conveyed by train to the West under Hooker. From the Mississippi Valley Grant hurried all available troops under Sherman to the point of danger. Thus reduced in strength both armies in Virginia accepted an extension of the lull in the fighting on the Rapidan.

In the meanwhile men and horses had steadily been flowing into both rival camps. Nine thousand men rejoined Lee in a month, while drafts of recruits and the return of the detachments sent to enforce the conscription brought the Army of the Potomac up to seventy thousand men. The former proportion of numbers having been re-established it occurred to the commander of each army at the same time to strike at his opponent. The first movement of the Federal corps having been interpreted by the watchful Confederate outposts as a further reduction of their army, Lee resolved to play the same bold game which had succeeded so well against Pope in the same district. FitzLee's cavalry division with a small force of infantry was left to hold the Rapidan as a screen while the corps of Ewell and Hill marched round the Federal right flank, with the intention of falling on their communications with Washington, and of compelling Meade to fight an offensive battle near Manassas to reopen them. For several reasons it would be more difficult thus to deal with Meade than it had been to fool Pope. The former was not only an abler general, but the fate of the latter was before his eyes as a warning. In August 1862 Lee held the line of the Rappahannock, in October 1863 he was thrust south of the Rapidan

The
Battle of
Chicka-
mauga.
Septem-
ber 20.

Both Lee
and Meade
try to At-
tack.
October 9.

and would have much further to go to reach the enemy's flank and rear. Unfortunately for the South a message from their principal signal post on Clark's Mountain was read by the enemy and revealed the scheme, but the first measures of the Federal commander were not calculated to diminish his danger.

While the Confederate columns were pressing on their way Meade rashly divided his forces; French's corps and Gregg's division of cavalry were left at Culpeper to cover his right, while the rest of the army continued its movement of concentration to attack Lee in the neighbourhood of Orange Court-house.

Summary of the Campaign of Marches. October 9. An analysis of the movements of the contending forces from October 9 to 20 is of the highest technical interest as a demonstration of how far skill in manœuvre can go towards gaining important strategic advantages over an energetic and wary opponent. A brief summary of the eleven days' operations will make it easier to follow a more detailed narrative. On October 9 Hill's corps, after a détour south-west in order to deceive the enemy, reached Madison; in the evening the Southern cavalry drove in Federal pickets on the James City road.

October 10. On October 10 Lee concentrated at Madison. Hampton's cavalry division had a sharp fight with Kilpatrick's horsemen at Thoroughfare Mountain in which the Confederates were victorious and captured two thirds of an infantry regiment sent to reinforce the Federal Horse. At night the Confederate advanced guard held James City. The Federal infantry advancing to the fords of the Rapidan were halted by Meade, who at length had become convinced that Lee was massing troops against his right flank. Buford's cavalry division had crossed the Rapidan at Germanna Ford and had ridden up the right bank in order to assist the general advance. Owing to the change of plans Buford found no friendly infantry at the fords, but was vigorously attacked by FitzLee's cavalry charged with the duty of blindfolding the Federals along the Rapidan. Buford was glad to retreat with some loss. While these

cavalry fights were taking place Hill's army corps had pushed on to Griffinsburg and Lee ordered his two wings to converge on Culpeper next morning, where he hoped to have a battle.

But Meade had taken alarm ; during the night and early morning his forces converged on Culpeper, while his cavalry October 11. delayed the advance of Lee's columns. During the afternoon and evening the Federal army regained the banks of the Rappahannock. Lee occupied Culpeper at noon but was obliged to halt in order to distribute rations to his men. Now Culpeper is linked to Washington by the railway and by the turnpike road so often trodden by armed legions in this long struggle. Warrenton Junction is twenty-four miles distant by rail, and Warrenton twenty-nine miles by the turnpike road from Culpeper. This road and one parallel to it were available to Lee, and the railway to Meade. The devastated state of the country, however, threw the entire burden of feeding troops on to the supply service of the respective armies, which was of course far easier to maintain along the railway than by road. If Meade made the best use of his time it was impossible for Lee to anticipate him at any point of the railway, and the three divisions of Federal cavalry clung so closely to Stuart's two divisions as to prevent that adventurous leader from cutting the railway by a raid.

A blunder of Meade's was destined to give Lee the chance for which he longed, of severing the Federal army October 12. from its base, but the activity of the Federal cavalry prevented him from taking advantage of it by concealing the dispositions of the Federal troops until Meade had retraced his steps. On the morning of October 12 Meade, believing Lee's movement to be a mere feint, resolved to resume the offensive and marched towards Culpeper with two army corps deployed while the other three held the line of the Rappahannock at ten miles interval. Buford's cavalry division preceded his advance, which was a magnificent spectacle. The broad mass of Blue infantry tramped across the country ready to come into action, while the horsemen, who encountered no serious resistance, reoccupied Culpeper to find the birds had flown. Meade

halted his two army corps in the dusk of the autumn evening near Brandy Station. He himself was the prey to great perplexity, for though it was clear that the hostile army had disappeared from his front, yet no indication of the path it had pursued was to be got. While the main body of the Federal army had indulged in these bootless manoeuvres the two Confederate corps had held on their course. Hill, marching by cross roads, reached Amissville, and Ewell, with Hampton's cavalry, occupied Jefferson, but the Confederate cavalry was held up by Gregg's cavalry division at Sulphur Spring on the main road. A sharp fight took place, in which Gregg became so absorbed that he failed to send information to headquarters, an omission which was also made by French the leader of the III corps at Fayetteville, who had helped to extricate the cavalry. These omissions to send news of vital importance are the more remarkable that they occur so often in the highest ranks. Late in the afternoon several messengers carried the information to Meade, who thereupon realised his danger and issued orders for a forced march back to the Bull Run, a distance of forty miles from Brandy Station. Lee having formed the plan of intercepting the enemy at Bristow Station, close to the Manassas battlefield, failed to seek as keenly as he might have done for an earlier occasion to fall on the hostile flank.

On the 13th therefore the Confederates continued their way and converged by parallel roads on Warrenton, while
October the Northerners, marching for dear life, reached
13. Three-Mile Station and Warrenton Junction in the afternoon with their advanced guards. Lee was again obliged to halt to distribute rations, but ordered Stuart to reconnoitre towards Catlett's Station with a cavalry division in order to develop the situation. The Southern Horse then swept through Auburn Mills, where a brigade was left as a link with the main body. Proceeding towards the railway Stuart sighted a vast convoy wearily making its way north-eastward. In the dusk he was obliged to approach it before he became aware that it was guarded by an entire army corps. He then tried to return by the way he had

come, but found that in the meanwhile another Federal army corps was marching through Auburn Mills, whence it had driven his connecting force so as to interpose its whole strength between Stuart and Lee. Stuart was compelled to hide his command in the woods for the night.

In the morning Lee resumed his march. Hill was directed to follow the turnpike as far as Buckland Mills and October then to march on Bristow Station so as to strike 14. the retreating enemy in flank. Ewell was ordered to march through Auburn to Greenwich, there to join hands with Hill. The retreating Federals, however, were too quick for their pursuers, and when Hill reached the railway at Bristow Station he found Warren's corps, the II, drawn up behind it ready for action.

Without proper reconnaissance or other preparation Hill launched the Confederate infantry in attack, and a sharp repulse was the result. One brigade was severely cut up; three general officers and five hundred men were injured, besides the loss of four hundred prisoners and five guns. Warren having inflicted this check with the loss of only two hundred men, skilfully continued his retreat behind the Broad Run and thence to the line of the Bull Run, behind which Meade had fallen back with his whole army.

The Army of the Potomac strongly posted on the left bank of the Bull Run offered no chance to Lee of a October decisive victory. He accordingly set to work to 15. destroy the railway as effectually as possible in order to prevent the Federals resuming their operations. At Richmond there was great rejoicing in the belief that the two battles of Manassas were to find their complement in a third great triumph of the Southern arms and another chase of the routed Federals into Washington. At the capital of the Union panic as ill-founded held sway for a while; troops were hastily called up from all directions to defend the place, and another incursion of hostile forces into Maryland and Pennsylvania was expected. Even Halleck, however, understood that Meade's situation was very different to Pope's, and on October 15 commanded him to resume the offensive.

Stuart's skilful manœuvres checked the Federal advance until it was too late to prevent the destruction of a long stretch of the railway, and the last engagement of the brief campaign was an attack by the two Confederate cavalry divisions combined upon Kilpatrick's command, which had been lured into pursuing Hampton's division while FitzLee lay in wait on his left flank. The Federal division only saved itself from destruction by the headlong flight of one brigade from close to Warrenton right into Buckland, and the rapid retreat of the other, an episode which hugely delighted the Confederate bivouacs, where it was known as 'Buckland Races.'

As Lee retreated Meade advanced; his cavalry for some time after 'Buckland Races' did not venture far afield, but hugged the infantry columns. Rappahannock Station and Culpeper were successively reoccupied by the Federals, while Lee retired behind the Rapidan; so that a month later both armies were in much the same quarters as they had quitted for the trial of strength which never took place.

At the dawn of October 12 Lee's two corps might have fallen on the III Federal corps with every chance of destroying it; on the 13th when both Confederate wings united at Warrenton, the situation presented a rare occasion for a thundering stroke at the retreating enemy stretched out in two long unwieldy columns which were struggling to get past the Confederate army without a conflict. Why did not Lee snatch the chance for which he had marched so far? The reasons are threefold. In the first place the difficulty of feeding his men along the road delayed the troops at Warrenton, as it had at Culpeper on the 11th. Next in importance came the fact that the Federal cavalry, ably commanded by Pleasanton, continued to interpose between Lee and his quarry; and lastly it cannot be denied that Lee, great strategist as he was, on this occasion, as on the march to Gettysburg, clung too long to his preconceived scheme of how the campaign should develop, nor did he watch as narrowly as he should have done for the first good chance to strike. Concentrated in and around Warrenton at noon

of the 13th, he disposed of forty-five thousand riflemen of whom five thousand were cavalry, with one hundred and eighty guns. Besides the branch railway to Warrenton Junction, distant only nine miles, a number of roads led from Warrenton eastward by which the mobile Confederate brigades might have been directed against the left flank of the retreating Federal army, and the march of the Confederates on the 12th had been so short that the troops might confidently have been called upon for a great effort. Instead of despatching two cavalry brigades to reconnoitre, four or five well-mounted patrols, led by chosen officers, would have located the mass of the Federal army while rations were being served out to the infantry, and the extreme fatigue of the Northern soldiers, who had been on the march with short halts day and night since October 10, would have made it easier to surprise them and the result more decisive.

Not only did the two great columns of Federal infantry and guns offer an easy target for their enemy to aim at, but the principal convoy of their trains was marching through Weaversville and Brentsville guarded by cavalry. This convoy could not keep up with the other two parallel columns and might have been cut off if its whereabouts had been known. No serious effort, however, seems to have been made to locate it.

The singular adventure which befell the two brigades with Stuart throws light on the situation of both armies on the night of the 13th. Having met the right column of the Federal army, marching on the railway and on a rough road made by the Federal soldiers along the line, Stuart wheeled his troops about and returned up the left bank of the Cedar Run toward Auburn, where he had left his connecting brigade. Preceded by scouts, the Confederate brigades marched in parallel columns until the report was brought to Stuart that an immense column of Blue infantry with guns and train was streaming through Auburn. The Confederate chief galloped forward to reconnoitre; he quickly perceived that his best plan was to hide, for the column was too long to be turned, so he plunged

with his whole force into a plantation of young pines, and in the close covert the men dismounted less than a quarter of a mile from the road by which the endless procession of hostile troops was defiling. The whole III corps had passed, but before they were out of rifle range the head of the II corps appeared. One brigade after another toiled along the road in the deepening gloom until at length their bugles sounded the 'Halt,' and the marching column began to stack arms and prepare for a short night's rest. So close were the two forces that the Grey soldiers, cowering in the undergrowth, could hear the conversation of their enemies as they clustered round the fires which were quickly lighted all round. A chain of troopers on the edge of the wood instantly seized every Federal who strayed there, and holding a revolver to his face bade him be silent. A single shot, or the escape of one such straggler, would have betrayed the situation. The horses remained bitted and girthed up, and the order was to mount and charge through the enemy's bivouac if discovered. A captured Federal officer was brought before Stuart, who offered a share of his supper; the Northerner replied, 'I accept with pleasure because I shall be able to return your hospitality to-morrow.'

During the night, however, six of Stuart's scouts walked boldly through the enemy's lines, and made their way to Lee's headquarters to report the predicament of the cavalry. Lee was giving his orders for the next day's march and he then added instructions to Ewell for an attack on the Federal column at dawn. Stuart's troopers rested by their horses with the reins on their arms, but the unmusical voices of the mules which had drawn the ammunition waggons, and which could not be induced to remain silent, kept the whole force in anxiety all night. When the first faint light of the morning gilded the feathery tops of the pines a mist from the brook clung to the ground and hid the stems of the trees. Suddenly a single rifle shot rang out, followed quickly by others, and then the snarling chorus of a musketry fight made itself heard as Rodes' division extended to attack the Federal column. Without the loss of a second Stuart's seven guns were unlimbered on the edge of the wood. The

Blue soldiers were plainly seen upon the high ground as they got under arms in clustering groups. The first few shots struck down many men and spread great confusion. Before the Federals had recovered from their surprise the cavalry had got clear of their hiding place and were trotting down the bank of the stream, which they crossed, and they rejoined their army after a considerable détour.

While Ewell had been rescuing Stuart the Third corps marched along the turnpike through New Baltimore to Buckland, but before this place was reached the column turned southward, heading for Greenwich. The Pur-suit con-
tinued. The right Federal column, consisting of the VI, I and V corps, continued to march along the railway. The III under French pushed on from Auburn through Greenwich to Gainesville covered by Gregg's division of cavalry. The rest of the Federal cavalry was engaged in protecting the long convoys, and the hasty retreat of the Federal army somewhat resembled a flight; for, although the several corps maintained excellent order and moved quickly, about fifteen hundred stragglers who could not keep up were captured. The II corps, having shaken off Rodes' Confederates with some difficulty, marched rapidly towards Bristow Station by a country road, pursued by Ewell for a short distance. When Hill's advanced guard reached Greenwich the Federal infantry had already passed the village and Gregg's cavalry was filing through it behind them; Hill deployed the leading brigade of one of his three divisions and FitzLee's cavalry joined in the fray. Heth's division continued to advance on Bristow Station, where, in obedience to Lee's orders, Hill hoped to cut off the Federal rearguard, and perhaps the greater part of the Federal army. By the time, however, the Confederate riflemen, who were scouting ahead of their column, came in sight of the railway, the tail of the V corps was crossing the Broad Run and the head of the II corps was approaching from Auburn. Consequently there remained but this one Federal corps within reach of attack, though prompt measures might have cut it off completely from the rest of its army.

On perceiving the procession of Federal troops Hill

seems to have come to the conclusion that he had only an escaping rearguard to deal with, which he must detain at any cost. No careful reconnoissance, which would have revealed the enemy's real situation, was made, but two brigades of Heth's division and a battery were hastily deployed for attack; a third brigade crossed the Broad Run and advanced towards the railway. Hampton's cavalry division having been under arms all night, and FitzLee's having followed the Federal III corps on the turnpike, there were no cavalry attached to the infantry divisions, and once again the absence of reconnoitring horsemen brought about a serious reverse. General Warren, who had marked the approach of the hostile infantry from the railway embankment, quickly and skilfully disposed his troops. His leading division, Webb's, formed line along the railway with its right on the Broad Run: his second division, Hay's, prolonged Webb's left on the railway whose ditch and bank sheltered the Blue regiments; while these troops opened a sharp fire, Caldwell's, the last division of the Federal army, having no foe near them, swung their left forward so as to flank their own infantry facing north along the railway. In rear of the line and in the intervals of the brigades the artillery of the corps crowned a number of hillocks, and in places fired over the heads of the riflemen. The position thus hastily occupied was very strong, having a strip of open ground in front of it never less than one hundred yards wide.

The double attack made by Stuart's hidden cavalry and Rodes' infantry on Warren's troops at dawn had been followed by some sharp fighting, for while the Federals were pressed in rear a Grey cavalry regiment had thrown itself athwart the path of their retreat, and the deployment of a whole infantry brigade had been necessary to clear the way. When the combat was broken off the Federals marched south-eastward so as to strike the railway near Catlett's Station, while Ewell's corps marched north-eastward so as to unite with Hill. Both leaders had about seventeen miles to traverse before reaching Bristow Station. Ewell, however, showed

The sharp
Fight at
Bristow
Station.

Warren's
skilful
Leader-
ship.

far less skill than Warren in resuming his march after the skirmish, for he completely failed to join Hill's corps that afternoon, while Warren's men almost overtook the main Federal column whose rear they protected. The first shots fired by Hill's corps at the retreating enemy had put Warren on the alert and he had quickly and smoothly taken up the position already described with eleven thousand infantry. His riflemen and guns firing from behind the shelter of the embankment at the Confederate flank was the signal for battle; Hill immediately turned to attack and sent an urgent command to Anderson for support. Wilcox, with the last division of Hill's corps, which had marched in one long column, was too far behind to assist, but the two divisions at hand gave a numerical equality with the enemy; for crushing and decisive victory, however, Hill depended on Ewell's co-operation, which according to Lee's programme was to be counted on between 3.30 and 4 P.M. Hill therefore instructed Anderson to deploy his two leading brigades so as to gain touch with Ewell's corps; without waiting until this was done, two brigades of Heth's division were ordered to attack after a hot fire had been exchanged.

Since they had parted from the deadly embrace at Gettysburg the two armies had marched many a weary mile and often faced one another in battle array without another trial of strength. At last the chance of revenging their fatal repulse on Cemetery Ridge seemed to have come to Hill's gallant soldiers. The cry was heard 'Put your stickers on the guns!' and answered by the familiar rattle of fixing bayonets. Then the long line of Grey arose with a mighty cheer and emerged from the cover of the woods. Directly it showed itself a fierce shout of defiance from the defenders preluded a more rapid fire, which at such close range struck down the charging soldiers by the score and staggered the advancing line. Two brigade commanders were badly hit, but Walker's men on its left penetrated as far as the railway, where, however, they were met by a new Federal line thrown back to meet them. A North Carolina regiment broke and fled; then the whole attacking force wavered, fell back, and bolted for

Repulse of
Confede-
rates.

the cover of the wood, leaving their foremost battery exposed to capture and several hundred prisoners in the hands of the enemy.

The check was severe and the loss heavy, but if Hill had known the enemy's real strength and the extent of his front he might have renewed the assault with a good chance of success, or turned Warren's right flank. But no cavalry patrols were available for the task of searching round the hostile position, nor yet for the not less important work of linking Ewell's corps with Hill's already engaged. Baffled and mortified, in doubt as to the enemy's force and as to Ewell's approach, Hill hesitated to manoeuvre. The fight became a stationary duel of rifle and artillery fire which inflicted slight loss on the troops screened by cover on both sides. Although late in the afternoon the two divisions of Confederate cavalry reached the field no further measures were taken to prevent Warren's retreat, while General Sykes commanding the V corps having been tardily informed of Warren's danger had countermarched his army corps to the assistance of his comrade, so that the opportunity for striking at an inferior force slipped through the fingers of the Confederate chief.

In the night Warren's corps reformed its marching column and disappeared across the Broad Run, whence it
 Warren
 disap- marched rapidly all night and rejoined Meade's
 pears. army next morning on the left bank of the Bull
 Run. Here the Federal general had at length
 faced his pursuers with his whole army. At dawn, on October 14 Warren's soldiers had beaten off a surprise attack on their bivouacs, they marched seventeen miles, fought a severe action for five hours and completed the day's work by a long night march initiated within rifle shot of the hostile outposts. Such a performance attests the high quality of the troops and the brilliant capacity in most critical circumstance of their young general. Lee reached the field early on the 15th and rode over it with Hill, who eagerly tried to explain the failure. Lee listened in silence; the scene of the combat was still strewn with broken arms, cartridges, and equipment. Here and there still lay, in the posture in

which it had fallen, the lifeless form of a Confederate soldier, whose long hair and tattered uniform were stirred by the breeze of the October morning. Lee felt that the whole expedition had failed in the main object of bringing the Federals to battle under advantageous circumstances, so turning to Hill he only said, 'Let us bury these poor fellows and say no more about it.'

Meade was now strongly posted behind the Bull Run, and it was impossible to cut him off from his base with Lee's Washington and useless to attack him in front. Retreat. Further offensive operations would have to be directed against the Federal right flank, so as once again to threaten their posts on the Potomac and Maryland itself. For operations on this scale Lee's army was far too weak, but by clever use of his cavalry he induced Meade to believe that he really contemplated them. On the 15th Stuart made a dashing attack with the fire of dismounted men on Warren's veterans, which caused some loss and confusion, and partly avenged the defeat at Bristow Station, but Lee had already organised his retreat. On the 15th his men were busy inflicting all possible damage on the railway while the cavalry kept the enemy amused. It was not until the 19th that the Federals resumed their advance in force, but the only collision which ensued between the two armies was the defeat of Kilpatrick's cavalry division by Stuart's combined forces. The result of the whole expedition was to damage Meade's prestige, since he had with greatly superior strength been driven back seventy miles without a battle; it also imposed another long delay on the Federals who could not resume the offensive along the Orange railway until once again it had been repaired sufficiently to be used as a channel for supplying the invaders of Virginia.

Although nervousness for the safety of Washington continued to influence the Government, and Halleck's orders to Meade's the field army tied it as with a chain to the direct Offensive defence of the capital, and so prevented any bold Plans. manœuvres against Lee's diminished forces, yet great disappointment was felt with Meade and openly expressed because he had accomplished so little. The general

himself was not altogether satisfied with the result of the autumn campaign. The Indian summer, as the last fine days of November are called, would soon slip by, and then rain and snow would fill the rivers and reduce the roads to quagmires. If he was to strike at Lee while still weakened by the absence of the First corps he must lose no time, and accordingly the utmost energy was displayed in repairing the railway and in other preparations. Meade himself wished to manœuvre boldly in order to turn the right of the hostile army and establish himself at Fredericksburg. If this manœuvre succeeded, and since Lee's army lay principally round Culpeper it stood a good chance of succeeding, the Federal army would have firmly established itself on the right bank of the Rappahannock as an advanced base for further operations in the spring, instead of having to fight sanguinary battles to get there like Burnside and Hooker. Halleck, however, vetoed the plan, giving as his reason that it would abandon the Orange and Alexandria railway. He retained his field army therefore as a local guard to the line, instead of making the line subserve the purposes of the army. His real motive was the safety of Washington: it was what Lincoln in writing to Hooker had called the 'old difficulty.' If the army uncovered Washington for offensive purposes it laid Northern territory open to attack. If it did not uncover Washington its manœuvring power was clipped, and its enterprise restricted to a single line of advance. While the Government never could bring itself to the bold scheme of trusting to the operations of their field army to keep the enemy employed, and so to stop his offensive strokes, the commanders of the Army of the Potomac could never bring themselves to attempt in earnest a direct advance by the Orange railway. They all tried to compromise the case, and this fact goes far to explain their failure.

An examination of a map showing the roads which connect Fredericksburg with the Orange railway at Bealton Station, Culpeper, Rapidan Station, and also showing the two roads to Orange Court-house, will enable the reader to understand the conditions under which both commanders laboured.

Lee could not prevent the Federals from reaching the southern bank of the Rapidan, but he could fight them in the difficult country between the Rapidan and the North Anna better than in the more open country along the Orange railway, where their superiority in numbers and in guns was certain to tell. It has therefore been argued that it should have been the prime object of the Federal commander to fight a pitched battle with Lee's army in a field as clear of forest as could be found before the Southerners had time to entrench, and the experience of Grant's 'overland' campaign goes far to support the suggestion. If this theory be correct, then it again demonstrates as a principle of strategy that decisive results are only to be obtained by striking at the vital point of the enemy's system, and such strategy entails the use of offensive tactics, for which high manœuvring power is requisite and good cavalry.

The hope was now cherished in the Confederate camp that the Federals had had enough fighting and that they would keep the peace until the end of the winter. Lee had fixed his headquarters at Culpeper; the Third corps lay at that place and along the Warrenton road. The Second corps barred the railway, Rodes' division kept watch over Kelly's Ford, where some former entrenchments had been improved and the other two divisions took it in turn to occupy Brandy Station or Rappahannock Station. At the latter place Lee had caused a bridge of boats to be constructed and protected by some earthworks on the left bank so that he could cross the river to attack the enemy at his pleasure. The Southern soldiers, believing that they would remain where they were for the winter, set to work to build huts and otherwise to make themselves as comfortable as possible.

Meade had his army in cantonments on both sides of the railway and on the line Warrenton-Warrenton Junction. On November 5 and 6 he accompanied his cavalry on an extended reconnoissance of the Confederate posts on the river; at nightfall on the 6th he issued orders for concentration. Sedgwick with the V and VI corps was ordered to march through Fayetteville on Rappahannock Station and

Situation
of the
Armies
Novem-
ber 5,
1863.

there to force the passage of the stream. Meade personally led the left wing of his army, which concentrated at Bealton Station to drive the enemy from Kelly's ford. Distances varying from fifteen to twenty miles separated the Federal divisions from their rendezvous but each one arrived punctually; Sedgwick approached the enemy very cautiously and the left wing became engaged first.

A single battalion of Ramseur's North Carolina brigade guarded the fords of the river in the neighbourhood of Kellysville, in which village Rodes' division was quartered. Small posts of cavalry watched the country on the left bank. These were quickly driven in by the advanced guard of the III corps, which then deployed for attack. The bluffs on the left bank overlook the loop of gently sloping ground between the village and the ford. Under shelter of a wood the Federals brought several batteries into action, while their skirmishers extended right and left on the bank. Orderlies galloped to Rodes, and to Ewell the corps commander, to give warning of the attack, while a crackling fire kindled on both sides of the ford. The Southern guns were soon silenced and Trobriand's brigade gallantly breasted the stream and stormed the opposite bank. Two of Ramseur's battalions, eight hundred men, were deployed, but offered a feeble resistance. The greater part of one battalion was captured, and the other gave way. In the meanwhile, first Rodes' division, then Johnson's reached the field, and extended a solid line across the loop made by the river on which the Federal advanced guard had made good its footing. The light was failing and Meade, who had as yet heard nothing from Sedgwick, peered cautiously at the enemy's position unwilling to strike home until he knew more. Night descended on the scene before another collision took place, and next morning the Confederate corps had disappeared.

About one o'clock the head of Sedgwick's column came in contact with Confederate outposts guarding the bridge-head at Rappahannock Station. Slowly and very methodically he prepared his attack. The defended works were not strong in profile, were overlooked from a

Meade
forces the
Passage of
the Rap-
pahannock.
November 7.

November
7, 1 P.M.

neighbouring height and swept only a small space with their fire. The outlying detachments of Southern riflemen were therefore soon driven into their trenches.

Early held the bridge-head with Hoke's Louisiana brigade, but reinforced at once with Hay's North Carolina men. He then inspected the position and came to the conclusion that it was not strong enough to resist assault. Lee, however, who joined him was of a different opinion, and trading on the known reluctance of the enemy to attack he ordered the place to be held. The other two brigades of Early's division lay on the right bank within supporting distance, but the Federal artillery prevented the deployment of the batteries with which Lee designed to flank his works. The twilight deepened without any further development; the soldiers on both sides lighted fires, ate their supper and stretched themselves out to sleep.

The silence of the night did not last long; two brigades of Federals were aroused without noise and formed in The Night column. The one on the right succeeded in Attack. rushing the Confederate sentries, but the defenders quickly seized their arms, lined the parapet and repulsed the assault. A rough west wind carried the sound of the firing away from Early's reserves on the right bank, and when the flashes of rifles ceased they believed the alarm to be a false one. Almost at the same time the second Unionist brigade, having stealthily approached, penetrated the works where a desperate fight with the bayonet took place. In this combat the assailants, having once got through their opponents, had all the advantage. The 121st New York and 6th Maine cut off the Confederate fighting line from the bridge, its sole line of retreat, and suddenly the struggle in the stormy darkness became a furious encounter between individuals and small groups. At last the Confederates became convinced that they were surrounded and hopelessly outnumbered, though in reality two thousand of their men were fighting with no more than three thousand of the enemy. A rush was made to gain the bridge; about five hundred got across it, while some tried to swim the icy stream. Fifteen hundred Confederates were captured or cut down on

the right bank before Early set fire to the bridge, one of the last to cross being General Hays, whose horse broke through the crowd of men and carried his rider safe back to his own lines. Three hundred Federals were killed or wounded in this short and bloody combat; four standards and eight guns besides the prisoners were captured by them.

During the night Early's division quitted the banks of the stream and reunited with Ewell's other two near Stevensburg, while Lee sent word to Hill to lose no time in retreating from the Upper Rappahannock through Culpeper to the Rapidan. When daylight appeared both passages of the river were in the hands of the Federals and a fine opportunity presented itself for isolating one of the enemy's wings so as to defeat it before the other could assist. As soon as it was light Meade rode forward to reconnoitre; he could see nothing of the enemy, who had already marched some distance, and he had no cavalry at hand to pursue. The fruits of victory were consequently lost, for the situation of the Confederate army was not discovered until it had gained the Rapidan. The Federals advanced as they had done before, on November 8, from the river to Brandy Station with two corps deployed for action. Since they could proceed no further than Culpeper until the railway was repaired they took possession of the camps which had so lately sheltered their opponents, and made immense efforts to repair the bridge over the river, which they effected by November 19.

The new line taken up by the Confederate army after the disastrous and humiliating loss of the Rappahannock position extended from Liberty Mills to Clark's Mountain near to which Lee fixed his headquarters, and thence to Verdiersville with outposts on the Mine Run. As before, Hill's corps was on the left and Ewell's on the right, and once again the Confederate soldiers set to work to construct huts and to raise light entrenchments covering the fords. Although the Federal army lay so close, it does not seem to have been believed that the fighting would be renewed. The winter with its rain was rapidly closing in, and it was not thought that the railway could be repaired until the

Retreat of
Confede-
rates.

The Line
of the
Rapidan.

end of the month. Nevertheless every precaution was taken against a fresh surprise. Stuart's troopers patrolled the banks of the Rapidan and the turnpike road from Orange to Verdierville, which connected the right and left wings and which facilitated concentration. Lee's army reduced again by numerous furloughs to less than fifty thousand men, protected the railway line through Orange Court-house to Gordonsville; if the enemy passed the Rapidan below him Lee lay upon his flank and could attack him in the Wilderness. But Meade was aware of the numerical weakness of his adversary, and was determined to force another battle on him. For this purpose he planned to concentrate the Army of the Potomac swiftly and secretly on his left, so as to cross the Rapidan, where Hooker had passed it in the spring.

Relying on his troops and commanders to march with the same punctuality as had enabled him to seize the fords of the Rappahannock, Meade set his forces in motion on November 26 in three columns. The Meade's Dispositions to cross the Rapidan. III and VI corps were to march on Jacob's Ford; the II corps was directed to seize the turnpike by way of Germanna Ford; and the V and I corps were sent to Ely's Ford to gain the plank road at Parker's Store. Gregg's division of cavalry was to cover the left flank of the army and protect its wheel to the right, which Meade foresaw would be necessary to meet the enemy's first concentration, though he hoped by rapidly turning Lee's right to induce him to retreat southward into the more open country traversed by the Orange railway. The success of the scheme depended on the rapid concentration of the Federal corps at the fords, their transfer to the right bank in a single day, and finally on harmonious action of the three columns divided by the tangled thickets of the Wilderness, in the teeth of an active foe who had already conquered on this same ground and who knew it well.

Heavy rain on November 23 postponed the movement till the midnight of the 25th. Meade reckoned that the whole army would cross the Rapidan before night on the 26th, and that by noon of the 27th it would be in possession

of the coveted roads. Each column had a pontoon troop; each man carried three days' rations, and five rations a man were carried in the carts; all baggage was reduced to a minimum, and it seemed as if nothing could mar the execution of the first part of the plan. The departure of the columns was fixed for two hours before daybreak, which meant that the men must get under arms and the column be prepared to move during the night. The left and centre columns were punctual, but the III corps was late in starting, and only reached the river at noon, two hours after the others. The ford had not been properly reconnoitred, and the banks were found to be too steep for the passage of artillery and waggons, which had therefore to go round by the next ford. Considerable delay ensued in placing the pontoons; the rain having swollen the river it was found necessary to construct trestles to prolong the bridges, for the fords were too deep to be waded with safety. While this delay occurred the long column of foot-soldiers and waggons was compelled to crawl, now halting altogether, now moving forward a little, so that when the sun set on November 26 the leading corps of each column were still crossing, nor was the passage of the army completed till next morning.

The early morning of the 27th found the Federal army much exhausted by their exertions of the preceding thirty-six hours. Warren's corps had pushed along the plank road from Germanna Ford, but French's corps, the III, fell into confusion among the labyrinth of heavy tracks which led from Jacob's Ford and made little or no progress. Two Federal divisions of cavalry guarded the right flank of the army on the 26th, and were designed to keep the attention of the Confederates fixed on the vicinity of the railway by demonstrations of activity. Stuart, however, quickly penetrated this well-worn device and gave notice to Lee early in the day. A little later the march of a strong Federal column was reported on the road through Stevensburg. Before nightfall Lee was aware of the enemy's scheme and promptly issued orders to meet it. Ewell was to march along the turnpike and parallel roads to attack the enemy's column in flank before it emerged from

Lee's Dis-
positions,
Novem-
ber 27.

the Wilderness, while Hill was to hurry to his assistance. Dawn of the 27th saw the long files of Grey soldiers marching eastward with the grim intention of punishing their unmannerly foe for disturbing the repose of winter.

The reader who has studied the campaign of Chancellorsville is already familiar with the district which now became the arena of another passage of arms. As on May 1, so on November 27, the Federal army had established itself on the south bank of the Rapidan; its advanced troops were on the main road which traverses the northern part of the forest from east to west, and a start had been gained on the enemy, who was, however, rapidly approaching to stop further progress, but this time from the west instead of from the east. It was just as essential for Meade as it had been for Hooker to get clear of the woods, and time, as so often happens in war, was the prime factor in the situation. If Meade could have done as he wished he would have turned eastward instead of westward in order to seize Fredericksburg and the Marye Heights, but stringent orders bound him to the Orange railway and Lee soon guessed the conditions which handicapped his opponent.

Rising in the ridge which carries the plank road through the woods the Mine Run collects the waters of a number of ravines which it empties into the Rapidan a mile and a half above Jacob's Ford after cutting the turnpike and Rapidan Station roads almost at right angles. From the latter to its mouth the small stream has cut out a winding course between steep banks; they rise on an average one hundred feet above the sole of the valley which is some six hundred yards broad. It forms a sort of boundary ditch to the forest, for although the woods stretch westward of it, yet the country soon becomes more open. On the left bank of the Mine Run Lee determined to take his stand so as to bar the turnpike and plank roads, while he could quickly cut off the Federal army from its base if it should try to march southward without fighting. Time was essential to enable Hill to come into line with Ewell, which would be possible before dawn of the 28th, if the Federals could be checked till then.

Ewell, therefore, with Jackson's old corps, had to repeat the manoeuvre of May 1 by engaging the Federals before they emerged from the jungle.

A series of costly fights had sadly reduced the number of the comrades who had taken part in Jackson's last enterprise; to those who still remained with the Second corps the edge of the Wilderness brought back thrilling and melancholy recollections. But the tradition of the glorious feat of arms had penetrated the hearts of the conscripts when they joined, so that all Ewell's soldiers were deeply stirred as they climbed the steep bank of the Mine Run and strode once more into the sombre glades which concealed their persistent enemy.

Although every hour was of value, yet Meade's army made very slow progress on the 27th. Warren's corps November marching by the best road easily reached Locust 27. Grove, where it came in contact with Southern cavalry and opened fire with a battery to announce the fact. Sykes with the left column had still farther to go, but the Federal cavalry pressed forward along the plank road until it met a Grey brigade sent by Stuart to block the way. A skirmish ensued in which the infantry of the V corps came to the aid of the cavalry, driving the Confederates westward before sunset. On the right, however, misfortune had overtaken the Northern army.

The march of the III corps from Jacob's Ford had brought its advanced guard in contact with Johnson's scouts about 9 A.M. At this encounter the Federal commanders became disconcerted. Meade's orders to push on to the turnpike were plain and reiterated; the sound of Warren's battery emphasised the necessity of obeying them, but the fear of Confederates lurking in unknown strength on their path paralysed the energy of General French, who checked his column, countermarched, and at last became engaged in a confused struggle with the hostile division, which lasted until it was nearly dark, and which cost him a loss of seven hundred men. Johnson, having accomplished his object of delaying the Federals, then fell back upon the Mine Run.

The same thick mist which had so often hindered

operations was clinging to the damp woods on the morning of the 28th, when the Federal army resumed its march. The right column continued its advance until it came abreast of the II corps at Locust Grove; a general advance November 28. was then made by the II and VI corps, supported by the I and III corps along the turnpike, and through the woods north of it, while Sykes closed the V corps into Locust Grove. The troops marched in parallel columns by the forest tracks, which were sodden with the recent rain, in winding processions of Blue with colours furled and an arch of brown leaves overhead. The generals rode on in front and soon came upon the deep ravine of the Mine Run. Looking across it, they beheld a busy crowd of men felling trees, digging energetically and making every preparation for their reception. Up and down the valley they rode with the same result. Sedgwick on the Federal right and Warren on the left closely studied the hostile front to find its weak point while the columns closed up and piled arms within the woods, but right along the valley as far as the source of the stream the Southern riflemen extended. Hill's corps had arrived overnight and the whole Confederate army directed by Lee himself was now hard at work fortifying the new position.

Strongly posted as they were Meade had everything to lose by waiting. If he meant to attack at all he should have done so without delay, before the enemy had had leisure to finish the breast-works, but he could not bring himself to risk the throw. All day the Federal generals reconnoitred and the Confederate soldiers dug, felled trees and dragged them to the crest of the slope. For more than six miles the position extended, but both Warren and Sedgwick found what they reported to be weak points on its southern and northern extremity. Meade accordingly ordered an attack by both his wings, while the centre reduced to a single corps pressed along the turnpike road. The rest of the army was disposed in two groups under Warren and Sedgwick, but Warren's objective was three miles south of the turnpike, and it could only be reached by the road from Locust Grove already traversed and cut up by the V corps.

Warren set out at daybreak on the 29th, meaning to

gain the plank road and so to strike at the enemy's extreme right. It was late in the afternoon before he reached his goal and deployed his troops south of the plank road as far as the railway. Hill had made a corresponding movement, and leaving a few battalions to connect with Ewell, had thrown his right flank beyond the plank road. He had not, of course, had time to raise fresh breast-works, and if Warren had attacked at once, superior numbers might have gained a victory; but Warren felt bound to concert his action with the other wing, so he first carefully studied the ground, and then rode off to Meade's headquarters. At six o'clock the final arrangements were made for the morrow; as soon as Warren's guns were heard, the Federal right which overlapped the enemy should storm the opposite bank after an artillery preparation, and if either wing were successful the centre should attack also. No fighting took place on the 29th, but while the Federals were shifting their troops about, the Confederates continued to improve and extend their breast-works.

After long hours of darkness the troops on both sides rose from their cold bivouac under the trees for a mortal combat. At eight o'clock the Federals were to open fire, and Warren's corps was then to charge across the ravine. The story goes that when Warren made a final survey of the enemy's line he was greatly impressed with its strength, and with the entrenchments they had made in the night. On returning through his brigades massed under cover for the assault, he perceived that each man had fastened a bit of paper on his jacket and ascertained that they, believing the assault would be repulsed with destructive loss, had written their names and regiments on the tickets which had caught his eye. Whether or no this story is true, Warren changed his mind. While the woods re-echoed with the roar of the Federal batteries north of the turnpike, and the soldiers of the II corps, tormented by suspense, awaited the command to risk their fate, Warren sped to Meade's headquarters and explained his inaction. Meade returned with him and concurred in his view. The battle was suspended all along the line, and the afternoon

of the 30th was spent in concentrating towards the turnpike with the object of attacking at that point, the centre that is of the opposing lines.

Warren's action in suspending the assault involved a very heavy responsibility, and cannot be held up as a pattern to be copied. When a general attack upon the enemy has been decided upon, it is too late to shirk the issue, or to refuse the co-operation of a portion of the army, however important. Special circumstances may justify such an extreme measure in a subordinate general, but they would generally depend upon a fresh situation having arisen since the attack had been planned, which does not appear to have been the case in this instance. The difficulties of manœuvring with large forces in the Wilderness were very great, but it cannot be said that the Federal army was well handled. Besides the needless delay and purposeless fight on their right flank on November 27, the processional movements along the enemy's front were never concealed from him by action at other points of the line. No attempt was made to surprise the foe; in every projected attack he not only had ample warning but leisure to entrench also. On the 29th the energetic action of Rosser's brigade of Confederate cavalry, which had ridden round Warren's column to attack his rear, helped to paralyse his action, and the fire of this skirmish borne by the wind and echoing through the woods raised the possibility that some such expedition as Jackson's at Chancellorsville was being attempted. On the evening of the 30th Generals Hampton and Stuart personally reconnoitred through the thicket, hoping to find a chance of repeating Jackson's successful coup; on his return Stuart concerted with Lee a great offensive stroke, but the concentration of the Federals toward their centre induced Lee to wait for another day, in the hope that the enemy would attack and be disastrously repulsed.

The next morning a great mass of Blue infantry crouched in the woods north and south of the turnpike awaiting orders to storm the centre of the Confederate position. Its defenders, however, had not been idle. At this point, hitherto unmenaced, breast-works had

Decem-
ber 1.

arisen as if by magic in the night, so that the centre of the line presented as forbidding a front as the right flank had the day before. Another long reconnaissance having satisfied Meade that the task of breaking through the hostile position was beyond his power, he resolved to give up the attempt. Then the question arose as to what was next to be done.

The only solid fruit of the expedition which lay within the reach of the Federal chief was to seize and hold Fredericksburg. When no attack on his position took place Lee feared that Fredericksburg had become the Federal goal and resolved to attack in his turn; but Meade considered himself bound by Halleck's orders to the Orange railway. Should he then renew the attempt to turn Lee's right flank by marching southward through the Wilderness? Meade soon convinced himself that this scheme was impracticable. He had consumed more than half the supplies which he had brought and there were but three days' rations left. To replenish he must call up fresh convoys from the left bank of the Rapidan, but if the army moved southward its communication with Germanna Ford would be at the mercy of the enemy. Lastly, the state of the roads and the time of the year greatly increased the difficulty and danger of manœuvring against Lee while his army was undefeated. Meade determined therefore to retreat. As soon as it was dark his infantry followed the guns and waggons already started towards the fords, so that when the Southern infantry advanced along the plank road at dawn on December 2 they met no one. On December 3 the Army of the Potomac had regained its cantonments, and the warfare which had caused so much blood to flow since Hooker began his campaign in the spring ceased for the year 1863. For one year more the defenders of Virginia were able victoriously to repel the invader, and to exact from his devoted legions a still more fearful toll of the bravest and best before the encircling hosts of the North accomplished their stupendous work.

The match between Lee and Meade in the months of September, October, and November has greater interest for the professional than for the lay reader. For the former it is full of useful lessons. It emphasises the principles of

strategy which the preceding campaigns have illustrated. The importance of the prestige which attaches to a victorious general, and the liberties he may in consequence venture to take with a cautious adversary is once more apparent. The ruling condition of success in an aggressive campaign is seen to be a tireless watch for any opening the enemy may give and not to allow any preconceived plan to interfere with an unexpected chance, but above all it demands a cavalry superiority in order to know of such openings in time, and in order to take advantage of them. Once again the fact becomes apparent that the manœuvring power of an army depends upon the discipline of its infantry on the march, the skill and knowledge of its generals and their staff officers, and, most important of all, upon the efficacy of its cavalry in the work of screening and reconnoitring.

As a study of troop-leading the movements first of Meade in his advance to the Rapidan, countered by Lee's flank march to Warrenton and the subsequent manœuvres of the Confederates to force on a battle, are worthy of recollection. For any man who aspires to be a judge of military operations it is worth while to notice the marching powers of the two armies in the zenith of their excellence, and the deciding advantage in mobility which the possession of a line of railway for supplies gave to the Federals over their antagonists who depended on a road, even in the short distance between the Rapidan and the Bull Run. More than once each side forfeited the chance of striking a dangerous blow by looking too long before the leap; while Hill's attack on Warren at Bristow Station failed from the opposite fault, *i.e.* want of proper reconnoissance and want of proper connection between the attacking forces. In fact there was failure to make the best use of good horsemen, both as staff officers and patrol riders.

That the net result of the three months' campaign was favourable to the defence cannot be wondered at when it is remembered that Meade's army was hardly if at all superior in fighting power to Lee's, in spite of a certain numerical preponderance, and that the Federal commander was

debarred from making the best use of his chances by the inflexible instructions of his superiors. Either an energetic offensive such as Meade had initiated when Longstreet's corps was sent away to Tennessee, or the capture of Fredericksburg with a firm footing on the right bank of the Rappahannock, promised important advantages as against slight risks. The result of Grant's operations in the following spring prove that the complete defeat of Lee's army by Meade's, in the autumn of 1863, was hardly possible; but the adoption of the route which Grant eventually chose in his march to the James justified Meade's plan of seizing Marye's Heights when he stood between Lee and Fredericksburg on November 27. Had the Federal army entrenched itself in a position covering the oft-disputed passage of the Rappahannock at that point, it would have been almost impossible for the inferior numbers of the Confederates to drive it back across the stream, and thus a starting point for the next campaign would have been gained, which in Grant's skilful hands might have proved of great value, and which at any rate would have rendered unnecessary the costly and bootless march through the Wilderness.

CHAPTER XI

GRANT IN THE WILDERNESS

U.S. Grant—Fort Donelson and Shiloh—Vicksburg—Chattanooga—Sherman—Grant and Lincoln—Grant joins the Army of the Potomac: March 24—Character of Grant—Grant's Plan for 1864—Strategy of the Overland Campaign—Exhaustion of the South—Situation of Opposing Forces: May 1—The Federal Army—Orders to March: May 2—Midnight, May 3—Confederates March: May 4—Battlefield of the Wilderness—May 4—Grant's Orders for May 5—Battle of the Wilderness: May 5—May 6—Longstreet Wounded—Severe Fighting in the Evening—The Result of the Battle: May 7—Losses in the Wilderness—Spottsylvania Court-house—May 8—May 9—The Battle of May 10—May 11—The Battle of May 12—The Cavalry Fight at Yellow Tavern—Death of Jeb Stuart—Grant's Advance: May 21 to 31—June 1 and 2—Cold Harbor: June 3—The Passage of the James—Attack on Petersburg: June 17 and 18—The Fighting in the Wilderness: May 5—Hancock's Description of the Field—Federal and Confederate Tactics compared—Cavalry, Artillery, and Staff in the Wilderness—Incidents of May 6 with Longstreet's Corps—The three Attacks of Longstreet's Corps: May 6.

ULYSSES SIMPSON GRANT was the somewhat whimsical name of the great captain who led the Federal armies in U. S. their final campaigns against the Southern power. Grant. He had had a most remarkable and chequered career. After serving twelve years in the army, in 1854 he retired into private life and found it very hard to earn a living. Just as Napoleon had known evil days when he tried to live by subletting apartments in Paris, so the conqueror of the Confederacy was at one time reduced to collect small debts for his neighbours, and eked out his resources by fetching and selling faggots in the suburbs of St. Louis. At the outbreak of the war he was in straits for money and, as generally happens in such cases, his friends fell away and avoided him. His first application for military employment was ignored. In May 1861, however, when the magnitude of

their peril dawned on the Federal authorities, they became less particular, and Grant's appointment as a colonel of volunteers was confirmed in Washington. His rise was rapid.

Little as his personality pleased his employers in peace, the test of war proved him to be of sterling stuff, and his leadership in the task of organising the Federal forces in Missouri and Illinois was gladly accepted. His first important success was the capture of Paducah, which controlled the confluence of the Ohio and Tennessee rivers. On November 6 he led three thousand five hundred troops to attack an entrenched camp at Belmont on the west bank of the Mississippi above Columbus, but the expedition failed. Then Halleck became Federal commander-in-chief in the West, and though Pope was his favourite subordinate he quickly recognised the talents and grit which distinguished Grant.

At the end of January 1862 Halleck sent Grant with thirty thousand men and seven gunboats under Commodore

Fort Donelson and Shiloh. Foote up the Tennessee river to capture Fort Henry and Fort Donelson on the river Cumberland, which flowed near and parallel to the Tennessee. Both places were swiftly reduced by Grant, who insisted

on 'immediate and unconditional surrender.' The capture of Fort Donelson with thirteen thousand prisoners on February 16 had important local effects, and cheered the Northern people for the coming contest. While Pope marched victoriously down the Mississippi gaining control of its course reach by reach, Grant pushed through Tennessee, occupied Nashville, the State capital, and divided the Confederate forces under Beauregard and Sidney Johnstone. One hundred miles south of Fort Donelson the Federal leader halted to await the reinforcements, which Halleck had sent him under Buell and Nelson. Easy success seems to have made him careless, for at Shiloh, April 6, he was surprised by the combined forces of S. Johnstone and Beauregard, and his army was almost routed. The fall of Johnstone and the indiscipline of the raw Confederate forces among whose ranks the victorious onslaught had spread disorder, saved the Federals from disaster. Grant was able

by mighty personal exertions to rally his army, and on the morrow, having been joined by Buell and Nelson, the Federal forces turned the tables and compelled the enemy to retreat. Shiloh was a savage scuffle between two undisciplined hosts of armed men; it was one of the bloodiest encounters of the war proportionately to the numbers engaged.

In July 1862 Halleck was summoned to Washington and Grant was given the command of the forces destined to clear the valley of the great river, and to reduce Vicksburg. Vicksburg, the principal stronghold which barred its course. At the same time a Federal army under Banks based on New Orleans, which had fallen to a combined attack by land and sea, marched up the river and invested Port Hudson.

Grant's campaign against Vicksburg was the great opportunity of his military career which made his name and secured for him the foremost place among the Federal generals. His army organised in four army corps and numbering seventy thousand men was supported by a strong flotilla of gunboats, but the distances to be traversed were enormous, and the engineering difficulties seemed no less puzzling than the problem of supplying the army in the heart of the enemy's country, while engaged in the leaguer of the enemy's strongest fortress. Various ingenious schemes to construct canals past Vicksburg for the Federal steamers having failed, on December 27, 1862, Sherman, the ablest of Grant's corps commanders, attempted to rush the Confederate defence and thus end the struggle. A sanguinary repulse was the result.

Checked in his advance from the north Grant hit on the bold scheme of crossing the Mississippi, and moving down its western bank so as to strike at the Confederate communications westward and southward. Lincoln disapproved of the scheme, but Grant persisted in it. He recrossed the Mississippi thirty miles south of Vicksburg, and on May 14 he stormed and captured Jackson, the State capital, to the relief of which Joseph Johnston was pressing with twenty thousand men, while Pemberton lay on his other flank with forty thousand troops. Leaving Sherman to check the Confederates at Jackson, Grant now turned upon Pemberton's

army, which he signally defeated on the Big Black River, and drove into the redoubts of Vicksburg May 18. The fortress was then closely invested and cut off from all communications with the south and west. Never having been supplied for a long siege, it speedily began to suffer from want of food, as well as from the repeated attacks and ceaseless bombardment of the Federals. On July 3, 1863, the same day that Lee suffered the fatal reverse at Gettysburg, Pemberton consented to Grant's terms of almost 'unconditional surrender' at Vicksburg, and on the following day the great American anniversary saw the Stars and Stripes hoisted on the ramparts.

Great was the triumph of the North and boundless the gratitude of the President, who generously wrote to the victor, 'You were right and I was wrong.' The fall of Vicksburg reduced the Southern forces by forty thousand men, and severed the States west of the Mississippi from the rest of the Confederacy. It was the event of the greatest military importance which had yet happened excepting only Lee's failure to conquer at Gettysburg. Grant employed the next three months in firmly establishing the Federal authority along the banks of the great river, in opening up the railways and in driving Joseph Johnston's corps out of Mississippi State. The exertion of the summer campaign amid the enervating heat of the low-lying lands had caused much sickness in the army, and Grant himself suffered, but took no leave from his command. He worked incessantly, declining sturdily to be made a hero by politicians and journalists, who beset his path and lay in wait for interviews.

In mid-September came the news that the Confederates had concentrated against Rosecrans' army, which they defeated at Chickamauga on September 20. The popular voice designated Grant as the general to repair the disaster, and he was invested with supreme command of the Federal forces west of the Alleghanies. Directing Sherman to march to the threatened point through Northern Alabama, a distance of three hundred miles, Grant himself proceeded there by rail. He found Bragg, the

Southern general, blockading Chattanooga in a spiritless fashion, and for a whole month Federal reinforcements kept arriving under the nose of the Confederate commander. On November 23 Grant made a combined assault on his besiegers with the forces of Hooker, Thomas and Sherman, who had just arrived ; he utterly defeated and scattered them with immense loss. Bragg was chased twenty miles into Georgia, and the Federal forces set about preparing for the stern contest which loomed in the future before they could claim the right to penetrate further into Georgia. Meade's failure during the same period to inflict any decisive defeat upon Lee's army left no rival to Grant in the general estimation, and in February he was called upon to take supreme command of the United States armies both of the east and west.

The battle of Chattanooga had set the seal to Grant's fame ; he now became the idol of the nation and the hero of the press. In the army his success evoked no such jealousy as the rivalry of former leaders had given rise to. Meade cheerfully agreed to give place to him or to serve under him, and the tact and modesty with which he accepted honours and good-fortune helped him on his way. In truth Grant's career in the west must be considered one of the most fortunate in history. From the start he commanded troops superior in number, resources and morale to the adversary, and except at Shiloh he was opposed to generals of but moderate capacity. That he successfully gauged their mediocrity and exploited the feeblednesses of his foe is a strong proof of his ability. His strategical insight and tactical skill improved with every experience. The gigantic struggle which he waged in 1864 showed him to be beyond doubt a leader of the first order, yet perhaps history would have had another tale to tell if Lee or Jackson had been pitted against Grant in the early days of his successful career.

If Grant was fortunate in his opponents, he was no less so in the colleagues who rose to high command with the Sherman. army of the West. Of these the most distinguished was Sherman, little if at all inferior to his chief in military genius. Sherman succeeded Grant in the command of

the western army ; his operations in 1864 and 1865 were more successful than Grant's round Richmond, and finally consummated the ruin of the Southern power ; but then he was not opposed to Lee nor to the Army of Northern Virginia. Sheridan, McPherson, Thomas and McClelland all rose to high command and gained great reputations.

On March 8, 1864, Grant came to Washington knowing none of those in authority and having hardly any acquaintance in the capital, where he had been but once before, for a single day. Accompanied only by his young son he had quietly taken up his quarters at Willard's Hotel, where he was, however, soon found out by an enthusiastic crowd of admirers, whose officious demonstrations embarrassed the modest general not a little. His first meeting with Lincoln took place the same evening. Grant was conducted into a room crowded with high officials, generals and members of Congress, in the midst of whom towered the President's lean figure. The two men formed a great contrast in appearance. Lincoln's expressive countenance, clean shaven but for a tuft of beard on the chin, and lit up with humour and sympathy, resembled Grant's impassive features as little as the tall lithe figure of the statesman recalled the broad short frame of the soldier. But they soon understood one another. The heart of both was set in the same cause. Both were free from affectation and pose ; and, what was most important, the conceptions of both as to the military policy to be pursued were now the same. Lincoln had learnt at last the fatal folly of divided control and dispersed forces. At the eleventh hour he came to understand that the war required the controlling hand of the first soldier in the Union with supreme power. It was well for the North that the rival President had not even at that tardy date recognised the same truth. If Lee had been invested with the same authority as Grant in March 1864 the task of the latter would have been far more arduous and there would doubtless have been a yet more instructive chapter of military history to record.

Under the wing of Stanton, the War Secretary, Grant was introduced to the crowd who struggled to shake hands with

him. So keen was the competition to approach the hero that finally he was compelled to stand on a sofa beside his friend, blushing and stammering thanks for the warmth of the reception. But this worship was not to his liking. Having received his new commission from the President and having returned thanks in a few simple and dignified words, he left Washington as soon as possible to visit the cantonments of the army on the Orange railway. In close consultation with Meade he planned the prosecution of the next campaign. Both generals also paid a flying visit by sea to Fortress Monroe; then Grant returned to the Western army, having thus inspected both wings of his widely extended command. The Anaconda scheme devised by McClellan was at length to be a reality, and the crushing of the rebellion in its gigantic coils an accomplished fact.

It was from Nashville, the centre of the immense Federal line, that Grant as the lieutenant-general issued his first general order on March 17; he then betook himself once more to Washington to confer with the President and to make final arrangements for the Spring campaign. Stanton, the War Secretary, had hitherto been a stumbling block to the commanders in the field from his love of meddling with their business and because of his influence with Lincoln; but Grant's firmness and reticence impressed him with the wisdom of letting the new general go his own way. Grant in his Memoirs describes his most important interview with the chief of the State. Lincoln having assured his general of the staunch support of the Government, and of its intention to leave his hands unfettered, proceeded to suggest the line of operations which in his opinion promised the best results. McClellan would have volubly demonstrated its weakness, and would have conveyed more offence than conviction. Grant listened in meditative silence, and it seems probable that his bearing on this and other occasions did almost as much to inspire confidence as his wonderful record of victory. It is worth while to reproduce the gist of Lincoln's plan, if only to show how limited was the insight of the great statesman in military art after his many experiments and unrivalled opportunities of acquiring knowledge.

The President proposed an advance against Richmond between two of the rivers which converge east of it, so that the flanks of the Federal army would be secured in the operation ; he failed to see that not the assailant but the defender would gain by limiting the zone of conflict, by reducing the front to be guarded, and by preventing the out-flanking movements which are always to be dreaded from superior numbers. Harmonious relations, however, between the two continued to prevail, and preparations for the renewal of the struggle in the Spring on a greater scale than heretofore proceeded apace.

The five army corps comprising the Army of the Potomac were consolidated into three, the II under command of Hancock, the V of Warren, and the VI of Sedgwick. Each corps was now composed of four strong divisions and the IX corps under Burnside was added to the command. One of Burnside's divisions consisted of negroes. Each corps was separately inspected, the muster rolls were closely scrutinised ; great preparations were made for replacing casualties and for tending the large number of sick and wounded which Grant well knew would be on his hands very soon after taking the field. The reception accorded by the army to its new chief was not marked by enthusiasm. The soldiers of that army had seen McClellan's place filled by Halleck and Pope with great reputations gained in the west, and by Burnside and Hooker, all of whom Lee easily defeated. Meade alone had made head against him, and Meade's extreme caution little satisfied the prevailing thirst for decisive results. The superior officers, however, received Grant on his arrival with proper loyalty and supported him staunchly to the end. He fixed his headquarters as commander-in-chief with Meade, who continued nominally to lead the Army of the Potomac. Philip Sheridan, the best cavalry leader of the western army, was chosen to replace Pleasonton, who was not popular with his superiors in spite of the brilliant services he had rendered in the previous summer. General Andrew A. Humphreys was Chief of the Staff, and it is from his detailed history of the ' Virginia Campaign of 1864 ' that the most reliable

Grant
joins the
Army of
the
Potomac.
March 24.

account of its events is to be got. Halleck was relieved of his post 'at his own request.'

It is a remarkable fact that the three great conquerors of the nineteenth century far from being appreciated in their early career all fell into disgrace with their first employers. Napoleon was flung into prison and narrowly escaped execution. Moltke retired from the service of Denmark and lived to lead the armies which chastised her. Grant had sunk into obscure poverty when the misfortunes of his country gave him his chance. Marvellous as were the successes he achieved as a commander in the field and military statesman, yet perhaps his chief claim to greatness rests on the character which dominated jealous rivals, compelled the confidence of his superiors and held the devotion of his troops through the darkest hours. No great man in history surpassed Grant in simpleness of purpose and freedom from sham and pretence of all sorts. He was wise, modest and brave. That he was not a great master of tactical science must be conceded, but remembering how little incentive he had received to think out its problems until he was of mature age and had been for six years a civilian, it was not to be expected that he would shine in the field which of all others requires many years of long and thoughtful study. As a strategist he was inferior to none of the American generals. His grim determination to persevere in spite of a holocaust of victims has been denounced as heartless disregard of human life, but his chivalry to the vanquished and tender regard for his sick and wounded show him in a very different light. It is hardly open to question that the real cruelty lies in dallying with war. The most humane as well as the most politic action when once rifles are pointing at one another is the one which quickest brings about a decision. Respect for human life should inspire due preparation for war and reluctance to engage in it wantonly, but should not interfere with true strategy, when once the dread arbitrament has been resorted to.

It would perhaps have been well for Grant's memory as

a national hero if his name had never been identified with a political party, if all the States, victorious and vanquished alike, could have claimed his fame as a common source of pride. The wounds of war heal quickly compared with the festering sores inflicted by peaceful strife, and the ballot-box leaves resentments which rankle long after the loss of battles has ceased to be other than a stirring episode of history.

In general the scheme which Grant set himself to carry out was the same which McClellan had devised two years earlier, but he brought more energy and concentrated purpose to its execution. Better than McClellan he understood the importance of time and the need to harass the enemy's forces every day of the week. He therefore planned a simultaneous advance of all the Federal forces in the first week in May, after concentrating them as far as possible, and after providing for the retention or occupation of localities vital to the final result. Thus while Sherman's army of the West was reinforced to the greatest possible strength, two army corps numbering together thirty-four thousand troops under Butler were left on the banks of the James, to detain Confederate forces there or to seize the enemy's capital if it was too incautiously denuded of troops. Sigel with a corps of seventeen thousand men was to press up the Shenandoah Valley so as to deprive the enemy of its resources, which had hitherto proved so useful to him. Sufficient garrisons were left to hold conquered territory, and all the remaining might of the North was thrown into the attack upon Lee's hitherto invincible army. The enemy's field forces formed the immediate objective of the Federal attack, which was so directed against his capital and its railway communications, as to compel the Confederate armies to fight in the field chosen by their adversaries. For Sherman, Sigel, and Butler the line of advance was dictated by imperious local circumstances, but to Grant's army there offered itself a wider choice of roads to Richmond.

The principal strategic advantage of the South in the coming contest would be its interior position. The danger

constantly existed that the Confederate Government would place Lee in supreme command of all its forces, and that, while the army under Sherman was held at bay, a concentration of forces would be hurled upon the Army of the Potomac. To put the utmost possible pressure upon all the enemy's troops, and not to relax it for a day, was the most obvious method to prevent this concentration. Before he was summoned to Washington, Grant had committed himself to the opinion that the Army of the Potomac should be conveyed by sea to the banks of the James, there to begin its next campaign. Whether he deferred to the well-known wishes of the Government that Washington should be covered by a direct advance, or whether he was converted to the opinion that it was best to attempt the ruin of Lee's army by the overland route, is uncertain. It may, however, well be believed after the proofs Lee had given of his offensive capacity, that Grant was afraid to leave him for two or three weeks to work his will in some daring expedition. The road to victory still lay over the ruin of Lee's army, and that might be accomplished more easily sixty miles from Richmond than in the near neighbourhood of the Confederate base.

The attack by the overland route having been resolved on, there still remained a considerable choice of roads. Should the Federals turn the right or left of the Southern army, and if the former should it commence its advance from the fords of the Rappahannock which led into the Wilderness, or attempt to avoid that unfavourable ground by seizing a bridge-head at Fredericksburg and moving thence direct on Richmond? Each of these lines of advance had been unsuccessfully attempted, each had some points of advantage over the others. To turn Lee's left, using the Orange and Alexandria railway for supplies, gave the Federals the best chance of winning a great tactical victory. The country was sufficiently open to admit of the deployment of their superior forces on a broad front, and gave scope to their superior artillery. Tactical defeat would as before compel Lee to choose between being cut off from Richmond or having to abandon the railway system south of Gordonsville and

the Shenandoah Valley. The risks involved were, however, proportionately great. Every mile of the railway in its rear would have to be guarded as the Federal army advanced, which would speedily reduce its fighting strength. The Shenandoah Valley on his left and Richmond on his right gave Lee opportunities for shifting his base and for daring manœuvres. The country was exhausted and all supplies would have to be brought by rail; the large number of wounded with which the Federal army would soon be charged would also depend on the railway for transport to a place of safety. Grant finally decided that his strength was inadequate to the enterprise; he resolved instead on moving by the straightest road to Richmond, which lay through the Wilderness.

The country to be traversed and its peculiar difficulties have been described in discussing Hooker's campaign, but Grant preferred to encounter them rather than give the enemy the chance of disputing the passage of the Rappahannock at Fredericksburg. He seems to have believed that the line of the river would afford the enemy the means of checking his superior forces, and therefore resolved by rapid movement to surprise the passage: he was also not without hopes of getting right through the Wilderness before Lee's forces were sufficiently concentrated to bar his progress. In this he underrated the energy of his foe, and the difficulty of conveying all the trains of the army across the Rapidan and along forest roads to the southern edge of the Wilderness.

Whichever way the problem was regarded it presented colossal difficulties. To outwit such a general as Lee, to demoralise and destroy such troops as he led, even with a twofold superiority of numbers, was a stupendous undertaking. Every Federal soldier knew that there was no royal road, no short cut to victory, but that, however skilfully they were led, very bloody fighting and many doubtful days must be endured before they reached the end of their task. It was therefore with quiet determination to do its utmost and to endure the worst that the Army of the Potomac resumed its pilgrimage, and who can doubt that this spirit of patient courage, and it alone, enabled the

Federal troops to face the appalling experiences of the campaign without demoralisation? The movement round Lee's right when once accomplished enabled the Northern host constantly to change its base, and to open fresh avenues of supply and communication by the navigable estuaries of the Virginian rivers. Every such movement also brought it in closer contact with the fleet and facilitated movements of troops by water to reinforce the invading forces at any point, or to open up a fresh line of attack. The strategy of the enterprise was consequently the most cautious which could have been adopted, but the tactics by which Grant sought to carry out his plan were bold to the verge of rashness. Relying on his numerical preponderance and inexhaustible resources of men and material, he tried to overwhelm the enemy by repeated attacks wherever he was met with and however strongly he was posted, 'to wear him out if by mere attrition.' A summary of the principal events of the campaign from May 4, when he crossed the Rapidan, to June 18, when he failed in the storm of Petersburg, will show what fortune attended this method.

Although the Southern Government maintained a defiant attitude and the spirit of the great majority of the people, men and women, still supported the war with energy, Exhaustion of the South. yet the signs of exhaustion had become more unmistakable as the winter wore on. There were still some two hundred thousand men in the field to resist the five hundred thousand invaders, but the means of meeting the losses of another campaign did not exist. The Gettysburg campaign, Vicksburg and Chattanooga had deprived the Seceding States of troops which could not be replaced, and the disastrous issue of the fighting had for the first time really exposed the interior of the country to attack. In May 1864 there was no semblance of war on even terms, of a struggle on the frontier which might be carried on to Northern soil; the Confederacy was definitely thrown on to the defensive to stave off if possible the deadly embrace of the invaders. The history of these times makes it hard to decide whether to admire most the splendid patriotism of the North, which persisted so staunchly in the

apparently impossible task after such failures as Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville, or the desperate resolution of the Southern population which made greater sacrifices of property and life than any community in modern history. The intense personal feeling aroused by the struggle is illustrated by Lincoln's exclamation of agony in December 1862: 'If there is another man out of hell as wretched as I, then I pity him!' After Federal victories had isolated the Southern forces in Louisiana and food was increasingly hard to obtain for the Confederate troops in that state, the division commanded by Prince Camille de Polignac which was half starving showed signs of insubordination. The Prince collected his men and harangued them. 'I wish I could tell you,' said he, 'that matters are likely to improve, but on the contrary I fear harder times are in store for us. It is for you to decide whether the cause for which we are fighting is worth the sacrifices we are called upon to make.' Thenceforth he had no more murmuring from his soldiers. In days of peace and plenty the heroic elements in national life are too often absent altogether, and it is such a crisis as war alone brings about which searches out the real worth of a nation, and leaves it on record as an offset to much suffering and loss.

At the end of April Lee's army, consisting of the three corps of Ewell, Hill and Longstreet, less Pickett's division at Petersburg, still occupied the cantonments it had taken up after Meade established himself at Culpeper. Lee's headquarters were at Orange Court-house; Stuart lived in camp hard by, but the main body of the cavalry was quartered south of Fredericksburg for the sake of forage. Longstreet had been sent back to the army in the middle of April at Lee's urgent request, and his two divisions were quartered at Gordonsville. It is not apparent why they were not moved closer to the Rapidan as soon as Lee convinced himself that Grant would cross the river below him. As will be seen the delay in bringing Longstreet's forces to the first battlefield nearly caused disaster. Ewell's troops were disposed to guard the line of the Rapidan east of the railway, while

Situation
of oppos-
ing Forces,
May 1.

Hill's picket line extended across the roads to Culpeper west of it. Cavalry posts and patrols kept vigilant watch and rapid concentration of all three corps to front or flanks was provided for.

The strength of the army on May 4 was nearly forty-nine thousand infantry, five thousand artillery, and seven thousand cavalry. The repose of the winter months had restored its morale and brought back many convalescents to the ranks. Right through the wet and cold weather the troops had suffered from want of blankets, clothing and regular supplies of sufficient food. Often but one day's meagre rations were at hand, so that Lee was worn by anxieties which his superiors at Richmond should have prevented at any cost; but the army had already performed such miracles in defeating the well-supplied hosts of the enemy that it was taken for granted the feat would be repeated in spite of the tremendous preparations in the North which could not be concealed. As the spring advanced bringing with it the immediate prospect of more hard fighting, which meant wounds and death to many of the survivors of past dangers, it is not surprising to learn that the solemn situation and the peril of their country induced a spirit of religious fervour in Lee's camps along the Rapidan. Services and prayer meetings were often held, and the general from policy and inclination encouraged the movement. An army is seldom more dangerous than when it is filled with religious enthusiasm.

Grave as the situation was known to be by superior officers, the trust with which Lee inspired his men and the recollection of former victories kept up their courage and confidence. They calmly awaited the advance of the enemy in the belief they would serve Grant as they had served McDowell, McClellan, Pope, Burnside and Hooker, each of whom had brought vastly superior numbers against them. It cannot be said that the army in 1864 was more formidable than it had been in the spring of 1863, but as the sequel will show it had not deteriorated.

Crossing the Rapidan we find the Federal troops mainly grouped around Culpeper with outposts on the stream,

Right along the railway by which its daily food was brought troops were cantoned for protection of the line as well as The Fede- to facilitate supply. Furlough had been freely ral Army. granted to officers and men; crowds of civilians, journalists and traders swarmed in the camps. Society at Washington welcomed many of the officers with dances and dinner-parties until Grant suddenly stopped all leave, cleared his camps, and at the end of April cut off all communication with Washington as far as he was able. The three corps of Meade's command, the II, V, and VI, had an average strength of twenty-five thousand infantry and artillery, and Burnside's IX corps was of about the same size. The cavalry corps under Sheridan had eleven thousand mounted men in three divisions, so that nearly one hundred and twenty thousand troops supported by large reserves stood ready to fall upon the sixty thousand Confederates.

On May 2 confidential orders for a swift march to Germanna and Ely's Fords were issued. Each man was to carry fifty cartridges, three days' complete rations besides three days' bread. Beef for three days was to be taken on the hoof. The trains were to be massed under the command of one officer with a guard of one thousand two hundred infantry from each corps. With the troops marched the fighting trains only, that is the forage, ammunition and ambulance carts which would be immediately required. One cavalry division was to cover the front of the army, the other two having seized the fords were entrusted with the duty of protecting the baggage trains, which were ordered to cross the river at Culpeper Mine and Ely's Fords after the II corps. The V and VI corps were to cross by Germanna Ford so as to form a flank guard to the army. The order enjoined an advance through the forest on the 4th, and indicated Spottsylvania Court-house as the objective. From Culpeper to Germanna Ford was twenty miles by road; from the fords to Spottsylvania is rather less, but the road from Ely's Ford to Chancellorsville was but a track. Two roads would be available for the troops, but the trains would move in a single column to the river.

As soon as it was dark on the evening of May 3, the Federal corps pushed their preparations, and shortly after midnight their advanced guards were busy throwing pontoon bridges over the river. Before dawn the bridges were constructed and positions taken up to cover the passage. Parties of horsemen then pressed forward along all the roads through the forest south, east and west, while the infantry in dark columns filed along the roads between the two rivers silent and thoughtful. As the light increased the haze of dust stirred up by marching troops in many directions attracted the notice of the watchful Confederate posts. Then word was brought to Ewell that a cavalry patrol had seen the baggage train of a large force on the road to Richardsville. There could no longer be any doubt; the long-expected attack was developing.

The information was swiftly conveyed to Lee and spread through all the Confederate cantonments. Troops rapidly getting under arms, waggons being packed, mounted men cantering to and fro, enlivened every little village and camp along the Rapidan which sheltered Southern soldiers. Ewell's brigades were soon tramping to gain the turnpike road. The sunshine of the lovely May morning glittered on their arms and lent an air of respectability even to the shabby uniforms of the men, and to the rough tackle of the guns and waggons. The lean and wiry horses seemed to understand that the game was afoot once more and moved briskly in the teams. By midday of the 4th the whole Confederate army had been alarmed and the furthest divisions of Hill's and Longstreet's corps were getting under arms. The Second corps was already well on its way.

The attack had been expected by Lee, who was kept well informed of the enemy's doings. He had warned Jefferson Davis of the extent of the Federal preparations, and of the more formidable character of the new general and his resources. On May 2 he had met a group of his superior officers on Clark's Mountain, and had then warned them to be in readiness, indicating the lower fords of the Rapidan as the enemy's probable point of passage. When the news reached him of

Con-
federates
March,
May 4.

the hostile march he could not conceal his satisfaction that Grant was about to launch his army into the jungle which had made it possible to defeat Hooker and to foil Meade. Lee promptly resolved to attack Grant's flank as soon as his troops were fairly committed to the woods; with this intention he ordered the whole army to concentrate on the Mine Run as speedily as possible, but directed the commanders of the Second and Third corps to avoid a general action until the First corps was within supporting distance. The pike was assigned to Ewell and the plank road to Hill. Stuart was already on his way to collect his two cavalry divisions.

The main features of the country in which the contending armies met once again has already been described:

Battle-
field of
the Wil-
derness.

the sinuous course of the river with its tributary ravines; the rib of land parting the waters of the Rapidan and the Po, followed by the two roads and railway-cutting from west to east, connecting Orange Court-house through Chancellorsville with Fredericksburg; the thick woods which clothed the ground and especially the dense thickets on the western edge of the forest; the two small streams between whose ravines was contained the densest jungle of the Wilderness; the Wilderness Run and seven miles west of it the Mine Run, which formed the western boundary of the forest. With these principal features the reader is already familiar, but a close scrutiny of the large-scale map is necessary to appreciate the distances covered by the different corps in the first week of the campaign, and the several roads by which the two armies reached the battlefield of Spottsylvania Court-house.

All day on the 4th the Confederate troops marched and the Federal trains defiled over the river and up the steep bank into the woods. By noon, the hour at which half the Southern force commenced their concentration, the heads of the two Federal columns of infantry were halted at Wilderness Tavern and Chancellorsville respectively, after helping the engineers to construct the bridges. They might easily have pushed on several miles further, but Grant considered it more prudent to close up his army while the

trains crossed the river and proceeded southwards. It was not until 5 P.M. on May 5 that the whole baggage of the army got across. At 1 P.M. on the 4th Grant telegraphed to Burnside to make a forced march to Germanna Ford, which he might be expected to reach at nightfall on the 5th, having forty miles to cover with his rearmost division.

While the masses of both armies drew nigh to one another the cavalry had already come in collision and the reports of Wilson's Federal patrols indicated that large hostile forces were moving eastward on both the plank and pike roads. Grant's orders for the 5th, issued from Meade's headquarters at 6 P.M., May 4, were as follows.

'The following movements are ordered for May 5:—

'1. Major-General Sheridan will move with Gregg's and Tabert's cavalry divisions against the enemy's cavalry in the direction of Hamilton's crossing. General Wilson's Orders for May 5. with the 3rd cavalry division will move to Craig's meeting-house on the Catharpin road. He will keep out parties on the Orange pike and plank roads, the Catharpin road and Pamunkey road.

'2. Major-General Hancock, commanding the II corps, will move at 5 A.M. to Shady Grove Church and extend his right towards the V corps at Parker's Store.

'3. Major-General Warren, commanding the V corps, will move at 5 A.M. to Parker's Store on the Orange plank road and extend his right towards the VI corps at Old Wilderness Tavern.

'4. Major-General Sedgwick, commanding the VI corps, will move to Old Wilderness Tavern on the Orange pike as soon as the road is clear. He will leave a division to cover the bridge at Germanna Ford until informed from these headquarters of the arrival of General Burnside's troops there.

'5. The Reserve Artillery will move to Corbin's Bridge as soon as the road is clear.

'6. The trains will be parked in the vicinity of Todd's Tavern.

'7. Headquarters will be on the Orange plank road near the V corps.

'8. After reaching the points designated the army will be held ready to move forward.

'9. The commanders of the V and VI corps will keep out detachments on the roads on their right flank. The commander of the II corps will do the same on the roads in his front. Their flankers and pickets will be thrown well out, and their troops be held ready to meet the enemy at any moment.

'By command of Major-General MEADE.'

The situation contemplated by these orders is well worth studying. A defensive battle by the II, V and VI corps to fend off Lee's flank attack until the arrival of the IX corps would seem to have been Grant's intention from the order to park the trains. Grant did not know precisely what forces Lee would dispose of on the 5th, but he knew that Lee could not have more than fifty thousand infantry at most to oppose to his sixty-five thousand with twenty thousand following close in support.

He may well have surmised that Lee could not bring up all his forces until late in the day, and in fact only five divisions took part in the attack, about thirty thousand men. It is worth considering whether Grant would not have done more wisely to have prescribed a vigorous offensive in case the two armies should come to blows.

Like Hooker, Grant was much relieved at getting over the river without a fight. At nightfall on the 4th, he held the same positions as Hooker's right wing on the night of April 30, 1863.

The heads of Ewell and Hill's corps halted on the pike and plank roads with advanced posts at Locust Grove and New Hope Church. Their advance westward was resumed early on the 5th, but was very cautiously conducted. About noon, however, Ewell's leading brigade came into collision with the V corps two miles east of Locust Grove. The sharp fight which followed inaugurated the great battle of the next two days. When the presence of a strong hostile force on the pike road was notified to Meade, he sent orders to Warren to form line to his right, and to attack. He commanded Hancock to halt and

Battle
of the
Wilderness,
May 5.

to make arrangements for joining Warren if necessary. Sedgwick was ordered to move from the river bank by the lane from Orange Grove to the pike in order to fall upon the enemy's flank. The woods greatly impeded the execution of these orders, which were consequently but slowly carried out. In the meanwhile the Confederate troops arriving by the pike and plank roads deployed and came into action across the two roads from the head of Flat Creek through Hagerston's and Chewning's farms to the railway. A sanguinary and indecisive struggle swayed to and fro during the afternoon. The Confederate left wing gained considerable advantage, but the two divisions of Hill's corps which composed their right, though successful at first, were much used by the masses of Hancock's corps as it gradually came into action.

Fear of a flank attack induced the Federals to echelon large reserves in rear of either flank, and their left was to some extent paralysed by the active Confederate cavalry which engaged Wilson's cavalry divisions on foot and conveyed the impression that infantry was also present by their heavy fire. Darkness closed the struggle leaving the combatants in position about half a mile apart. During the night hasty breast-works were constructed by both sides.

Ere the sound of firing had ceased to re-echo in the wooded ravines Grant had issued orders for a combined May 6. attack on the two hostile groups holding both pike and plank roads by the II, V and VI corps. The IX corps was ordered to support it. Prisoners taken on the 5th gave information of Longstreet's impending arrival and so revealed the opportunity lost in the morning. In order to redeem the mistake if possible by falling upon the enemy before Longstreet's approach, the attack was planned to take place soon after dawn.

The Confederate left beat off the assailant with heavy loss, and in turn assumed the offensive without inflicting much more harm than it suffered; but on the right the diminished and exhausted soldiers of Heth and Wilcox's divisions after a short resistance fell back into the woods before the fiery onslaught of Hancock's troops. They,

however, held on to Tapp's farm and the clearing north of the road, so that the left of Hill's line was thrown back and for a time severed from Ewell. Confederate defeat was averted by the arrival of Longstreet's two leading brigades, which came along the plank road at the 'double quick' until abreast of Tapp's farm, where Lee was personally directing affairs. Cheering lustily the new comers threw themselves upon the disordered Federals and flung them back. Anderson's division of the Third corps which had been left on the Rapidan came up soon after the First corps had reinforced Hill north of the road. By 7 A.M. the Federal attack was held in check.

Encouraged by his success and inspired no doubt by Jackson's famous stroke the year before, Longstreet disposed one of his divisions to assail the enemy's flank, while he bore down on their front with the other. Longstreet wounded. It was a most difficult matter to get the attacking lines into preliminary position, and while personally assisting to direct the manœuvre, Longstreet and his staff received a volley from his own men, which struck him down severely wounded and killed the gallant General Jenkins of South Carolina. This misfortune occurred but three miles from the spot where Jackson was killed in exactly the same way. As when Jackson fell, so now, confusion and delay occurred with the Southern commanders. Lee rode into the front lines, and perhaps because he thought the opportunity had passed, suspended the assault. It took place later, but the enemy having had time to rally and reinforce, it was repulsed.

During the afternoon Grant made the greatest exertions to combine all his forces for a simultaneous attack. Burnside had come into line and the cavalry was Severe Fighting in the Evening. massed on the left flank. At the same time Lee contemplated exactly the same thing. He saw that his troops were more than a match for the hostile masses who fell over one another in the woods, in spite of the desperate efforts of their leaders, and especially of the gallant Hancock, to give unity and force to the Federal movements.

Lee aimed at nothing less than to pen up Grant, as he had penned up Hooker, on the river bank by skilful blows at his flank until he frightened the Northern general into retracing his steps. But Grant was made of very different stuff to Hooker or even to Meade, and for this reason Lee's plan failed, though his gallant riflemen surpassed themselves in their endeavours to carry it out. In the general attack on the Southern army which inaugurated the battle of May 6 the Federal right wing could make no impression on their enemy, whose positions were already rectified and covered by breast-works. Burnside next led an attack against the enemy's centre, but it soon fell into confusion in the wood fighting. Before Hancock made his advance his corps was fiercely attacked in front and flank by Longstreet's men. They drove the Federals as far back as the Brock road along which their breast-works enabled them to rally. Field's Confederate division penetrated even this line, but was driven back by a counter-stroke of Carroll's brigade. After this Hancock's command was in no condition to resume the offensive. The Confederates sullenly fell back and a stationary fire fight took place till it became dark.

Just before sunset the left of Ewell's corps under Early attacked the Federal extreme right by surprise. Two Federal brigades were cut up and many prisoners taken, but the Confederate advance soon fell into disorder. Their reserves were not skilfully thrown in, and the gathering gloom prevented any decisive result. A thick curtain of smoke was hanging over the two armies which clung to the woods for some time and made the night darker. With difficulty the scattered commands were reorganised for the collection of the wounded and for improving the entrenchments. An average distance of three-quarters of a mile separated the two armies when daylight broke.

A sharp contest in the afternoon between Stuart's and Sheridan's cavalry corps resulted in the retirement of the latter over the Ny river. Stuart followed up and barricaded the roads north of Todd's Tavern with felled trees.

The confusion in the Federal army had been remedied to some extent during the night, but the task of defeating the

enemy on this field seemed to Grant beyond his power. Lee had his line entrenched across the pike and plank roads and held strong pivots in Tapp's, Chewning's and Hagerson's farms and the clearings round them. Guns had been brought up into the line, and the Southern forces presented a far more formidable aspect than the day before. A fraction of the Rebel army might defend the position while the rest initiated some offensive stroke. Grant resolved to transfer the contest to more open ground, and at the same time to continue his movement towards Richmond. With this object he made Sheridan push back Stuart as far as Todd's Tavern and started off the trains towards Spottsylvania. The army was ordered to get what rest it could during the day and then to follow as soon as it was dark; the V and II corps were ordered to march by the Brock road, the VI and IX through Chancellorsville and Piney Branch Church. The two columns of infantry would thus continue to interpose between the trains and the enemy, from whom an attack was to be feared while the movement was in progress. Grant directed that if such an attack was made the whole army should countermarch to meet it.

Both sides claimed the victory. To whom should it be awarded? By far the greatest material damage befel the Federal army, which lost four thousand mortally hurt in the two days' struggle, some nine thousand injured more or less severely, and from whose standards there were still some three thousand stragglers, most of whom, however, rejoined in time. Each side took about one thousand five hundred prisoners. The little Confederate army was diminished probably by two thousand lives lost and five thousand wounded. Grant could far better afford the loss than Lee and was able to continue his march; so that in spite of local successes, and the moral gain to the Confederates by their splendid achievement, the result must be considered on the whole favourable to the invaders. It was destined to be their last tactical victory for many weeks of desperate fighting.

If the result be considered unfavourable to Lee, it does

not follow that he was wrong to attack Grant's flank on the 5th. He would certainly have done better to have waited till the afternoon, if that had been possible. He might then have deployed his whole army on the morning of May 6 with more decisive results. The operation he attempted of massing his forces so close to the enemy invited their attack on the morning of the 5th, and Lee knew that in Grant he had a more enterprising opponent than Hooker. Such reflexions are easy to make after the event, and after giving them due weight it must be conceded that both the march to the Wilderness, and the tremendous battle which followed, are among Lee's best performances. He now knew that the shadow of Gettysburg no longer oppressed his troops, and with confidence he threw his flexible and mobile army athwart the path of the invasion, forcing his foe to deliver at Spottsylvania, Cold Harbor and Petersburg the bloody and futile assaults which shattered his gallant forces and saved the Confederacy for another year.

From the Wilderness let us accompany Grant's army on its difficult march round Richmond to the southern bank of the James, briefly describing the principal events, and then returning to examine more closely the incidents of the first great encounter with Lee.

Spottsylvania Court-house. The operations ordered by Grant for the night of May 7 were duly carried out, but Stuart's tireless troopers had reported the movements of the Federal baggage and, Lee instantly penetrated his enemy's design. Longstreet's corps, now led by Anderson, was sent at 9 A.M. by a lane on the north of the Po river, which ran parallel with the Brock road and about a mile from it, to Corbin's Bridge, where the column crossed the stream. Turning to the left at Shady Grove, the two divisions recrossed the river at dawn, May 8, and took post on a low ridge covering the village of Spottsylvania Court-house on the north, and barring all the roads pursued by the Federal forces. This manœuvre was rendered possible by the sturdy resistance of Stuart's two cavalry divisions, which had fallen back fighting before the enemy's cavalry, and which had only ridden away at last to clear the front of the First corps deployed in rear. Both Federals and

Confederates had been marching all night quite close to one another by parallel roads through the woods, but the coveted position fell into Lee's possession by the superior skill and promptness of his cavalry chief.


Sharp fighting between Warren's corps, the V, and the First corps failed to dislodge the latter, and during the day May 8. entrenchments were thrown up by both sides. Late in the afternoon another attack was made upon the defenders of the ridge, but, largely owing to the exhaustion of the Federal infantry, it gained little ground. The night march following the desperate battle in the Wilderness had been very trying. The weather was very hot; fine dust from the rough woodland roads filled the air. The way was very dark thanks to the overhanging woods, save where forest fires impeded the march, and sent thick volumes of scorching smoke and sparks into the ranks crowded in the narrow track. More than once the Federal column on the Brock road was made to halt by the guns and waggons in front of it, and in the morning, when Warren was massing his troops by the roadside for rest and breakfast, they were called upon to join in the fight with the Confederate cavalry. The Grey infantry, on the other hand, had marched without interruption. No cavalry had disputed their advance, and they had sooner than their enemy emerged from the forest. In the morning they had breakfasted in peace, and quietly occupied their position before they were attacked. The Federal generals, and Meade in particular, have been sharply criticised for allowing Lee thus to cross their path; the explanation lies in the fact, so often demonstrated by the events of this war, that the army which has a cavalry superiority can, other things being even approximately equal, always outmanœuvre its opponent.

The distance from Hancock's left at nightfall on May 7 to the Federal right in the new line of battle was but seven miles by the Brock road, but the task of withdrawing so great a force by night from the presence of the enemy was very difficult, and reflects much credit on the skill of the Federal staff. The distance which most of Warren's troops had to march during the night was thirteen miles. The

position which Lee took up at Spottsylvania was in the shape of a huge V. The apex of the V pointed towards the hostile approach and challenged attack. Across the salient, however, entrenchments were made, and traverses were thrown up on the wings, so that the defenders could retire from one line to another in rear.

During May 8 both armies closed up towards this position; and both worked at their trenches and brought up guns. Sharp skirmishing continued on May 9 in which Sedgwick, the brave leader of the VI corps, was shot through the temples and killed. No decisive action however, was attempted by either side, for the soldiers in each army much wanted rest. The Federal losses in the fight of May 8 and in the skirmishing on May 9 amounted to about two thousand killed and wounded.

The Federals continued to press their skirmishers against the enemy's position so as to find out its extent and strength. What they discovered was not, however, of much use to them. The V-shaped works prolonged their western face one mile to the south-west and their eastern face for about two miles southward. Both of Lee's flanks rested on the Po river; the eastern face of the salient was covered by thick pine wood, the apex of the angle was defended by a work traced across the angle for about three hundred yards facing north, which blunted the point of the V; thus:—



The western face of the salient was only covered by wood in places; it had for the most of its length an open space in front of it which the enemy must cross under fire to attack. The Second corps held the east face and the First corps the west face. Hill's corps continued the line of the Second corps to the Po and formed a reserve.

On the evening of May 9 Hancock was ordered to cross the Po with the intention of attacking the enemy's left rear. His troops established themselves on the south bank

before dark, but during the night Lee sent a division to oppose them, and extended his entrenchments across their front. In the morning Meade recalled Hancock, whose troops rejoined the army at 5 P.M. In the meanwhile hard fighting had taken place. All the morning a duel of guns and skirmishers had gone on; about 3 P.M. the V corps assaulted the west face of the salient, and a little later the VI corps fought its way into the east face. The V corps was beaten back with heavy loss; the VI corps, however, gained considerable success, captured several hundred prisoners, but not being supported by strong reserves was also compelled to retreat. The day's work had been very costly in life, and had only served as a reconnaissance in force. The Federals lost about five thousand men, the Confederates probably two thousand.

During May 11 preparations were made for renewing the assault, and Hancock's corps was transferred from the right May 11. to the Federal centre. The ground was once more carefully reconnoitred, and the troops destined for the storm of the salient slept on their arms close to their objective point. The Confederates strengthened their works and constructed a second and third line of trenches within.

Dense fog favoured the approach of the stormers at 4.30 A.M. on May 12. Hancock's men rushed the breast-work, swept all opposition before them and captured almost the whole of Edward Johnson's division of the Second corps, about three thousand men. In the first flush of victory Hancock sent word to Grant that he 'had finished up Johnson and was going in at Early.' If the first victorious rush had been more promptly supported and followed up much might have been accomplished, but the Confederates were given time to rally behind their second line of breast-works, and the resistance they offered to any further advance of the enemy was obstinate in the extreme. Passing from defence to counter-attack the Grey brigades made desperate efforts to recover the lost ground, and from time to time succeeded in pushing back the intruding wedge of Blue infantry. Rain fell heavily, and a steaming mist rose and mingled with the smoke almost

concealing the mass of men locked in deadly embrace. The description of the action given by Brigadier-General Grant, who commanded the Vermont brigade of the VI corps, vividly paints the savage encounter.

‘It was literally a hand-to-hand fight. Nothing but the piled-up logs or breast-works separated the combatants. Our men would reach over the logs and fire into the face of the enemy, would stab over with their bayonets; many were shot and stabbed through the crevices and holes between the logs; men mounted the works, and with muskets rapidly handed to them, kept up a continuous fire until they were shot down, when others would take their place and continue the deadly work. It was here that the celebrated tree was cut off by bullets and the logs cut to pieces and whipped into basket stuff. The rebel ditches were filled with dead men several deep. I was at the angle next day. The sight was terrible and sickening, much worse than at the Antietam.’

Besides the main attack both Federal wings attempted to penetrate the Confederate line without success. The rain increased towards the evening, but fighting went on until the murky darkness made it impossible to distinguish friend from foe. Humphreys states that the Federals lost six thousand eight hundred men in all on May 12, the Confederates between four thousand and five thousand. Grant could boast of the capture of Johnson’s division in the morning, but had no other solid result to show for the carnage. He could only reflect that Lee felt heavy losses more severely still, and in his despatch to Lincoln he telegraphed ‘I propose to fight it out on this line if it takes all the summer.’ Finding it impossible to overwhelm his enemy by direct attack Grant tried to envelope his flanks, and he extended his entrenchments with that object. The roads, however, were quagmires after the storm; all movements of the Federal troops were perforce executed slowly and quickly discovered by the vigilant foe, who was always ready to meet them on a new line. After skirmishing and counter-entrenching for a week, Grant repeated the manoeuvre which had brought him out of the Wilderness; he moved round the Confederates

with his main body, while a strong rearguard remained entrenched on their front, and by this manœuvre the Northern army was led from the blood-stained field of Spottsylvania. On May 21 it reached Guiney Station, thus making a long stride on the road to Richmond.

The Federal forces had been reduced by about thirty-five thousand men since the campaign began, but about fifteen thousand men had joined them from Washington. Twenty thousand sick and wounded were conveyed to the base by steamer, giving the Northern people a sad proof of what the struggle was costing them. Remembering the unparalleled severity of the fighting and the continuous strain of fatigue and excitement to which both armies had been subjected since May 4, the student of war marvels at such heroism and power of physical endurance.

While the masses of contending infantry had been fighting desperately at Spottsylvania, the cavalry corps led by Stuart and Sheridan had also waged war against one another on a separate field. Grant had yielded to the temptation of detaching his cavalry against the enemy's communication, an evil course which is always attractive when sounder methods fail. On May 9 Sheridan concentrated his three divisions in rear of his army, and rode round the eastern flank of the lines of Spottsylvania, crossed the North Anna, and took the road to Richmond. Stuart was promptly informed of the march, and started in pursuit with a brigade of Hampton's division, while FitzLee was sent by another route to cover the capital. Stuart quickly overtook the rearguard of the huge Federal column and hung on to its skirts on the 10th, but could not prevent its leading division spreading across the country and doing considerable damage. Six miles north of Richmond at Yellow Tavern, on the 11th, the Northern Horse encountered FitzLee's men, dismounted, in position, and a lively action took place. The Confederates gained some advantage by a mounted charge on a Federal brigade, which was still in fours on the road, but they were heavily outnumbered. Stuart with Gordon's brigade came into action against Sheridan's rear, compelling his enemy to face in two directions,

The
Cavalry
Fight at
Yellow
Tavern.

and pressing him with his usual courage and energy. The attack gave time to the militia at Richmond to man their works, but this delay was dearly purchased, for Stuart himself was fatally wounded while personally fighting in the front line, and Gordon, his brave brigadier, was killed outright.

Thus fell the celebrated leader of the Confederate cavalry. Unvarying good luck in action had made him careless of personal risk. His plumed hat, broad yellow scarf and fine figure marked him out so conspicuously that it is remarkable he survived four years' fighting. Few soldiers have had a more distinguished career. To Stuart belongs the glory of inaugurating a new system of cavalry tactics. His brilliant leading of the Second corps at Chancellorsville after Jackson's fall proved his capacity to command infantry also. His luckless raid in the Gettysburg campaign will ever be considered to be his one great failure. With such able subordinates as FitzLee and Hampton to lead the cavalry he would probably have been better employed as Lee's chief Staff officer in that campaign.

Stuart was conveyed to Richmond, but died before his wife could reach his bedside on the evening of May 12. Brave, intelligent and generous, he leaves a renown of which every American may well be proud.

Having disengaged his force from the action at Yellow Tavern, Sheridan continued his raid. He passed the outer defences of Richmond, but was held up by the defenders of the inner line, of whose weakness he was ignorant. Proceeding down the Chickahominy, after some skirmishing he reached Haxall's Landing, and thence moved by water to rejoin Grant, whose bivouacs he regained on May 24. Except the accidental killing of Stuart and Gordon, his raid accomplished nothing of importance. One may, however, speculate on the results which this large cavalry force might have accomplished in combination with the infantry at Spottsylvania. If two of Grant's four corps had held Lee fast in his lines, the other two might have closed on his rear and cut off his retreat. Sheridan's cavalry alone could have rendered this manœuvre possible by sweeping away the opposing

horsemen who guarded Lee's flanks, and by seizing a position in Lee's rear before his infantry could extricate themselves from the lines of Spottsylvania in time to entrench afresh.

As generally happens when fighting is severe, after the horses of the cavalry it is the men of the infantry who most rapidly diminish in number. The great battles of Grant's Advance, May 5, 6, 10 and 12 had fearfully reduced the Federal ranks. Not only were the actual musters reduced, but as inevitably happens the fallen included an unduly large proportion of the bravest and best, whose spirit carries the mass along and inspires it with energy to fight. Undaunted, however, Grant resolved to try another fall, and since Lee had succeeded in barring the direct road, he edged away to his left and moved southward by the Fredericksburg and Richmond roads and railway.

The general character of the country he had to traverse from the Po to the James river was open and cultivated in parts, but intersected with belts of forest through which swampy streams wound their course. From Guiney Station, on the 21st, he marched through Bowling Green on the 22nd, to Milford 23rd, and thence to the north bank of the Anna on the 24th, opposite Hanover Junction and twenty-eight miles from Spottsylvania. At this point Lee opposed him once more. The II and V corps each succeeded in passing the stream, but only to find the enemy wedged in between them, with the point of his salient resting this time on the river. The Federals lost fifteen hundred men before they could retrace this false step.

Continuing his flank march down the Pamunkey river Grant crossed it near the little town of Hanover. He was reinforced by the XVIII corps from Butler's army, under General Smith, which had been brought by water to White House when it was found that Beauregard had practically invested the so-called army of the James in the Bermuda Hundreds, a loop of low-lying country almost enclosed by the river. Lee had also been reinforced by about twelve thousand men, and had reorganised his army in four corps, the fourth corps commander being John Breckinridge, who

had been vice-president of the United States from 1856 to 1860. This officer had already served with distinction at Shiloh, Chickamauga and Chattanooga; he now arrived fresh from defeating Sigel's Federal corps in the Shenandoah, repeating once more Jackson's famous march to Richmond in June 1862, but with a mere skeleton of the famous Valley army. He is said to be distinguished as the one prominent politician in the war who was also a good general. On May 31 the armies confronted one another on the Totopotomoy Creek, both of them edging cautiously towards the Chickahominy. That evening a cavalry fight took place at Cold Harbor which left a good position in the hands of Sheridan, and Grant hastened to reinforce him with infantry so as to secure the passage of the river near Gaines' Mill, the very spot where Jackson and Lee's combined attack had defeated McClellan.

In spite of all precautions and a long night march, however, the Federals were unable to prevent Lee from gliding
 June 1 across their front and entrenching his army on the
 and 2. left bank of the river. The first two days of June were spent by the Federals in closing up their army and in skirmishing with the enemy. Lee's bold attitude seemed to offer yet another chance of crushing him by superior numbers; but the assault had to be delayed until dawn of June 3, owing to the exhaustion of the Federal troops on the 2nd, induced by the heat and by marching at night.

On June 3, just before the first rosy streaks of daylight appeared, the II and VI corps in deep columns ran across the
 Cold narrow stretch of swampy jungle separating them
 Harbor from the hostile picket line, which was only held
 June 3. with small posts. These were quickly driven in; then the Northern riflemen dashed through the thickets over their ankles in mud and water, and attempted to rush the Confederate breast-works. But the attack had been foreseen. The defenders were lining the rough parapet, and, waiting until the dense throng of charging men were within a few paces, they began a rapid and deadly fire which ripped open the attacking mass and threw it back in fragments. In ten minutes the heaviest loss was inflicted on the two corps of

the Federal left before the right and centre could co-operate, but fighting continued all the morning; many partial assaults were repulsed with murderous loss by the cool fire of the Southern soldiers, artfully assisted by guns which had been sandwiched in the disputed parapets. At last the Federal infantry only responded to the command 'charge!' by firing from where they lay. The army was beaten, and with appalling loss of life. It is only possible to calculate how many men fell in the actual storm by deducting from thirteen thousand, the total recorded loss for the dates May 27 to June 3, the numbers reported to have fallen on the previous days. By this method we reckon that on June 3, about two thousand five hundred were fatally wounded, besides four thousand five hundred wounded who recovered: the enormous proportion of the dead being due to the fact that after the action neither side would propose an armistice to collect the sufferers between the lines until most of them were beyond human aid. In the series of actions known as Cold Harbor the Confederates lost between five thousand and six thousand.

Lee did indeed attempt to follow up his great victory by offensive strokes, but felt himself too weak to expend the lives of the soldiers who must inevitably fall in a decisive attack. Regarded from the point of view of his instructions, which were to prolong his defence to the utmost, he was undoubtedly right. If he had been in supreme command of all the Confederate armies we can hardly doubt that at this period of the war he would have risked everything in another bold throw for complete victory, since it was evident that by such a success on the battlefield alone could Grant be diverted from his goal. It was already manifest that he was not to be intimidated like former commanders of the Army of the Potomac.

The 'Overland Campaign' is usually described as closing with the battle of Cold Harbor, but it seems more logical to include in its history the march to the 'shining waters of the James,' where after two years' bitter strife the Army of the Potomac regained the position held by McClellan in July 1862. For twelve days the Federals watched Lee's army at Cold Harbor threatening

The Passage of the James.

it with assault by entrenching lines and sapping approaches so as to hem it in, but without success; then they repeated their former flank movements, crossed the Chickahominy and pressed towards the river James below Malvern Hill, where a fleet of steamers and ferry boats guarded by gunboats lay ready to carry the army across.

In spite of the defeat at Cold Harbor, and the sufferings endured by the troops cramped in narrow trenches for so many days, without sufficient water or means of cooking their tough rations, the march was well and punctually executed. Grant's dispositions were skilful enough to make Lee believe that Richmond was still his objective, though Beauregard at Petersburg was clamouring for reinforcements. The latter had in fact good reason for alarm. Grant had sent Smith's corps, the XVIII, back by water from White House on the York river and it had rejoined Butler before sunset on June 14; the next morning Hancock's brigades were massing on the southern bank. Failure of the Federal staff to combine the attack of the forces thus available against the defences of Petersburg and their slender garrison alone saved the place. Delay of twenty-four hours in making the attack, which should have followed hard on the arrival of the Army of the Potomac, enabled Beauregard to check the enemy until Lee, having realised his mistake, hurried brigade after brigade by rail from Richmond to the succour of his trusty colleague.

June 18 is a date which according to Macaulay should be sacred to Nemesis, if classical superstitions held good.

To Grant, as to Frederic and Napoleon, it proved the anniversary of a stinging defeat. A combined assault on the Confederate works in the evening of June 17 met with little success. Perhaps the troops could no longer repeat the dashing charges which had cost them so dear at Spottsylvania and Cold Harbor. The renewal of the attack on the 18th led to murderous loss and utterly failed to break down the stubborn defence. Between June 15 and 18 Grant lost no less than eleven thousand men captured, wounded and slain. Even he was obliged to call a halt, and to prepare by slower methods to

Attack on
Peters-
burg, June
17 and 18.

reduce the great stronghold of the South. Lee had emerged triumphant from a campaign which is surpassed by no other in gallant fighting and skilful direction. Even the glories of the campaign of France in 1814, and Frederic's wonderful defiance of his enemies in the Seven Years' War, pale before Lee's astonishing performance; for neither Napoleon till he met Wellington, nor Frederic at any time, was opposed to such a dangerous enemy as Grant.

We have attempted to give a brief summary of these operations in outline before discussing their tactical execution in detail. The record of the fighting is as rich in lessons for every rank of troop leader as the strategy of the campaign is for everyone who wishes to have sound general knowledge of military affairs. It is of great interest to those who would know the most that can be expected of supremely good troops, led by unrivalled commanders, and in particular should guide those whose duty it is to ponder upon the defence and attack of the British Isles. The defence of Richmond, from its proximity to the coast and its dependence on railway communication with the interior, gives on a small scale an idea of the problems of land warfare involved in the defence of London; but Richmond was strongly fortified and naturally protected by the country between its walls and the enemy's base. The eventual struggle which decided its fate took place on the neck of the railway system connecting it with its inland resources. How that struggle came to pass belongs to another period in the history of the war.

The remarkable resemblance from a tactical standpoint between the Manchurian campaign of 1904 with the contest between Grant and Lee in spite of forty years of invention and other developments of military science cannot fail to increase the interest with which the mighty struggle in Virginia will be regarded. Of all its hard-fought battles the Wilderness is most fruitful in lessons for contemporary warfare. It was characterised not only by the extensive use of field fortification on both sides, which has since become so essential a factor in fighting, but also by bold manœuvres on the part

The Fight-
ing in the
Wilderness,
May 5.

of adversaries who were separated by two days march when called to arms, and who consequently met in the manner technically known as the 'chance encounter'; an encounter that is between two forces on the march as contrasted with an attack made by the one against the other in position. The great battle is still more remarkable as the most important instance of forest fighting on record, surpassing even the contest in the same forest twelve months before, on account of the greater energy displayed by the Federal host, and consequently the greater difficulty in resisting it; the relative strength of the contending forces was about the same.

The Federal leader who most distinguished himself in this battle, as at Gettysburg and in many later ones, was Hancock. His description of the ground is worth quoting once more. 'It was covered by a dense forest almost impenetrable by troops in line of battle, where manœuvring was an operation of extreme difficulty and uncertainty. The undergrowth was so heavy that it was scarcely possible to see more than a hundred paces in any direction. The movements of the enemy could not be observed until the lines were almost in collision. Only the roar of musketry disclosed the position of the combatants to those who were at any distance, and my knowledge of what was transpiring except in my immediate presence was limited, and was necessarily derived from reports of subordinate commanders.'

It is evident that in such a contest the power of the smaller executive units to fight for themselves depending on the influence of subaltern officers, and also on the value of individual soldiers, counted for more than big combinations. Local knowledge and skilful tactics enabled the Confederates to seize the line of the three farms at the outset, which gave them all the advantages to be obtained from the ground. Their left flank was tolerably secure, and with their right they were able to manœuvre. Lee made use of this power to worry the enemy with bold attacks, while he firmly retained his grip on the two roads which the enemy must seize in order to break his line effectually. Though on the

Hancock's
Descrip-
tion of the
Field.

offensive, his men fortified themselves as fast as they gained ground.

Lee's attempt to mass his army in the woods east of the Mine Run within four miles or less of the Brock road, by which the Federals were marching south, without fighting until he chose to begin, was, as we have seen, too delicate an operation to be carried out against such a determined chief as Grant, though it had succeeded against Hooker. On the other hand, the danger existed if Lee held his hand too long that the Federal army would slip past him.

When an army is forced to make up for numerical inferiority by wits and skill it often develops better tactical formations than the enemy. This seems to have been the case with the Southerners in the Over-land Campaign. They learnt to come into action by marching in a column of fours and even of single file, guided by some skilful forester at the head. They learnt to deploy into line while one company as a chain of skirmishers extended into the woods on either side of the path to keep the enemy amused. They found that skilful direction of the marching columns and rapid deployment gave them many an initial advantage. The first exchange of fire at close quarters so often decided the fate of these encounters in the forest that surprises gained by bold and rapid movements were more telling than ever. The Federals, relying on their superior numbers and strong reserves, clung too much to line formations, which quickly became broken up in moving through the thickets, or to attacking with dense swarms which again and again were repulsed by an enemy who was prepared for them. Hancock's great success on May 12 was won by surprise, for although the Confederates expected attack, the fog concealed the torrent of Blue soldiers until it was pouring over the parapet.

A glance at the map of the Wilderness will show the inestimable value of the Brock road to the Federal army. By it Hancock had been able to retrace his steps in the morning of May 5, and later on it had formed the one connecting line which had given solidity to his command in the

maze of woods; it had also facilitated communication between Grant, the corps leaders, and one another. Without it concerted action would hardly have been possible. The advanced position of the Confederate right at Tapp's farm illustrates how cleverly the shelter of the woods may be used in attack. Both on the 5th and 6th gaps occurred between the two groups of Confederates fighting on the pike and plank roads, in spite of which their troops were pressed forward on the latter and successfully clung to Tapp's farm through all the vicissitudes of the battle. At the most critical moment, 6 A.M. on May 6, when the two divisions of the Third corps were recoiling before the superior numbers of Hancock's troops, the Confederate regiments on the plank road and at Tapp's farm formed a crochet to the rest of the line, from which they were almost cut off. Such audacious tactics could never have been attempted on open ground.

In the game of 'bluff' so successfully played by Lee his cavalry as in previous campaigns rendered essential service ;

Cavalry,
Artillery
and Staff
in the
Wilder-
ness.

but it was fortunate for Stuart that his opponent detached two of his three divisions to guard baggage, which could as well or better have been protected by infantry before noon on May 5, and that at no period of the two days were the superior numbers of the Federal Horse used with the energy which Sheridan displayed in later operations. The superior artillery of the Federals, too, rather cumbered their marching columns than assisted them; the Confederates on the other hand managed to bring their guns into line in spite of the woods, so as to gain important advantages, particularly across the clearings which surrounded the three farms. It is true that no worse field for artillery could well have been found, but both cavalry and artillery have got to learn that battles are very exceptionally fought on polo grounds. It is unsoldierlike and pedantic to grumble that ground is unsuitable. An army which takes the offensive must be prepared to track the enemy to his lair; all arms must make the best possible use of the accidents of the country, they must get there somehow, and use their wits to circumvent the foe. The Confederate staff no doubt did better

than the Federal, but then it had a simpler task by far, both by reason of the size of the respective forces and the scheme of their operations. Difficult as the work of combining the efforts of great masses in such woods must be under any system, it was almost impossible without the most perfect arrangements for reporting the progress of different units, for maintaining communication between them, and for obtaining and sifting information. The want of officers trained for this important service is shown by the appointment of Theodore Lyman, 'an accomplished gentleman from Boston, as volunteer aide to General Meade, serving without pay or allowances, who passed May 5 and 6 with General Hancock sending constantly brief notes with small diagrams to General Meade showing the progress of the operations and giving the latest information. It was Meade's habit to entrust this service to Lyman, sending him to the different corps commanders.'¹

When at the very nick of time Longstreet's vanguard came at a run along the plank road, and thrust itself through the wavering Confederate line at 6.15 A.M. on Incidents of May 6, with Longstreet's Corps. the 6th, General Lee was between Tapp's farm and the road giving orders and trying to stem the torrent of the Federal advance. As soon as the men of Gregg's Texan brigade caught sight of his tall figure on the famous grey charger, Traveller, they set up a 'yell' which rang through the forest glades above the tumult of the battle. These Texans were favourites with Lee: they had come from so far to defend Virginian soil and had fought so well. On this occasion he answered their greeting by placing himself at their head to lead the charge they were about to deliver. But as soon as the men saw his intention a clamour arose from the ranks, 'Go back, General Lee! go back, sir. We'll do the job, never fear!' A sergeant seized his bridle and turned his horse's head, so that he was constrained to turn back and join Longstreet, who had just arrived.

On May 10, when the VI Federal corps broke into the salient at Spottsylvania, Gordon's Georgians with Pegram's

¹ See Humphreys' *Virginia Campaign of '64*.

Virginians were hurled into the gap thus made in the Confederate array to drive out the intruders. Lee, who was present and who realised the danger of the situation, again rode forward to lead the charge. It was Gordon on this occasion who stood in his way, saying, 'These are Georgians and Virginians who have never failed.' Then turning to his advancing line he shouted, 'You will not fail this time, will you, boys?' The answer of the men was 'General Lee, to the rear; we will not fail;' and they were as good as their word.

Besides the first attack which stopped the Federal advance in the early morning, the First corps delivered two distinct offensive strokes. The enveloping movement in which Longstreet was accidentally shot was checked for the time, but renewed about 11 A.M. The delay no doubt enabled Hancock to meet it successfully, but the bold advance had effectually thrown the Federal left wing on the defensive.

The final attack delivered soon after four o'clock was made amid circumstances of surpassing grandeur. Along a swaying line six miles in length the smoke arose as from a huge furnace, for not only the white wreaths of powder smoke fading into blue above the trees hung over the whole length of the line of battle, but in many places the forest was on fire; the flames crackled in the underwood and licked the lofty tops of the dry pines, sending up black columns of smoke in which the flaming timber stood out like beacons. In the charge of Field's division and part of Kershaw's against Hancock's entrenchments on the Brock road, which was held for the most part by regiments of New York and Pennsylvania, the fire scorched the faces of the defenders; blinded and bewildered by great gusts of smoke and sparks the Federals were in places compelled to fall back from the road. But the enemy was effectually held at bay by the flames, though deadly showers of bullets were exchanged through the fire. In several places regiments or brigades charged in swarms. Hand-to-hand fighting followed, and the crimson silk of the hostile standards tossed defiantly on either side of the log parapet.

The commander who could throw in the last formed reserve generally triumphed in these mêlées. They took place along the hardly disputed Brock road, and in the swampy jungle which divided it from the three farms forming the bed-rock of the Confederate position. The broad flash and louder roar of guns were discerned wherever they could be dragged into action through the wood. Every path and ride was swept at intervals with squalls of case shot.

For a few minutes the Southern colours were planted in Hancock's trenches. The Texans followed the 'Lone Star' on their standard into the thickets beyond; then came the turn of the tide with the irresistible wave of fresh Federal reserves. The flood of the attack ebbed, leaving behind it a high-water mark of stark and writhing forms, of broken weapons and burning logs. The utmost efforts of many brave men could not save some hundreds of the wounded from cruel death in the flames.

Hardly had the battle subsided on one flank than its clamour rose and fell on the other, while the slanting rays of the setting sun cast a weird light on the smoking forest. Merciful darkness came at length to end the carnage, and many men from both armies strayed from their ranks to search for water. In this manner a number of prisoners were taken by each side who lost their way and wandered into the enemy's bivouacs.

The length and intensity of these engagements, and the enormous percentage of loss endured by both sides without demoralisation, established a noble record of what may be expected from armies of citizen soldiers, whose lives are pleasant, whose homes and belongings are dear to them, and who are called upon simply to do their duty without hope of compensating reward or fanatical thirst for glory.

Well may the historian conclude his narrative 'It has not seemed to me necessary to attempt a eulogy upon the Army of the Potomac or the Army of Northern Virginia.'

CHAPTER XII

THE AMERICAN ARMIES

The Influence of Sea Power on the American Civil War—The American System of Recruiting—American Methods of Making War: The Use of Cavalry—Cavalry Raids—Mounted Riflemen—Shock Tactics—Conditions imposed by New Weapons—Light and Heavy Cavalry—Marching *versus* Fighting—Offensive and Defensive Policy—Mechanical Progress and Military Art—Unsuccessful Generals—German Influence in Military Science—Prussian System of Command—Moral and Material Influences—Infantry Attacks with Contemporary Weapons compared with those of the Civil War—Organisation of the American Armies—The Discipline of Armies—Chancellorsville and Gettysburg—The Honour of a People—The National Cemeteries.

THE war between the Northern and Southern States of the American Union is rich in lessons for the solution of almost every great problem which still faces the military student and statesman. Not the least important of these problems with each one of the empires now wrestling for the right to call itself a 'world-power' is the rôle and status of the navy in its military constitution. As the very title suggests a 'world-power' demands for its essential support sea-borne trade protected by a military navy, but the means for nursing the one and for maintaining the other are limited by the sacrifices which the people can be induced to make after providing for immediate security from invasion by an adequate army. For the two great Anglo-Celtic nations on either side of the Atlantic the case, however, is different. Unless they are once again plunged in civil war, or fight with one another, it is upon their navies that the first brunt of any quarrel must fall. Some strategists would therefore confine their serious preparations in peace to naval war alone, leaving to

the course of events the task of developing an army in the (according to them) unlikely case of a big army being wanted.

Without going deeply into this complex question, it may be noticed that every great maritime empire which the world has yet seen has trod the same path. The wealth and importance derived from maritime supremacy have lifted one state after another above its contemporaries until its population, relieved of the discipline of danger, has become luxurious, vicious and unwarlike. Then poor and envious neighbours have attacked it. For a time inaccessible position and the possession of the superior machinery for naval war, manned by a small number of skilled workmen, have proved sufficient protection. Finally the more warlike population has gladly taken up the challenge on another element, and has disputed the empire of the sea as keenly and successfully as the sceptre of the land; Athens and Tyre, Carthage and Rome, Venice and Spain have all followed the same career.

So far Britain has avoided the fate of all her maritime predecessors, but in the history of her military triumphs naval war has but preceded and paved the way for ultimate and decisive success on land. The victory of the seceding American Colonies which split the empire of the English in twain was won by land warfare in the teeth of great maritime superiority, though temporary eclipse of the naval power facilitated the victory by land. The attempt of the Southern States to secede from the Federal Union was undertaken in spite of conditions which made the naval supremacy of the North an even more important factor in the struggle. Not only had the South no ships, but neither had she arsenals, factories, or dockyards wherewith to construct them. She depended to an unusual degree on open sea traffic for distribution of the raw material, and for importation of the machinery which were essential to her independent existence. The means of placing her armies in the field, to say nothing of maintaining them there, must be brought from oversea or wrested from the enemy. If in 1862 the North had exchanged generals with the South, the

Federal victory could not have been long delayed; the superior talent of the Confederate chiefs not only armed their troops at the expense of the enemy, but narrowly missed decisive victory on Northern soil. The salvation of the Union, therefore, was no doubt greatly assisted by naval power, but was only achieved by the overwhelming superiority of the Federal land armies after a long and at times doubtful struggle.

In the summer of 1862, in spite of every advantage which naval power conferred on the North, the invasion by Lee's army for the second time went perilously near to finishing the contest in favour of the Confederacy. Nothing that the blockading squadrons could do affected the issue of the fierce duel at Gettysburg which decided whether the North or the South should prevail in the Union. If Lee had conquered the Army of the Potomac and established himself at Baltimore and Philadelphia, it is hard to say how far the Secessionists might not have carried their demands. The boast of the Southern senator that he would call the roll of his slaves in Boston might not impossibly have been fulfilled.

In truth, it is as easy to exaggerate as it is to depreciate the importance of naval power. No country can excel in trade without it. In any war waged along a sea coast its importance is very great, because it controls the means of moving and supplying troops by sea; though it is not necessarily decisive. To carry on war oversea, naval supremacy in the waters which divide the theatre of war from the base of the army is of course essential to success. Nevertheless history has repeatedly recorded that States which rely on the inaccessibility conferred by surrounding sea and superiority in naval armament are on the highway to ruin, unless behind the fleets there is a sturdy population with sufficient patriotism and discipline to take up arms in order to consummate the victory on sea by success as decisive on land.

The experience of all the States of Continental Europe during the nineteenth century has been that a system of military training embracing the great majority of the

manhood of the nation is as indispensable to safety in war as to political and economical development in peace. The people of America on the contrary have strongly resisted any such tendency, and the passionate adherence to the so-called ' Monroe Doctrine ' is in no small measure to be ascribed to the aversion which is excited by the prospect of submitting to any scheme of universal military service. Yet in the greatest crisis of her history the experience of America was identical with that of Europe. It was the absence of a military constitution which alone rendered the Civil War possible, just as the end of the trouble was only achieved by a far-reaching system of compulsory service. The existence of a common army for training the manhood of the whole nation, North and South alike, would have knit the people together in a manner which would have made secession unthinkable, just as effectually as the war has done ; the physical and economical development of the population, however, needed no such stimulus as training in arms has alone been able to supply to the dense population of older countries. The men and women who had crossed the Atlantic to face unknown difficulties and perils and their immediate descendants found in the task of extracting wealth from the virgin prairies, forests and mountains of a new continent all that they required to keep them fit in the struggle for life. Moreover a great proportion of the men of America were accustomed to handle firearms, and a very considerable number were expert riders. This was especially the case in the South, where consequently armies were more quickly formed and trained than in the North. For many years to come the daily avocations of the people of the United States aided by the glorious traditions of the great war will provide men capable of being quickly transformed into formidable soldiers. As time passes, however, and as the economic conditions which prevail in Western Europe extend to America, they will entail a corresponding change in the population and necessitate more artificial methods of training them for the supreme struggle of nations.

The stupendous career of Napoleon had exerted its

influence over the students of war in America as elsewhere, and the future leaders of the armies of both the North and South had learnt at West Point, the excellent cadet school of the United States, to reflect on the principles and practices by which the Emperor of the French had gained his astounding series of triumphs. While they were encouraged to think, the young American officers were untrammelled by the traditions and customs which have stunted the initiative and dwarfed the development of some European armies. This fact, together with the presence of a great majority of unprofessional men who held commissions in all grades on both sides, and who came from a people distinguished above all others for impatience of arbitrary methods and for ingenuity in practical business, account for the daring experiments and bold initiative, which on the whole characterised their methods of making war. It was the South, however, which led the way in using every expedient within the reach of its resources. In the first two years of the war authority did much to curtail individual activity in the Northern armies, where discipline seemed the one thing wanting. At a later period when the armies of the Union had reached a more perfect stage of development, they were not behind their opponents in this respect, while from the firing of the first shot the industries of the North gave greater scope to all sorts of mechanical ingenuity by land and sea.

The army which McClellan led to capture Richmond in the summer of 1862 was destitute of any fighting force of cavalry. The few hundred horsemen which belonged to it were required for orderly and escort duty, and the one occasion when a handful of them intervened in the battle of Gaines' Mill merely demonstrated the uselessness of sacrificing a body of troops too small to effect any good result. At the same period of the war Lee, who had been a colonel of cavalry, had organised a small but active division of Horse under Stuart's command which rendered solid service, besides performing surprising feats, such as the raid round the Federal army in the Peninsular campaign. In the Valley of Virginia, a small band of Horse commanded by Ashby

American
Methods
of Making
War: the
Use of
Cavalry.

did much to render possible Jackson's brilliant manoeuvres, and contributed in a large measure to his success. In the campaign which followed McClellan's retreat, and which transferred the strife from Richmond to Washington, Stuart's cavalry again played a most important rôle, screening the movements of the infantry columns, disturbing and harassing the Federal army in every possible way. Without the help which Stuart was able to give, the flank march round Pope's army by Jackson's corps, and the concentration of the two Confederate wings on the battlefield of Manassas, would not have been possible.

In the western and central theatre of war the opposing cavalry forces were much more equal, and indeed superiority lay with the Federals, who commanded the services of a horse-breeding country on both banks of the Mississippi whence they drew recruits and remounts, increasing in quantity, quality and leadership till the end of the war, while the resources of the South were as steadily diminishing.

In two respects the manner of handling the Confederate cavalry was original. The first remarkable innovation was the daring and unprecedented scale on which raids were made round the enemy's flank to strike at his communications and supply depots. These raids did much to inspire terror and confusion among the enemy at an early stage of the war, in proportion as they raised the confidence and enthusiasm of the Southerners; nevertheless, the good obtained by any manoeuvre in war must always be set off against its cost, and the cost of these raids in horseflesh, but most of all in the absence of the cavalry from other duties at critical times, was very great. The forces employed were not strong enough to remain on the enemy's communications for sufficient time to embarrass him seriously, and the third year of the war in Virginia saw the Federals imitating the tactics of their opponents in this sort of warfare, which was thenceforth more disastrous to the South than to the North, owing to her more slender resources.

The only raid which achieved great strategical results was that against Pope's communications in August 1862, and then Stuart's cavalry worked in close co-operation with

Jackson's infantry. The moral to be drawn would seem to be that it is very rarely worth while to detach a force of cavalry from the main body of the army to harass the enemy's rear, unless it possesses in itself sufficient defensive power to hold on to a position athwart the communications it seeks to interrupt for a long enough period to cause the enemy grave misfortune; or unless it is accompanied by infantry in sufficient strength to fight. This is only another way of stating the theory that the battlefield so far transcends in importance every other point of the theatre of war, that no objective is worth aiming at in preference to striking with *all* available strength at the enemy's field forces.

The art of making war is not susceptible of being taught by rules and dogmas, but if there is one such law which almost universally holds good, it is the one just stated.

The other important departure from established tradition was the constant use of the American cavalry as riflemen Mounted Riflemen. to fight on foot. Indian warfare, and the invention of breech-loading and repeating firearms, had suggested the important results to be gained by developing the fire power of cavalry; and the dense forests which facilitated ambushes, flank marches and protracted resistance of a few rifles against superior numbers, all helped to foster these tactics. To Stuart belongs the credit of having brought to perfection a use of the cavalry arm which had been foreshadowed by the dragoons of Marlborough's epoch, but which had not been seen during the intervening great wars in Europe; nor has it ever yet been successfully imitated. The South African Boers developed from their Kaffir wars a force of cavalry capable of defending itself stubbornly and capable of attacking on a small scale, but not of pressing an attack on foot against sturdy resistance, nor yet of combining shock with fire tactics. The Russian cavalry alone in the European armies has successfully grasped the principles of cavalry tactics taught in the American war, for they alone of European cavalry have shown as yet any aptitude for combining shock with fire tactics; yet judging from their performances both in Bulgaria and Manchuria, the Russian regiments lag far behind their model both in the technical

skill of officers and men, and in the quality of their mounts. There is no reason to doubt that the British in South Africa would have solved the question of developing the most formidable type of cavalry had they made use of their existing cavalry force as a nucleus, for its rank and file had been well trained as marksmen, as lancers and as horsemen. Instead, however, of expanding its cadres, the British War Office levied in direct competition many thousand mounted 'infantry,' whose rank and file consisted partly of the cream of the regular infantry and partly of untrained volunteers. The great majority of the men so organised could not ride, saddle, or care for their horses, which consequently were used up in unprecedented numbers to no purpose, while the regular regiments of cavalry took the field with effectives so small as to reduce their fighting value to an almost negligible quantity. It is wise to assume, however, that the next great war will produce a cavalry leader capable of combining the constant pressure which cavalry can bring to bear on its adversary by rifle fire, with the knock-down blow it is also able to inflict by charging on horseback, when the rare occasion offers itself. For the occasion, though rare, always does arise; all that is wanted in order to profit by it is a leader who never ceases to watch for it, and who can rise to the great opportunity when it occurs.

Although the leaders of the 'Southern Chivalry' never shrank from charging on horseback and frequently attacked the enemy's cavalry thus, yet it was soon found that such charges even when most successful failed to destroy the opposing regiments of Horse who fled into the forest to renew the struggle on foot, while they were very costly to the victors in lamed horses. Experience proved even in those days of comparatively feeble firearms that exposure to rapid fire at close ranges was the danger most to be feared by cavalry in battle formation, and if the fire was followed up by a charge the effect was generally decisive. Such was the experience of the campaign against Pope in August 1862 when the cavalry superiority of the Confederates was most conspicuous. There is no important instance in the Virginian campaigns of cavalry striking a destructive

blow at a properly organised force of hostile infantry by shock tactics; this fact has been taken to prove that the thing is impossible, or at any rate inexpedient considering its inevitable cost. It should, however, be remembered that the whole success of the Confederate strategy depended on daring manœuvres and rapid marches only to be accomplished by the help of the precious cavalry corps in its strategical rôle, acting that is off the battlefield, and before contact between the main armies had been established. It was only by this means that the necessary information of the enemy's dispositions could be obtained and taken advantage of; it was only thus that Jackson's swift flank marches could be executed without untimely interruption. Their cavalry in fact was in the opinion of the Confederate generals too precious to be used up in close fighting, though in the great victories on the Rappahannock Stuart's brigades were generally found prolonging the Confederate flank, and effectually preventing the enemy's turning movements. In this way Lee guarded his exposed flank on the Antietam, at Fredericksburg and at the passage of the Potomac in July 1863.

In spite of the rare occasions of cavalry charging infantry in the Virginian campaigns, the fear of being attacked by galloping horsemen often paralysed the efforts not only of the Federals but of the Confederates, who had less reason to fear it. The startling effects of an occasional charge by a handful of riders falling by surprise on infantry of greatly superior strength probably caused the respect in which the arm was held, and give grounds for the theory that precious as the small cavalry forces undoubtedly were, yet great chances of substantial success were missed by not resorting to shock tactics against infantry on more than one occasion. In the Chancellorsville campaign a counter-stroke by the Federal cavalry on the Orange road, had it been present in strength with its army on May 2, might have wiped out the effect of Jackson's first successful attack. If, on the other hand, the successful rush of the Southern infantry had been followed up by the charge of even three hundred horsemen, the XI corps would have been routed as effectually,

and with greater loss, while the infantry divisions which fell into disorder by a long pursuit in the failing light would have remained intact for another thundering stroke, and they might well have destroyed another Federal corps. At Gettysburg both Federals and Confederates would have found opportunities of inflicting deadly blows by a cavalry pursuit if their cavalry had been at hand; the Confederates on the first day after the defeat of the I and XI corps, the Federals on the third day after Pickett's disastrous repulse. At the battle of Fredericksburg, Stuart's troopers fought dismounted and rendered valuable service, but the ease with which the Southern army repulsed the furious and repeated assaults of the enemy's infantry showed that they might with advantage have extended still more their own lines of infantry and have held the cavalry brigades in reserve to hurl upon the defeated Federals when they recoiled from the reach of the defending riflemen, just as Wellington did at Waterloo. In fact, since Waterloo there never was such an opportunity for dealing the *coup de grâce* at a defeated army by a combined general attack of infantry and cavalry as Lee neglected to use at Fredericksburg; and it may safely be said that such chances, rare and precious in the life of nations, will ever be lost unless the leaders are educated to seek for opportunities to *annihilate* the enemy, and taught to use every man and horse, every living and mechanical weapon available for the purpose.

While it is quite true that the longer range of the rifle and smokeless powder give considerable advantages to infantry against charging cavalry, yet the latest developments in warfare are by no means one-sided. The moral strain of long exposure to the fire of a hidden foe, the disorder into which infantry inevitably falls in a doubtful contest, as well as the wide extension of the modern battlefield, give to the cavalry leader who lies in wait for his opportunity to strike home as much as the new conditions of combat yield to his dismounted adversary. The principal reason for refraining from shock tactics will ever be the same as held Stuart's hand; namely, the absolute necessity of employing every

Conditions
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horseman available on other duty. When an army includes a force of ten thousand riders *over and above* what is necessary for the daily service of security and information, such as Napoleon always took care to have under his immediate orders ; when such a force is mounted on horses that have not been worn out by fatigue, and is led by officers well acquainted with infantry tactics, at the same time daring and cautious, then the world will certainly see the feats of Seidlitz and Murat repeated in spite of any conceivable improvement in firearms.

Cavalry, if it is to charge at all, must ever be prepared to face superior numbers of infantry, but there is a disparity which renders all attempts to close useless and foolhardy. When less than one thousand troopers are sent to ride down five or six thousand infantry or more, over ground which reduces the pace to a trot or slow canter, and on horses which are spent, it is a patent absurdity to quote their failure as proving the impotence of charging horsemen in a modern fight. The cavalry leader wields the most deadly weapon in all the armoury of scientific war, namely the power of constantly surprising his enemy both by fire and shock. If he knows how to use it by skilfully combining his methods and choosing his opportunities, he may hope even to surpass the feats of Stuart and Forrest, Pleasonton and Sheridan, the greatest cavalry leaders since 1815.

In the armies of Frederic and Napoleon, which still remain in broad outline the models of modern military organisation, the cavalry forces were invariably classified for two distinct functions ; there were light and heavy cavalry. Light cavalry for the strategical work of security and information, and heavy cavalry for the tactical business of charging the enemy's masses on the battlefield. While the former rode ponies, cobs and small horses which could go far if slow and subsist on the roughest forage, the dragoons and cuirassiers required for the battle were mounted on heavier horses able to gallop fast with a heavy weight for a short distance, but requiring more care and capable of enduring less fatigue than the others. In the American armies the partisan corps and mounted militia in

some respects corresponded to light horse, but the whole of the cavalry forces were constantly employed on the same work, and it is evident that no general under modern conditions could venture to forego the advantage to be gained by using almost the whole strength of the mounted arm to clear his front of the enemy's cavalry, nor could he always refrain from employing his regiments as dismounted riflemen in order to husband them for shock tactics. Nevertheless, it will probably be wise to organise the cavalry in two separate classes according to the quality of their horses. Small or unbroken animals may quite well be assigned to regiments of reserves or to less perfectly trained formations, while the horses actually in the service, and those of better breeding and consequently of greater value, should be assigned to the regiments of the line of battle. While the former regiments should as far as possible do the rough work of patrolling, outposts and escorting convoys, the latter should as a general practice be kept to fight on horse and on foot.

One of the commonest, as well as the most fatal, mistakes which generals make in war is to squander by untimely extravagance their resources in horseflesh. Few generals know what horses can endure in the way of hardship and hard work without destructive loss; few pause to think whether the game is worth the candle when with a light heart they give orders to the cavalry which must inevitably deprive them of its serious aid in later operations. McClellan, Pope, Burnside and Hooker all used up their cavalry without accomplishing any good purpose. Had Lee made the same mistake his fighting power would have quickly broken down.

Most people who read about war are unable to comprehend that marches are usually more costly to an army in men and horses than battles, and that prolonged rain is more fatal than bullets. Every march diminishes the strength of an armed force; even a comparatively short march has been known to use up a large army if badly organised and exposed to rough weather. *Marching* *versus* *Fighting.* Horses usually receive less food, less consideration and more work than men; but under a prolonged strain horses, unless

they have been carefully trained for it, break down quicker and recover slower than men. In the field the horses of the cavalry are generally treated as if they were machines quite impervious to weather, and requiring neither oil nor fuel. When the inevitable débâcle occurs great is the astonishment and wrath of its sapient authors. On the other hand, a force of cavalry, whose soldiers are good riders and accustomed to look after their horses, possesses, and will ever possess, advantages of inestimable value over foot soldiers in any theatre of war where a horse can carry a man. Large bodies of infantry only average two miles an hour on the march under favourable conditions, and sixteen miles a day is a good performance for an army corps of twenty thousand infantry. Five thousand cavalry will easily march the same distance in three hours. For twenty thousand foot soldiers on a single road to deploy into line of battle even on a deep formation takes at least two hours, and may easily take much longer. In thirty minutes five thousand cavalry can form a line of dismounted riflemen on as broad a front, capable of inflicting a disastrous check on the slowly moving adversary; and when at length he brings his greater strength to bear, the troopers, like unfaithful lovers, can ride away to play the same rôle elsewhere.

The greater the perfection of the rifle, the more important will be this power of dealing the first blow, but the task of inflicting it against a serious enemy can only be performed by real cavalry which can ride well, and which is swiftly and cleverly handled.

The more fatal the effect of a surprise by a fire upon troops on the march or massed in rendezvous, the more perfect should be the one shield and buckler by which alone it can be warded off; and great as is the value of time in actual contact with the enemy, the hours spent on the march are sometimes even more precious. If they are to be economised, early and correct information must be gleaned by the cavalry for the commanding general. An infantry corps of fifteen or twenty thousand men is aroused in the grey dawn to partake of a breakfast of hard biscuit, and to march twelve miles in the wrong direction. In the afternoon

the whole distance has to be countermarched in pouring rain, so that late at night after twenty hours' incessant fatigue, the troops stagger into the bivouacs whence they started and are more effectually defeated than if they had lost one-fifth of their strength in a stubborn fight. It would need but a few squadrons let loose in their lines to cut them up altogether. Such incidents, however, are liable to occur repeatedly in the movements of an army whose cavalry is dominated by its opponent.

Closely allied with the question of the rôle of cavalry and the proportion it should have in the armies of the future is the ever-present alternative as to whether it is wisest to await the enemy's attack or to fall upon him before he is ready to make it. Offensive and Defensive Policy. Offensive policy was forced on the North from the beginning of the war, but it took two years of disastrous failure to prove that, even with great superiority of numbers, the offensive cannot be expected to succeed unless it is sustained by certain conditions. First and foremost the leaders of an attacking army must possess the confidence of their men and be loyal to one another; the troops must have reached a certain level of training and discipline, and the cavalry must at any rate be able to hold in check the enemy's horsemen. In 1861 the press and public of the North were in too great a hurry to wait for trained troops of any kind, least of all for trained cavalry. In 1862 McClellan believed that he could operate in the thickly wooded Peninsula without cavalry, but the absence of information of the enemy's movements, and the impossibility of keeping open communications with the detached forces of the Union, were among the principal causes of the Federal general's defeat. Hooker so far took these lessons to heart that he was careful to equip himself with a fine body of horsemen numerically superior to the enemy, but he knew not how to combine their efforts with his infantry on the battlefield, and chiefly for this reason his offensive campaign failed.

As a general proposition most scientific writers on war are agreed that it is preferable to attack rather than to defend, always assuming that the forces available have reached a

degree of technical excellence which justifies their employment in operations entailing forced marches and hard fights in the open. To compress the reasons for arriving at this conclusion in a few short paragraphs is all the more difficult because they are deduced from the mass of experience which the history of many past wars has furnished. There is always the prime condition of successful warfare to be remembered, which is that final victory in any contest rests with the side capable of making the last successful attack on the adversary's forces and strongholds. Then there is the moral advantage to be reckoned with, which the attacking attitude possesses over the side awaiting a blow; and since moral results in war are so far more decisive than material, this aspect of the question should never be lost sight of. To await the enemy's attack makes him a present of the opportunity to compass the ruin of the side which has chosen the passive rôle; the assailant can choose his time and place to strike, and by a judicious distribution and concentration of his force can be sure of superiority at any given point. As against these considerations must be set the local advantages of tenaciously defending a naturally strong position, and the enormous help in so doing to be derived from even two hours' work with spade and axe. Sometimes circumstances limit the choice of the attacking general, and compel him to act on a given road or at a fixed time, whereby he is placed at a disadvantage; more often it is wise to count on his missing his opportunities so that his army may be fallen upon, after exhausting itself by an unskilful and fruitless offensive. Such was the opportunity which Burnside gave to Lee at Fredericksburg, and which Lee in his turn gave to Meade at Gettysburg.

The repeated failure of the offensive efforts of both Northern and Southern armies not unnaturally impressed the imagination and spread the conviction that defensive tactics were always preferable for their own sake. We find Longstreet obstinately recommending to Lee to make his strategy offensive but his tactics—his fighting, that is—defensive. In other words, Longstreet advised the policy of perpetually threatening blows without the intention of striking

them. The most simple and ill-advised opponent would not take long to see through such a game of bluff, and would easily devise measures for its undoing. Very different were the theory and practice of Jackson and Lee, of Sheridan, Sherman and Grant. While the great Confederate generals persistently sought for occasions to deliver stunning blows even when strategically on the defensive, the Federal leaders who in the end strangled the Confederacy never gave up the offensive, but piled blow upon blow at whatever cost to their own armies until their greater resources wore out the gallant foe.

It is a commonplace that while the principles of strategy are unchanging and its practice consequently liable to very little alteration, tactics on the other hand are susceptible of constant development as local conditions change and weapons improve. In the theory and application of tactics, therefore, a sceptical and utilitarian frame of mind is necessary to excel, an intelligence polished by the study of history and by practical experience in order to seize the fleeting favours of Fortune, which according to Napoleon must be won when she is in the mood. The American leaders were certainly as intelligent as could be desired, but they had had no practice in handling troops, and succeeded through painful losses in solving the practical problems presented by the war. Since the Civil War the progress of invention has wrought great changes in the apparatus of fighting, the general tendency of which has constantly been the same. As the mechanism has become more complicated, it has called for better trained and more skilful workmen to employ it, without whom decisive results are more and more unlikely to be achieved. Each improvement in armament has increased the destructive power of well-trained riflemen, and has added to the handicap of troops whose training, intelligence, leadership and courage fall below the required standard. That standard has varied in subsequent wars, but the saying has invariably held good, 'Whosoever hath to him shall be given: and whosoever hath not from him shall be taken even that which he hath.'

Mechanical Progress and Military Art.

The Prussian victories over the Austrian and French Imperial armies, but even more the complete collapse of the brave troops hastily and indifferently organised by the French Republic in 1870, prove the necessity for military science and preparation; their effects have revolutionised the political conditions and daily life of the Continent of Europe. The war in 1877 between Russia and Turkey, undertaken with inadequate forces by the attacking Power, led to the sanguinary checks of the Russians before Plevna which seemed to sustain the creed of the defensive school. A close study of the events in the campaign, however, reveals that the leaders of the disastrous assaults were ignorant and incapable generals, who attacked without proper reconnaissance or proper combination of forces, who unduly hurried their preparations and delayed their blow. The brilliant feats of Skobelev, who thoroughly understood how to lead infantry in action, and whose successes were as remarkable as the failure of some of his colleagues, stand out in sharp contrast to the average Russian tactics.

With each great change brought about by improved armaments a corresponding change in the formation of troops in action and in the most suitable method of leading them has become necessary. Instead of studying to make use of the new conditions in order to inflict more destructive blows, the same theory has always been advanced by a certain school of the timid and irresolute: they say the progress of invention is all to the advantage of the side which rests on the defensive, and it is madness to seek a decision in the open field because it will be impossible to extort from the adversary the required opportunity. Courage is now useless against the deadly argument of shot; victory is only to be got by operations of the type of a blockade, which gradually hems the enemy in, and brings about his submission by wearing him out. To the disciples of this school the events of every great war give comfort and conviction. Yet in Europe as in America, and now in Manchuria, the solid results of victory have constantly belonged to that nation and army which has snatched the initiative, and which has followed up its offensive strategy by tactics as bold at what-

ever cost of life on the field of battle. The inevitable loss of life in attacking a stubborn foe is a very good reason for not going to war, if war can be avoided, but no reason for shirking the rôle of assailant when the chance of taking it presents itself. To inculcate a doctrine of passive defence and to allow troops to doubt their own offensive power is a most fatal form of education and a sure precursor of defeat, to be found in decaying society and worn-out military institutions.

In truth no nation need expect to achieve great things in war unless it is more sound in soul and body than its adversary. War is the crucial test, the infallible proof of a country's fitness for its position in the scale of nations. The staunch valour and patriotism of the American soldiers, who gamely continued the struggle after sustaining defeats such as Fredericksburg, have won for the United States her place in the world as much as her immense material and commercial resources. A great responsibility also rests on those charged with the government of the State in peace, to provide leaders in war who are at least as capable as their probable opponents, nor can the courage and intelligence of the soldier in the ranks always be counted on to retrieve the disasters brought about by incapacity in the supreme command.

History is said to repeat itself, but nowhere is that repetition more monotonous than in the record of military administration. We have seen how both the rulers of the North and South jeopardised the cause confided to them by dispersing, instead of concentrating, their available forces at the crisis of their fate. In every war the same errors are made, the same excuses are given. The critical point is not recognised or recognised too late. Reasons in plenty are always found to explain failure: the wiliness of the foe, the exceptionally difficult nature of his country, his ignorance of conventional methods of troop-leading, and unscrupulous innovations in the art of war. Without specifying date or place, the historian can truly describe the failure of the indifferent general in almost any campaign in much the same terms, and ascribe it to very much the same causes.

Unsuccessful
Generals.

The general in question will have failed to study the characteristics of his enemy and the personal character of his principal opponents, nor will he be aware of the fighting value of his enemy's troops. He will hug the defensive; but if committed to an offensive strategy he will fail to realise the value of time, and having resolved to strike, he will by an excess of caution move too slowly in making his advance and hesitate over the decisive move. In seeking to provide for all eventualities he will weaken himself unduly at the one decisive point, and neglect to ensure proper and timely co-ordination in the efforts of the several fractions of his army. In an offensive campaign he will shirk offensive tactics and avoid attacking the enemy's troops in the open field, thus giving them time to elude him, to entrench themselves, or to pass to the attack in their turn as they please. Such a general will say that improvements in firearms have rendered offensive tactics obsolete because they are too costly and hazardous. By his tactical timidity he will spoil the ardour of his troops and stunt the initiative of his subordinates. He will have no idea how to combine the three arms, cavalry, infantry and artillery, in a battle. The cavalry will probably be despatched on a distant raid to frighten the enemy into a retreat by harassing his rear at a distance from the true field of action. Victory in fact will be sought for by manœuvres instead of by fighting; geographical points will be seized and mistaken for strategical ones. In whole or in part the above description applies to each one of the commanding generals who failed conspicuously in the Civil War; it also applies to the failure of other commanding generals in subsequent wars.

Brilliant as the performances of the American generals and soldiers unquestionably were, it must be candidly acknowledged that ever since the Napoleonic wars the Germans have led the way in the scientific study of military matters. It is now the fashion to scoff at them in practical application, and no doubt success has been as usual followed by considerable pedantry in details; nor can the appearance of the individual German of any rank be compared with the lithe athletic

German
Influence
in Military
Science.

figure of the American soldier ; but, judging by the rough test of experience, the performances of the Germans led by their great professor and by his pupils must be admired. The reader has only to look at the map of Prussia at the date of the battle of Gettysburg and to compare it with the area and importance of the German Empire of to-day, to realise what a sound military constitution can effect for a people. In the war of 1866 between the North and South of Germany, Prussia bore the same proportion in population and material resources that the Confederate States did to the Union : if the German struggle had developed into a match of endurance like the American, it must also have ended in the ruin of the smaller Power ; but the rapid and thorough work of the Prussian military reformers changed the course of the world's history. The short career of victory by which Moltke led his army to the gates of Vienna, and to the annihilation of the French Imperial forces, established the Empire which still guards the heart and holds the hegemony of Europe.

Moltke like Lee and Jackson was a disciple of the school of aggressive war of which Napoleon was the greatest exponent ; but as the organiser of a military government which has stood the test of time he stands alone. It would seem from the course of European history that national disaster alone can supply the motive force for creating an army ; at any rate it was so with Prussia. The destruction at Jena of the army which had proved superior to all others in the days of Frederic, and the humiliating years of Napoleon's domination, brought about the system of a national army and inspired the great writers and theorists who led the best brains of the German people to the study of military politics. It was, however, the hands of Moltke which perfected the weapon thus created, and which fashioned the means of directing it.

Aggressive war was the breath of his nostrils. He taught it in peace and practised it in war on a scale till then unknown. He always laid down that aggressive strategy depended on offensive tactics, and trained his troops in this axiom of belief. As each improvement in the machines of war came into use Moltke indicated the changes in the

methods of troop-leading which the increased range and more rapid fire of new weapons had rendered necessary, but never allowed it to be said that such mechanical developments had altered the vital principles on which war should be conducted. His views have inspired the military science of Europe ever since 1870, and beyond the bounds of Europe a new nation of conquerors has given the latest and not the least convincing proof of their truth.

The misunderstandings which arose between the commanders of the higher units of the Federal army at Prussian Chancellorsville and of the Confederate forces at System of Gettysburg, and which did so much to bring about Command. failure in each case, illustrate the dangers which especially beset an army in the delicate and widely extended operations of attack on a great scale. In 1813, the great campaign in which the Emperor tried personally to direct armies on a modern scale, it was the failure of independent commanders to combine, as well as inferiority in the cavalry arm, which caused the defeat of Napoleon's strategy. Moltke solved the problem of securing unity of action from several different chiefs on a widely extended front in the command of armies exceeding half a million of soldiers by the creation of the Prussian General Staff. In it were collected from the whole officer-corps of the army the select few whose intelligence naturally took the required bent, and who were trained in personal contact with the Chief of the Staff. The fact that a great number of the higher commands in the Prussian service as well as in many of the smaller German States were held by men of the different reigning houses, who had little or no other qualifications for their responsible positions, made it necessary in order to ensure unity of purpose and concerted action throughout the whole German host, to have with each division an officer of the General Staff, whose duty it was to countersign all orders and to share the responsibility for them. This arrangement did not prevent all unfortunate incidents in 1870, but it brought about that the several divisions supported one another with an energy and certainty hardly to be looked for in an army composed of so many

different contingents, some of which had very lately been at war with Prussia. As the system developed and took root the majority of the generals were chosen from officers who had already served on the General Staff, so that the German leaders of the future will belong to one school of military thought.

In the teaching of Moltke, and in the writings of his pupils, a distinction is ever drawn between the moral or Moral and psychological phase of the art of troop-leading and Material the material and visible part of the work. It is Influences. hard to exaggerate the importance of the first of these classifications, which is so closely interwoven with the second that no arbitrary line or division can be drawn between them.

At what moment do material losses destroy the ardour of troops and convince them of their inability to fight any longer? No rule of proportion, no pedantic theory, can give any idea, but a sympathetic study of the soldier in the ranks, and an intelligent reading of the history of war will quicken the imagination of the officer. To discern and use every device which circumstances put within his reach, to heighten the courage and confidence of his men and to lower the morale of the enemy, is the task of a good tactical leader, who must be able to feel the pulse of his troops at all times, and especially in action.

If the limp and listless conduct of the armies of most of the great military Powers when commanded by incompetent leaders and serving in a war which aroused no enthusiasm, be compared with the best performances of the same army when fired by enthusiasm and led by a great chief, the importance of the soldier's frame of mind will be appreciated. In almost any battle victory complete and decisive is gained by the side which first succeeds in imposing the idea of its moral superiority on the foe. However sanguinary a battle may have been, there are almost always enough survivors on the defeated side to continue a doubtful struggle if every man is resolved to conquer or die. It is only when the determination to win ceases that an army is beaten in the vast majority of battles. A thrill of exultation

and confidence quickly penetrates the mass of a great host, but despondency and panic spread their fatal influence with the same electric speed. The more intelligent soldiers are, the more capable they become of understanding and seconding the intentions of their chiefs, but the more critical of incompetence and the more susceptible to be discouraged when they lose faith. Men of every different nationality and district need to be separately studied; even the disposition of individuals and the manner in which they are affected by what is passing in a campaign differ enormously; though a strange bond of sympathy unites men who are living, working and suffering together with the same great purpose.

A comparison of the circumstances under which infantry must advance to the attack in the teeth of rapid and long-range rifle fire with the conditions which prevailed in the War of Secession by no means bears out the theory that the defence has gained over the attack in essential points, unless some time and opportunity for field fortification have artificially strengthened the former. In the era of short-range weapons, which may be said to have closed with this war, the zone of destructive fire to be traversed by an assaulting line or swarm was far narrower than it is to-day; but in those days it was generally impossible for the assailants from a distance to bring a converging and enfilading fire to bear upon the point of a position selected for assault either with guns or rifles; still less was it possible to maintain that fire until the attacking troops were about to mingle in hand-to-hand strife with the defenders, and then to direct deadly showers of missiles on to the ground immediately behind the defensive line so as to break up its supports and threaten its retreat.

The distance at which rifle fire checked the Virginians who tried to carry Cemetery Ridge on July 3, 1863, was two hundred and fifty yards, and this range may roughly be considered as the limit of decisive fire; but in crossing that space there was time enough to inflict murderous loss on a closed line of infantry. There could be little or no element of

Infantry
Attacks
with Con-
temporary
Weapons
compared
with those
of the
Civil War.

surprise after the attacking troops ceased fire and marched forward to storm, unless ravines or woods gave access to the position of the defenders, who naturally tried to avoid such ground. The tactics of the day required a deployed line of bayonets at the collision ; fire was seldom or never expected to drive out the enemy without a charge. Smoke obscured the view and added to the confusion, so that the defenders could bring up reserves locally, and at the last moment charge the attacking line, still staggering under the effects of close-range fire. Such were the tactics taught by Sir John Moore to the British infantry, and repeatedly put in practice by Wellington with brilliant results. In many a hard fight the American infantry prevailed by the same plan. It was difficult for cavalry and almost impossible for artillery to help in the crisis of the attack, and most difficult to reinforce an attacking line at the right moment. The reinforcements which followed it in most cases merely added to the enemy's target ; they arrived too late to be of use, but in time to become involved in the losses and repulse of the first line. A fire fight between attacking and defending infantry almost always ended in the success of the latter.

The fact that from several distant points long-range fire both of infantry and artillery can now be brought to bear on a chosen point of the defended position, and that this fire can be delivered by men working in safety beyond the zone of the enemy's missiles, or from under cover, has greatly changed the balance of advantage in favour of the attack. On most fields of combat well-taught infantry can use cover as effectually in preparing an attack as in resisting it, and the position of a defending force is generally quite easy to locate by proper reconnaissance, while the locality of all the attacking guns and rifles can never be fixed with certainty if cleverly disposed. Under cover of a pitiless rain of shrapnel and rifle bullets, lines of skirmishers can creep closer and ever closer to the point it is intended to charge, while all defensive positions extending over two miles of front have some weak point, some ground unswept by fire in front or on the flank, which admits of a mass of the enemy approaching within three hundred yards of the position

without serious exposure. Personal examination of a number of battlefields will convince anyone who doubts this proposition; and if a position extends for less than two miles at least, it is easily enveloped by long-range fire.

To sum up, in the first decade of the twentieth century, as compared with the military epoch which closed with 1865, the defender is now exposed to a longer and more severe preparatory strain before the actual collision than was possible forty years ago. Pressure can more effectually be brought to bear on the whole extent of the position, thus concealing to the last moment the real goal of the attack. The more gradual development of the fight discloses the weak points of the position; the difficulty of reinforcing at the right moment has passed from the attack to the defence, when once the former has established a superiority of gun and rifle fire; lastly, nothing has been discovered to prevent or render more difficult a surprise by night, under cover of fog or forest, or by the favour of any other accident of ground and weather. A study of the ways of savages and wild animals in stalking their foes or their prey is still very instructive. It is true that the antelope has no magazine rifle to repel the rush of the panther, but his vigilance and senses of sight, smell and hearing, which give warning of approaching danger, are so highly developed that the match between the attacking and the defending parties is not uneven. Cunning plans secretly and swiftly executed, surprise by a sudden impetuous rush of a swarm of men running or riding at top speed to close in hand-to-hand fight, such have ever been the chief weapons of successful offensive tactics since men and animals have made war on one another.

The military forces of the United States were organised in three classes of troops. A very small 'regular' army which at the outbreak of the war did not consist of more than twenty thousand men protected the frontiers and western territories against the Red Indians, and formed a nucleus for fresh levies in case of war. The enlisted soldiers of the regular regiments were well paid, and it was therefore possible to choose men

Organisa-
tion of the
American
Armies.

of fine physique for the service. The United States cadet school at West Point provided the best education of the sort then to be had anywhere, and the many distinguished leaders supplied by it to both the Federal and Confederate armies attested the excellence of its early training. The regular regiments all adhered to the Federal Government and greatly distinguished themselves in the war.

It was, however, on the volunteers that the Government relied to fill the ranks of its field army. The volunteers had no previous training and consisted of men from all classes of society and from every district and nationality to be found in the Northern States. They elected their own regimental officers as a rule, and in a surprisingly short time acquired the character of reliable troops. They were enlisted under very varying conditions of time; the first enrolment was for only three months, so little was the gravity of its task understood by the Federal Administration. Later the volunteers were enlisted for the duration of the war, but a proportion of men continued to be engaged for a hundred days as a temporary expedient from time to time. The plan of giving large bounties to men who re-enlisted induced every man to quit the army when his term expired in order to earn the bounty on re-enlisting; it was also the motive of much desertion. It took about one year before the first volunteer armies acquired sufficient solidity for campaigning, and two years before any formidable force of cavalry was formed under the Stars and Stripes.

Thirdly, there was the militia, which had never ceased to exist, but which had not taken part in war since the struggle with the British. The militia furnished the local defence of the Federal States, while the armies kept the field. It was employed in petty fighting on the frontier of the two Republics, in making and repelling raids, and in resisting the invasion of Pennsylvania by the Confederate army, when it rendered considerable service.

The Confederate armies were organised on the same pattern as their adversaries, except that they had no regular regiments. The volunteers, and particularly the cavalry, in the Southern States consisted of material which, generally

speaking, learnt the soldier's business quicker than the men of the North, most of whom came from an industrial population which lived in cities and followed indoor occupations. From the date when the war began to assume a serious aspect the South resorted to conscription to levy her volunteers, and as the want of men became more and more pressing the age of liability was repeatedly extended, till at last it practically embraced every able-bodied white male in the Confederate States, and was said by their enemies to 'rob both the cradle and the grave.' In the North conscription was established when the unexpected prolongation of the war and the sanguinary defeats in Virginia had effectually checked the enlistment of volunteers. The reasonable and equitable principle was adopted of calling on each State to supply its quota of soldiers in proportion to its population, just as it had the right to send representatives to Congress. Substitution on a large scale was permitted by money payment, and owing to the number of men obtained by voluntary enlistment the Government, without having recourse to anything like universal personal service, disposed of more soldiers than it could put into the field; but the right to require it was asserted and made good by Congress.

A similar organisation of the troops prevailed on both sides, which had been inherited from the British army of George III. The men were enrolled in regiments consisting of ten companies forming one battalion. When raised the regiments consisted of from six to eight hundred men, but their strength in the field soon fell to an average of from four to five hundred. A varying number of regiments constituted a brigade, and in the Federal service two or three brigades formed a division; the Confederate divisions usually consisted of four brigades. In each service the regiment formed the principal executive unit, and having regard to the dearth of officers qualified to lead troops, it was the smallest unit which could be relied on to act independently. The brigade, consisting generally of regiments from the same State, corresponded in size and importance with the regiment of Continental armies.

We have said that the general officers on each side were chosen from the men who had been educated at West Point, and who for the most part had served in the regular army ; any that remained after filling the high ranks were posted to the staff. As might be expected, both armies suffered throughout the war from lack of properly trained staff officers. *The organisation of the troops into handy units for executive command is of equal importance to the creation of an adequate staff.* It is impossible to get the best tactical results from troops unless their organisation into units and sub-units fits in with work in the field. Provided that there is maintained at least one man to the yard, the broader the front on which any particular unit deploys for the fight the more effective will be its fire, and the greater the hostile force kept at bay ; but the influence of a leader is limited to the width of front over which he can direct operations, and that space becomes narrower as the enemy's fire becomes more intense. It is comparatively easy to exert supervision from front to rear, to send orders and to watch over their execution, but directly the men form line the power of command is greatly restricted. In the same way it is easier to guide the direction of a column than a line ; one horse or man than two, two than eight, and so on.

In the heat of a fight it is extremely difficult to execute even simple manoeuvres with smoothness and certainty, and that difficulty has increased with the range of firearms. Two essential conditions are required : the first is that all military formations should be of the simplest and most practical character, and the second that the principal unit of command should be of a size and sort which admit of one man's absolute control in the field and in quarters, where he must become intimately acquainted with his men, so as to acquire the personal influence over them which is necessary to carry them through the dangers and confusion of a fight. In the American armies this unit was the regiment ; the armies of Europe have all followed the example of Prussia in making the company of two hundred men the corresponding unit, four of which form a battalion ; three or four battalions form a regiment.

The formations of the American troops were as simple as could be desired, for they had no time to learn the complicated antics dear to the martinets of old-fashioned armies, which, having outgrown their warlike character, expend their energies in outward adornment, pomp and show, while shunning all the hard practical work necessary to train troops to fight and march. The Federals were too fond of piling deep columns of attack one on another in a manner which exposed a very vulnerable target without giving a corresponding addition of energy to the advance. The Confederates from want of men generally made the mistake of attacking with too thin lines not sufficiently closely followed by reserves. Jackson and Hancock were probably the best infantry leaders in the two armies, but neither succeeded in originating any clever innovation in infantry tactics.

Langlois in his 'Study of Two Recent Wars,' which foreshadowed with remarkable accuracy the characteristics of the fierce struggle in Manchuria, laid down the rules by which alone great results can be obtained on the battlefield. The enemy must be attacked in the open and compelled to stretch his forces out along roads on the march. If he hugs fortifications which have been too elaborately constructed to offer a chance of successful attack, the strongholds must be invested. Once an army is invested its fate is merely a matter of time unless relieved. When attacking troops who have taken up a position in the open field, the weak part of that position, which for a certainty exists, must be found, and there the attack must be thrust home. Attacks must be made by troops in sufficient depth and the whole secret of success rests in the proper use of reserves.

Langlois cites the skilful handling of his command by Skobelev in the sanguinary assaults at Plevna in September 1877, where his young staff officer, the now famous Kouropatkin, first became distinguished, as an example of how infantry should be directed in attack. The Japanese have shown us how to exploit the military science of the West with the intelligence of their own subtle brains, and the devoted courage of a nation steeped to the lips in patriotism. Their achievements are a warning that war must not be

lightly undertaken, but once embarked upon must be prosecuted as if every man had staked his life on its successful issue.

Not the least remarkable feature of the Civil War was the rapidity with which the vast numbers of men enrolled in the new armies acquired the habits of military discipline in spite of many conditions which militated against them. The volunteers came from a people jealous to a fault of personal liberty and of the dignity of the individual. The officers whom they were required to obey had no professional training, and in many cases, of course, were found to be unfit for their authority. The campaigning was as severe in hardship and bloodshed as any recorded in history, but their talent for combination in work and politics, their quickness in recognising the essential conditions of their task, carried the Americans through the hard trial of temporarily sacrificing their freedom. Discipline was not established in a day. Periods of demoralisation there certainly were, but taken in the aggregate the records of both Federal and Confederate armies prove that the new conditions of warfare demand a system of discipline, of combined action that is, which rests not on fear of punishment, nor yet on mechanical custom, but on the intelligent appreciation by the rank and file of what is wanted of them, and on their willing co-operation derived from loyalty to their cause and confidence in their leaders. The startling successes of the badly equipped hosts of revolutionary France over the regular armies of Europe, had already shown how formidable an instrument in war the well-directed enthusiasm of a nation can be. The more independent rôle thrust on subordinate commanders and even on individual soldiers, particularly of the cavalry, by the development of firearms and by the consequent wide extension of armies in the field, has enormously increased the necessity for intelligent co-operation rather than for blind obedience.

In the history of the war there is nothing more striking than that the fairest prospects of the Confederate army were lost in the Gettysburg campaign by precisely the same

mistakes of principle and detail which Lee had recognised so promptly, and exploited so successfully, when committed by his adversary during the brief struggle in the forest round Chancellorsville.

Chancel-
lorsville
and
Gettys-
burg.

The enterprise undertaken by Hooker when he crossed the Rappahannock was light indeed compared with that imposed upon Lee when he invaded the North. The Federal general led nearly one hundred thousand infantry with four hundred guns to fight fifty thousand riflemen with one hundred and fifty guns. An equal preponderance in cavalry was assured to the Northerners. Hooker's communications were securely guarded ; an uninterrupted supply of men and stores was assured to him, and large armies were ready to profit by his first victory, to close on the defeated Southerners and consummate their ruin. Lee at Gettysburg on the contrary could only count on a superiority of forces in battle by skilful manœuvres ; in crossing the border he risked his communications, for he could not afford to detach troops enough to protect them. He could count on no reinforcements, and for supplies he had to seize the enemy's magazines. Consequently his only hope of victorious issue lay in daring and successful strategy.

The underlying fault in the conceptions of both generals was that both expected to win an offensive campaign by defensive fighting. This motive prompted them both to detach their cavalry rather than to combine its offensive action with the infantry, and to shrink from the rapid and decisive measures which always involve some hazards, but which alone reap great successes. With Jackson's inspiring counsel and able assistance Lee made Hooker pay dearly for every blunder and hesitation. The absence of his own cavalry in the Gettysburg campaign was certainly not intended by Lee, but it came about in no small degree from the absence of a clearly defined purpose to attack the Army of the Potomac as swiftly and violently as possible. Dread of the attacking rôle paralysed the best schemes of both Hooker and Lee, and threw away their most promising opportunities.

The more extensive the field of action becomes the more

difficult it is to approach the enemy's forces to reconnoitre ; and the greater the part played by individuals beyond the ken of the commanding general, the more intellectual will be the science of war for chiefs of every grade. Mistakes will have more fatal and far-reaching effects. It will be increasingly important and increasingly difficult to recognise the essential points, as apart from the points of a situation which may have to be neglected in taking decisive action. The Chinese plan of making war by mathematics, and choosing military mandarins for their academic performances, will as the art develops lead to consequences more and more disastrous. If war is a science it is also an art, and must be studied as such. It requires a combination of artist and scientist in its professor ; a hard head and a practical mind indeed, but the sympathetic touch of imagination must not be wanting. Every officer cannot hope to combine qualities so rare, but everyone who hopes to gain an insight into the game can study it from the right standpoint.

The year 1904 will be famous in history for the campaign in Manchuria, second only to the campaign of 1864 in the stubborn valour of the combatants. The absence of any considerable force of cavalry from either army deprives it of the interest which it would otherwise have had, by limiting the action of the adversaries to direct attacks without curtain to screen them, or manœuvring power to vary them. The most decisive successes not having been followed up by a cavalry pursuit have failed to knock out the defeated army for any considerable period. There has been no scope for remarkable feats of generalship, but only for remarkable valour and fighting power on both sides. It is a fascinating and not unprofitable pursuit to peer into the future in order to forecast the type of fighting on a great scale between armies as determined and as well commanded, but which are provided with every weapon of modern war, including a due proportion of cavalry.

A clear comprehension of military science and the best physical efforts of strong men are required in offensive warfare, but the moral qualities in the nation and army by which alone great peril can be faced, and great sacrifices made,

are not less essential. In the Russians the soldiers of Japan have found enemies of the most formidable character, but the triumph of the East over the West has been gained by precisely the same means as have for so many centuries secured the superiority of the European over the Asiatic. A standard of self-sacrifice in the manhood of the whole nation, and a code of chivalrous honour permeating the corps of officers and the class which furnishes it, superior alike to their opponent's ideal and practice, have achieved military and national triumph for the youngest of the great Powers of the world.

The intelligent discipline, which is above all things essential to offensive warfare to-day, depends almost entirely on simple-minded loyalty in the subordinate and simple-minded zeal for the public weal in the superior officer. When the latter is principally interested with intrigues for his own advancement or convenience, the former will never be fired with the intense devotion by which alone great victories have been won in the past, and by which alone they are capable of being won in the future. It is hard to remember these things in peace when no pressing danger threatens. Military business is hateful to the politician; it is gladly thrust aside to be controlled by a few specialists whose authority is sometimes out of all proportion to their capacity for wielding it. In sober truth there is no issue in politics which is of greater importance to the whole community, and of which every elector should try to attain at least a rudimentary knowledge, than the organisation and control of the military forces of the nation. The neglect to do so in a democratic state will sooner or later entail a heavy penalty.

The well-kept national cemeteries of America, and the countless rough crosses which mark the last resting place of many thousand men on the battlefields of Europe, should remind the people that international rivalry may at any moment assume the fiercest conditions.

When such a crisis overtakes a nation, its peasantry and working men must go forth to be slain and maimed by the thousand that the predominance of their race may be assured. The war of the future will not be a contest with conventional limits

but a duel to the death for imperial power, of which the War of Secession is a type. If when that hour comes the manhood of a nation is not to be spent in vain, and the tears and sufferings of those at home endured to no purpose, the possibility of war, and the preparations for it which are necessary in peace, must be faced while there is yet time.

On a grey day in November 1863, while the great issue still trembled in the balance, the cemetery which contained the mortal remains of the heroes of Gettysburg was dedicated in solemn fashion. President Lincoln came by train from Washington to the famous field of battle, and at the close of the funeral oration he was also called upon to speak. Drawing from his pocket a small piece of crumpled paper on which he had written some notes, he spoke as follows :

‘Fourscore and seven years ago our fathers brought forth upon this continent a new nation, conceived in liberty and dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equal. Now we are engaged in a great civil war, testing whether that nation, or any nation, so conceived and so dedicated can long endure. We are met on a great battlefield of that War. We are met to dedicate a portion of it as the final resting place of those who here gave their lives that that nation might live. It is altogether fitting and proper that we should do this. But in a larger sense we cannot dedicate, we cannot consecrate, we cannot hallow this ground. The brave men living or dead who struggled here have consecrated it far beyond our power to add or detract. The world will little note nor long remember what we say here, but it can never forget what they did here. It is for us, the living, rather to be dedicated here to the unfinished work that they have thus far so nobly carried on. It is rather for us here to be dedicated to the great task remaining before us, that from these honoured dead we take increased devotion to the cause for which they here gave the last full measure of devotion, that we here highly resolve that the dead shall not have died in vain, that the nation shall under God have a new birth of freedom, and that the government of the people, by the people, for the people, shall not perish from the earth.’

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
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THE WILDERNESS

Scale: — 1 1/2 miles to 1 inch

English Miles



Federal Trenches Blue.
Confederate " Red.

